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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Leyla ALIEVA
Director, Center for National and International Studies
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
CONFLICT SETTLEMENT IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS: NEW PROSPECTS AND LIMITS
Abstract
This study attempts to analyze the models and approaches to conflict settlement based on EU programs that rely on the maximum possible use of the Union's mechanisms, policy tools, and resources. So far, the EU's ability to act effectively in the Central
Caucasus has been limited. Today, however, the EU betrays much more interest in the region, while its new programs for the Central Caucasus have created new opportunities for individualized approaches to conflict settlement on the basis of EU programs and tools.
KEYWORDS: the European Union, the Central Caucasus, conflict settlement, European integration, policy tool impact potential.
Introduction
It has been stressed more than once that the emergence of the European Union, set up after World War II, was geared at the idea of peacekeeping as one of the new structure's foreign policy priorities repeatedly confirmed in its documents and decisions.
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Despite the fact that the EU applied its peacekeeping potential far and wide—from the Balkans to the Middle East—the results were not always impressive.
Some authors think1 that the EU has created a fairly extensive set of tools of conflict settlement applied, although not always successfully, in neighboring countries for the simple reason that their efficiency depends primarily on the specifics of Brussels' relations with the sides involved.
The international conflict settlement measures launched in 1993 within the OSCE and the U.N. have so far failed to produce impressive results. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the OSCE framework produced a form of cooperation (the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group) of all major external forces (states) whose interests have been infringed upon because of the conflict; this steered the conflict into a civilized and peaceful channel—the positions of the sides, however, remain as irreconcilable as ever.
It should be said that the degree of EU involvement in conflict settlement in the Caucasus varies from country to country. In contrast to the conflicts in Georgia (the Geneva talks in which the EU, OSCE, and U.N. are also involved), the EU has been steering away from conflict settlement in Kara-bakh. The European Neighborhood Policy did nothing to supply the corresponding national plans of Azerbaijan and Armenia with mechanisms of conflict resolution.
In view of the closer relations between the EU and the three Central Caucasian republics within the EU's latest programs (European Neighborhood and Eastern Partnership), these states have been discussing their attitude toward EU integration and the EU's role in conflict resolution.
Political and Institutional Limits and Possibilities of EU Influence on Conflict Settlement in the Central Caucasus
The EU relies on the Common Foreign and Security Policy—CFSP as its main foreign policy instrument. Since the day it was adopted in Maastricht, the EU has been using it in the international context to express its attitude toward armed conflicts, human rights issues, and any other event related to the principles and values the EU is determined to protect. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 supplied this instrument with another element—the High Representative for CFSP. The CFSP has a military element that allows the EU to be involved in peacekeeping and preventive operations.
Despite the fact that the European Parliament's ability to influence decision-making is fairly limited,2 the decisions reflect the EU's main trends and priorities. The importance of the Central Caucasus for the EU is shown by the fact that the European Parliament recently passed several resolutions related to this region that outlined the EU's policy in the Central Caucasian countries.
The Resolutions of 15 November, 2007 On Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy3 and of 17 January, 2008 On a More Effective EU Policy for the South Caucasus4 can be described as documents devoted to the situation in the Central Caucasus. On 20 May, 2010, the European Parlia-
1 See: N. Tocchi, The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard, Routledge/ UACES, 2007.
2 See: U. Diedrichs, "The European Parliament in CFSP: More than a Marginal Player?" The International Spectator, No. 2, 2004.
3 See: European Parliament Resolution of 15 November, 2007 on Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (2007/2008[INI]).
4 See: European Parliament Resolution of 17 January, 2008 on a More Effective EU Policy for the South Caucasus: From Promises to Actions (2007/2076[INI]).
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ment passed a resolution On the Need for an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus5 that concentrated on the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Resolution of 20 May, 2010 says, in particular, that "the frozen conflicts are an impediment to the economic and social development and hinder the improvement of the standard of living of the South Caucasus region as well as the full development of the Eastern Partnership of the ENP; whereas a peaceful resolution of the conflicts is essential for stability in the EU Neighborhood."6 The same resolution went on to say that "further efforts should be made so as to identify common areas of interests that can overcome divergences, facilitate dialog and promote regional cooperation and development opportunities."7
The document stressed that "the EU's main objective in the region is to encourage the development of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia toward open, peaceful, stable and democratic countries, ready to establish good neighborly relations and able to transform the South Caucasus into a region of sustainable peace, stability and prosperity."8
In the documents and statements of the EU Commissioner for Foreign Policy, the European Parliament has called on the European Union to be more actively involved in conflict settlement in the Central Caucasus because "retaining the status quo in the conflicts in the region is unacceptable and unsustainable, since it bears the constant risk of an escalation of tensions and a resumption of armed hostilities." Instability along the borders of the newly adopted EU members and the involvement of other countries in two of the EU's new programs (Eastern Partnership and European Neighborhood) have acquired special importance. As early as the 1990s, the European Union became interested in the energy resources in the Caucasus and Central Asia and, therefore, in the region's stability.
