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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Gulshan PASHAEVA
Ph.D. (Philol.), Deputy Director of the Center for Strategic Studies under
the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (Baku, Azerbaijan).
EUROPEAN MODELS OF AUTONOMY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT SETTLEMENT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Abstract
The article looks at the possibility of using several key elements in some of Europe's autonomous entities as a base model for settling the Armenian-Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is presumed
that the so-called interim status of Nagorno-Karabakh developed on the basis of European experience could later be an integral part in determining the final status of this region.
Introduction
When analyzing the reasons for the existing or potential conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse, politicians and experts frequently refer to the lack of correspondence between the current political-administrative and the historical religious, ethnic, or linguistic borders. Furthermore, this lack of correspondence is characteristic of many countries, whereby world experience shows that direct attempts to set this matter to rights end in the emergence of new, even more complicated problems. In this context, the experience of European regionalization—the long-term strategy of the EU member states aimed at systematic and consistent expansion of the competences of regions in the political, socioeconomic, and cultural spheres—is of immense practical interest. That said, despite the fact that many
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EU countries have regions where national minorities compactly reside, the separation of such regions based on ethnocultural factors alone is a relatively rare occurrence,1 while the main objective of the EU's regional policy is to reduce the gap in the socioeconomic development levels of different regions.
The principle of subsidiariness,2 which defines the approach to distributing powers among different levels of authority, is the legal basis of regionalism in the EU. Within the framework of this approach, management problems should primarily be resolved at the regional (and/or local) level, providing that their resolution is possible and effective. On the other hand, the central government traditionally reserves itself exclusive powers in such spheres as foreign policy, defense, currency regulation, customs and border service, and constitutional legislation, for example, whereby keeping in mind the legal interests of the regions. It is believed that this harmonious redistribution of rights and duties between the central and regional authorities promotes the establishment of the relevant procedures and institutions that make it possible to combine local self-administration and national interests, as well as defuse the ethnic, religious, and cultural tension that arises in multiethnic states.
At the same time, the long and successful experience of regional autonomies in several European countries provides sufficiently compelling reasons for using these autonomies as models in conflict settlement. To confirm this, experts have even been discussing the possibility of adopting certain elements of the Aland model, for example, in relation to the so-called northern territories that continue to be the main bone of contention in Russian-Japanese relations.3 Another pertinent point is that as early as 1999, a group of members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe submitted a resolution draft on universal principles for resolving ethnic conflicts in Council of Europe member states, whereby the model of conflict settlement used on the Aland Islands was one of the successful examples pointed out.4
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the idea of using the positive experience of several European autonomous entities as a model of conflict settlement became quite popular among the representatives of several international organizations, state structures, the expert community, and the public of the South Caucasian countries. It is generally known that the European models of autonomy help to overcome the downside of extreme administration centralization and make it possible to create favorable opportunities for socioeconomic development and preservation of the national-cultural identity of minorities within a single state. And although the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group has still not led to any visible success in settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, it is obvious that studying European experience is of great practical significance both for Azerbaijan and for Armenia, since it makes it possible for the conflicting sides to delineate the basic outlines of the autonomy that the Armenian population of the region could be offered.
One of the possible ways to withdraw from the impasse is to offer Nagorno-Karabakh a so-called interim status that would allow the sides to temporarily retreat from their extreme viewpoints on status definition and concentrate on resolving the region's urgent socioeconomic and humanitarian problems. Baku believes that this approach, by ensuring the legitimacy of this self-governed territory,
1 See: Regionalnaia politika stran ES, ed. by A.V. Kuznetsov, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2009, p. 9, available at [http://www.imemo.ru/ru/publ/2009/09024.pdf] (availability of all Internet resources checked as of 1 July, 2012.—G.P.).
2 See: I.I. Khokhlov, "Subsidiarnost kak printsip i mekhanizm politiki Evrosoiuza," Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhd-unarodnye otnosheniia, No. 5, 2004, pp. 95-101, available at [http://www.edu.ru/db/portal/e-library/00000045/ Hohlov.pdf].
