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Volume 6 Issue 4 2012
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Nadana FRIDRIKHSON
Director of the Institute of Demography, Migration, and Regional Development, Project Coordinator at the Center for Strategic Development Modeling (Moscow, the Russian Federation).
U.S. AND RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: THE FORMATION OF NEW TRENDS
Abstract
This article examines the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. and Russia have defined the main interests in the region. Furthermore, whereas Washington has its own interests and mechanisms for implementing its designated plans, Moscow, although it clearly values its presence in the Central Caucasus, has been unable to draw up an alternative
project to counteract the advance of the U.S. into the region.
This paper also analyzes the possible risks for Russia if a Central Caucasian strategy is not drawn up, examines the new trends in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and notes the need to revise the status of the OSCE Minsk Group and form a potential interregional leader.
And everyone is talking about Karabakh again
Alexander Koreniugin
Introduction
Any region experiencing territorial conflicts is exposed to two main trends—it becomes a target of interest of major external players and a mechanism of influence on geopolitical competitors, on the one hand, while the countries party to the conflict may undergo a socioeconomic slump, thus creating prerequisites for the interference of external forces in political life, on the other.
One of the most protracted conflicts in the Central Caucasus is the opposition between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Unsuccessful talks have been going on between Baku and Erevan since 1994, whereby a consensus cannot be reached due to the diametrically opposite positions of the sides. Baku places the priority on preserving Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, with Nagorno-Karabakh as its integral part, while Armenia upholds the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act—the right of nations to self-determination. Furthermore, the OSCE Lisbon Summit of 1996, at which the co-chairs offered three main principles for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, was not a breakthrough, but only another link in a long chain of subsequent negotiations. Neither the subsequent Madrid Principles of 2007, nor the Zurich Protocols of 2009 were recognized or changed the current situation.
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On the whole, the mediation by external geopolitical players can provisionally be divided into five phases.
■ The first relates to 1992 when CSCE mediation dominated over independent attempts by individual countries to establish talks.
■ The second phase relates to Russia's declaration of its interests, which led to a decrease in the influence and role of the CSCE.
■ The third phase—from December 1994 to the end of 1996—is characterized by an increase in cooperation and rise in trust between the OSCE and Russia, which ended in the Lisbon Summit of 1996.
■ During the fourth phase, in 1997, France and the U.S., along with Russia, became co-chairs of the Minsk Group, which intensified international attention toward the conflict, as well as Azerbaijan's discontent, since it saw France as a pro-Armenian force.
■ The fifth phase signified direct talks between the presidents of both countries, during which the OSCE was essentially relegated to the background.
So today it has become clear that not one of the initiatives undertaken has yielded the necessary result. The OSCE Minsk Group finally succeeded in providing the sides with a permanent platform for holding talks on peaceful settlement of the crisis, as well as in monitoring the situation in the contact zone. However, this, on top of the constant reports from both the Azeri and the Armenian sides on violations and periodic human losses, is intensifying the irritation felt by the conflicting sides and demonstrating the acute need for new solutions.
It is important to note that all of the external players drawn to one extent or another into resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue are pursuing their own interests, which is significantly complicating the resolution of one of the most arduous territorial conflicts in post-Soviet history.
Furthermore, today, when talking about the Central Caucasian countries, it should be acknowledged that there are prerequisites in the region for forming a strong player capable of initiating a new integration project that will unite the member countries of the region and turn them into a single geopolitical entity that will pursue its own interests on the world stage. However, this requires restoration of a dialog between the states, which relates directly to the territorial disputes. It is precisely these aspects that are arousing the keen interest of external players who are essentially striving to integrate the region into their own political course and appoint their own protégé. So the region's member states must monitor the initiatives they are being offered with particular care, correlate them with their own interests and prospects for future development, and strive to recreate a complete picture of the interests of foreign political players in order to identify partners and antagonists.
