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31Grafov Dmitry B.*
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIA'S DETERRENCE OF THE U.S. IN SYRIA AND BEYOND IN TERMS OF DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE REALISM
Abstract: the analysis of the facts of the current Russian policy allows the modern theory of international relations to continue the discussion about which approach is more effective - in the case of offensive or defensive realism? The article is devoted to approach Russia's strategy of countering the US indirectly through the intermediate states. It's concerned with the reasons why Russia decided to engage in the Syrian conflict in 2015 and what are in this perception are the real goals of Russia's policy in the region. These questions cannot be considered out of connection with the total confrontation of Russia with the western countries in Ukraine. The Syrian conflict is only an external deck for Russia in countering the U.S. Russia tests its own power to force the U.S. out of Syria and seeks any opportunity to demonstrate the U.S. how vulnerable they are. There is a triangle of interests of key regional actors - Turkey, Iran and Russia. And all of the triangle's sides oppose the U.S. The rising confrontation with Washington in Syria triggers Moscow to seek a ways how to use other potential rivals of the U.S. as Washington has a lot of tension and conflicts beyond the Middle East. The author's analysis of the actors behavior is based on the "security dilemma" and the "balance of power" approaches. Following a certain scholarly approach it is presumed that Moscow acquires the power via the "low-cost strategies" without the straight projection of power, using any opportunity to balance the U.S. power via the other countries.
Keywords: Russia, Syria, Turkey, U.S., defensive realism, offensive realism, buck passing, balance of power, security dilemma.
There are two branches of Structural realism theory: the offensive and defensive realism. And there is a dispute among the followers of the defensive and the offensive realism about the reliability and efficiency of the different approaches. Despite the international law, the international policy is based on anarchy. And most of the states should decide: to keep status quo or to to head for the power-maximizing to guarantee their own security. The defensive realists argue that the maintaining balance of power is the right way to save status quo and to secure the state [32, p. 126]. The offensive realists state that great powers may secure themselves only through the maximizing of own power [15, p. 21]. The defensive neorealists state that a strong willing of states to balance power (counterbalance and overbalance) against the threatening of power-seeking states may face in turn with the counter measures that jeopardize the very survival of the maximizing power state or forcing it to pay high cost. The excessive concentration of power may be self-defeating when triggering balancing counter moves.
Dmitry B. Grafov - PhD (Political Science), Senior Research Fellow, IOS RAS; e-mail: [email protected], about author: http://ivran.ru/persons/DmitryGrafov.
The growing confrontation between Russia and the United States makes it possible to compare the effectiveness of the U.S. offensive realism approach and the Russia's approach of defensive realism in the combination with the "buck passing" strategy. When a great power is trying to prevent rivals from the gaining power at expense of its security, it can choose to act by favoring the "buck passing"—transferring the responsibility to act to other states while remaining on the sidelines.
The questions about why Russia decided to be involved in the Syrian conflict in 2015 and what are the real goals of the Russia's policy in this region still remain controversial for the western politicians, as well as for scholars. Four years on, it's clear that the presence of the Russian army in Syria made some of the desirable for Russia results. Moscow reaffirmed its strong position in the international relations, Assad's government is saved, while the options of the modern weapons and the decisiveness of the Russian leadership were demonstrated. But did Russia head for only these goals? Are there any other goals of the Russia's policy? The western policymakers and "think tanks" have their own perceptions of the Russia's policy. They perceive Russia has engaged in a broad, sophisticated, well-resourced and surprisingly effective campaign to expand its global reach. These objectives include, first and foremost, the undermining of the U.S. positions as a leader of the liberal international order and the cohesion of the West, promoting the specific Russian military and energy interests, pushing back the United States from the areas of traditional U.S. influence [8]. Firstly, the western analysts address the issue of cost to the U.S. interests of Russia's efforts to gain geopolitical and economic goals beyond its neighborhood? And secondly, what are Russia's costs of these efforts, which may exceed the benefits that Moscow hopes to receive?[28]
Syrian field of countering the United States
The first puzzle looked like Russia was bombing Idlib and talking about a peaceful settlement, and at the same time was forcing a rebels from the de-escalation zones, including Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta and Deraa. There are two reasons for this hammering policy: 1) threatening the opposition to force it to conclude a deal with the Syrian government; 2) sweaping any opposition to President Assad as a long term goal. The deal of Syria's de-escalation zones was signed by Turkey, Russia and Iran, it calls to end to hostilities between the rebels (but not terrorists) and government forces in four regions in 2017 [16]. It's clear now that the Russian policy had a goal to cease fighting on one frontier to transfer forces to others ones and to defeat enemies one by one. The Syrian Arab army (SAA) does not have the necessary resources to fight on all fronters at the same time. The four de-escalation areas were established: the Idlib province and the certain parts of the neighbouring provinces (Latakia, Hama and Aleppo provinces); the certain parts in the north of Homs province; Eastern Ghouta; Deraa and Al-Quneitra provinces.
