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Original article
DOI: 10.31696/2227-5568-2021-02-064-089
THE OUTLOOK ON THE TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM DIFFERENT PARADIGMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Dmitry Grafova
a - IOS RAS, Moscow, Russia
a- graftvc@mail.ru, ORCID: 00 00-00 02-7334-5398
Abstract: The article is attempt to evaluate the foreign policy of Turkey from the key paradigms of international relations: liberalism, constructivism, realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism. Turkish military power actively involved in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, the South Caucasus with the intention to alter the existing power distribution. This may be considered as signs of the offensive realism strategy. Offensive realism asserts that states willing to use force to advance their own interests, and the survival in the international system requires to maximize power. Defensive neorealism holds that aggressive expansion collides with the interests of other states and their desire to ensure their own security in the first place. According to the balance of power theory, the expansion and maximization of power reduces the security of an offensive state by countering a coalition of balancing states. But in the case of Turkey, there are no signs of emerging a counterbalance coalition, and this is «know-how» of Erdogan's policy. From the liberal perspective, also, there are no signs of countering of the internal and external liberal determinants (Turkish civil society, NATO's policy, affairs with liberal allies) of Turkey's foreign policy. The deadlock of joining Turkey to the EU and abolition of Ataturk's secular and republican guidelines are signs of failure of liberal approach to Erdogan's foreign policy. Turkey's offensive policy, ignited nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire, means the inability of international institutional cooperation to overcome anarchy and power maximizing instinct.
From the constructivist perspective, the social structure affects the decision-making process. And this is confirmed in Turkey. Expansionism and resentment of historical injustice towards Turkey are necessary to strengthen Erdogan's power and legitimize it. Constructivist approach may explain the meaning Turkish, Turkic and Neo-Ottoman identities. Identities and interests mutually constitute and effect foreign-policy behavior. And Erdogan shapes identities in the state and beyond on the basis of the interests of the of the power.
Neoclassical realism approach may be useful in the analysis of Turkish foreign policy too. It underlines importance of a state's domestic arrangements, particularly decisionmakers' perceptions. And, of course, Erdogan's perception is crucial for foreign policy. Perceptions usually tend to follow the actual distribution of power, but in the case of Erdogan's aggressive policy, there is a risk of misjudgment, when long-term trends are hidden behind short-term perceptions. The main emphasis of article is on attempts to determine Erdogan's strategy and examine it from the standpoint of offensive (realism) / defensive (neoralism) approach of international relations, and evaluate its effectiveness. Erdogan has created a multipolar balancing structure of foreign relations, in which Turkish rivals restrain each other. This structure is similar to a pentahedron with Turkey in the center and its main rivals-partners on the tops. Erdogan, shifting closer to one top or another one, can effectively bargain using threats with other rivals.
Keywords: Turkey, foreign policy, liberalism, constructivism, realism, offensive, defensive, neorealism, neoclassical realism
© Dmitry Grafov
ПОЛИТИКА
Научная статья
ОЦЕНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ ТУРЦИИ В ПЕРСПЕКТИВЕ РАЗЛИЧНЫХ ПАРАДИГМ ТЕОРИИ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ
Дмитрий Борисович Графова
а - Институт востоковедения РАН, Москва, Россия а- graftvc@mail.ru, ОРСЮ: 00 00-0 0 02-7334-5398
Аннотация: В статье делается попытка проанализировать внешнюю политику Турции с точки зрения различных подходов международных отношений: либерализма, конструктивизма, реализма, неореализма и неоклассического реализма. Президент Турции Р.Т. Эрдоган прибегает к военным средствам на для изменения баланса сил в Сирии, Ираке, Ливии, Восточном Средиземноморье, на Южном Кавказе, пытаясь вернуть под свой контроль отдельные территории, принадлежавшие Турции до Первой мировой войны. Такая политика президента Эрдогана может рассматриваться, как проявление стратегии наступательного реализма, которая предполагает максимизацию силы для гарантирования безопасности, продвижения национальных интересов и лишения такой возможности конкурентов. С точки зрения оборонительного подхода в неореализме, ставка на силу Турции не должна остаться без ответа сразу нескольких государств, ощущающих угрозу своим интересам. Но в случае Турции нет признаков появления балансирующей коалиции. Автор анализирует это ноу-хау внешней политики президента Р.Т.Эрдогана.
С точки зрения либерального подхода в международных отношениях, и внутренние, и внешние либеральные детерминанты (гражданское общество, демократические институты, встро-енность в НАТО, либеральные союзники) должны удерживать Турцию от использования силы, но этого не происходит. Тупик в отношениях с ЕС, отказ от секулярных и республиканских принципов Ататюрка, неспособность международных институтов купировать инстинкт максимизации силы говорят о бесперспективности либерального подхода к анализу политики Эрдогана. Конструктивистский подход исходит из влияния внутренней структуры общества на процесс принятия решений. И это наблюдается в Турции. Экспансионистский курс руководства вызывает ностальгию по величию Османской империи, желание взять реванш за унижение в Первой мировой войне. Обещая отплатить за обиды, нанесенные Турции, президент Эрдоган обосновывает укрепление своей власти и её легитимность. Конструктивистский подход может объяснить попытки Анкары сформировать тюркскую, турецкую и неоосманскую идентичности, используя внешнюю политику, и оперевшись на эти идентичности, действовать с позиций наступательного реализма.
Анализ с позиции неоклассического реализма исходит из важности внутригосударственных механизмов и восприятия принимающих решения. Особенность восприятия Р.Т. Эрдога-ном места Турции и современной геополитической ситуации может объяснять его желание изменить соотношение сил в регионе агрессивным образом, особенно учитывая возможность ошибочного восприятия краткосрочных отклонений в качестве долгосрочных трендов. Основной акцент статьи делается на: а) вычленении стратегии Р.Т. Эрдогана на основе его политики в отношении ключевых акторов, которую можно назвать «торгом под угрозой»; б) оценке эффективности этой стратегии с точки зрения наступательного (реализм) и оборонительного (неореализм) подходов международных отношений. Автор приходит к выводу, что Эрдогану удалось выстроить мультиполярную балансирующую структуру международных отношений, в которой противники Турции сдерживают друг друга. Эту структуру можно сравнить с пентаэдром, в котором Турция располагается в центре, а главные конкуренты-партнеры представляют вершины. Сдвигаясь ближе то к одной, то к другой вершине, Эрдоган
может успешно торговаться и шантажировать в балансирующих треугольниках, угрожая или потакая интересам ключевых акторов.