U.S. Policy in the Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Washington's interest in protracted settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is closely intertwined with U.S. policy as a whole in the post-Soviet expanse. It is worth noting that Washington perceived the collapse of the Soviet Union as one of the important victories of the 20th century. A vast territory subordinated to a single center and acting as a single geopolitical entity that formed the bipolar system in the world disintegrated into 15 states. Discussions about the reasons for the collapse are still going on today, while it should not be forgotten that a large number of American political scientists were drawing up a concept regarding the disintegration of the Union and trying to find the Achilles'
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heel of this extremely complex state entity. Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the most influential representatives of the U.S. political elite, at one time reckoned that the national question was the Soviet Union's weak link. It should be kept in mind that this mechanism of destabilization is still active today.
In the initial period after the collapse of the Union, which can be provisionally defined as a "struggle for the Soviet Union's heritage," the United States kept a close watch on the processes going on in the post-Soviet expanse, striving to identify places in the region that might be potentially conducive to its own interests. Worried that Moscow might restore its former power, the Western players initiated different projects, the main aim of which, apart from supposedly assisting the establishment of a democratic system, was the desire to pull the former Soviet republics away from Russia. Keeping in mind the grievances and complaints that had accumulated against Moscow, this was not a difficult task.
It stands to reason that when claiming world hegemony, the United States had a keen interest in the Central Caucasian region. This defines Washington's tasks in the region: aggravation of the situation around Iran (and here it should be remembered that this problem affect the interests of Turkey— the historical rival of Iran, Israel, and Armenia—a state which, only by cooperating with Iran, can withdraw from its isolation), Azeri oil, and, of course, access to the Black and Caspian seas, which pave the way to further penetration into Central Asia. It is no coincidence that in August 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton declared the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea zones of U.S. national interests.
If we look at a map of the region, we can follow the logical chain of Washington's foreign political intervention—Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq—which legitimately lead to Iran, and given Turkey's solidarity with NATO, the U.S. could soon control this important area. Nor should we forget the U.S.'s presence in Afghanistan.
All of these aspects are closely related to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is vital for the U.S. to dominate in this region.
■ First, the Georgian political elite's inclination toward Western policy allows the United States to be close to the rather unstable North Caucasian region, which, given the forecast of a new wave in the financial crisis, will make it possible for Washington to manipulate the situation.
■ Second, it is advantageous for the U.S. to control Georgia and Azerbaijan, without allowing, in so doing, Tbilisi and Baku to strengthen bilateral cooperation.
This is particularly important given that Azerbaijan and Georgia are encountering similar problems today, primarily unresolved territorial disputes, and this aspect is very propitious with respect to manipulating sociopolitical opinion in these countries. Moreover, the presence of the U.S. in the region and its control over the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh question will make it possible to squeeze Russia out of the area.
In other words, as of today Washington is not interested in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since this will boost development of the Central Caucasus and eliminate the U.S.'s lever of pressure and manipulation. It is more advantageous for the U.S. to make use of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to solve its own tasks, establish its hegemony, and gain control over oil and access to the Caspian Sea, with further advance into Central Asia. This gives every reason to affirm that today the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the United States' "window" to energy-rich Central Asia, where Washington will begin competing with China.
So today Washington's policy regarding Nagorno-Karabakh is directed toward creating prerequisites for further prolonging settlement of the conflict. It could use the national minority question and territorial bargaining in the context of the Iranian question as tools to achieve this end. For example, talks could go along the lines of "recognizing the independence of the "NKR" (the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) and South Azerbaijan." However, it is unlikely that such a proposal will come to fruition, if only because unification of South Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijan Republic will entail launching combat action against Iran. What is more, it should not be forgotten that
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this scenario will require upturning the whole of public opinion formed in Azerbaijan over the last 20 years in the context of the need to restore Azerbaijan's territorial integrity by returning Nagorno-Karabakh. This aspect returns us to the question of the possibility of forming a new player in the Central Caucasian region capable of launching the "gathering of land" mechanism within the framework of a new integration project. Given the resolution of territorial disputes, today Azerbaijan, which is capable of creating a political and economic bloc of regional states, could well become this state. An important element of this formation will be the supra-religious format, since this aspect could create another lever of pressure on the countries.