There's only one zone one year later. Helping the Syrian army to free one rebels zone after another, Russia states that the rebel groups include al-Qaeda or IS-linked fighters. And there is no "de-escalation" with terrorists. The Idlib province is the last zone. Russian jets have stopped hammering the Idlib province when the leaders of Russia, Iran and Turkey have agreed to meet for talks about the future of the last de-escalation zone.
The second puzzle. The turkish President R.T. Erdogan strongly opposes an advance on the rebels in Idlib. As the results of Putin's talks with him a new demilitarized zone was established. Russia and Turkey have agreed to create a demilitarized zone along the contact line between the armed opposition and the government troops, with the withdrawal from there of the radically-minded rebels. This is not the same as de-escalation zone [3]. It should be admitted that in this point Russia has to change the previous policy and find new ways to eliminate the Syrian rebels. But it cannot be excluded that Moscow and Ankara could make a new deal in order not to allow the armed opposition groups to stay where they are in the Idlib province. For Turkey the deal about Idlib is connected with a desire to clear Manbij from their own kind of 'terrorists' [22] - YPG, YPJ Kurds organizations that are the part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) supported by the U.S. This is a field of cooperation with Moscow and Ankara. On one hand, Idlib was never a top priority for Ankara, because the fighting with Kurds is superior goal. Moreover the further attempts to protect Idlib from Asad's power have a risk of rising tensions with Russia. On other hand, taking under the control the Kurdish-held territory at the east of the Euphrates and along the Turkey-Syria border is not a superior goal for Asad's government. There is a room for deal and Russia may conclude it.
The third puzzle is a key puzzle looks like an opportunity for Russia to use the contradictions between Turkey and the United States regarding the Kurds. In Erdogan's view, all Kurds are terrorists and Turkey has ambitions to gain full control over the north-eastern Syria. In this perspective, Moscow will need to prevent the confrontation between Ankara and Damascus about Idlib and the northern part of Syria because there are territorial claims between them. The Erdogan's policy is a kind of domestic interests motivated policy, which aims to present him as a leader of the Ottoman world and a modern leader of the Islamic world. It was important for him to save the face. He could not seem weak and could not yield to Russia in the eyes of the domestic public opinion. He considered turkish-speaking syrian Turkomans to be under the security umbrella of Ankara. Ankara did not agree that Idlib and other territories were cut off from Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Erdogan stated Turkey's right to protect Idlib's habitants from the Syrian "massacre government".
In turn, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem stated that the Turkish-controlled Iskenderun province was Syrian territory, and the Syrian government is ready to return it under its own sovereignty [20][21]. Meanwhile the defeat of the Kurds is a key goal of the Erdogan's domestic policy and for that he is ready even for the confrontation with the United States. This is evidenced by
a tough phone conversation in early 2018, when President Trump urged Turkey to exercise caution in Afrin, Syria, and to avoid any actions that may lead to a conflict between Turkish and American forces [33]. Trump also expressed a concern about the destructive and false rhetoric coming from Turkey, and also about Americans and local employees detained in Turkey under false accusations.
According to the Western analysis, the Russian mission in Syria is there not only to protect Assad's government, but it also has a clear goal to put pressure on the U.S. indirectly, through third countries.
After the deal with Turkey about Idlib
The Western States consider that Russia holds the same position as the Assad's government and Iran. But it is not true. The goal of Assad's government is to survive at any cost. At the same time there is a triangle of interests of three key players: 1. Turkey, 2. Iran, 3. Russia.