Ключевые слова: Турция, международные отношения, либерализм, конструктивизм, реализм, наступательный, оборонительный, неореализм, неоклассический реализм
Liberal perspective
Traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential that stabilises and legitimises the global order1. While still Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan was following the way of global reform and European integration. He took the power by democratic way, but then restrict democratic order. Emerging middle powers demonstrate much regional influence and self-association, they seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region, but they do not pretend to power distribution or redistribution.
After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Erdogan made attempts to revise foreign policy towards Arab region and the Islamic world. In 2010, he supported «Gaza Freedom Flotilla» Operation. Israeli troops boarded the ships, and nine activists were killed by Israeli troops. Relations between Israel and Turkey were strained, but Israel subsequently eased its blockade of the Gaza Strip. Turkey's foreign policy has seen many changes since former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took President office in 2014.
Erdogan's evolution took place gradually from the flirting with political Islam ideas to the rising tide of national populism. Since Gezi Protests in 2013 the Erdogan's regime creates its populist disguise on the base of ideas of neo-Ottomanism. Turkish President uses collective nostalgia, referring to the good old glory days of the Ottoman Empire, exploiting resentment of the broad population, promising to create a new «Great Turkey» but, in fact establishes his own regime of neo-Sultanism2. The turning point of Erdogan's semi-authoritarian rule was the widespread repression after the suppression of a military coup in 2016. Hundreds of military officers, judges, officials, politicians, journalists were imprisoned on charges of ties with the plotters. Erdogan, pushing for constitutional amendments, changed the system of government from a parliamentary semi-democratic to a presidential semi-authoritarian one in 2017-18. The failed coup attempt against Erdogan's rule has become a the turning point in Turkey's foreign policy too3.
Liberal international relations theory holds three interrelated principles. Rejection of power politics till it is possible. The gaining mutual benefits of international cooperation. The using international organizations and nongovernmental actors for shaping state preferences and policy choices. The states are seeking more cooperation and less conflict, they resolve disputes in a non-violent way using International institutions, such as the United Nations. A States, embedded in domestic civil society and international democratic system that decisively constrain aggressive actions, interested in international trade because
when countries economies are interconnected through trade they are less likely to go to war with each other4.
Turkey, staying a critical NATO member and desperate candidate for membership in the European Union, has refashioned itself as a revisionist power challenging its regional neighbors and also treaty allies like United States, Greece and France. Erdogan has taken steps that have put it openly at odds with Washington and the rest of the alliance — including acquisition Russian S- 400 air defense system, threaten of drilling inside the Greek continental shelf5. Turkey occupated Idlib, Afrin and the surrounding area in Syria's Aleppo Governorate, fighting U.S.-allied Kurdish fighters. Erdogan undermines U.S. policy on Iran, helping Iran evade American sanctions. Turkish President is establishing a military presence in the Red Sea, heightening tensions between Egypt and Turkey as well as Egypt and Sudan. Turkey escalates violating Greek airspace, threatening the stability of the Aegean Sea.
All this is a clear sign that Turkey does not adhere to the Westernist and status quo-oriented foreign policy. And the recognition of the US policy as American hegemony does not match the liberal theory of international relations. On the contrary, Erdogan uses the liberal theory as a cover for Turkish policy in Syria. He justified involvement in Syrian civil war by defending civil liberties, humanitarian intentions, protecting Syrian refugees, Sunnis, Turkomans and other various oppressed identities.
The approach of neoliberalism admit that democracies do in fact fight wars. However, democracies do not fight wars with other democracies because of liberal values, principals and economical dependence. Therefore, democratic states are more likely to resolve issues diplomatically. Furthermore, citizens in democracies are less likely to think of citizens in other democracies as enemies6. This theory is difficult to apply to the Turkish foreign policy. It isn't a policy of democratic and liberal state.
Constructivist perspective
The term constructivism makes the stress the socially constructed character of international relations. The constructivists claim that international normative structures matter in world politics7. Any policy has roots, trunk and leaves. The roots and leaves of Turkish foreign policy are well matched with constructivism because international relations are not only affected by power politics but also by ideas shared by those who describe themselves as constructivist. Erdogan is an active constructivist. Moreover there are state-based foreign policy elites that adhere an ideas of New Great Turkey that Erdogan exploits, and that impacts upon foreign policy construction. Constructivist analyses focus on «broader social structural context»8. There are a lot of Turks that agree to support idea of Turkey's rising, they support Erdogan, share resentment of unjust place of modern Turkey, determined by powerful states during XX century.
The next key element of policy construction is identities. The formation of a Ottoman national identity, overarching ethnic, linguistic and religious identities, was a core of Ottomanism in the nineteenth-century. Neo-Ottomanism was emerging as a key framework of Ahmed Davutoglu's strategic thinking*, it is supplemented by liberal elements, such as soft power, conflict resolution and promotion of «win-win» solutions9. Follofing this view, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country, can simultaneously exercise influence in all these regions, using common identity and thus claim a regional superpower role. Identities exert on security policies and related behaviors. Identities are necessary in order to ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order10. The concept of soft power is usually considered as a foreign policy tool in the liberal paradigm. But in Turkey's foreign policy strategy, «soft power» is used to create a Turkish identity in «strategic depth» and can be recognized as a reliable tool from constructivist perspective. There is wrong to interpret the turn of Turkish foreign policy as in the direction of Islamism, or Pan Turkism. «Pan Turkism» or «Islamism» are used mainly as for legitimizing foreign-policy preferences and for strengthening a Turkish identity.