It is important to note that the international community might have a contradictory opinion about the establishment of a new union. On the one hand, it could halt the advance of the U.S., while on the other, it will ultimately put an end to the question of integration of the regional states into the Eurasian Union.
However, it is premature to analyze this situation since the project cannot be brought to fruition until the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, as well as several other problems and tasks have been resolved.
Russia's Policy in the Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Both the conflicting sides and the international community have a contradictory opinion about Russia's participation in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, whereby both of these viewpoints are based on their personal perception of Moscow.
It is important to note that today both Azerbaijan and Armenia are Russia's strategic partners in the post-Soviet expanse, which makes Moscow's interest in settlement this conflict feasible, on the one hand, while it arouses legitimate mutual irritation of the participants in the conflict, on the other. After Vladimir Putin designated a course toward establishing a Eurasian Union, insinuations began spreading, like an echo in the mountains, that Russia will make use of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a lever to promote Azerbaijan's and Armenia's integration into the Eurasian Economic Union.
Today, Russia's political elite has been showing an understanding of all the negative and destructive consequences of this method for attracting countries. However, this has in no way changed the partners' perception of Moscow. Therefore, Baku and Erevan are skeptical of this initiative, which of course casts aspersions on Russia as a mediator in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Furthermore, in contrast to the tactics being pursued by Washington (even if they do not meet the interests of either Azerbaijan or Armenia), Russia does not have its own project today for ensuring its presence or influence on the processes in the Central Caucasian region.
The statement by State Duma Speaker ex-head of the RF presidential administration Sergey Naryshkin1 shows that Russia's political upper crust understands that it needs to have its own projects and solutions to counteract U.S. intervention, however there is nothing specific today, and the absence of solutions is fraught for Moscow with the conflicting sides losing their confidence in it, which is further aggravated by the absence of a political dialog with Georgia.
1 "We are against resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in accordance with ready solutions from the outside. We firmly believe that the problem can be resolved if the interests of both sides are ensured. If this kind of solution is found, Russia is ready to act as guarantor of such an agreement," available at [http://www.yerkramas.org/2012/07/09/ spiker-gosdumy-rf-rossiya-protiv-resheniya-karabaxskogo-konflikta-po-gotovym-receptam/].
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The statement made by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin2 during a conversation with the Voice of Russia radio station gives reason to believe that Russia has faith in the success of further efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group, even though, as was indicated earlier, this structure has essentially failed to make any positive contribution to resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
All of these statements show that Moscow must dramatically change its strategy in this matter, since as of today Russia's policy regarding settlement of the Karabakh conflict boils down to rhetoric about the need for preserving peace and the sides coming to a compromise agreement.
There is a grain of truth in this position in the sense that it would be expedient for Baku and Erevan, after analyzing the efforts of the mediators over the last five-seven years, to try and exclude "extraneous third parties," since the interest of mediators is largely hindering the search for a compromise solution.
The matter concerns a possible change in the OSCE Minsk Group members or even the formation of a new structure, which, having accumulated previous work experience, will be called upon to find a solution to the problem. It is not the Western countries that should provide the vector for resolving this internal regional problem, but the states that have close ties with the Central Caucasian region and are interested in its establishment as a strong geopolitical entity. These countries are Turkey, Iran, Russia, and possibly Israel.
If Moscow begins manipulating the Karabakh problem in the context of promulgating integration into the Eurasian Economic Union, defines a precise format of cooperation with Turkey in this issue (since ignoring Ankara's position could have negative consequences), determines its position with respect to Iran keeping in mind the aspects designated earlier that have an influence on the Ka-rabakh issue, and comes to the understanding that Nagorno-Karabakh is the United States' "window" to Central Asia, prerequisites will be created for forming Moscow's new strategy on the Central Caucasus, which will proceed from an objective understanding of the processes that are currently unfolding, including the need to establish a regional leader.