Turkey is valuable for Russia as a situational partner. The deal about Idlib demonstrates that Moscow prefers to make concessions to Ankara. The deterioration in relations with Ankara will have unacceptable consequences. The supply of the Khmeimim Russian Air Base in Syria is highly dependent on the supplies through the straits in the Black Sea. Also, Turkey at any time can improve relations with the United States as easily, as Ankara and Moscow have turned from war to peace in 2016. On the one hand, Russia has no means to force Turkey to comply with the Treaty on the Straits of Montreux. On the other hand Turkey has a right to block the straits if its own security is threatened. Russia has to avoid the confrontation with Turkey. The most difficult task for Russia is pushing the Turkey out from the Northern Syria. According to the Russian scenario, it should be made without a conflict. The rough expulsion by force may hurt the next stage of interaction - to break the alliance of Kurds and the United States, and put to the end the American presence on the borders of Turkey and Syria. But at the end of 2018 President Trump decided to withdraw American forces from Syria after the talks with the President Erdogan. Preliminary Trump was supposed to tell Erdogan to back off on his repeated threats to attack the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the America's main partner in Syria. But he failed to force Turkey to agree to de-escalation and limitation of military actions against the Kurds.
Trump chose to withdraw forces from Syria and not to jeopardize Turkey's membership in NATO. He didn't do that yet and it seems Trump is willing to get some concessions from Erdogan (the refusal to purchase S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia), but the Russia's goal is achieved. Moscow considers Ankara as a valuable tool of countering the U.S. in Syria. Russia is not interested in the confrontation with the US directly, and hopes that Turkey do that. This is the "buck-passing" strategy in the way Mearsheimer talks about it [15, 158-160]. The expulsion of the U.S. from Syria is in the common interests of Turkey, Russia, Iran and President Assad. And each of the state has their own reason to push
the American policy to fail at any point. This creates a field of buck-passing. The Kurdish ground was a soil for the U.S. operations. Now the Kurds are closer to the official Damascus. The withdrawal of U.S. troops is likely to be viewed as a betrayal of America's Kurdish allies, and this betrayal opens a way for cooperation between the Assad's government and Kurds against Turkey.
Earlier the Kurds were partners of Assad in fighting radical islamists, but the tension between allies raised in the dispute over oil-rich territory. Moreover, the Kurdish troops are not Russia's enemies, but after they have chosen the U.S. as an ally the Russian troops feel themselves on the other side of the frontier. Iran has a problem with the Kurds in its territory as well. But the main goal of the Russian defensive approach has been achieved - i. e. attempts to push Turkey against the U.S. have succeeded.
The next Russia's short-term goal is to restore the power of Assad's government over all the Syrian territory. It should be done without the confrontation with Turkey that demonstrates strong support for the rebels in the north of Syria and isn't going to seem a betrayal. Sweeping away the Syrian opposition at all is not a right decision for Russia. In Idlib province, most likely, Russia will repeat the scenario of dividing the opposition into two parts. Troops of islamic terrorists and joined with them will be destroyed, moderate part will again be offered negotiations. Moscow seeks ways to force opposition (or part of the opposition) to agree with the smart plan of legitimizing the Assad's rule under the new constitution to be drafted by a Constitutional Committee.
On the one hand, a Constitutional Committee is needed to prepare the constitutional reform in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. On the other hand, Russia works on the formation of the Syrian Constitutional Committee in its own interests. The Talks with the Syrian opposition began in Geneva. But then Moscow has organized the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. Russia continues attempts to reconcile the opposition in the Astana format [13]. The goal of Russian policy is to force Syrian opposition to collaborate in the Constitutional Committee. Because the formation of the Constitutional Committee without an opposition is impossible. The answer to the question of how Moscow is going to achieve this can be found in the proposal to include representatives of the Syrian civil society in the Constitutional Committee. This "third party" of the deal should act as an ally of Assad. Those, who will agree to collaborate with Moscow and Damascus, may be rewarded with the top positions in the new Syrian government. The rule of Assad will not be threatened if the leaders of opposition get "chairs" without the power. As a results Moscow and Damascus will appear as peacemakers and adherents of democracy. There is no doubt that part of the opposition may agree to play this game. They have a choice to be demolished or to believe that Assad will give them something on the advice of Russia. This plan may be considered as more tricky than smart, because it doesn't eliminate the possibility of new setbacks in future. If it succeeds, Russia will celebrate another success in countering the U.S.
