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2018.02.009. GRIGORY LUKYANOV. LIBYAN CRISIS: FIVE YEARS OF INSECURITY, DEGRADATION AND DISINTEGRATION // "Konfrontatsiya mezhdu Zapadom y Rossiey: S kem vi, strani Asii y Afriki?" - Moscow, 2016. - P. 51-64.
Keywords: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (GSPLAJ), crisis, degradation, disintegration, "Arab spring", M. Qaddafi, Africa, ISIS.
Grigory Lukyanov,
Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Higher School of Economics
Libyan crisis, the researcher writes, presents a spate of military-political conflicts lasting more than 5 years, differing in their form and nature, but representing a part of a single process of degradation and disintegration of Libyan society at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century.
In February, 2011 the wave of popular outrages which subsequently became history under the name "Arab spring," having swept wider population and brought down political regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, reached northeast provinces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (GSPLAJ). Within a week as limited on number and membership meetings of Libyan human rights defenders escalated into something more, having no parallels neither in Cairo or Alexandria, nor in Tunisia. In Benghazi in 2011 the armed revolt which became a fundamental principle of the collapse of not only the regime, but also all Libyan statehood in the form in which it existed more than 40 grew from the protest directed against a judicial arbitrariness in separately taken case.
Contrary to the widespread belief representing Libyan events as a part of the "Arab spring" and identifying them with the situation in Egypt and Tunisia it is necessary, the researcher emphasizes, to prove fundamental differences of the "Libyan spring" to determine not only roles of an "external factor," but also internal background. Long before the crisis of 2011 in Libyan society and the state there were formed contradictions
undermining bases of the political regime and turned institutions which earlier accomplished stabilizing functions, in a source of problems for further development of the system in whole.
The political regime created by M. Qaddafi combined elements of traditional political culture - that was necessary in the conditions of prevalence of tribal character of public relations -and differentially selected tools and institutions of the state of an era of art nouveau period. Oil resources of the country which provided economic boom and "Libyan social miracle" made a similar hybrid form of state effective for fulfillment of society's requirements during its transformation and inclusion in regional and world economy, in 1970-1980th years. Nevertheless, in the 1990th several destructive tendencies for Libyan state took place. First, it was an ideological delegitimization of the regime in the eyes of the Jamahiriya population. Foreign policy reorientation of GSPLAJ - instead of the Arab Middle East the main direction of its foreign policy became Africa - destroyed the myth about a special place of Libya in family of Arab peoples. Turning around Africa and opening borders for Africans, M. Qaddafi got an influx of "new blood" to Libyan society. Thereby the leader of revolution and political elite received an ideologically loyal layer and economically dependent population but appearance of African migrants triggered off interethnic and interracial contradictions in Libyan society.
Secondly, there is a loss by a political regime of the arbitrator status over the tribes which are the main social institute of Libyan society defining political and cultural identification of most Libyans. For the 1970-1980th the base of M. Qaddafi regime and all Jamahiriya was the triad of tribal unions of a warfalla, the magarha and a kaddafa. From among their representatives there was a formation of power structures on all hierarchical vertical that provided balance of interests and distribution of benefits and preferences between the most numerous tribal union of the coast, the largest tribe of the South and native tribe of the revolution Leader, relatively. In 1993 after exposure of attempt of a military
coup tribal union leaders of a warfallal tuned out to be under suspicion of its organization that led to repressions against them. Loss of preferences resulted in consecutive deterioration in living standards for representatives of the largest tribal association, loss of confidence to the regime in general and privileged tribes - in particular.
Thirdly, there is an escalation of elites' conflict. This tendency represented itself in a new perspective in recent years of the regime existence - after lifting of international sanctions and restrictions. Removal of external barriers gave opportunities for integration of GSPLAJ into regional and world economy, returned old (the Russian Federation, Italy, France, Great Britain) and attracted new (Turkey, the People's Republic of China) investors and partners, promoted growth of welfare of the highest political and economic elite of the country. The political system created by Qaddafi with the purpose to resist external influence was too conservative and almost not reformed. There was polarization of elite in top echelons of power. For the lack of legal mechanisms and procedures of devolution after beginning of physical inability of Qaddafi to execute functions of the leader in the country there should have come crisis of power and open a "window of opportunities" on system reforming.
