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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Volume 7 Issue 1-2 2013
Taleh ZIYADOV
Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Cambridge (U.K.), Research Fellow at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA)
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
SOME ASPECTS OF APPLYING THE SWEDISH-FINNISH MODEL TO SETTLEMENT OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
Abstract
This article presents an analysis of the so-called Swedish-Finnish (Aland) model that includes the historical background, the settlement process, the political status of the islands, details about the self-administration structure of the Aland Islands, as well as the relations between the
local Aland parliament and the central government in Helsinki.
The author draws several parallels between the Aland Islands and Nagorno-Karabakh and also gives recommendations that can be used during settlement of the Arme-nian-Azeri conflict.
KEYWORDS: Aland model, autonomy, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Introduction
For many years now, analysts and political experts have been offering numerous different models for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. One of the models envisages giving the Nagorno-Karabakh region a status similar to that of Finland's Aland Islands. This model might be the best alternative for determining the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh, since it permits self-administration, which Armenia wants, while at the same time preserving the country's territorial integrity within the internationally recognized borders, which is Azerbaijan's main demand.
In July 2005, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Goran Lennmarker (Sweden) suggested that the Swedish-Finnish model of autonomy enjoyed by the Aland Islands might be useful in determining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and, in so doing, become a significant stimulus for resolving this long-standing conflict. A few years ago, an Armenian delegation from Nagorno-Karabakh visited Finland, where it was asked if this model might be beneficial for resolving the Armenian-Azeri conflict. While acknowledging all the advantages of this model, one of the delegation members said that "the model would be acceptable for Karabakh if Karabakh had autonomy in Finland rather than in Azerbaijan."
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Azerbaijan may not be Finland, but nor is Nagorno-Karabakh the Aland Islands, just as Armenia is not Sweden. In this case, it is not the political or economic situation in Armenia or Azerbaijan that is important, but whether the Aland model would be realistic for reaching a compromise resolution of the conflict. Most Armenians and Azeris would certainly support this resolution if the international community proposed and supported this model, in so doing offering both sides corresponding stimuli. Moreover, this model would allow the representatives of both nationalities to coexist peacefully again, gradually reducing the hostility between them.
The Aland model continues to draw attention both from the Armenian and the Azeri press. But only a few of the articles have presented an in-depth analysis of the structure of this model, comparing the history of the settlement of the Aland Islands and Nagorno-Karabakh question.
This article presents an analysis of the Swedish-Finnish (hereafter Aland) model that includes the historical background, the settlement process, the political status of the islands, details about the self-administration structure of the Aland Islands, as well as the relations between the local Aland parliament and the central government in Helsinki.
Historical Background
The Aland Islands are situated between Sweden and Finland at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia in the Baltic Sea. The population of the region comprises around 27,000 people, more than 90 percent of whom are Swedes. In his book,1 James Barros divides the history of the islands into three main periods:
1. Swedish control (1157-1809);
2. Russian control (1809-1917); and
3. Finnish control (from 1917).
Like the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the strategic position of the Aland Islands made them a target in the geopolitical games of several large nations for many centuries. In 1714, during the rule of Peter the Great, the region was occupied, although not for long, by the Russian Empire. During subsequent years, Russia and Sweden repeatedly fought for control over the region, which was constantly transferred from one to the other. Not until after the military campaign of 1808-1809 did Russia eventually succeed in establishing control over the Aland Islands and the adjacent Finnish regions that were under Swedish control at that time.
The arguments of Swedish diplomats about the strategic importance of the islands at the talks with Russia during those years are reminiscent of the current debates at the Karabakh talks. In his book, Barros describes how the Swedish negotiators "vainly insisted upon the fact that the Aland Islands have never been anything other than a Swedish province," to which Russian diplomats replied that they were "not concerned with old Swedish frontiers, but with new Russian frontiers."2 According to Barros, "having used the Aland Islands as a military base against the Swedes, the Russians were aware of their strategic importance, not only for the defense of Finland, but also for control of the Baltic."3
1 See: J. Barros, The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968.
2 Ibid., p. 2.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
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The Aland Islands were part of the territory, along with other parts of present-day Finland, ceded to Russia by Sweden under the Treaty of Fredrikshamn on 17 September, 1809. The question of militarization or demilitarization of the Aland Islands did not leave the agenda of the Russian-Swedish talks throughout the 19th century. Sweden demanded neutrality of the islands "as an independent state under the protection of France, England and Sweden."4 This demand was supported by Great Britain, but rejected by Russia. In 1856, Russia, France, and Great Britain signed a convention on demilitarization of the Aland Islands, which put an end to the debates, at least until the collapse of the Swedish-Norwegian alliance in 1905. In 1907, in exchange for recognition of Norway's independence, Russia demanded annulment of the 1856 convention, which would permit Russia to deploy its troops on the islands. But when Russia publicly voiced the proposal to annul the 1856 convention, it aroused a ruckus in Sweden and Great Britain, and the question was removed from the agenda for some time.