Long-term goals
The Russian policy in Syria is analyzed in the broad context of the Russian-American deterrence. It has many points, Syria is only one of them. The Russia's entry into Syrian conflict on Assad's side in 2015 was a reaction to the isolation of Russia after the reunification with Crimea. In fact, it seems weird. What is the reason for Mocsow to start the new military operation, when the conflict with Ukraine at domestic borders is not resolved? The case of Crimea and the case of Syria should be considered in connection with an the attempts of Moscow to search for ways to deter the expanding of NATO that began in 1997. Moving the borders of NATO to the East didn't help to solidify democratic and market reforms in Russia and did not help to strengthen the united Europe. Instead, Russia has been pursuing the policy based on the conviction that the post-cold war order in Europe is an expansion of the area of American interests, it's certainly challenging Russia and has nothing to do with keeping peace. But this is a kind of deterrence in the democratic theory that did not work in the case of Russia. The democratic theory argues that democratic values always prevail over the national interests, the democratic states are not bothered by security dilemma, and the Western policy makers believe that Russia wouldn't oppose the United States and its allies after the Cold war. But even a small democratic Serbia does not want to sacrifice its national interests and continues to resist the Western countries. Russia challenges the West much more. The supporter of defensive realism Kenneth N. Waltz even mocked the thesis of the theory of democratic deterrence that democracies do not fight democracies [31, 10]. The Russian's position after the reunification with Crimea this does not appear as a solution of the security dilemma1. Russia doesn't want to be challenged, but can't find the way to secure its borders and interests without raising a new batch of countering measures against the Western powers.
What happens after the reunification with Crimea from the Western point of view?
The United States Senate Committee of Foreign Relations has published a report of Russian's asymmetric assault measures and implications for U.S. national security [24]. Senators tend to picture Russia's policy as an assault on a democracy and liberal order over the world but in the geopolitical view they consider Russia's measures as a hybrid war against the U.S. interests. The policy of Russia is named a hybrid war with asymmetric threats. The US politicians are irritated by the Russia's activity in cyber, media and energy space. They also suspect Russia's government in the attempts to break unity of NATO's allies through the impact on the domestic policy. All that should be recognized as the indirect threat, a kind of soft or smart power. And, of course, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Russia in retaliation for its support of the President Assad.
1 John Herz stated that the security dilemma is 'A structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening' [9, 157].
But what does all this mean in terms of defensive and offensive realism? Russia opposes the U.S. indirectly, the hybrid asymmetric steps are a kind of defensive strategy. Settling the Russia's military base in Syria and the help for Assad on the battlefield was also a creation of a new position by balancing the power with Washington. Four years after the reunification with Crimea the Russia's position is improved. The conflict with Ukraine has moved to the second line in the media's coverage. It seems to be semi-frozen. In the Syrian conflict Russia presents itself as a fighter against the islamic terrorism on the world stage, and as a mediator of the Syrian crisis settlement.
The flexible policy of Russia in the region has resulted in the improvement of relations with Turkey. In late 2017 the Turkish and Russian officials have signed an agreement for a guaranteed delivery of 2.5 billion US$ worth of S-400 'Triumf' anti-aircraft weapon system [25]. This irritated the U.S. [26]. Turkey has received threats for the surface-to-air S-400 missile deal. The White House has warned the Turkey's officials over for the consequences they will face, if they refuse to abandon the purchase of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia.
Meanwhile, the deterioration of the Turkish-American relations is in the Russia's interests. Moscow has no illusions about the sustainable alliance with Ankara in long-term perspective. But on the one hand, Turkey is a valuable market for Russia in the perspective of tightening of the anti-Russian sanctions. On the other hand, the rift between one of the NATO members and the leader of Alliance may led to the weakening of NATO. This is one of the desirable goals of Russia's balancing power policy. Moreover, the disagreement of Brussels with Washington's plan to apply new anti-Iran sanctions opens new perspectives of the deterioration of the U.S.-NATO relations.
The interests of Tehran and Moscow in the Syrian conflict are very close. But not only in Syria. The U.S. President Trump decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Paris Agreement or the Iran Nuclear Agreement) was the other remarkable event that changed the geopolitical situation. This opens the next chapter of the U.S.-Iran confrontation. Iran threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz if sanctions stop the oil export. The U.S. promise to ensure freedom of navigation by force. At the same time, the Iran's influence in Iraq is growing, and Iraq is a new field of the standoff. Russia still follows the restrictions on the supply of arms to Iran, which are part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That means that for each trade deal involving arms supplies Iran needs to obtain a case-by-case approval from the UNSC.But should Moscow do this while Washington has withdrawn from the deal? This new situation creates a leverage for rebalancing power in a the favor of Russia.