Turkey's approach to the West has evolved from the idea that membership in Western Institutions, most notably the European Union, is a must for rising and strengthening to an other idea that the identity politics is more significant11. Another basic statement of constructivists is that international organizations participate in the processes of social construction of actor's ideas about its own interests. This influence can be considered negligible or insignificant in the case of Turkey. The constructivism of Erdogan's foreign policy pursues only one goal — to strengthen and legitimize his own power.
The constructivism approach helps to explain the reasons of the Turkish identity-based foreign policy and the ways of its representation. But it says nothing about how to successfully realize this policy on the international stage. Any policy should have a trunk (shaft), not only the a roots and leaves, in order to succeed, overcoming the resistance of other actors. The «power politics» is still a necessary leverage, despite the fact that it is socially constructed. The point of intersection of constructivist and realistic perspectives is Davutoglu's concept of «strategic depth», used to denote Turkey's geographical and historical relations in the Middle East, which, as the name implies, place military and strategic power at the forefront12.
Realism and Neorealism perspectives
At first glance, Erdogan acts like a follower realism theory with offensive approach. The Turkey's policy demonstrates competition, ambitions and readiness to escalate conflicts. He poses Turkey as power maximizing, fearless state, willing to
* Former diplomat who served as the 26th Prime Minister of Turkey and Leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from 2014 to 2016. He previously served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2014 and chief advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan from 2003 to 2009.
be successor of Ottoman Empire. We first saw the offensive behaviour of Turkey in the Syria. Erdogan did not tolerate Russia's involvement in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar al-Assad. He acted in a mirror image. He supported the opposite side. He stated that the Syrian Turkmens and other Sunnis are under the protection of Turkey and then occupied the North Syria. As Russia helps the Assad regime, Erdogan supplies military equipment to Assad's opposition and builds networks of strongholds with Turkish infantry on the occupied territory.
At the beginning of the civil conflict, it was believed that Turkey was going to promote regime change in Damascus, as well as provide Turkey with a place at the negotiating table on the future of Syria. But then, it becomes obvious that Erdogan was interested in establishing control over the territories inhabited by friendly Turkomans, as well as clearing Northern Syria of Kurds that Turks treated as terrorists. All that makes possible to consider Turkey's foreign policy from the offensive realism perspective.
In the theory of realism, states are in an environment of insecurity and can never be certain about the intentions of other states. The international system is anarchic, and the main goal of states is to increase their own strength for survival13. In the theory of realism, states are in an environment of insecurity and can never be certain about the intentions of other states. The international system is anarchic and the main goal of states is to increase their own strength for survival.
The main shift in Turkish foreign policy was in choosing of tools. Before Arab Spring Ankara used diplomatic and economic tools and persuaded its goals through the policy of «openness»especially on the neighboring countries. This is considered a major shift in Turkish foreign policy toward the Arab countries14. In 2014, Erdogan resorted to the military tools to implement its objectives in Syria. Bright example is decision to attack Russia's fighter jet Su-24 on the Syrian — Turkey border and sending Turkish army into northern Syria to fight a U.S.-allied Kurdish militia.
The theory of offensive realism is opposed by defensive neorealism. This assumption asserts that the main goal of states is not to maximize power, but to strive for maximum security and create conditions for preventing aggression. An aggressive expansion one of states will face with a balance of power on the part of other ones that are concerned about ensuring their own security. Defensive neorealism points out that the structure on international system should limit offensive behavior15. The Turkish president does not act as a direct or outright offensive realist, but as a smart one. He chooses new pain points of Russian interests — Libya, Armenia, and Ukraine — to counter Russia. Erdogan threatens Greece. But France and the EU stand behind the Greece. And Athens has no intention to threaten the Turkish border. Erdogan threatens the US to block its access to military bases. But there are no signs of the emerging of coalition of states that should balance the offensive state in terms of offensive realism. This can be explained through balancing in triangles that Turkey uses to restrain its own rivalpartners by each other.
Turkey's balancing in Syrian Triangle between Russia and the US
The Russia's attempt to save the Assad regime was unexpected for Erdogan. He has his own plan for the reshaping of Syria to the benefit of Turkey at the expense of Hama, Aleppo and the Kurdish areas. Unleashing the Russian operation in Syria was a way out of Moscow's political isolation in the international scene after the joining of Crimea. There is no other reasonable explanation for why Russia has frozen the vital conflict with Ukraine in Donbas and Luhansk and decided to demonstrate force far from its borders in order to save a nonessential ally16.
There are three points of confrontation between Russia and Turkey in Syria:
1. Erdogan supports the Syrian armed opposition that fights government forces. Russia stresses the difference between the Syrian political and armed opposition, arguing that the political opposition is certain part of peace solution of Syrian civil war through the Constitutional Commission. But Russia's military operations in Syria is a clear sign to the armed opposition that it should lay down the weapon to survive.
2. Another Erdogan pretext for countering Russia is defending Turcomans from bombing. Turkish president states that Turcomans and Turks have a common Turkic origin**, they are not a terrorists and North part of Syrian Idlib province is their homeland17. 3. The Syrian Kurds chose independence from the Assad government and, as allies of the United States in the fight against the «Islamic State», were attacked by Turkey. Russia protects the Kurds from the Turkish offensive in the north-eastern regions of Syria. On the one hand, Russia is trying to mediate between Assad and the Kurdish leaders, and on the other hand, Moscow has a goal to weaken the Kurdish-American ties.
Moscow and Ankara try to avoid direct clashes, but they are engaged in a veiled struggle. Russian President V. Putin doubted the existence of the turkomans and presented the bombing of «turkomans» as the sweeping of Islamist terrorists18.