3 See: M. Ikegami, "Rost doveriia, bezopasnost cheloveka, smiagchenie suvereniteta: reshenie problemy 'sev-ernykh territorii', podskazannoe 'Alandskoi modeliu,'" Analytical Reports of the Scientific-Coordination Council on International Studies of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University), Russian Foreign Ministry, Issue 4 (19), October 2007; Development and Stability in Northeast Asia, Papers from the Fourth Russian-Japanese Scientific Practical Conference, Moscow, 18 October, 2006, pp. 28-31, available at in Russian [http://www.mgimo.ru/files/11817/ad-19.pdf].
4 See: Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts in Council of Europe Member States, Motion for a Resolution, Doc. 8425, 28 May, 1999, available at [http://www.assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc99/EDOC8425.htm].
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will allow the Armenian and Azeri communities of Nagorno-Karabakh, relying on European practice, to independently form legislative, executive, municipal, and other local bodies, the functioning of which will create favorable conditions for drawing up a consensus decision about the final status of the region.
European Autonomies: From Opposition to Cooperation
During the long years of their development, the leading European countries have been able to create diverse forms of autonomous entities that enjoy different degrees of self-government for protecting the collective rights of ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities. According to the figurative expression offered by Ruth Lapidoth, author of the book Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, "Autonomy is a means for diffusion of powers in order to preserve the unity of a state while respecting the diversity of its population."5 In practice, a solution to this dual task is reached by heeding not only the majority's, but also the minority's opinion when making decisions on important issues, that is, in this case, "the principle of consensus" proves just as significant as "the principle of the majority."6 At first glance, this mechanism does not entirely correspond to the generally accepted formula "one person-one vote." However, experience shows the expediency of using particular conciliation mechanisms for making consensus decisions in the event that one of the sides (the central government or the autonomy) thinks that the other side has exceeded its legislative powers.
With this in mind, such examples of autonomous entities as the Aland Islands (Finland) and Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol (Italy) are of particular interest. Despite their different historical experience, these European autonomies share several common factors, taking account of which could prove beneficial for reaching a conflict settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh.
■ First, these autonomies are essentially national-territorial entities, the majority of the population of which belongs to an ethnic community that is in turn a minority within the framework of the entire state.
■ Second, in order to retain the identity of the minority, these autonomies have the right to independently form their own legislative, executive, and other local bodies.
■ Third, each of these models of autonomy is continuously evolving, which leads to the dynamic redistribution of powers between the central government and the government bodies of the autonomous region, as well as influences the set of powers that applies to matters of their joint competence.
■ Fourth, these autonomies have effective guarantees,7 including international, to ensure their stable functioning.
It is worth noting that a positive contribution was made to resolution of the conflict situations around several European autonomies precisely by those neighboring countries that supported the population of these autonomies in their opposition to the center due to ethnic kinship, on the one hand,
5 R. Lapidoth, Autonomy:Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, United State Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 3.
6 T. Fliainer, "Pravovye mekhanizmy i protsedury dlia predotvrashcheniia i resheniia natsionalnykh konfliktov iz opyta shveitsarskoi konstitutsii," Kazanasky federalist, No. 3 (7), 2003, available at [http://www.kazanfed.ru/dokladi/jor-nal/kazfed_7.pdf].
7 For more on guarantees in conflict settlement, see: St. Wolff, Guarantees and Conflict Settlements, available at [http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/Guarantees%20in%20Conflict%20Settlements.pdf].
