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8lamic world, and on the other hand, facing potential confrontation with the US and the North Atlantic Alliance.
The factor of the Kurds living in Iraq, with their separatist and independent tendencies, was also significant. This posed a potential threat to Turkey's territorial integrity and internal security in the future. If the Kurds in Iraq were to achieve independence, it would only be a matter of time before the same aspirations arose among the Kurds in Turkey. Hence, the Kurdish factor became a sword of Damocles hanging over Turkey's head. To be fair, the US continued to use the Kurdish factor against Turkey, which we consider as a contemporary variation of the Eastern Question.
The US attempted to leverage Turkey's NATO membership and open a second front against Iraq on Turkish territory. However, Turkey pursued a skillful policy, and both sides made higher demands on each other than originally planned. The US sought a significant military presence in Turkey to keep tension on Iraq's northern front, and Turkey made substantial financial demands, amounting to up to 92 billion US dollars [2].
Thus, it became clear to the U.S. that although Turkey was part of the North Atlantic Alliance and had a close relationship with the US, it was still attempting to pursue a more independent policy in all fields. Turkey's favorable geographical location and resources could give the US an advantage if there was an opportunity to exploit them, but this opportunity did not seem forthcoming. Consequently, the US started creating certain external problems for Turkey, including lobbying for Turkey's desire to join the EU.
It is essential to emphasize that Turkey expressed its desire to join the EU as early as the 1960s and officially applied for EU membership in 1987. However, this desire of Turkey has almost always faced lobbying efforts from both the US and the EU. Turkey's inclusion in the ranks of EU member states is neither in the interests of the US nor the EU, leading them to lobby for respect for human rights, democratic standards, domestic reforms, press freedom, and actions against activists. However, the most critical factors are Turkey's geopolitical realities, including its role in the Middle East region and its tense relations with neighboring states.
Therefore, a potential alternative for Turkey in such a case is to be a catalyst-mediating state in various processes and promote its interests when necessary. It should be noted that Turkey reacted rather firmly to this lobbying and even made efforts in 2009 to create the Organization of Turkic States [3], demonstrating the ability to unite Turkic-speaking peoples when necessary and to have its own, albeit less influential, organization.
These cases served as a trigger for the US, indicating that Turkey could pose significant
problems in the future. Turkey appeared unwilling to content itself with its status as a US representative in the region, aspiring to become a separate center of power, possibly even opposing the United States. It was evident to the U.S. that Turkey's political, diplomatic, and military influence would grow in the future, and preventing this growth would become increasingly challenging due to Turkey's diplomatic flexibility and periodic engagements with Russia.
During this intricate and multifaceted period, the so-called Arab Spring emerged. The Arab Spring was characterized by the belief that revolutions would spread across the region through the domino effect, but the actual wave primarily reached states where the U.S. had particular interests. It is not coincidental that China also incurred significant losses during the Arab Spring, instigated by its economic expansion.
As a result, U.S.-Turkey relations are expected to take on new dimensions in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, encompassing both military and diplomatic fronts. Bilateral relations, especially from this point forward, have consistently been complex and diverse, with the closest interactions between the 'allies' notably occurring in Syria.
Islamic extremist groups became active in Syria in 2014, notably the 'Islamic State,' which declared the establishment of a 'caliphate' spanning territories in Syria and Iraq. The fight against terrorism became a primary focus of the USA's regional policy, leading to the announcement of a 'comprehensive and sustainable counter-terrorism strategy' in 2014. The aim was to weaken and eliminate the Islamic State.
In the Syrian conflict, the battle against terrorism became a major point of contention between the US and Turkey. The conflict of interests became apparent in September 2014 after the U.S. administration initiated the establishment of an international coalition to counter the terrorist activities of the Islamic State [5]. It was clear that Turkey was not inclined to become a member of such a coalition, as it would involve allowing the US and its allies to use vital military facilities on its territory, particularly the Incirlik air base. For Turkey, the issue of creating a 'security zone' on Syrian territory remained unresolved, with a primary focus on strengthening its influence in the northern regions where Kurdish armed formations were concentrated.
The Turkish government did not share the US view on the need to support the Syrian Kurds. However, Ankara's stance on the Islamic State changed after the terrorist attacks in southern Turkey in the summer of 2015, which were attributed to this organization. The issue of national
security returned to the agenda, leading to airstrikes on PKK positions in northern Iraq following the attacks. Since the failed peace talks with the PKK in 2013, the Turkish government found itself fighting on two fronts: against the Kurdistan Workers' Party and its affiliates, the People's Self-Defense Forces, and the Islamic State. This inevitably complicated Turkish-American relations.