Russia's diplomacy has invented many tools to counter Turkey's offensive behavior in Syria. One of them is the «Astana Format». This forum for peace talks was officially established in 2017 to help in negotiations to end the Syrian conflict, but the main goal of Russian policy is to bind Erdogan by agreements with assistance of Iran to limit Turkish military activity in northern Syria19. The ceasefire was reached in Idlib province but is violated from time to time. Erdogan and Putin agreed on the presence of Turkish strongholds in northern Syria and joint patrolling of the front line. More than a dozen meetings were held in the Astana format20. Also, there is a bilateral framework of interaction between Russia and Turkey, that has produced a lot of joint Memorandums of Understanding21. Moreover there are
** Turkic language family that Erdogan uses for supporting his demands, was a historical Turkic tribal confederation conventionally named the Oghuz Yabgu State in Central Asia during the early medieval period. Today the residents of Turkey, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Khorezm, Turkmens of Afghanistan, Gagauzia are descendants of Oghuz Turks. The term incorporates the Iraqi Turkmen/Turkoman homelands running from Iraq's border with Turkey and Syria and diagonally down the country to the border with Iran. Anderson Liam, Stansfield Gareth. Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise, University of Pennsylvania Press. 2009.
meetings of Russian-Turkish Joint Strategic Planning Group that is a part of HighLevel Cooperation Council22. But all this is connected with the bargaining around territories controlled by Turkey through Syrian armed opposition and affiliated islamic groops (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, etc.).
Turkey is facing off against the United States in northeastern Syria where the Kurds have challenged Assad's rule. The United States supports and protects the Kurds and helps them to create their own democratic state. Turkey considers unacceptable the U.S. alliance with the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). Erdogan considers the Kurdish Self-Defense Units (YPG — PYD) to be terrorists that must be destroyed as well as the»Islamic State», also he accuses Washington of «standing by terrorists» in Syria. The Turkish forces launched operation «Spring of Peace» against the YPG and SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) in 2019 and hit the targets on Kurdish-controlled territory in significant depth threatening the American strongholds. President Donald Trump has ordered to pull the majority of US troops from the country's north to avoid to avoid injuring American soldiers. The US government tried to urge Turkish president to halt his incursion, but, despite Turkey is a NATO ally, one attack US troops in Syria was happened23. President Erdogan agreed to Russian President Putin's proposal to limit Turkey's incursion to a buffer zone, after which Russian military police and the Turkish army patrolled a 10-kilometer zone along the border24. Some American observation posts were occupied by Russian troops.
Thus, there are triangle of opposing interests between Turkey, Russia and the United States. Moreover, this confrontation is not limited to the Syrian conflict and includes Turkey's acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system, the US sanctions against Turkey, the Turkey's demand for the extradition of a preacher Gulen and irritation with Erdogan's behavior in NATO.
The most desirable Erdogan's goal in relations with the US is extradition of Muslim religious leader Fethullah Gulen who has lived in self-imposed exile in the US since 1999. Turkey officials blame Gulen masterminded the 2016 attempted coup. Also before to the failed putsch, Gulen's movement collected compromitation files, attacked top officials and ignated a 2013 corruption investigation that targeted figures close to Erdogan25. But the Trump administration refused to extradite Gulen. Despite Turkey is key American ally on the south of Europe, White House and Congress criticize Erdogan for restriction freedom of assembly, association and highest number of imprisoned journalists in the world. President Erdogan rules in a largely authoritarian manner, although retains formal democratic institutions. He further consolidated power in June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections by amending the Constitution.
First sanctions were imposed by Trump Administration on Turkey for incursion in Kurdish region. It was announced of reimposing steel tariffs of 50 percent on Turkey and halt trade negotiations with the country immediately26. The Trump administration imposed sanctions on two government ministers over the detention of American Pastor Brunson and rised additionally tariffs on Turkish steel and
aluminum in 2018. Erdogan has declared in request that the United States was engaged in «economic warfare» against Turkey27.
Erdogan uses bargaining in combination with pressure or threat. The lever of pressure on the United States is the purchase of Russian weapons. Turkey has acquired the Russian S-400 air defense system for $2.5 billion. The Trump administration tried to derail the deal by making a counter-offer: US officials made it clear to Ankara that it could buy the Patriot Raytheon surface-to-air missile system for $3.5 billion. But Ankara began to bargain, demanding a much lower price. The US has refused to deliver F-35 fighter-jet for Turkey in response to the purchase of the S-400. Then Washington has imposed on Ankara secondary sanctions outlined in detail in the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). CAATSA includes penalties for countries or companies that engage in significant transactions with entities linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense and Intelligence Services28.
In response Erdogan has threatened to kick the US forces out of the Incirlik air base if Washington implements CAATSA. Turkey continues to discuss this option, threatening the US. State Department and Congress intensifying plans to move military assets from Incirlik to Greece29. In responce, Erdogan balances the American pressure by demonstrating the possibility of purchasing Russian Su-35 or Su-57 fighter jets. Turkey's military dependence of the U.S. will become critical in the case of war with Greece, another member of Alliance. But there are no signs that Erdogan are succeeded in pressuring on the US using Russian lever.
Meanwhile, Turkish President has other bargaining chips. If the US Administration will argue that Turkey becomes an increasingly unreliable NATO ally, Erdogan can overbalance American threats through military cooperation with China or deepening cooperation with Iran not only by purchasing more oil and gas, but also in the military field. Cooperation in the Turkey—Qatar — Iran triangle is already running with Qatar's strengthening role. The US authorities have long suspected that President Erdogan and his relatives have special interests in deals with Iran. The deputy general director of the Turkish Halkbank, Mehmet Hakan Atilla, was sentenced in the United States to thirty-two months in federal prison. The trial revealed Ankara's extensive efforts to help Tehran evade sanctions30. Erdogan's policy has led to the only result that the United States does not consider Turkey as ally in the great power competition, as it did during the Cold War. But Turkey's attempts to balance the US and Russia with threats and bargaining continue.
Balancing in Libyan Triangle
Turkey has supported the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), al-Saraj, based in Tripoli, in the Libyan civil war against the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, based in eastern Libya. LNA gets support by the United Arab Emirates, Russia and Egypt. Turkey has signed with Libya the
Memorandum of Security and Military Cooperation and provided the training and military support to GNA.