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and strictly adhered to the basic principles of international law, on the other. Particular mention should also be made of Sweden's level-headed posture, which acceded to the League of Nations' ruling that the Aland Islands belonged to Finland.8
To present another example, Austria and Italy struggled long and hard over the situation in South Tyrol, where different ethnic groups, whose current status depended on which of the two state entities this region belonged to, lived for many centuries. Before World War I, the Trentino-South Tyrol region belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while the Italians who made up the majority of the population in Trentino comprised the national minority in this empire. However, in 1919, in accordance with the Saint Germaine Treaty that de jure registered the fall of the empire, all the territories to the south of the Brenner Pass went to Italy. Venezia Tridentina, which comprises Italian-speaking Trentino and Alto Adige, populated mainly by a German-speaking population, who in turn became a national minority in the Italian State, was created in these territories. Furthermore, another ethnic minority has lived in this region from time immemorial—the Ladins, whose language belongs to the Rhaeto-Roman subgroup of languages and who presently comprise around 4% of the population of South Tyrol.9
It should be noted that despite the outcome of World War I, Austria did not consider the question of South Tyrol to be finally closed and hoped that Germany, as well as close cooperation between the Hitler and Mussolini regimes, would promote its favorable outcome. But the state interests of Germany and Italy took the upper hand and the German-speaking population of South Tyrol was offered the choice of either abandoning its homeland and adopting German citizenship, or remaining and having to deal with the real threat of assimilation by the Italians.
The first attempt to finally settle the problem was made in 1946 after an interstate treaty between Austria and Italy was signed (the so-called Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement).10 Within the framework of this treaty, the German-speaking population of the province of Bolzano (South Tyrol) and the neighboring bilingual population settlements of the province of Trento were guaranteed complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants, the opportunity to obtain an education in their native language, and use German in public institutions and official documents; they were also issued a quota for entering the public sector.
However, in 1948, when it adopted the first legislative act on the status of the autonomy, Italy united the province of Bolzano (South Tyrol) and Trento, thus forming a single region Trentino-Alto Adige. Having done so, ethnic Italians began to form the significant majority (around two thirds of the population) in this new autonomous region, which naturally aroused discontent among the German-speaking population. Austria supported the demands of the South Tyrolese, raising this question for the first time at the international level in the U.N. in 1960. A corresponding resolution11 of the U.N. General Assembly urged the two parties concerned to resume negotiations with a view to finding a solution for all differences relating to the implementation of the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement. Eventually, in 1969, the Italian and Austrian Governments agreed to a so-called Package of some 137 measures designed to revise the 1948 Autonomy Statute, as well as an 18-stage Operational Calendar for the Package's implementation.12 In 1972, a new significantly
8 For more on the special features of the Aland model in the context of defining the future status of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, see: G. Pashaeva, "The Aland Precedent," Caucasus International, No. 2, Autumn 2011, available at [http://caucasusinternational.org/article/30].
9 See: "South Tyrol in Figures," 2011, available at [http://www.provinz.bz.it/en/downloads/Siz_2011-eng.pdf].
10 See: Treaty of Peace with Italy. Appendix IV, available at [http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Vol-ume%2049/v49.pdf].
11 See: Resolution No. 1497 of the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly on "The Status of the German-Speaking Element in the Province of Bolzano (Bozen), Implementation of the Paris Agreement of 5 September 1946, " available at [http://www.un.org/ru/documents/ods.asp?m=A/RES/1497(XV)].
12 See: A. Alcock, The South Tyrol Autonomy. A Short Introduction, 2001, available at [http://www.provinz.bz.it/ en/downloads/South-Tyrol-Autonomy.pdf].
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revised Autonomy Statute13 was adopted on the basis of the Package, however in practice, full implementation of all the agreements was not achieved until 1992, after which Austria officially declared in the U.N. that the dispute with Italy over South Tyrol had been terminated.14
Incidentally, the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement is still in effect, since it not only forms the legal basis for the current Statute of South Tyrol, but is also an integral part of the peace treaty between Italy and its allies, which in this case essentially act as the guarantors of its performance. This fact has played a significant role in the positive development of the situation around South Tyrol, since the borders of both Austria and Italy were enforced by several agreements adopted at the end of World War II, thus placing the conflicting sides within a strict legal framework. There can be no doubt that integration of Austria and Italy into a single supranational entity—the European Union, which entailed the creation of an interstate transborder alliance—the Euro Region, the territory of which includes the Austrian Federal Region of Tyrol and the Italian Autonomous Region of Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol also helped to remove the contradictions in South Tyrol.