Split of elite became the reason that outrages in Benghazi in February, 2011 escalated into the organized insurgent movement provided with organizational and material resources within the country and from abroad, and system of State agencies and security was paralyzed and disoriented. Within decades army of the Libyan Republic, and then of Jamahiriya existed in two forms: support of the regime and a source of infinite plots against it. By 2011 in the country there were no armed forces capable to constrain external threats adequately. Having enormous stocks of outdated, but efficient weapon Libyan army which lost discipline and unity was paralyzed by passivity of the Supreme command and a rigid vertical of attachment. While opponents of M. Qaddafi supporters and "old" Jamahiriya not without
external support managed to accumulate forces and resources, including military ones.
G. Lukyanov considers main stages of development of Libyan crisis. The first stage which began in February and ended in October, 2011 is called a civil war and can be characterized as a period of the interstate internationalized armed conflict in Libyan Jamahiriya to falling of which it led. Two military-political camps acted as participants of opposition - supporters and opponents of the political regime of M. Qaddafi respectively. During battle actions on the party of the regime opponents who united under the auspices of the Transitional National Council (TNC) in Benghazi in March, 2011 a number of the foreign states and international organizations acted that doesn't allow to consider the conflict purely internal. Completion of this stage happened after M. Qaddafi's death on October 20, 2011.
The second stage evolves a short chronological period from the second half of autumn of 2011 till summer of 2012 inclusively when insurgent groups which won at the previous stage with active foreign mediation started the preparation for the first general election designed to create temporary nation-wide representative body of the Supreme power — the General National Congress (GNC). The leadership of PNS which is formally recognized as foreign observers, but not being such in practice was debated by large associations (The Council of War in Tripoli), and separate local groups (tribes and revolutionary teams). Emergence of various platforms for negotiation process and coordination of positions of various actors groups (tribes, new political parties, armed groups, local authorities) in the course of elections preparation, nevertheless, didn't allowed them to avoid application of organized violence of armed groups. Armed conflict of low intensity continued up to the beginning of vote and didn't come to the end after its termination and coming down.
The third stage is the most long-term which began in summer of 2012 after start of work of GNC, it came to the end in spring of 2014. During its existence central authorities didn't stop
trying to establish control over all territory of the country that only lead to reverse results. Including, emergence of autonomous sentiments at the local level (Benghazi, Misurata), strengthening of centrifugal tendencies, increase in number of federalization supporters of the country and decentralization of a system of government. Splits in GNC made a process of adoption of political decisions in it long and difficult, and work in general - inefficient. The internal political conflict of jurisdiction caused by refusal of GNC Islamic fractions to recognize results of the Constitutional assembly work, elections results of deputies of a new - already constant - representative body, the House of Representatives, and to stop work of the Congress became the reason of this period ending. An attempt of military authorities of Libyan national army to deprive of Islamists of their main support in the person of militarized organizations and revolutionary teams by the means of military and police operation "Dignity" was unsuccessful and propelled the country into a new civil war.
Throughout the fourth stage which lasted since spring of 2014 to winter of 2015-2016 in Libya violent confrontations of supporters of two parliaments which refused cooperation and dialogue with each other continued. This refers to a new civil war. Renewed GNC in Tripoli and the House of Representatives in Tobruk posed themselves as autonomous centers of force each offering a way of further development of the country. At the same time resources of both governments - both material, and moral and political - were restricted that didn't allowed any of the parties to achieve a decisive preeminence in bilateral opposition. In this context the ability of Cabinet of Ministers in Tripoli and Tobruk to control own supporters turned out to be in ambiguo , real power appeared in hands at warlords and military leaders, tribal and ethnic leaders.
The sixth stage originating in December, 2015 and proceeding up to present time in many respects represents aspiration of a number of political forces, mainly outside Libya, to keep territorial integrity and political subjectivity of Libyan state
contrary to all destructive tendencies. Formation under the aegis and protection of the UN, European and Arab states of national unity government of Libya in December, 2015 - January, 2016 on the territory of the neighboring Tunisia represents nothing but an attempt of external forces to moderate Libyan crisis and not to allow distribution of its influence in Maghreb and the Mediterranean. The conflict passes into the new stage of development which showed full inability of various political camps in Libya to find a way to political settling of developed contradictions.