Also, Erdogan has sent its troops to Libya. And the Turkish parliament has approved the extension in troop deployment. Ankara and Tripoli signed a pact on military cooperation, as well as an agreement on maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean31. Turkey has sent a large shipment of military equipment to pro-GNA militias fighting the LNA. The troops of mercenaries was recruited from the Syrian opposition, and transferred to Libya too. Haftar's attack has failed to break through the GNA's front lines along the capital despite the support of Russian privat «Wagner group» military company. Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unnamed combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) played the important role in the defeat of Russian air-defense «Pantsir S1» systems, that were re-exported from the United Arab Emirates32. The successful using of Turkish drones was repeated later in Syria. Erdogan has demonstrated that Russian troops cannot protect themselves either in Syria or in Libya. His goals are to counter or block Russian forces in Syria by Libyan lever and save the Government of National Accord, led by Fayez al-Sarraj. The result is semi successful. Moscow and Ankara have signed ceasefire agreements in Libya. Erdogan hasn't ousted Russia from Syria but signed with Putin agreement that stipulated the creation of the «safety corridor» along the country's crucial M4 highway, which Russian and Turkish forces would patrolled together. The agreement effectively preserves Idlib as the country's last remaining rebel stronghold, while preserving a Turkish foothold in the region.
Russia has the potential to create a balancing coalition with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates against Turkey in Eastern Mediterranean but it is obvious that Erdogan can increase the threat to Russian interests in other places, for example, in the Ukrainian direction. Erdogan intimidates, contains, but doesn't cross the red line. The next moment, he can appear at other place and create new position with new ally and new threat. Turkey has demonstrated this in Livia after clashes with Russia in Syria and repeated it once again in Azerbaijan during Karabakh war in 2020. Turkish president does not act as a straight offensive realist, but, as a smart one he uses bargaining with a threat. This behavior may be considered as offensive and (less so) defensive bargaining.
Balancing in Greek Triangle
Turkey undertakes increasingly serious steps that put it at odds with Washington and the rest of the Alliance members over Greece. Conflict with Athens is not dispute about offshore resources only. Greeks are considered by Turks as sacral and historical foes. Turkey has never forgotten the Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne, which defined the defeat of Ottoman Empire in First World War and caused to reduction of the modern Turkish Republic state territory33. Istanbul, Western Thrace, Western and Southern Anatolia were occupied. In 1920 Turks rejected «Treaty of Sevres». The Turkish War of Independence has began after the withdrawal of
part of Allied troops (Britain, France and Italy) The leader of the Turkish National Movement, Mustafa Kemal, has fought a fierce war against especially on Greece during the 1922-1923 and defeated the army of Greeks in the Greek — Turkish war. But «Lausanne Treaty» forced Turkey to give up Western Thrace and the most of islands in Aegean sea — part of core Ottoman Empire — to Greece34. President Erdogan recognize relevance of Misak-i Milli National Oath that has been announced by the last term of the Ottoman Parliament in 1920. The Misak-i Milli claims that the territories inhabited by a Turkish majority are the homeland of the Turkish nation. From this the Turkish claim to Western Thrace, northern Syria, northeastern Iraq comes35.
Also, the «Aegean Dispute» is a consequence of Lausanne Peace Treaty36. The main driving forces behind the very problematic relations between Turkey and Greece are raised over maritime and aerial zones of the jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea and and Greece safety of its islands in the Aegean Sea. The struggle Turks to reestablish and extend their zones of jurisdiction over the Aegean Sea began after they lost their control along with the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the Greeks established zones of influence over it in accordance of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Nowadays Turkey doesn't recognize the legal continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones around the Greek islands. Turkey has applied the 12-mile width of territorial waters limit to its coasts outside the Aegean. Greece has already done the same in the Ionian Sea and states that it reserves the right to apply this rule and extend its territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles at some point in the future in the Aegean Sea too. 12 miles territorial waters has been allowed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (Art.3). Turkey strongly opposes this. The Turkish parliament officially declared that unilateral action of establishing territorial waters by Greece in the Aegean Sea would constitute a «casus belli»37.
Turkey and Greece were on the brink of war or unleashed the battle many times. Full scale Turkish invasion of Cyprus was happened in 1974. That year Turkey sent an oceanographic vessel followed by warships to explore part of Aegean Sea where Turkish and Greek continental shelf overlaped. Greece sent a diplomatic note to Turkey and sent out a naval force. In 1976, Ankara sent a scientific ship, accompanied by a warship, to collect seismic data around Lesbos Island. Greek authorities have placed country's armed forces on full alert. In 1987 the Turkish ship was about to enter disputed waters to conduct an oil survey. The Greek Prime Minister ordered the ship to be sunk if found within disputed waters38.
There have been many accidents with dogfighting between Turkish and Greek fighter jet near the islands in Aegean from 1992 to the present. Several jets of both sides have been shot down. Similar incidents were happening in disputed waters between patrol, reconnaissance, coast guard vessels of both countries. On the one hand, Greece and Turkey have long been held back by the Alliance. Now Turkey shows less willingness to obey NATO integrity. On the other hand, the agreement on maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, signed by Turkey and Libya, legitimates and ignites Turkish claims on disputed shelf.
So, firstly, in the Mediterranean, Turkey confronts Greece and its NATO allies, primarily France and Germany. Secondly, the Turkish-Libyan agreement on maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean is a blow to Egypt's interests. The clash with Greece threatens the Turkish economy that will be severely affected by US and European heavy sanctions. Germany has called on Turkey to end its gas and oil drilling in contested regions off Greek islands and expressed cohesion with Cyprus and Greece as partners39. France has recalled its ambassador to Turkey for consultations after R. T. Erdogan insulted his French counterpart E. Macron. He said Macron needed mental help over his attitude towards Muslims40. In this direction, Turkish President acts as a constructivist representing clashes with the UE' counterparts as protection Muslims and Islam, accusing NATO of unwillingness to support Turkey's fighting terrorism in Syria.