Rebalancing the power beyond Syria
Russia considers the Syrian conflict as an external deck for countering the U.S. It's better to do this in the Middle East than in Ukraine, near the Russia's borders. The engagement in the Syrian crisis gives Moscow a possibility to act together with
other states opposing to the U.S. interests. This is a defensive realism strategy to strengthen the opponents of the U.S. and give them a possibility to act first.
J. Mearsheimer, pointing out the differences between the offensive and defensive realism, claims the states acting as defensive realist look for the opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals [15, 28-34]. The U.S. acts as offensive realist vs Russia that chooses the defensive realism strategy. The defensive neorealists note that the powerful states gaining excessive concentration of power in the international system are acting self-defeating, triggering the balancing countermoves [34, 177].
A new era in the confrontation between the U.S. and Russia, which began after the reunification of Crimea, gives some answers to the dispute of supporters of the theories of deterrence, the offensive and defensive realism. The American "think tanks" have no doubts that both countries continue the permanent confrontation, strategic competition with the far-reaching global implications. With regards to the security and prosperity, Russia has long been preoccupied with the challenge of securing against the external foes, and has taken refuge in the strategic depth. It's inevitable that Russia will push borders outward as far as possible from the Russian heartland and will limit the foreign influences inside the Russian-controlled territory [7].
Following defensive realism strategy, Russia may use not only Turkey or Iran. The rising confrontation with Washington on the Syrian field (the new possible strike of cruise missiles to Syrian bases or threats to retaliate the Russian Air forces) triggers Moscow to seek way how to use other potential rivals of the U.S. Washington has a lot of hotbeds of tension and conflicts beyond the Middle East. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 30 November 2016) in respect of the U.S. declares the right to respond firmly to the hostile actions, including the bolstering of national defence and taking the retaliatory or asymmetrical measures [18].
The U.S. has conflicts with North Korea and China (the trade war and the South-Chinese Sea dispute). There is also an emerging conflict with Pakistan on the ground of the settlement of the Afghan crisis. And it is no accident that Moscow is taking some significant steps, demonstrating the presence close to these hotbeds of the tension. For a long time, it seemed that Moscow was keeping its distance from Pyongyang. But on the 8th of September, 2018, a special envoy of Putin's - head of the upper house of Russia's Parliament, V. Matviyenko - visited the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and gave him a letter from President Putin [29]. Kim Jong-un confirmed his readiness to develop a relationship and payed an official visit to Russia on April 23, 2019 two months after a failed summit meeting with President Trump. Russia has called on lifting the sanctions from North Korea and stressed that Pyongyang would not give up the nuclear weapons until the sanctions are lifted. This demand contradicts the U.S. approach. It was remarkable that a few days later Kim Jong-un visit to Moscow North Korea
released photographs of tested missile look remarkably like those of a Russian-produced Iskander.
Another example is Russia's rapprochement with Pakistan. On the 20-th February 2018 the Russia's foreign minister at a meeting with his Pakistan's counterpart has defended the armed opposition in Afghanistan from the U.S. It's unbelievable statement: 'The Afghanistan strategy, that was recently presented by the U.S. administration, focuses on the need to increase the use of force and military pressure on the armed opposition, although it is clear to Moscow and Islamabad ... that it is leading to nowhere.' Lavrov has also pointed out that Mi-35M combat-transport helicopters were 'transferred to our partners' in Pakistan, and stressed that Islamabad joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a full member, and then joined the SCO Regional AntiTerrorist Structure (RATS) [14]. As a result of Russia's counterbalancing power in Afghanistan, according to some American experts, the U.S. found that it is better to negotiate with Taliban about US-withdrawal [5].
Back to the Middle East it should be recognized that some extraordinary events in Iraq may have great consequences. In 2018 there have been attacks on the U.S. embassy in the Iraqi capital Baghdad for the first time in several years. Rockets were fired at the U.S. Consulate in Basra. The White House has warned Iran that it will 'respond swiftly and decisively' [27]. Washington has no doubts that attacks were organized by the Iranian proxies. This demonstrates unsustainable position of the U.S. in Iraq. And there are a lot of players around Iraq - Russia, Turkey, Iran - that are willing to force the U.S. out of Iraq.