During World War I, Germany promised to return the Aland Islands to Sweden, but in exchange demanded Sweden's allied participation in the war. However, Stockholm was adhering to neutrality and demanded that the Aland Islands be turned into a neutral zone. At the same time, Russia, knowing that Germany was planning to occupy the islands, prepared military forces to oppose it. In a letter to Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Sazonov on 1 January, 1915, Naval Minister Vice Admiral Ivan Grigorovich emphasized the importance of the islands for Russia. "[T]he whole area was of 'great strategic importance' and consequently the navy's task was to keep the area firmly in Russia's possession."5
The turning point for the islands came with the fall of the czarist government in Russia, establishment of the Provisional Government, followed by the Bolsheviks' advent to power. At that time, Finland demanded independence from Russia, while Sweden insisted more virulently on accession of the Aland Islands. In the end, in December 1917, the Finnish parliament declared independence.
Finland's Independence
Events similar to those that took place in 1988-1992 in Azerbaijan and its Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region also occurred on the Aland Islands in 1917. In August 1917, the residents of Aland held a secret assembly at which they discussed the question of accession to Sweden. "A four-man delegation was chosen, with instructions to bring to the Swedish government and Parliament the knowledge that for special reasons the 'population of Aland deeply desired the reincorporation of its islands with the Kingdom of Sweden'," writes Barros.6 Between 25 and 29 December, the population of the Aland Islands held something like a referendum and signed a petition to King Gustaf of Sweden calling for unification. This message fortified the position of the Swedish political groups that were calling for immediate occupation of the Aland Islands.
Taking advantage of Russia's weakened position, King Gustaf sent a message to Germany, Austria, and Turkey demanding that the question of the Aland Islands "be considered during the peace negotiations with [the] Russians at Brest-Litovsk 'in order to safeguard [the] vital interests of Sweden in those islands'."7 Germany offered Sweden its assistance in the talks with the Bolsheviks on accession of the islands to Sweden. At the same time, Germany also put forward several conditions: Sweden should "allow the islanders to decide the issue in a plebiscite; to construct no fortifications on the
4 J. Barros, op. cit., p. 8.
5 Ibid., p. 21.
6 Ibid., p. 62.
7 Ibid., p. 66.
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islands; not to hand over the islands to any other power; and, lastly, to begin negotiations for an increase of iron ore exports to Germany after the war."8
However, on 4 January, 1918, Russia recognized Finland's independence. It is surprising that, ahead of all of the other European countries, Sweden also recognized Finland's independence the same day. Helsinki would repeatedly make subsequent use of the argument that "Sweden and the other powers had, by their unconditional recognition, accepted the Aland Islands as part of the sovereign Finnish state."9
Several weeks after recognition of Finnish independence, a civil war broke out in this country. While King Gustaf tried to act cautiously and avoid direct confrontation with Finland, the Swedish opposition demanded immediate control over the islands. Soon after that, Sweden dispatched its naval ships and occupied the Aland Islands. Later, German troops established control over the whole of Finnish territory, including the Aland Islands.
Status of the Aland Islands
Finland's independence did not resolve the problem of the Aland Islands, and the talks between Finland and Sweden, like the talks between the victorious powers and Russia, continued. Helsinki accused Stockholm of interfering in its internal affairs by supporting the Alanders in their striving to unite with Sweden. This intensified the tension in the relations between the two states. The government of Finland informed the Alanders that it would "guarantee 'full security' for the islands and urgently requested them 'to avoid all acts which would injure Finland's [territorial] integrity, as this would not be tolerated'."10
Just as Sweden at one time suggested raising the question of the status of the islands at a referendum during which the people of Aland would determine their future, the outcome being known in advance, so likewise is Armenia insisting today on the monoethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh voting at a referendum, the outcome of which, incidentally, is also a foregone conclusion. Azerbaijan, like Finland in the Aland question, rejects this mechanism for resolving the dispute.
"As early as the spring of 1918 [Stockholm advised the Alanders] that independence could only be acquired by developing their own self-governing institutions, by an act of will of the Alanders themselves, as well as by organizing public opinion for a union of the islands with Sweden and for a plebiscite at the proper moment which the Swedish government would require from Finland."11
At some point, speculations appeared that Finland was considering the possibility of territorial exchange by transferring the Aland Islands to Sweden and receiving the territory of Eastern Karelia in exchange. But these speculations were refuted in a special statement by the Finnish government. Instead, Finland offered the island residents a high status of autonomy within Finland.