France and EU stand behind the Greece but they hold Turkey back deliberately and gingerly, because Russia will be happy to provide any military equipment, any resources, any support to any NATO troublemaker. So, Erdogan is free to use pressure and threats in the Mediterranean triangle, because his geopolitical rival-counterparts have different or opposite interests in many points, and the result is their mutual deterrence.
Balancing in Russia's backyard (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine)
Turkey and Russia, despite the clashes in Syria, talk a lot about cooperation. In 2020, Erdogan and Putin launched a new gas line to export Russian gas to Turkey and Europe, and they promised to follow the path of cooperation in trade and diplomacy41. Erdogan and Putin are meeting ahead of the Berlin conference on the Libyan, and warring sides of the Libyan conflict announced a cease-fire in response to the call of Turkish and Russian leaders. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu backed an immediate ceasefire agreement between Libya's warring rivals during a meeting of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Geneva42. In 2020, Erdogan visited Russia amid tensions between Ankara and Moscow over new clashes opposition troops with Syrian government forces in Idlib43.Turkish and Russian forces are carrying out joint patrols in Northern Syria and Idlib province to sweep YPG/PKK «terrorists» and radical islamists. Russia, Iran and Turkey held a trilateral video conference meeting of the heads of state for facilitating the Syrian peace settlement44. In 2021, Putin and Erdogan launched a third stage of the Russian nuclear power plant in Turkey45.
But actually, Ankara and Moscow try to achieve the dependence of the opposite party. Russian agricultural market and Russian tourists give more than $30 billions to Turkey. But Ankara can throttle the supply of Russian gas. The sales of Russian atom electricity will depend on the Turkish energy regulator. Also Erdogan may cancel joint patrolling missions and launch full scale offensive with total occupation of Idlib. Putin has no doubt that the US and the EU will support Erdogan against him.
Meanwhile, Erdogan has chosen new painful point of Russian interests — Armenia, where the Russian military base is located. He has pushed his ally President of Azerbaijan to launch an offensive against Karabakh, which is under the control of Armenia, but Azerbaijan defined this region as its own. Turkey has delivered Bayraktar drones to Azerbaijan. The influence of Turkish homemade drones has been substantial on the battlefields of Syria and Libya. These drones played a crucial role in the fighting over the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region and ensured the defeat of Armenian troops armed with Russian weapons46. Moscow was unpleasantly surprised that Azerbaijani troops raised Turkish flags wherever they had won in Nagorno-Karabakh.
In addition, Erdogan has intensified cooperation with the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. In 2020, the defense minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar has visited Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and signed a military agreement about further cooperation in the fields of military, defense and security. After Turkey has supported for Azerbaijan in its latest war with Armenia under the motto of «one nation two states,» Erdogan began rapprochement with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan under the new motto of «one nation six states»47.
Turkey shows even closer rapprochement with Ukraine. Erdogan doesn't recognize joining of Ukrainian Crimea to Russia, he repeats it year after year. In 2020, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has signed of a «goodwill» agreement concerning the defense industry and a «military framework agreement»48. Defense cooperation implies producing drones, jet engine, warships and exchange of intelligence information. This is similar to Turkey's warning to Russia. And Erdogan can go further, threatening Russia's interests in Donbas and Luhansk, providing direct military support to Ukraine.
The model of multipolar balancing
According the defensive realism, that is part of neorealism, an offensive states should be counterbalanced by other states seeking to maintain the status quo. In spite of international anarchy it does not reward aggression49. Any attempt to maximize power by offensive state or defiance of the international order should get a respond of international structure. Defensive neorealists argue that the anarchic nature of the international system encourages states to undertake defensive and moderate policies50.
Turkey has increased its own power, damaged the security of border states, and violate the interests of other states. But in the case of Turkey there is no a deterrent reaction of balancing coalition. Turkey itself has created a balancing «anti-coalition». The balancing structure that Erdogan designed can be depicted as the pentahedron with the rival-partners of Turkey at the tops and Turkey itself at the center of the pentahedron. (Fig.1)
Figure 1
The structure of Turkey's interaction with the main counter-partner-adversaries
U.S.A.
The US can't impose full pressure on Erdogan because he will shift to Russia. He will ballance the pressure of any EU members backing Greece's interests in the same way. Putin has experienced for itself by Erdogan balancing Russia's activity through different triangles: in Libya, Caucasian, Central Asia, Ukraine. Turkey had sometime strained relations with Iran, but Erdogan was involved by Russia in the «Astana format» of the Syrian settlement with the participation of Iran. Erdogan can get closer to Iran and counterbalance US pressure, or, conversely, stand up to Iran and be more useful to the US. The possibility of such balancing worries the United States. Turkey has reduced its imports of Iranian oil under the pressure from the Trump administration. But Erdogan doesn't refuse to buy gas from Iran, challenging U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran. At the same time, Turkey agreed to install an anti-missile radar, which is part of anti-Iran's missile warning system.
Beside, Erdogan also has another trump card in his pocket. He can support Palestinians by military power. After the new clashes between Israel and HAMAS have erupted, Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has proposed to form an international protection forces for Palestine's civilians in an emergency meeting of Organization of Islamic Cooperation. He told that «the Ummah expects our leadership and courage, and Turkey is ready to take whatever action is necessary»51.
Turkey's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian war will force the United States to discuss Turkey's interests at different points.
This multipolar balancing makes Turkey hard invulnerable to any rival partner from any top of the pentahedron. Moreover, Erdogan has more room to maneuver in the middle of the balancing pentahedron, he can maneuver and solve the problems with his rival-partners on the pentahedron tops one by one. Turkey uses the same algorithm with minor changes: 1. Making demands. 2. Demonstration of the threat for opposite interests. 3. Execution of part of the threat, demonstration of possible losses. 4. Balancing the reaction (response threat). Creating new position and raising the bet in the dispute. 5. Demonstration of the possibility of bargaining and possible benefits. 6. Offering of a deal under the pressure.