The problem of South Tyrol once more showed that effective settlement of an ethnopolitical conflict, particularly when the interests of many actors are affected, is entirely possible if its participants can forego their maximalist demands for the sake of achieving an end result, thus making a contribution to mutually advantageous integration and peaceful cooperation between previously conflicting nations. In particular, Austria, by supporting the fair demands of the German-speaking minority, treated the national interests and territorial integrity of Italy with respect, while the Italian government, by supporting the adoption of the region's new Statute in 1972, performed its obligations to protect the rights of its German-speaking citizens. The representatives of the main linguistic communities of South Tyrol also played their role, with the joint participation of whom a harmonious system of political institutions was created in the region ensuring equal relations both between the communities and between the autonomy and the center.
Interim Status for Nagorno-Karabakh
As we know, one of the reasons the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has still not been settled, despite the many years of efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group, is the absence of generally accepted rules for resolving this kind of ethnoterritorial conflict. Unfortunately, the world actors have been unable to reach a common opinion about when the right to self-determination should be realized exclusively within the borders of countries that already exist and are recognized by the world community, although determination in precisely this issue would promote a reduction in the threat to the national security and territorial integrity of many states. Moreover, in recent years we have been increasingly witness to a selective attitude toward the basic principles of international law on the part of the leading nations, particularly with respect to the conflicts in the Balkan countries and in the post-Soviet expanse. We can talk as long as we want about the degree of guilt of the sides involved in the events of August 2008, but we would do well to heed the opinion of well-known specialist in international law Rein Mullerson, who believes that "by formally recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia acted as rashly as those Western
13 See: Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol) Special Statute, available at [http://www.gfbv.it/3dossier/diritto/ statuteng.html].
14 See: Letter dated 17 June, 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A/46/939 of 19 June, 1992, available at [http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N92/263/51/PDF/N9226351.pdf?OpenElement].
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states which recognized Kosovo; both sides thus further opened the Pandora"s box of territorial disputes."15
As for Nagorno-Karabakh, to be fair, it is worth recalling one of the first attempts to officially delineate a conceptual framework of conflict settlement made at the OSCE Lisbon Summit in 1996.16 The Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group recommended three principles at that time for settling the Armenian-Azeri conflict, which were: territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic; legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan; and guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population.
As we know, Armenia, which sees in absolute terms the right of part of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh not only to self-determination, but also essentially to self-secession and the creation of their own state, was the only country that refused to support these principles, in particular the principle of territorial integrity. Unfortunately, the consensus nature of decision-making in the OSCE is projected onto the whole negotiation process, which for many years now continues to be based on the principle of "consent to everything or nothing." This hinders the opportunities of the Minsk Group to put pressure on the negotiation process, on the one hand, and creates the possibility for the sides in the conflict to reject practically any proposal of mediators based merely on their own vision of final settlement of the conflict, on the other.
This became particularly obvious after 2001, when the details of the three settlement proposals offered by the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group in 1997-1998 were published for the first time: the so-called "package solution," "step-by-step" solution, and "common state" proposal.17 As we know, the "step-by-step" solution aroused the fewest objections, both sides expressing their preliminary consent to it. Unfortunately, the then President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrossian was unable to convince his political opponents of the expediency of adopting this solution and was forced to step down, after which Armenia officially abandoned these proposals.18 An analysis of the events of those years again confirms the thought that only those settlement proposals can be of practical interest in which the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh is not defined until the subsequent stages of the negotiation process, since otherwise further development of the negotiations will inevitably be blocked by one or other of the sides.