The talks between Stockholm and Helsinki did not yield any results and the sides agreed to transfer examination of the question on the status of the Aland Islands to the League of Nations. The Great Powers tried to mediate, while the situation both in Sweden and in Finland deteriorated. Public opinion in both countries became more stringent and demanded immediate resolution of the islands' status. As a result, the League of Nations created two special commissions to resolve
Ibid., p. 62.
8
9 Ibid., p. 70.
Ibid., p. 90.
Ibid., p. 100.
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the question of the islands. The first commission was faced with comprehensively studying the political, legal, and historical aspects of the Aland problem and offering possible ways to resolve it. The task of the second commission was to make specific recommendations and draw up a peace agreement.
After listening to the arguments of both sides and carrying out its own research, the first commission (the Commission of Jurists) "believed that the primary question at issue was a legal one, namely, Finland's right to sovereignty over the Aland [Islands]. Here they wished to discuss whether Finland was a sovereign state after its union with Czarist Russia had been resolved and whether [Finland's] sovereignty extended to the [islands] as it did to other parts of Finland."12 As for the question of Finland's right to the Aland Islands, the commission concluded that "independent Finland in 1917 had included the island group [and Finland's] subsequent recognition by other states" meant that "Finnish sovereignty over the Aland Islands was 'incontestable' and that legally [the Islands] formed a part of the Finnish state."13
Armenia has also been repeatedly raising the question of Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. As in the case of Finland, Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and its right to Nagorno-Karabakh were recognized by the international community in 1992. According to international law, this is a fact that Erevan ultimately has to reconcile itself to.
The commission of the League of Nations also examined the question of supremacy of the state's territorial integrity over a minority's right to self-determination, which is also pertinent today. The question "Was it possible to acknowledge as an absolute rule that a minority in a state had 'the right to separate itself from her in order to be incorporated into another State or to declare its independence'" was addressed in the commission's report. Citing the commission's report, Barros writes: "To concede to either linguistic or religious minorities or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life."14
In the end, the Commission of Jurists came forward with the following recommendations regarding the status of the Aland Islands within Finland:
■ "In the province of Aland exclusively, primary schools and technical schools should give instruction only in Swedish, to the obligatory exclusion of Finnish, confirmed by law.
■ "The Alanders be accorded the right of preemption on every occasion when offers to purchase land are made by outsiders, and newly arrived settlers in the islands be granted the franchise only after a stay of five years.
■ "The Alanders be allowed to present a list of three candidates to the government at Hels-ingfors [the modern day Helsinki] for the position of governor, who was to be chosen only from this list."15
The commission also threatened a referendum on the status of the Aland Islands if the Finnish government rejected these recommendations. These recommendations were added to the already existing guarantees of autonomy of the islands adopted by the government of Finland. The final decision on the question of the islands was made on 24 June, 1921, and the League of Nations again confirmed the sovereignty of Finland over the Aland Islands. Three days later, on 27 June, Sweden and Finland signed the Aland Agreement—a peace treaty on the status of the islands.
J. Barros, op. cit., p. 314.
Ibid., pp. 314-315.
Ibid., p. 316.
Ibid., p. 318.
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Structure of Autonomy
An act on the autonomy of the Aland Islands was hastily drawn up and adopted by the parliament of Finland on 6 May, 1920. At first the residents of the islands rejected this act. But after the League of Nations discussed the question of the status of the islands, the proposed recommendations were added to the Act on the Autonomy of Aland of 1920. Lars Ingmar Johannson, who worked as secretary general of the parliament of the Aland Islands in the 1980s, writes that "the first popularly elected body, the Landsting, or Aland Parliament, was appointed through general election and it assembled for its first plenary session on 9 June, 1922."16 Later the Act on the Autonomy of Aland was revised twice, the first time on 28 December, 1951 and the second in 1993. The current legislation has been fully coordinated with the government of Finland and the population of the Aland Islands.
The "fundamental principle" of the Autonomy Act was "to give the Alanders as great a freedom to manage their internal affairs as possible with regard to the internal and external security of the country (Finland)."17
The Autonomy Act unequivocally and precisely divides legal responsibility between the parliaments of Finland and the Aland Islands. The Parliament of Aland functions in a similar way to the Finish parliament. It consists of 30 deputies elected every four years and functions as an institution that adopts laws and decisions on such issues of island life as the police, medical services, education, communications, economic development of the region, and so on. Johansson argues that "in these spheres Aland functions just about in the same way as an independent state with its own legislation and administrative machinery."18
"Provisional laws approved by the Aland Parliament apply in Aland, not any equivalent laws that may be passed by the Finnish Parliament. However, in spheres where the Aland Parliament does not possess legislative competence, the laws of Finland apply in Aland too just like in the rest of the country. Such sectors include the postal, customs and monetary services, courts of justice and the penal code, most aspects of civil law such as those concerning family, inheritance and trade, and foreign administration."19
Alanders also have a quota in the Finnish parliament and are elected by direct voting of the island residents, just like the other deputies of the country's parliament. All the legislative acts adopted by the Parliament of Aland are sent to the president of Finland for signing. He has the right to veto only in two cases: if the law adopted by the Aland parliament "has exceeded its legislative competence," or if the adopted act "threatens the country's internal or external security."20
The Aland Parliament also adopts laws regarding its own budget and taxation. Taxes, customs duties, and other fees are levied on the residents of the island in the same way as for all other citizens of Finland. The Aland Islands also receive guaranteed assignations from the Finnish state budget every year. In addition to this, the Parliament of Aland has the right to ask for additional financing from the Finnish state budget.