The Turkish government agreed to allow the US and the anti-ISIL coalition access to Incirlik Air Base to deploy personnel and drones [6]. However, US actions have once again introduced friction into Turkish-American relations. In October 2015, the Obama administration supported the creation of a coalition of armed opposition in northern Syria - the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which included the People's Self-Defense Forces, as well as various Arab groups. Turkey categorically refused to cooperate with the Democratic Self-Defense Forces [11]. Despite this, the US continued to use Incirlik Air Base and other strategic military facilities in Turkey.
After the attempted Turkish military coup on the night of July 15-16, 2016, the level of cooperation between Ankara and Washington decreased. Notably, the Turkish government accuses the Hizmet movement and its leader Fethullah Gulen of using their influence in the army and attempting to overthrow the government. Since 2013, a rift has emerged between Gulen and Erdogan. Erdogan closed Hizmet's educational institutions. The prosecutor's office launched an anti-corruption investigation against several officials, and Erdogan blamed Hizmet for its idea of a 'parallel state' during the corruption scandal. However, the 'Big Bribery' case collapsed, and all those responsible were released. After a failed military coup attempt in 2016, Erdogan blamed Gulen. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on US President Barack Obama to extradite the Islamic opposition figure Fethullah Gulen, whom Ankara accuses of organizing a military coup attempt in the country, to Turkey [18].
After successfully foiling the attempted military coup, the Turkish leader promised to severely punish its organizers; regardless of the structures they represent [17]. During the opening of the extraordinary session of the parliament, its chairman Ismail Kahraman emphasized that all participants in the coup attempt in Turkey 'will be brought to justice as soon as possible' [14]. Prime Minister Yildirim said regarding the United States that the country cannot be Turkey's friend as long as it harbors coup organizer Gulen [15].
These cases also document the tensions and the United States' search for an alternative candidate for Turkey's leadership. The Turkish government's
decision to temporarily stop using Incirlik Air Base came as a surprise to the United States. Along with deteriorating relations with the US, the Turkish government is becoming more active on the Syrian front. On August 24, 2016, with the support of the Free Syrian Army, Turkey launched a large-scale military operation, 'Euphrates Shield,' in Syria against the 'Islamic State' as well as against 'Syrian Kurdish terrorist groups.' On the same day, U.S. Vice President J. Biden said in Ankara that the U.S. supports the actions of the Turkish leadership [1]. The Turkish Armed Forces received assistance from the U.S. exclusively to fight ISIS. The parties agreed that Syrian Kurds should not cross the Euphrates. 'If they do not fulfill this condition, they will not be able to receive U.S. support,' Biden said [4]. Operation Euphrates Shield allowed Ankara to accomplish the minimum objective, i.e., Turkey established control over a border area about 100 km long and up to 50 km deep (over the towns of Jarabulus and Azaz).
In the context of the Syrian conflict, the same Kurdish issue, which found support in American circles but faced sharp condemnation from the Turkish side, began to develop with renewed vigor. The US also supported the Kurds by supplying ammunition to fight IS, [9] posing a threat of direct conflict for Turkey due to its multi-million Kurdish population and their separatist aspirations. It cannot be ruled out that this is also due to R. T. Erdogan's son, businessman Bilal Erdogan. Bilal's connection to the "Islamic State" began to circulate in the Russian press. In particular, it was mentioned that Bilal was buying oil from ISIS on the black market, and Russia strongly condemned this. Although Bilal later denied his ties to the terrorist organization, his connection to ISIS is no secret, even to Turks [13]. Although the US has tried to avoid expressing a position on this issue, the question arises: What kind of cooperation or alliance are we talking about if the United States is fighting the Islamic State in Syria, and the son of the Turkish president is doing business with the aforementioned terrorist organization?
Thus, with this fact, the Kurdish factor of the United States gets a new motive and shades to counter Turkey. Historical contradictions between the US and Turkey in the Syrian conflict clearly show that Turkey tries by all possible means to pursue a policy independent from the US and makes concessions only in deep crises. Meanwhile, the US, realizing the importance of Turkey and the simultaneous danger it poses, often tries to provoke internal turmoil in Turkey by skillfully using the Kurdish factor.
The above-mentioned is one of the main deterrents for Turkey because arming multi-million
Kurds to fight against IS (it is not excluded that these weapons and ammunition will be used against Turkey itself because of the separatist tendencies of the Kurds) and securing the political support of the US create a slow-action bomb on the territory of Turkey, which can explode at the most favorable moment for the US.
Turkey must pursue a restrained and rational policy with the U.S., considering the Kurdish factor, because, although Turkey has the resources to achieve its aims, they do not even come close to U.S. capabilities.
In the context of escalating relations, we also highlight the recent presidential election in Turkey. The outcome of the 2023 election will clarify whether Recep Tayyip Erdogan will continue his nearly 20-year political hegemony with maximalist policies that are not in the interests of the US or whether his era is coming to an end.