The main conclusion is that Russia tries to increase its own power and seeks for any opportunity to demonstrate the U.S. how vulnerable they are. Moscow acquires the power via the 'low-cost strategies' step by step. After 20 years of implementation of deterrence policy against Russia it is obvious where it leads. Does this policy work or not? This question was discussed by Mearsheimer and he compared the deterrence theory with the offensive and defensive realism. According to him the deterrence approach is unreliable. It's more of a tactic than a strategy. It works for such small countries, such as Serbia. The benefits of incorporation into the common market, the common liberal values and a democratic system opened for the influence, keep the states from confronting the Western superpowers. However, big countries behave in a different.
It is obvious that Russia was faced with the the choice: to agree to the rules established by the U.S. or to pay the high price for rejection. The deterioration of relations with Western countries, the isolation from Western markets by the sanctions, abandoning of common values are not the unacceptable price for Russia. Iran has made a similar choice. China is challenging the U.S. in the South China sea, refusing to surrender in a trade war demonstrates that it isn't going to yield to the U.S. demands at the expense of its sovereignty and to fulfill the American demands that might save the Chinese benefits on the global market. Beijing isn't ready to exchange its own security for something, which looks like a carrot, according to deterrence theory. There is no doubt that the policy of carrot
and stick has irreversibility of concessions and some negative consequences for some goats who were treated. The states that have exchanged its own security for a carrot couldn't return the security back. Moreover, there are other states that have a stick and can take the carrot away. Turkey, being American ally, isn't ready to exchange its own security and ambition to be recognized as a local superpower for the benefits of cooperation whith the U.S.
Having committed to the defensive realism, Russia didn't yet change the U.S. offensive behavior. The offensive and defensive realism may be seen as the different sides of one coin. The U.S. policy proves this. And America's NATO allies, such as the Baltic States, are used in the strategy of countering Russia. The key problem for Russia is the conflict with Ukraine that is applied by the U.S. to deter the Russian power following the strategy of buck-passing. The U.S. uses Ukraine against Russia. Both strategies - the offensive or defensive realism -pursuit the power by different ways. It's useful to recall that USSR have pursued a policy of the defensive realism and got some concessions from the United States. So, the discussion about which theory is more reliable should get outcomes only with the connection with the costs of both strategies. These costs should be considered in relation with the resources of states. The Great powers have far more resources than the smaller states. The Defensive realism may be the optimal strategy for the smaller states, because the offensive realism policy will lead to the unacceptable costs.
Indirect defensive realism approach
Usually the confrontation between two states is considered in terms of defensive and offensive realism. Russia uses the defensive approach against the U.S. but prefers not to use a primitive direct support of American adversarials. The direct support of adversarials is a classic deterrence tool, but may trigger the "security dilemma spiral" [10][11]. Russia does not wish the U.S. to respond as it illustrated in Fig. 1. Russia is willing to create (or to find) the sensitive point of the U.S. interests and to demonstrate the U.S. that there are two options. Russia may engage in the dispute and may not to do that, may harm the U.S. interests or may help the U.S. (as it happened in early 2000 in Afghanistan). It depends on the American actions at the other fields. The defensive realism approach of Russia is to offer the U.S. the choice: to increase own vulnerability or to ease, to get ("to switch on") the additional threat or not to face that. Moscow offers "to switch the on\off" option. But it's in Russia's interest to do this not directly, but through the intermediate state. The best example is Russia's nowadays cooperation with Pakistan in the Afghan conflict, that irritates the U.S. (Fig. 2). The kind of this is Russia's countering the U.S. in Syria through Turkey as the intermediate state. Russia supplies Turkey with S-400 air defense system. This makes the United States angry. And they refuse to supply Turkey with the F-35 fighters [12].
This may be indicated as the indirect defensive realism. The strategy of the simultaneous game on several boards means the interdependence of moves. The
opponent should feel himself like being stuck in a glue. If the U.S. don't honor Russia's interests on some boards, the new point of American weakness will be found and a new trouble for the U.S. will be created. There are two conflicts in which Moscow didn't yet interfere ('switched off' the threat). The first is the Iran-U.S. standoff. The US standoff with the North Korea is the second one. It is more reasonable to hold the position before the 'switch on'. If Russia 'switches on' a threat first, it will be a little bit hard defensive realism, not so smooth. But all options are on the table. The most valuable engagement of Russia may be in the Chinese-US conflict over the islands in the South-China sea. But Moscow tries to escape the direct opposing of the U.S.