The Alanders have their own flag and local police subdivisions. Moreover, the islands issue their own postal stamps and are represented (as part of the Finnish delegation) in the Nordic Council of Ministers.21
16 M. Isaksson, L.I. Johansson, The Aland Island: Autonomous Demilitarized Region, Alands Fredsforening (The Peace Society of Aland), 1984, p. 25.
17 Ibid., p. 26.
18 Ibidem.
19 Ibidem.
20 Ibidem.
21 The Nordic Council is a regional organization that consists of ministers and parliamentary deputies ofthe Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the autonomous territories of the Faroe Islands (Denmark), Greenland (Denmark), and the Aland Islands (Finland).
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Table 1
Comparing Basic Facts
The Aland Islands NKAO
Territory 1,527 sq. km. 4,400 sq. km.
Population 25,000 (est. 1990) 189,000 (1989)
Demographics 90% Swedish-speaking; 76% Armenians;
5% Finnish-speaking (est. 2011) 24% Azerbaijanis (1989 census)
Autonomy status Within Finland 1920(1921)-present Within Azerbaijan SSR 1923-1991
Secession claims Yes. Wanted to unify with Sweden Yes. Initially wanted to unify with Armenian SSR, then started to demand independence
Conflict/War Mostly between regional powers (No serious fighting between Sweden & Finland) War between Armenia and Azerbaijan; Ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis
Occupation Brief occupation by Swedish forces in 1918 Current occupation of NKAO and adjacent seven regions by Armenian troops
Lessons Learned: Achievable and Unachievable Objectives
(In Lieu of a Conclusion)
As we see, the model of autonomy of the Aland Islands has not only given the residents of the islands self-administration opportunities and cultural, economic, and political freedoms, but has also allowed two neighboring countries, Sweden and Finland, to peacefully coexist and cooperate after signing a peace treaty in 1921. This model meets the demands of the national minority for self-administration without violating the internationally recognized borders of the country. In actual fact, however, like any other autonomy in the world, the Aland Islands have their own specific traits that may differ from the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless, the model of Aland autonomy is the most optimal solution for resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
However, the question of whether the Azeri and Armenian sides will come to this conclusion in one year or five years' time is still up in the air. If Armenia and Azerbaijan (or the Armenians and Azeris) want to live in peace and prosperity, cooperate in regional projects and make progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration, settlement of the conflict with guarantee of the minority's right to self-administration while preserving the principle of inviolability of the borders is the only possible alternative.
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It is no secret that the separatists in Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia expected the decisions on Kosovo's ultimate status to somehow legitimize their separatist endeavors. However, as already happened with the Aland Islands at the beginning of the 20th century, there are achievable and unachievable goals in this issue.
All conflicts in the world, including the question of Kosovo's status (Resolution 1244 of the U.N. Security Council), are settled on the basis of international law. Erevan has never tried to disguise its discontent over Baku's attempts to discuss the Karabakh conflict in the U.N., mainly due to the already adopted resolutions of the Security Council (No. 822, No. 853, No. 874, and No. 884), which criticize occupation of Azerbaijan's territory and unequivocally call for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. But sooner or later all three Central Caucasian conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse will attract closer attention from the international community, the verdict of which will most likely displease the separatists.
There can be no doubt that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be higher in terms of autonomy and self-administration than the one that existed in Soviet Azerbaijan. But it also goes without saying that Karabakh will not acquire independence and will not become unified with Armenia. So while the Azeri side should recognize the right of the Armenians of Karabakh to self-administration and cultural and economic freedoms, the Armenian side should understand that Azerbaijan will never agree to a solution to the conflict that undermines the country's territorial integrity and changes the map of its borders.
The price of the issue and its possible consequences should also always be kept in mind. A delay in settlement of the Armenian-Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will not only divide the future generations of Armenians and Azeris, but also make them more recalcitrant and unwilling to compromise, while today a compromise is still achievable. However, Azerbaijan's growing international legal, economic, and military capabilities are prompting it to dig in its heels. And any compromise between the two governments on the conflict will require public approval in both countries, which is also fraught with certain difficulties.