The election was an unprecedented process with a runoff between two candidates: the ruling wing's representative, R.T. Erdogan, and the single opposition candidate, K. Kilicdaroglu. While Erdogan was eventually re-elected, some analysts attribute U.S. attempts to influence the presidential election [16]. There is speculation that K. Kilicdaroglu may have received US funding, suggesting a potential pro-American policy if elected. However, Erdogan retained power.
There is a possibility that compromises were reached between the United States and Erdogan on certain issues, allowing him to stay in power. This, however, does not dismiss the potential for future U.S. support for K. Kilicdaroglu as a political figure. Even if compromises were made, the US may aim to neutralize Erdogan in the political field and support a candidate who will pursue a more restrained and favorable policy for the United States.
A general picture emerges from the observations: Relations between the United States and Turkey have varied across different historical periods, displaying volatility rather than stability. Developments and contradictions have become particularly noticeable within government circles since Erdogan's tenure began, leading Turkey down a path of Islamic domination, a departure from the secular stance established by Ataturk. This has caused a conflict of interest, as Islamic extremism is considered the main enemy of the US, while Erdogan aims not only to be a link between the West and the East but also to be a leader of Islam, especially among the Turkic-speaking nations. Erdogan's Turkey is markedly different state, refusing to be a mere enforcer of US political goals in the Middle East or a representative in the South Caucasus region. It is powerful and, so far,
relatively independent country from the US, creating problems for many major geopolitical players by pursuing a rational and pragmatic policy. In the current geopolitical maelstrom, an opportunity has arisen for Turkey to further strengthen its position in the South Caucasus and become a vital player in the Middle East. This scenario is particularly not favorable to the US, as Turkey, under Erdogan, is likely to create obstacles for the US in various situations. Therefore, the US should adopt a pragmatic, rational, and somewhat restrained policy, using precise mechanisms with its ally. Erdogan's Turkey has become a state on the geopolitical board, which aims and interests cannot be ignored. Although the US is a superpower with many deterrents against Turkey and its policies, they are short-lived. The US should pursue a vigilant policy towards a state and a nation that, at various stages of historical development, has emerged victoriously from seemingly hopeless situations, constantly strengthening its position, and creating trouble for its adversaries and, if necessary, for its allies themselves.
List of literature and sources
1. ABD Baskan Yardimcisi Joe Biden ve Erdogan'dan onemli agiklamalar, URL: https://u.to/aVMKIA (link is shortened)
2. Iraq: Turkey, the Deployment of U.S. Forces, and Related Issues, URL: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL3179 4.html
3. Organization of Turkic States, URL: https://u.to/SiUgIA (link is shortened)
4. Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden and Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim at a Press Availability, URL: https://u.to/b1MKIA (link is shortened)
5. Transcript: President Obama's Speech on Combating ISIS and Terrorism, URL: https://u.to/GlMKIA (link is shortened)
6. Turkey approves U.S.-led coalition's use of air bases against Islamic State, URL: https://u.to/LFMKIA (link is shortened)
7. 7 октября 2001 года США начали военную операцию в Афганистане, URL: https://u.to/0yQgIA (link is shortened)
8. 11 сентября 2001 года. Что произошло, кто погиб и какие были последствия, URL: https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-58330861
9. Зачем США вооружают сирийских курдов?, URL: https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-39876270
10. Ирак спустя 20 лет после вторжения США: большинство иракцев считают, что при Саддаме Хусейне в стране жилось лучше, URL: https://u.to/XxgGIA (link is shortened)
11. К чему приведет создание курдской автономии в Сирии? , URL: https://u.to/RlMKIA (link is shortened)
12. Лидер РПК: партия изначально не верила в перемирие с Турцией, https://ria.ru/20160513/1432412136.html
13. Нефть и дружба с ИГИЛ: секреты семьи Реджепа Эрдогана, URL: https://www.vesti.ru/article/1759577
14. Подавление попытки военного переворота в Турции завершено, ситуация нормализуется, URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3461565
15. Турецкий премьер пригрозил пересмотром отношений с США, URL: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/18/07/2016/578cc4c3 9a7947fee5812a80
16. Эксперты отметили попытки США влиять на выборы в Турции, URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-
panorama/17741517/amp
17. Эрдоган пообещал наказать причастных к попытке переворота в Турции, URL: https://u.to/VFMKIA (link is shortened)
18. Эрдоган потребовал у Обамы выдать Турции оппозиционера Гюлена, URL: https://ria.ru/20160716/1467870707.html
Сдана /^шййй^Щ f 28.11.2023 Рецензирована / 0-рш^пиф1 f 02.12.2023 Принята /^[щтЩЩ f 15.12.2023