If the defensive realism approach doesn't work, Russia is ready to face the scenario like the Caribbean crisis between USSR and the U. S. Once this a wild card in the pocket has worked. Another scenario is to revive the Russia - U.S. standoff in Europe before the signing of the arms control agreement - The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty - in 1987. President D. Trump has confirmed the U.S. will leave an the arms control treaty with Russia dated from the Cold war that has kept the nuclear missiles out of Europe [2]. Considering the possibility of nuclear war and insisting that retaliation is inevitable, the Russia's president V. Putin made a symbolic joke: 'We would be victims of an aggression and would get to heaven as martyrs while those who initiated the aggression would just die and not even have time to repent' [1]. However, the times when the world stability was based on a bipolar system during the Cold war are gone. Now there are one superpower and two semi-superpowers - Russia and China. So, the probability of clashes between the United States and Russia will depend on the activity of the offensive and defensive policies of each State. This can be expressed in Fig. 3.
The ratio of losses and benefits also affects the probability of clashes (Fig.4). The "positive" side of nuclear weapons is a high cost of win. The price of one super power defeating another in a clash is unacceptable. As R. Jervis established [10], there are four types of security dilemma. The types are different combinations of the ability to divide the offensive and defensive weapons with the degree of the offensive or defensive strategy benefits. The Russian-American type of security dilemma is one of the most toughest. Russia considers all American weapons as offensive, but the United States do not agree. In line with the Jervis's approach the U.S. seems to believe the offensive strategy is better than the defensive one, but Russia believes the opposite.
Offensive or defensive realism: what may change state's behavior?
It's undisputable that the offensive or defensive realism gives only effective approach but not a guarantee to win. So, the next question put by international experts is which American policy may change the behavior of Russia in the direction desired by the U.S.?
There were attempts to determine what structural characteristics lead to the offense or defense dominance. The rate of technological advances, geography,
diplomatic and military factors, social and political order were considered among the other factors, that affect the choice between the defensive or offensive strategy [4]. But there is an important question to what consequences in military, economic, social spheres the choice of offensive or defensive approach may lead? What are the costs and benefits of the competitive behavior?
Changing the behavior of State on the international stage may have consequences not only in the foreign policy (F). All steps in the offensive or defensive strategy will have results that can be evaluated also in the domestic policy (I), defense and security (D), economy (E) [6, 35]. The consequences for Russia defending the position taken in scenario of confrontation with the U.S. by the defensive realism approach may be expressed by the equation:
QRu = F(+\-) + I(+) + D(+\-) + E(-\-)
Probably the rise of stake in the confrontation through the third countries does not guarantee a better position and can lead to both negative and positive consequences in the foreign policy, so F(+\-). The effects of competitive behavior will undoubtedly be positive for the domestic policy. The largest part of Russian society is shaped of patriotic believes and dreams of power rising. So, the evaluation is I(+). The impact on the defense and security also does not guarantee a shift to the better position at first step. Thus, D(+\-). But main negative consequences will occur in the economy. Sanctions will be strengthened. It's undisputable E(-\-).
What consequences Russia will face in the case of the acquiescence policy? Lowering the confrontation will definitely not improve the Russian foreign policy position. This will only encourage the U.S. to demand new concessions. So, F(-\-). Any concessions will impact on the domestic situation in a negative way. It will remind about the weakness of Russia in the 90s. Thus, I(-\-). There is no doubt that the reduction of confrontation with the United States will not strengthen the Russia's security. Perhaps only at the first moment. Washington will demand new concessions, for example regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as is it happening now. The return of Crimea back to Ukraine will also weaken the Russia's security. Therefore, it should be recognized as D(-\-). The consequences of reducing the tensions in the confrontation with the United States for the economy will be positive in the short term, but in the long term the U.S. will try to limit Russia's revenues from oil and gas, as well as access to the technologies and investments, on which the Russian defense potential is based. So, the consequences will be mixed as E(+\-).
The behavior of a state may change if the sum of benefits and costs of reducing the confrontation will be greater than those of the continuing confrontation.