Evidently the co-chairmen proceeded from these considerations when they put forward new proposals for settling the conflict—the so-called Madrid Principles, which were officially presented to the sides at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the OSCE member states in Madrid in November 2007.19 As we know, during the previous three years, the co-chairmen had repeatedly confirmed their adherence to the approach based on the Madrid Principles in various joint statements and urged the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to fulfill their obligations regarding coordination of the main principles for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.20
According to the Madrid document, which was first published in 2009, lasting settlement should be based on the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, including the principles of refraining
15 R. Müllerson, "The World after the Russia-Georgia War," 15 September, 2008, available at [http://www. opendemocracy.net/article/the-world-after-the-russia-georgia-war].
See: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Lisbon Summit, 1996, pp. 15-16, available at [http:// www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true].
17 See: "The Limits of Leadership: Elites and Societies in the Nagorny Karabakh Peace Process," Accord, Conciliation Resources, London, 2005, pp. 32-37, available at [http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/17_Nagorny%20Karabakh_ 2005_ENG_F.pdf].
18 See: I.M. Mammadov, T.F. Musaev, Armiano-azerbaidzhansky konflikt: istoria, pravo, posrednichestvo, Baku, 2008, p. 126.
19 See: OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Issue Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh, 29 November, 2007, available at [http://www.osce.org/mg/49237].
20 See: Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and François Hollande, President of the French Republic at the Los Cabos Summit of the Twenty, 19 June, 2012, available at [http://www.osce.org/mg/91393].
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from the threat or use of force, respect for territorial integrity, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The document also asserts that settlement should be based on the following six elements21:
■ return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control;
■ an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance;
■ a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh;
■ future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will;
■ the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and
■ international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.
It stands to reason that being in a state of profound confrontation, each of the conflicting sides interprets literally each of these elements, as well as the sequence for carrying them out, only from the perspective of their own interests. But the main thing is that the Madrid document does not assert the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, but only makes general mention of the mechanism for determining it by holding a referendum of the region's population. So it goes without saying that such factors as the conflicting sides recognizing the legitimacy of a referendum, the mechanism, as well as the deadlines for holding it are becoming extremely important.
Armenia thinks that the Azeris cannot return to Nagorno-Karabakh before holding a referen-dum22 and advocates the setting of clear time frames for holding it, presuming that owing to the numerical predominance of the Armenian community (as of the beginning of the conflict), the outcome of this referendum will be a foregone conclusion.23 It stands to reason that the international community will hardly support this approach since "this is too simplistic a reading of the possibilities a referendum could offer," while "ideally it would cement a negotiated peace deal and secure popular approval for its implementation." 24 And, of course, this mechanism of "guaranteed alienation" of Nagorno-Karabakh cannot suit the Azeri side, which, realizing the practical inapplicability of this form of "package" settlement of the conflict, prefers not to set specific time frames for this process.25
Moreover, as mentioned above, the European experience of settling ethnonational conflicts shows that the adopted decisions cannot always be legitimized by simple calculation of votes of the majority, since in this case the rights of the minority will inevitably be infringed upon. If settlement follows the scenario proposed by the Armenian side, the Azeri community of Nagorno-Karabakh will be that minority. To follow the logic of this scenario, the Armenian side should offer the Azeri community of Nagorno-Karabakh the same high status it demands for the Armenian community of this region. So either the Armenian side must agree that determination of the region's final status requires
21 See: Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by U.S. President Obama, Russian President Medvedev, and French President Sarkozy at the L'Aquila Summit of the Eight, 10 July, 2009, available at [http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-nagorno-karabakh-conflict].
22 See: President Serzh Sargsian answers the question of host of Vesti v subbotu Sergey Brilyov, 21 September, 2009, available in Russian at [http://president.am/events/press/rus/?year=2009&pn=1&id=37].
23 See: Interview of Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia Edward Nalbandian to the TV Channel Russia Today, January 2011, available in Russian at [http://www.mfa.am/ru/interviews/item/2011/01/30/russiatoday/].
24 Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 167, 11 October, 2005, p. 16, available at [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng= en&id=13730].
25 See: Exclusive interview of Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mamediarov to the Mediamax Agency, "Vremennye ramki golosovania uslozhniat situatsiiu," 11 March, 2011, available at [http://mediamax.am/ru-news-3-225.html].