Erdogan appears as a troublemaker, yet his strategy should be recognized as not only balancing, but also a bargain under a threat. He uses not only the pressure in dispute but shows that he can be useful for counter partner in other areas. For example, Erdogan likes criticise Alliance and appears like «NATO dissident». And this is what Russia likes. It is also Russian strategy to pull the Turks away from the NATO and thereby weaken the transatlantic Alliance.
Turkey has something to offer to any rival partner in exchange for situational support. Erdogan is ready to do much to improve relations with the United States. He makes a sign that he is ready to interrupt purchasing of Russian arms and to procure air defence systems from any NATO ally on satisfactory terms. The question is what to do with Russian S-400 air defence system that was purchased. One option is to transfer it to another country. Turkey could propose to give it up to Northern Cyprus. The bargaining is the national Turkish art. Erdogan knows that Washington will willingly support him against Moscow or Tehran. And Russia could make some concessions to Erdogan in order to use him against the US.
The bargaining using a threat
To hurt the interests of competing partners is not the goal of Ergogan in the first place. He uses force to persuade stubborn partners in the first place. But it isn't well known «policy of carrot and stick», it seems like the «Bargaining Model of War»52. This model in international relations theory presents the relationship between rivals as a dilemma of reliably estimating the ratio of benefits to losses in the event of war. The question is whether a war or a bargain will provide better ratio of benefits and losses. The model assumes that war is the undesired outcome for both actors, it is always costly and all actors involved suffer a cost of war. Bargaining is defined as an interaction where no one actor can benefit without suffering a loss. But the cost of bargaining is less than the cost of war. And one of the rivals, threatening the another, exaggerating the potential losses, tries to convince him that it would be better to make the concessions that does not lead to war.
Bargaining in this model is defined as interaction for the purpose of redistributing power. Actor A forces actor B to decide that a small benefit after a new slicing of
common cake is better than the large cost of containing actor A. The same goal is pursued by a classic war (dumb war), but bargaining using a threat is a smart war.
One of the assumptions of the model is that the lack of information and the high level of uncertainty between the actors lead to war. The motives and consequences of war are only revealed during the war, which allows the actors involved to adjust their behavior and motives to a lesser extent. Bargaining power is based on a lack of information, uncertainty, and pressure53. At the same time, it can be recognized as a kind of offensive realism. Erdogan, using bargaining power, demonstrates that the price of opposing him will be greater than making concessions to him. And it will be better to accept his terms, because he can take a new position and force his opponent by new levers from new positions.
As an example, the bargaining model of war can be applied to the confrontation Turkey with Greece. Both sides express willingness to fight and evaluate the ratio of benefits and losses in their own favor. The line to accept any deal that divides the good any where between points A and B represents a good that Greece and Turkey are willing to fight over (Fig.2). Each state suffers a cost of war that diminishes the good. Initially Greece is optimistic about the division of a good as a result of confrontation. But Greece estimates of the good less optimistically after Turkey's intimidation. The costs of war are calculated into the outcome (line Ag1 — Cg1).
Fig.2
Representation a good that Greece and Turkey are willing to fight over before Turkey's intimidation (as an example)
the Good Cost of War
////////////// ////
Ag Cg Bg
( the Good
\\ \\\\\\\\\
Bt Ct A
Turkey
Fig.2b
Representation a good that Greece and Turkey are willing to fight over after Turkey's intimidation (as an example)
Cost of War
Greece
Mzzzzzmzzzzzn
Ag1
Cg1 Bg1
bargaining area
Turkey
Bt1 ^-^ Ct1
Turkey is also not interested in the financial and human losses that would be a result of the war. Being under the pressure Greece could accept the Turkish conditions if the concessions are considered less than the cost of the war. The goal of Turkey to force Greece to accept any deal between points Ct1 and Cg1 in the bargaining area.
Turkish President has developed the art of bargaining using the threat of war. He adds to the threat some bonus as bait. On the one hand, Erdogan vows to fight back in Idlib and told that operation in Idlib 'only a matter of time'54. On the other hand, he buys Russian gas, criticizes NATO and calls for military protection of the Palestinians from Israel that can be useful for Russia's policy in Syria. Similarly, when Turkey develops military cooperation with Ukraine, supports the «Crimean Platform» as part of the Ukrainian strategy of de-occupation of Crimea55, all this irritates Russia, and Erdogan understands that this will be appreciated by the US and the EU. The same way, when Erdogan defends the Libyan Government of National Accord from «Russian hybrid threat», it is prized by the US. Conversely, although NATO opposes Erdogan's policies towards the Syrian Kurds, Greece and Cyprus, the US and NATO are ready to support Turkey against Russia. General Secretary of the Alliance Y. Stoltenberg criticized the attack of the Syrian government forces with Russian support on the Turkish strongholds in Idlib56.
As for Russia, it can be assumed that President Erdogan is trying to convince President Putin, by countering in Syria, that he can be a more valuable partner than President Assad, and Russia can get more from friendship with Turkey than from protecting Syria. Otherwise, Turkey may strengthen its influence based on the Turkic identity in Central Asia and some regions of Russia. This is a doubtful that the an alleged shared Turkic identity may be revitalized in Central Asia, but the leaders of this state can change their orientation from Russia to Turkey.
«Bargaining model» of Erdogan differs from «regular» one in that it engages not only two parties. Erdogan has congratulated Azerbaijan on liberating Nagorno-Karabakh, adding that Turkey will remain by Azerbaijan's side both on the battlefield and on the negotiating table. This message was addressed to Russia which guaranteed ceasefire and standing behind Armenia that has lost the war57.
Erdogan's model of relations with Russia and the United States, which uses of rapprochement and distancing, softening and tightening to show benefits and costs of relationship with Turkey, can be called a dribbling type policy. The result of this dribbling policy is the existence of two point of view in the American political class. Some analysts believe that the US should recognased Erdogan as a fractious ally but put into account his crucial role to Washington's strategic goals in the Middle East. Others believe that the Turkish president is guided only by his own interests. And Washington could rely on him only after meeting all his requirements. Although the adopts of this approach do not propose to punish Turkey too much58. An important feature of Erdogan's behavior is deception. There is no strength that can force him to follow the agreements. He is led by his own interests only. There is no doubt that
the next Russian jet fighter could be shot down by Turkey in Idlib despite economic and military cooperation with Russia.