Qreduc.conf. / Qcontin.conf. > 1
Otherwise, the competitive behavior will continue. Even a rough estimate of costs and benefits shows that there is no sense for Russia to make concessions to the United States. But Russia is not interested in the military confrontation, and is interested in the negotiations, because it is beneficial for the national economy. At the same time, the Washington's policy will have costs and benefits too. The Russia's goal is to make the costs for the U.S. too large for the benefits achieved, but to keep the own costs at the acceptable level. This is the costs and benefits ratio that triggers the change of policy.
Emerging power distribution shifts in 2019
Meanwhile, since the beginning of 2019, Russia and the United States are on the edge of a new stage of the mutual offensive deterrence. President Putin openly stated that after the beginning of the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty, Russia is beginning to develop new long-range ground-based cruise missiles and new ballistic (quasi-ballistic hypersonic) medium-range missiles. But he stressed that Russia's medium-and shorter-range missiles will not be placed in Europe and other parts of the world until the U.S. would not place such weapons there [19].
The 1987 INF Treaty was a clear win for the U.S. in the competition with the decrepit and weakening USSR, that tried to change its foreign policy to reconcile with the West and stop the arms race, because of the problems in its own economy. In accordance with the Treaty, the USSR destroyed 1,846 missiles at 117 sites, the U.S. - 846 missiles at 31 sites [30]. The INF Treaty prohibited the ground-based missiles only. Most of the Soviet missiles were ground-based ballistic missiles, but most of the U.S. medium-range missiles were sea-and air-based cruise missiles. As a result of the implementation of the Treaty in 1991, the United States had a lot of cruise missiles on the ships, submarines and bombers, but the Soviet Union did not have any medium-range and shorter-range missiles.
By 2015, however, Russia developed "Caliber"-type medium-range cruise missiles, a large number of which were deployed on the ships and submarines without violating the INF Treaty. Moreover, in 2018 the quasi-ballistic missile x-47M2 "Dagger" was adapted so it could be launched from the MiG-31 heavy fighter. The total has range increased to 3,500 kms. It was a clear sign for the United States that in a few years Russia will be able to eliminate the advantage of the United States in the medium-range cruise missiles. After that the U.S. used a formal pretext to accuse Russia of violating the INF Treaty, because there is no point for Washington to follow the Treaty any further.
Apparently, this is a turning point when the Russia's countering of the United States has been applied indirectly only. The U.S. officials understand that and want to forestall it. Once the INF Treaty lapses, only one New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will constrain U.S. and Russian nuclear forces up to 2021. It is highly likely the United States will not extend the New START Treaty on the same terms after its expiring in 2021. D. Trump criticized New START as a bad Obama deal. There are a lot of politicians in Washington that opposed
New START, in part because the Treaty entailed equal limits for the United States and Russia. In 2002 Washington insisted on the treaty model, which limited the deployed warheads, but not the missiles and bombers. Now Moscow is not going to accept an agreement that left missiles and bombers unconstrained, especially when the United States has a numerical advantage [23].
The non extension of New START will demise the nuclear strategic balance and may lead to a new Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. But there is no necessity for Russia to deploy the missiles in Cuba or Venezuela in the new era of the naval technological capabilities. In order to create a new threat to the United States it is enough to have a naval base near the United States and a lot of small cheap corvettes or submarines with the cruise missiles of medium range. Speaking about new Russia's naval missile systems President V. Putin recognized that strikes may be conducted against those territories, where decision centers are located and also include targets on the American soil [17]. Russia demonstrates ability to produce such naval weapons. The United States is very vulnerable from the sea, just as Russia is vulnerable to a hypothetical missile attack from the territory of Ukraine and other Russia's neighbors. The history proves that the offensive strategy of one super power against the offensive strategy of another comparative power leads to the negotiating table keeping in mind the meaningless of war.
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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЯ
Fig. 1
Hard defensive realism strategy
Fig. 2
Strategy of countering through intermediate State (smooth)
Fig. 3
The dependence of the probability of clashes on the activity of «offensive» and «defensive» strategies of each State
'1 P clashes
-►
0 0,5 1,0 1,5 K= offen (US) / defen(Rus)
Fig. 4
The dependence of the probability of clashes on the price of consequences (Price = losses / benefits)
'1 P clashes
0
0,5
1,0
-►
1,5 losses / benefits