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taking the opinion of the Azeri community into account, or continue to violate its rights, as it has been doing for more than 20 years now.
Nor should we forget that apart from infringing on the rights of the Azeri community, the conflict also led to violation of the rights of the hundreds of thousands of people populating the entire Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, which from the historical and geographical viewpoint has always comprised the lower (valley) and upper (mountainous) parts. In the national economic respect, Kara-bakh was a single entity, which was largely due to the fact that the Azeri population of lower Karabakh has long used the mountainous part of upper Karabakh (as well as part of the territory of present-day Armenia bordering on this region) as its summer pastures. Owing to this, as well as to the geographic features of the region, transport routes between the mountainous and valley parts of Karabakh passed largely from east to west through the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Unfortunately, the objective existence of such a socioeconomic and geographic concept as Greater Karabakh is still underestimated or even ignored by both the Armenian side and the international mediators, who prefer to view the conflict exclusively within the framework of an ethnic confrontation between the Armenian minority and Azerbaijan state.
Meanwhile, it is difficult not to agree with Anatoly Yamskov's statement that determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Lachin corridor, the legal position of the city of Shusha, and other complicated matters is not enough for achieving lasting peace in the region. In his opinion, "true settlement of the Karabakh conflict is only possible with restoration and further development of mutually advantageous and truly vital economic ties for the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent regions of Azerbaijan in transport routes, power engineering and communications, and the use of water resources."26
So it is obvious that long-term settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh does not boil down to the notorious formula "territory in exchange for a referendum," but demands taking solicitous account of the interests of both the Armenian and the Azeri communities of the region, as well as of the residents of the entire Greater Karabakh. One of the elements of the Madrid Principles, the so-called interim status,27 can play an important role in defining the mechanism for coordinating these interests. The Armenian side is trying to diminish the value of this element, claiming that the interim status offered Nagorno-Karabakh should be defined only as "all that Nagorno-Karabakh has today, plus the international recognition of that" (a so-called status-quo-plus arrangement).28 Meanwhile, in contrast to the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the determination of which can be unequivocally interpreted by each of the sides as victory or defeat, the interim status is a priori intended for solving very different tasks. The Azeri side views the interim status as an inevitable and very important stage in preparing favorable conditions for consensus determination (but not predetermination) of the final status of this region, whereby the elements of this status should later become an integral part of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh.29
When examining the question of granting Nagorno-Karabakh an interim status, we should also remember that the formation of modern autonomies in Europe has been a dynamic process stretching over long years. For example, over the more than 90 years that have passed since the Aland question first arose, the Law on Autonomy of this region has been amended several times. In particular, the
26 A. Yamskov, "Traditsionnoe zemlepolzovanie kochevnikov istoricheskogo Karabakha i sovremenny armiano-az-erbaidzhansky etnoterritorialny konflikt," in: Faktor etno-konfessionalnoi samobytnosti v postsovetskom obshchestve, ed. by M. Olkott, A. Malashenko, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 1998, pp. 168-197, available at [http://ethnoecology. ru/texts/yamskov/1998%20Traditsionnoe%20zemlepolzovanie%20kochevnikovistoricheskogo%20Karabakha.pdf].
27 See also: G. Pashaeva, "In Search of Reciprocal Compromises," Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, 2012, pp. 115167, available at [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/In-Search-of-Reciprocal-Compromises-15509].
28 See: "The Security Challenges in the Foreign Policy of Armenia," IISSNewsletters, September 2011, p. 13.
29 See: "We Can Calmly Reach a Peace Agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh," Interview of Foreign Minister of the Azerbaijan Republic E. Mamediarov to Interfax, 13 July, 2011, available in Russian at [http://www.interfax.ru/ txt.asp?id=199137&sec=1483].