So with respect to the policy of the U.S. and Russia in the Central Caucasus, including in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, a situation is developing today in which Washington is striving to implement its own scenario of the development of events, exclusively lobbying its own interests, while Russia has still not ultimately formulated its regional position, evaluating events in the context of the prospects for establishing a Eurasian Economic Union and the need to use its projects to counter the West.
Nevertheless, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still requires settlement. And this is conditioned both by the general situation on the international arena and by the domestic political and socioeconomic situation in the countries party to the conflict.
There are always two ways to resolve such disputes—either war (which does not meet the interests of either Azerbaijan or Armenia, since it brings only destruction beneficial to external players) or peace, whereby the key aspect here is future development.
The territories belonging to the states are asking for the authorities to meet several demands: an adequate level of socioeconomic life, protection from external threats, and the opportunity to produce and reap the benefits of their work. Unfortunately, these aspects are frequently relegated to the background, giving way to political rhetoric and the striving to reinforce one's status on the international arena. What is more, involvement of the states' authorities in productive forces development and regulation of economic relations would create entirely different conditions and change
2 "I think that we need to focus all efforts, as before, on the Minsk Group. There is a Minsk Group comprised of co-chairs and representatives of France, the United States, and Russia, as well as OSCE representatives who are working very conscientiously, traveling to the region, meeting with the leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and helping them to find acceptable formulations for future documents. We support this activity in every way and believe that it will soon lead to a specific result," available at [http://rus.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/65446337/83906817.html].
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the overall appearance of the conflict. If a country claims territory not by war, but by peace, it must offer projects that correspond to the demands of this territory, for example, the restoration of industry, infrastructural projects, the creation of new jobs, the development of machine- and lathe-building, and so on. Only after finding a solution to these tasks can we talk about the next step— settlement of territorial disputes by means of integration, whereby integration initiated precisely by an internal player.
Therefore, when talking about settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, mediators, and particularly Russia, should carry out an analysis ofwhich of the rivaling states—Azerbaijan or Armenia—is capable today of offering the NKR the necessary conditions for development.
This should not and will not become the key element in resolution of the problem, but will provide an entirely new vector. The Central Caucasian Region will be able to become an independent geopolitical entity not only with respect to regulating political aspects, but also in the post-conflict period when all the countries of the region will be able to develop their own potential. And here again it is appropriate to return to the question of establishing a regional leader that understands the price of peace, adequately evaluates the primary tasks, and is capable not only of acting as an initiator of unification, but also of formulating a general course for all the Central Caucasian states toward future development. However, this format is not advantageous to the West, particularly the United States, since if this happens its "window" to Central Asia will be closed.
Conclusion
Today we are witnessing a growing clash of interests among the major players in the Central Caucasus. The U.S.'s strategy to exclude Russia from the region is essentially being implemented in a non-aggressive form, while also producing the desired results. Such methods as information propaganda, close work with the countries' elites, introduction of American culture, and so on, have already proven productive. And if Moscow is unable to provide an alternative program to counteract this advance and particularly if it shifts to an aggressive method, it will only accelerate its exclusion, as well as create prerequisites for local military clashes in the region.
Although this article does not aim to model a military scenario of the development of events, it still makes sense to note that military provocation in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh question could rather quickly escalate into more serious clashes. In so doing, keeping in mind the situation with Iran, the Arab Spring events in several countries, and the absence of a single vector in the policy of the Central Caucasian states, it can be presumed that any potential military clashes would spread further than Azerbaijan and Armenia alone. So it is vital that Russia retain its partner relations with the Central Caucasian countries, define a format of interaction with Georgia (restoration of a political dialog with Tbilisi being one of the primary tasks of Russian diplomacy), and draw up and implement a "breakthrough" project in the region, which in the future could become Russia's reference point. In this sense, settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will not only promote strengthening of Moscow's position, but will largely change the overall geopolitical reality in the region. And whereas for the U.S. the Karabakh question is a way to promote its own advance into Central Asia, for Russia it could become a springboard for forming a new strategy in the Central Caucasus.