In 2003, the EU formulated the Common Security and Defense Policy and appointed its Special Representative for the South Caucasus to create the EU's political profile in the region.9 Euronest, the parliamentary assembly of Eastern Partnership, which includes a dialog platform for the parliamentary deputies of six countries involved in the Eastern Partnership program, is another mechanism of EU impact on regional security and conflicts, including a potentially closer dialog between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Caucasian countries are also involved in the Black Sea Regional Synergy, a multisided EU strategic program.
This means that after expanding in 2004 and launching East-related programs, the political documents of the European Union formulated increasingly ambitious plans of conflict settlement. This became even clearer during the 2008 Russian-Georgian war when, thanks to the hectic activities of French President Nicholas Sarkozy, the EU chair, who negotiated agreements with Russia on conflict settlement (only part of them were later fulfilled), a mission of 250 European representatives was placed along the cease-fire line; the EU set up an independent international mission under Swiss Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini to study the facts and present a report on the situation in Georgia. The so-called Geneva Talks began. These initiatives were presented as an escape from the contradictions of the EU's Caucasian policies caused by the so-called Russian factor when the European Union preferred to act cautiously in the Central Caucasus so as not to estrange Russia.
I have already written that the EU's approach to the conflicts in the Caucasus can be hardly described as uniform: it is affected by relations with Russia, the Armenian diaspora in some of the European countries, Turkish policy, and the EU's immediate interests at any specific moment. There
5 See: European Parliament Resolution of 20 May, 2010 on the Need for an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus (2009/2216[INI]).
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
9 See: S. Vasilyan, "The Policy of 'Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus'," Working Paper # 024, Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales Area CEI Paises Balticos, 2010, available at [http://www.caei.com.ar/es/programas/cei/ P24.pdf].
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are objective individual descriptions of the conflicts and objective assessments of European security threats that inevitably affect EU interests. There are also political factors behind the differentiated approaches to each of the post-Soviet conflicts. For example, the EU has refused to issue entry visas for the leaders of Transnistria, but allows the leaders of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia to visit the European Union. Moreover, the NKR has opened its offices in the main European countries.
So far, the EU has limited itself to prohibiting certain officials of Belarus and Transnistria from entering Europe; for political considerations this measure will be hardly extended; banned entry without corresponding economic sanctions (frozen bank deposits in EU banks) might prove inefficient.
In other cases, the EU's political documents, as well as resolutions of the European Parliament, clearly indicate that the EU supports the principle of Georgia's territorial integrity; however they say nothing at all about Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Meanwhile, back in the 1990s, Armenia violated (very much like Russia in 2008) the internationally recognized borders of the neighboring country. It is interesting to note that in 2008 the co-chairs of the Minsk Group voted against the draft resolution on Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.10
Since 2008, the EU has been involved in the talks on Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Geneva, but has done nothing so far in relation to the Karabakh conflict.
This means that there are certain contradictions that keep the EU away from conflict resolution in some cases. First, the European Parliament is extremely aware of the clash of interests: resolutions and other documents are not only the result of objective and long-term strategic considerations, but also of intensive rivalry of numerous groups of interests and the national interests of individual member countries. For example, the European Parliament recommended Turkey, which had closed its borders with Armenia in response to its occupation of Azeri territories, not to tie together its OSCE membership and the Turkish-Armenian protocols. This weakens, to a certain extent, the Azeri position at the talks. At the same time, the EU prefers to steer clear of the Minsk process. This means that Brussels, aware of the inefficiency of the talks within the OSCE, has reconciled itself to maintaining the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The European Parliament's position on the energy-related projects (transportation projects in particular) clearly indicates that it is fully aware of the importance of the three Central Caucasian states in their implementation; it has repeatedly insisted that Armenia should be included in these without specifying "if any tangible progress in conflict settlement is achieved." This means that its recommendation is unrelated to the reason why Armenia was and is excluded from these projects in the first place.
The EU has no efficient strategy to apply to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a rule, the European states explain their unwillingness to stick to the territorial integrity principles (as in the case with the conflicts in Moldova and Georgia) by the principle of non-interference in the settlement process or an attempt at "objectivity." This and similar declarations are often accompanied by statements that, as distinct from other post-Soviet conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh is a "disputed" territory.
The absence of a regional security structure, an objective and trusted arbiter that can insist on and realize the basic principles and rules of international relations in the region and the local countries' responsible behavior, is one of the highest stumbling blocks to conflict settlement in the Caucasus.
In the absence of such a structure, relations in the region could be regulated by development prospects opened up by cooperation with neighbors, especially with resource-rich and strong economies. In any other region of the world, the prospect of being excluded from the largest energy projects and economic contacts would have driven a country with little or no resources and no sea outlet to establish good relations with its regional neighbors at all costs. At the very least, this country would have kept away from conflicts in the neighboring country, but would have acted as a good neighbor
10 The resolution was passed by the 62nd UN GA (39 for, 7, against, 100 abstained) on 14 March, 2008, available at [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10693.doc.htm].
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trying to quench the separatist sentiments being stirred up in the neighbor's autonomous regions. Armenia, deprived of all, including economic, relations with its important neighbors (Azerbaijan and Turkey) and left outside the energy and transportation projects, has never tried to normalize relations with these two countries, in the first place, or demonstrate its respect for its neighbor's internationally recognized borders.