The author of the article analyzes key features and elements of disintegration process. Defeat of supporters of Jamahiriya in the military conflict of 2011 which is also called the Civil war in Libya marked crash of GSPLAJ as a political system and model of Libyan statehood. But death of Jamahiriya didn't lead to the end of its political elite, her considerable part also created new structures of power. Despite the lack of experience of party construction and parliamentarism in modern conditions, the political pluralism became natural heritage of Jamahiriya and Civil war. In summer of 2012 first time for many years general elections of deputies of the General National Congress (GNC), temporary representative body of power in the country took place. The liberal law on political parties providing a facilitated procedure of registration allowed, to create in the country dozens of parties and associations for participation in electoral process as soon as possible since the end of 2011 till spring 2012. The ideological range of organized political forces was rather wide, but reflected in many respects programs of associations of Libyan opposition abroad and also large foreign parties popular in all Arab world.
According to changes in the initial law on elections in GNC not representatives of parties, but independent candidates were to occupy a bulk of seats (120 of 200). In many respects for this reason in spite of the fact that with a certain overweight the victory among parties was won by secular association - "Alliance of national forces," outran "Party of Justice and reconstruction" - in
interim parliament there were many supporters of Islamization of the country. So-called Libyan Islamists had no unity and were presented by a galaxy of political parties and associations which were built around symbolic figures and groups at financial support of external sponsors of neighboring countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan), Turkey and the states of Arabian Peninsula (KSA, the UAE, Qatar). The conflict between supporters of a secular way of development and those who spoke in support of Islamization need of society and the state, couldn't be resolved at rearrangement of structures of TNC before elections of 2012, within newly elected GNC. Any of political forces had no due overweight and support in society, in Libya there is no tradition of trust to these institutions.
At the end of 2013 and first quarter of 2014 conflicts undermining the General national congress from within reached the height. In the spring 2014 government's authority of Ali Zeidan trying to meet too many contradictory requirements of various forces within the country and beyond its boarders failed downright. Forced measures of the Minister of Defence Abdullah al-Thani who has released Zeidan from duty of prime minister, aimed at stimulation of Constitutional assembly work, establishing order in GNC and preparation of new elections met organized repulse of supporters' coalition of Islamic organizations. Militarized groups of pro-Islamic associations "Dawn of Libya" and "Board of Libya" not only offered rebuff to government troops of General Khalifa Haftar, but also occupied the country's capital - Tripoli.
Against the backdrop of internal conflicts in Libya there was a new external force possessing far-reaching plans of further fate of all North African region in general. Having appeared at the end of 2014 near Dern town the cell of "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) soon declared about creation in Libya of three provinces of the Caliphate and by the end of 2015 established control over several settlements, including Sirt. From local and few group a Libyan branch of ISIL for only a few weeks turned into a serious military-political force with which the applicants for power
in Libya and interested in the crisis pacification by governments of foreign states should regard. At the same time, in G. Lukyanov's opinion, it isn't necessary to exaggerate value of a factor of ISIL and its influence on internal political situation in Libya in general. This organization with its ideology and structure continues to remain predominately unfamiliar for Libyan society, it can't be built in tribal structure and use it for itself to the benefit as it was made in Iraq and Syria. For this reason the territory under its control is small and limited to the areas ruined by war and left by population. For a year and a half the main efforts of troops of LNA and "Dawn of Libya" were mainly directed not against ISIL, and against each other. At the same time, in the first quarter of 2016 attempts to consolidate political forces of the country under the auspices of national unity government were based on designing of an image of a general enemy as ISIL was positioned.
In the medium term the Libyan crisis is still far from solution, and the fate of a single Libyan state is also foggy. The concept of a single centralized unitary state lost the legitimacy in eyes of a considerable part of the population and its representatives: centrifugal tendencies still gain momentum against the background of the continuing destruction of economic infrastructure, degradation of public institutions and total inefficiency of institutions of state. Federalization, or broad decentralization, seems to be the only means to hold together turning into self-sufficient bulwarks of conflicting tribes and military-political groups of the city and settlements. Fragmentation amplifying at all levels and atomization of society does well to the most radical political groups which earlier didn't have so favorable conditions for penetration into it and serves as the favorable environment for further disintegration of once single socio-political space of the Libyan state, - the researcher comes to such conclusion.
Author of the abstract - Valentina Schensnovich