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first Law on Autonomy adopted by the Finnish parliament in May 1920, but rejected by the Swedish-speaking population of the islands, was revised again after the well-known ruling of the League of Nations of 24 June, 1921. It incorporated several guarantees concerning the language of instruction in schools, the right to own land on the Aland Islands, the right to vote at elections to the local parliament and councils, and the provisions on founding the institution of governor, which ultimately promoted recognition of this law by the population of the Aland Islands. After that, the Law on Autonomy was revised twice in 1951 and 1991 and approved by the parliaments of Finland and the Aland Islands. A similar situation has also been observed in South Tyrol, where settlement of the conflict lasted for almost 50 years, and more than seventy decrees of the President of the Italian Republic were needed to implement the new Autonomy Statute of this region in 1972-1992.30
Based on this, it seems that precisely "interim" conditions are the natural environment for drawing up political and legal mechanisms of collaboration both between the Armenian and Azeri communities of Nagorno-Karabakh and between the relevant self-government bodies of this region and the government of the Azerbaijan Republic, as well as for establishing clear procedures for reaching a consensus in the event of a conflict of interests.
Conclusion
Despite the effectiveness of the European models of national-territorial autonomies, the attitude toward them in the Southern Caucasus remains ambiguous due to the significant differences in how institutions of regional self-government function in Europe and how they did in the former Soviet Union. Post-Soviet societies who are familiar only with vertical government management structures are still skeptical about the idea of non-conflict coexistence between the central government and national autonomies. However, neither Azerbaijan, nor Armenia, which for more than 10 years now have been members of the Council of Europe, as well as participants in the EU Eastern Partnership program, cannot ignore the successful experience of the formation of European autonomies, in particular, in the Italian region of Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol). Moreover, in contrast to the Aland Islands with their essentially homogeneous Swedish-speaking population, the pronounced dual community of South Tyrol and, correspondingly, the need to reach a consensus between two communities in important decision-making allow this region to be considered as a base model for settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
European practice shows that effective distribution of powers between the local and central government bodies and the use of consensus mechanisms for making joint decisions on matters of mutual interest can promote the formation of harmonious (essentially "non-vertical") relations between ethnic regions and the center. The elements of these relations could be used to settle the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh if Armenia abandons the absolutely unpromising formula "territories in exchange for independence."31 In this case, within the framework of an alternative triple formula "territories in exchange for an interim status, security, and economic cooperation," the Armenian side can certainly count on certain legitimization de facto of the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities (providing the Azeris are involved in the self-government processes in the region), on Azerbaijan refraining from the
30 See: K. Rainer, "Zakonodatelstvo avtonomnoi provintsii Iuzhny Tirol," Kazansky federalist, Nos. 1-2 (21-22), 2007, p. 54, available at [http://www.kazanfed.ru/dokladi/jornal/kazfed_21-22.pdf].
31 Certain representatives of the expert community of Armenia also recognize the lack of prospects of this formula, suggesting that it be replaced by the formula "territories in exchange for security" (see: Agenda for Armenian Foreign Policy 2011: Expert Analysis of the Analytical Center on Globalization and Regional Cooperation, Erevan, 2010, p. 22, available at [http://www.fes.ge/images/Fes_Files/2011-Publ-AM/agenda%20for%20armenian%20foreign%20policy% 202011.pdf]).
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
use of military force (underpinned by international guarantees), and on the restoration of transport routes and Armenia's full-fledged incorporation into regional cooperation.
Whatever the case, it is obvious that a long-term solution regarding the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh is only possible in the event of a consensus. In this context, as of today, an interim status is the most realistic instrument capable of stimulating the negotiation process and promoting a resolution of the socioeconomic problems of the Armenian and Azeri population of Greater Karabakh. And only in this event will this region be able to once more perform its historical transit function between Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the same time, full-fledged reintegration of the Azeri community into the sociopolitical and socioeconomic life of Nagorno-Karabakh should create favorable conditions for holding successful talks on the final status of the region. As the Azeri side sees it, only decisions made within the framework of an equal dialog between the two communities can be considered legitimate both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan.