The bargaining combined with a threat has different success in different directions. On the one side, Russia made some concessions to Turkish demands for buffer zones in northeastern Syria59, then agreed to the withdrawal of most of the Wagner Group and a cease-fire in Libya. On the other side, the US doesn't make any concessions to Turkey.
According Schelling's approach, it is not necessary to defeat an opponent totally. Instead, more subtle decision is to cooperate. «Cooperation» may take many forms from deterrence, limited war and disarmament to negotiation60. The creation of a bargaining situation will controls the «B» participant actions through the choices or decisions of «A» opponent by bargaining power. Communication between parties includes «tacit maneuvers», that is action-based communication.
There is a very important question about the resources needed to threaten the rival-counterparts. Turkey has NATO's biggest standing army after the U.S. but there is a dependence on western countries in supplying, services, maintaining fighter jets, tanks, naval equipment. Erdogan has a problems with transfer of technologies. All this is compounded by economic problems. The drop in the value of the Turkish currency during 2018, the decline in GDP, the country entered a recession. Turkish President draws a resource for confrontation from the conflicts of opponents. There is no doubt that Russia will help Turkey if the US strengthens sanctions. Ukraine is ready to help Turkey in aviation and engine-building technologies because Erdogan does not recognize Crimea as part of Russia61. Turkey will receive Qatar's support in deepening the conflict with Egypt and the UAE over Libya62. Moreover, Erdogan relies on domestic resources, he has ambition goal to push himself into a global leadership role in Islamic world and utilize Turkey's new foreign policy as a method to enhance the regime's domestic legitimacy and ensure its survival63.
Neoclassical realist perspective
The neoclassical realistic approach complements the constructivist view and eliminates some contradictions between realism and the neorealist approaches to Turkish foreign policy. Neoclassical realists agree that the constraints and opportunities of the international system shape the policy of the states, but the reaction of states is primarily determined by internal factors, such as the nature of their internal political regimes, relations between the state and society, as well a strategic culture. If systemic variables have a litle constraining effects that emphasized by neorealism, the state structures and perceptions of their leaders play a significant role in foreign-policy behavior64. Neoclassical realism attaches importance to a state domestic arrangements, particularly decisionmakers perceptions and states structures in explaining its foreign policy. But in modern Turkey, there are some limitations. There is only one institute and one
decision-maker. This is Erdogan. And all state structures and leaders perceptions that are heard in the public space are under the control of President Erdogan.
Conclusions
Ten years ago, Turkey was considered a «middle power» or «emerging middle power» with ambivalent regional orientation, cooperative initiatives and didn't demonstrate the ambition of power distributer. But after the engaging in Syrian civil war Turkish policy has been changed greatly. From the liberal perspective, there are no signs that Turkey is embedded in domestic civil society and in international democratic system that decisively constrain aggressive actions of Erdogan's Government. The Turkish foreign policy before Erdogan era could be described as a policy that does not exceed its Western allies in international affairs and adjusted Turkish interests to interests of great powers in the region. But then the Turkish president rethought the commitments to the United States and NATO allies that limit his political intentions. And these intentions are more offensive than defensive.
Turkey doesn't hold the conception of «co-operative» security, that is reliable from constructivist perspective. There is a way in which States can maximize their security without negatively affecting the security of others. But Erdogan has chosen another one. He doesn't identify the security of other states as being valuable to Turkey.
Someone accuses Erdogan of ambitions of a modern-day sultan. Certainly his rule is self-interested and power maximizing. Doing this, from constructivist perspective, he creates neo- Ottoman identity in Turkey and along its outskirts, therefore secures his own interests in domestic policy. His power suffers from lack of legitimacy, facing a number of political and economic challenges. By conducting this foreign policy, he tries to legitimate his rule through restoring the greatness of the Ottomans, bringing back the pride of the Turkish nation. His aggressive expansion doesn't contradict the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory as defensive realism asserts. The Turkish president does not act as a straight offensive realist, but as a smart one. The defensive realism argues that too much military power decreases a state's security because other states will balance the threat. But there is no balancing coalition of states that stands up to Turkey. The reason for this is that the Turkey's rival partners balance each others. Ergogan creates its own structure of foreign relations in various triangles of states interests, where Turkey balances between the opposing interests of rival partners. This is a multipolar balancing structure that Erdogan uses to his advantage. It makes Turkey no hard hurt from any rival partner.
Structuralrealism or neorealism points towards «structural modifiers», such as the security dilemma, that may lead to the outbreak of conflict on spiral model. But Turkey is acting aggressively in the center of opposing interests, and neither the US, the EU, nor Russia will escalate the conflict. Erdogan intimidates, threatens,
but tries not to cross the line of war. This is not a war without negotiations, on the contrary, it is a negotiation using the threat. Turkish President tries to convert the threat to bargaining power. Who is not on the battlefield is not at the negotiating table — this is Erdogan's approach. He creates a threatening position, and then exchanges it for concessions and benefits. Erdogan considers international relations as a market where one actor forces another to bargain from a position of strength.
For structural realists, domestic politics and leader characteristics play no significant role in determining policy, given the great dangers in an anarchic reality. But from the the neoclassical perspective, the regimes should secure themselves properly from without in an anarchic international system. In the case of Turkey, the interests of regime determine the national interests, Erdogan strengthens his own power using the foreign policy. The neoclassical approach gives priority to the political environment in which states interact. Turkey's foreign policy is hybrid. It is domestic motivated and identify based, from the neoclassical and constructivist perspectives, and, nevertheless, it uses the theories of the balance of power, as structural realists assert.
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ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ АВТОРАХ / INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Графов Дмитрий Борисович - к.полит.н., Dmitry Grafov - PhD (Political Science), старший научный сотрудник ИВ РАН, Senior Research Fellow IOS RAS, Moscow, Москва, Россия. Russia.
