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"Islamovedeniye," Makhachkala, 2015, No 4, pp. 6-17.
I. Fedorovskaya,
Senior research associate (IMEMO)
AZERBAIJAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
ZIGZAG IN RELATIONS
The development of relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union (EU) is of rather ambiguous character. These relations are based on the partnership agreement concluded in 1996 in Luxembourg and entered into force in 1999. In 2009, Azerbaijan was also included in the EU program "Eastern Partnership", the purpose of which was rapprochement with Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus without adopting them into the EU.
However, at the Vilnius summit in 2013, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev refused to sign the association agreement with the European Union and expressed his country's readiness to cooperate with the EU in the implementation of projects under the Eastern Partnership program. He said that the level of relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union requires a higher form of cooperation than the association. The term "association" is not entirely appropriate, since Azerbaijan is a self-sufficient country both politically and economically. Any integration process involves obtaining
additional preferences which are not visible within the framework of the association1.
Despite the fact that Azerbaijan and the EU constantly confirm their partnership, tension and mutual claims express their dissatisfaction with each other, and this has taken place throughout the history of their relations. Currently, there is a cooling period.
One of the top figures of the EU's neighborhood policy said that cooperation between Azerbaijan and the European Union was moving backwards rather than forwards. He expressed the hope that "we shall be able to identify several areas where it is possible to work together, and move forward together," but noted that the EU was concerned about the situation prevailing today2.
What has caused mutual dislike in the statements of Azerbaijani and European politicians lately? It was hardly the economic component of relations. The trade turnover of Azerbaijan with the EU amounts to more than six billion euros, and exports of the republic to the European Union reached five billion euros in 2014, or about 45 percent of the total export of Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan is an important, though not the largest, supplier of energy to Europe. Oil is the basis of energy export, and it reached 24.9 million tons in 2013, and 69 percent of it goes to EU countries. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has been built to transport oil to Europe bypassing Russia3.
The export volume of gas does not exceed five billion cubic meters, but there are plans to increase the supply of gas up to 10 billion cubic meters by 2019 from the "Shah Deniz 2" deposit. Azerbaijan is an important component of the project of Trans-Adriatic gas transportation route (TAP), bypassing Russia, and also of the "Nabucco" project. The European Union is aware of the strategic importance of Azerbaijan and
considers it as a serious and reliable partner, because Europe is interested in developing energy cooperation with it.
Azerbaijan considers that the dialogue between Baku and Brussels should be built on the basis of strategic partnership, which includes not only energy, but also other spheres. An agreement on simplification of the visa regime between Azerbaijan and the EU came into force in the autumn of 2014.
Azerbaijan aspires to the role of an independent and respectable state recognized both in the West and in the East. The European Union accepts Azerbaijan as a modern economic leader in the region and, potentially, the guarantor of stability in the South Caucasus. What is the cause of irritation in relations between Baku and Brussels?
Mutual discontent implies a whole range of reasons. Azerbaijan is dissatisfied with the vague position of the EU on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, considering that the EU demonstrates insufficient support for the territorial integrity of the republic.
As is well-known, the conflict arose in 1988 due to Armenian territorial claims against Azerbaijan. As a result, the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven surrounding districts (about 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory) were occupied by the Armenian armed forces. In May 1994, the parties agreed to respect the ceasefire. Since then unsuccessful peaceful negotiations have been conducted with the support of the OSCE Minsk Group chaired by Russia, France and the United States.
Azerbaijan accuses the EU of the absence of a clear position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue (that is, meeting the interests of Azerbaijan), and of its support of Armenia. Baku maintains that Europe is showing too much attention to the political situation in the country, imposing values which are alien to the mentality of the Azerbaijani people (for example, recognition of same-sex marriages), as well as accusing the authorities of violations of human rights and suppression of all dissent.
Suggesting the initiative of "European Neighborhood Policy" ten years ago, the European Union expected that the participating countries, including Azerbaijan, would gradually introduce the European standards, especially regarding the human rights. However, soon it became clear that the parties would disagree on the interpretation of serious problems. Azerbaijan believed that if a country was an important energy supplier and partner in the sphere of security, it could afford selective cooperation in certain economic and political issues, in accordance with its historical and socio-cultural features in the interpretation of the principles of democracy and respect of human rights. In this regard, Azerbaijan's state-run mass media constantly criticize the countries, which are the major "exporters" of Western values, namely, the United States and Germany.
Lately, there have emerged new grounds for mutual disagreement in the assessment of contemporary political processes. Baku fears the emergence of its own Maidan, so any independent activity in the political sphere is regarded as a threat to Azerbaijan's national security. According to European experts, Azerbaijan may enter into history as a country which "chaired the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and at the same time carried on an unprecedented campaign of reprisals against human rights defenders at home."4
Several months ago, the European Union adopted a resolution condemning political reprisals in Azerbaijan and called for the immediate release of political prisoners. This document was received in Baku nervously. Of course, any discussion of these issues is not included in the plans of President Aliyev during his visits to Europe. The Azerbaijani leadership denies the existence of political prisoners in the country, and the foreign-affairs adviser to President Aliyev has made a personal attack against the President of the European Parliament recommending the latter "to mind his own business."5
The EU understands that there is no effective way to influence Azerbaijan due to its cautious attitude to "Eastern Partnership" and the absence of ambitions in relation to European integration, on the one hand, and the EU interest in the energy resources of this Trans-Caucasian republic, on the other. For a time, Europe had to pretend not to notice the processes going on in that country. However, the EU runs out of patience with the accumulation of sharp criticism from human rights activists, who constantly accuse the EU institutions of a liberal attitude to the arbitrariness of the Azerbaijani authorities in exchange for Azerbaijani oil and other energy resources. Perhaps, a drop in energy prices and increasing political vulnerability of exporters of hydrocarbons will influence the tone of statements of European politicians.
Past experience suggests that the dynamics of interaction between the two parties within the framework of the existing format of relations between Azerbaijan and the EU, first, will be limited, and secondly, it will continue to be of an unstable character. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that political preconditions for greater mutual trust in resolving current regional and international issues, as well as creating new institutions for development, have not yet come into being, yet they could give additional impetus to the expansion of economic and trade exchanges.
References
http ://ru. oxu. az/politics/12292
http ://1 news.az/item_id=20150203095433 977&sec_id=2 http://www.meydan.tv/ru/site/politics/3436
http://www.panorama.am/ru/world/2014/11/25/azerbaijan-muizhniecs/ http://www.panorama.am/ru/politics/2014/12/05/azerbaijan-eu/
"Rossiya i novye gosudarstva Evrazii", Moscow, 2015, N1, pp. 98-102.
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