The sobering effect of the immediate (particularly economic) repercussions of the conflict was downplayed by considerable economic support from the West (the U.S. and the EU in particular). This created the illusion in Erevan that the country could survive without normalizing its relations with neighbors.11 Armenia, which is obviously interested in the regional energy and transportation projects, is trying to restore its economic relations (so far, with Turkey) without demonstrating responsible behavior toward its other neighbors. It does not need compromises either in "liberal" or "real interests" contexts. The EU's conflict resolution efforts not only did nothing to settle the conflict, but also encouraged its own patronage attitude toward the region's countries.
This means that at the political level there is a discrepancy between the EU's ambition to promote regional cooperation among the three Caucasian states, on the one hand, and the degree and nature of its involvement in conflict settlement, on the other.
It remains unclear whether, having ratified the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU will act as an independent force in ensuring "hard" (military-political) security or will prefer to remain a NATO ally of the United States in the Caucasian conflicts ("soft" security).
A big step forward was made in the summer of 2003 when Brussels set up the institution of EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and appointed Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie to this post. In the last few years, this post was filled by Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby, who organized regular consultations and kept conflict resolution in the center of Brussels' attention, which compensated, to a certain extent, for its inadequate involvement in conflict settlement in the Caucasus. However, it became known that once the Treaty of Lisbon had been ratified the functions of EU Special Representatives for the South Caucasus and for Moldova would be integrated into a new foreign policy institution—the European External Action Service (EEAS)—set up to help the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (EUHR). Meanwhile, an influential publication of Radio Free Europe pointed out: "Any downgrading of the EU's involvement in either part of the world would inevitably send powerful messages to both local capitals—most of which seek closer integration with the West—as well as Moscow."12 Several foreign ministers, mainly of the East European countries, protested against this prospect. The civil societies of the Central Caucasian countries were determined to preserve the post and Peter Semneby who filled it.13 As a result, his four-year mandate, which expired in February 2010, was extended to 31 August, 2010, and then to 28 February 2011.
Tools and Mechanisms
I have written above that the EU prefers to concentrate its efforts on liquidating the roots of conflicts—social and political discrimination, not an easy task in the Caucasian regimes.
The political documents, as a rule, suggest that EU policy tools (border programs and public dialog) should be used for conflict settlement. This calls for selective and individual approaches because in different conditions these tools produce different effects. In some cases (the Balkans serve as a pertinent example), successful trans-border cooperation was realized in the wake of political
11 See: L. Alieva, "Imperial Legacy: Economics and Conflict," Security Dialogue, Oslo, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1996.
12 A. Lobjakas, "EU Envoys in South Caucasus, Moldova Facing End of the Road," RFE/RL, 14 June, 2010, available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Envoys_In_South_Caucasus_Moldova_Facing_End_Of_The_Road/2071102.html].
13 Some of the NGOs and citizens of Azerbaijan in their letter to Brussels supported the institute of EU Special Representative for the Caucasus.
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settlement. In the case of occupation (the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), trans-border cooperation cannot be realized along mine-closed borders. It should be applied either before the active phase to avert a conflict or when a political settlement has been reached.
Conflict settlement tools are scattered throughout different departments of the EU's very complicated bureaucratic structure. The CFSP, for example, has a peacekeeping and crisis management department; on 26 February, 2001, in the wake of formulating the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) appeared that was to be applied for a short period of time immediately after the crisis; its scope, defined by a long list of other Community tools, includes human rights efforts, election monitoring, institution- building, media support, border management, humanitarian missions, police training and the provision of police equipment, civil emergency assistance, rehabilitation, reconstruction, pacification, resettlement, and mediation. The ESDP relies for its realization on several mechanisms, the permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC) being one of them. It is made up of ambassadorial representatives of the member states and charged with monitoring the international situation, as well as with political control and strategic direction of crisis response operations.
There is an extensive Conflict Prevention Associates (CPA) structure, an outgrowth of the Conflict Prevention Network, made up of corresponding EU structures, NGOs, experts, etc.
The new EU programs, the European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, addressed to the Soviet successor states can be described as similar instruments designed to prevent new conflicts, positively affect those underway, and improve the climate of conflict resolution.
The vague wording of the EU's position on conflict settlement also applies to the ENP Action Plans related to the Central Caucasian countries; they clearly indicate that the EU finds it extremely hard to reconcile the opposing positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the different approaches to the conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. The Plan of Action for Armenia spoke of the principle of self-determination as the key to conflict resolution and did not mention the principle of territorial integrity. The Plan of Action for Azerbaijan spoke about dedication to the principles of territorial integrity and respect for internationally recognized borders, but it remained unsubstantiated in the context of conflict settlement in the way this is done in the Action Plans for Georgia and Moldova.14
The above amply confirms that the European Neighborhood Policy deals with the conflict settlement problem indirectly, by addressing the problems of state governance, inadequate economic development, and the absence of security and stability.15 The EU attaches a lot of importance to human contacts and socialization, confidence-building measures, and regional cooperation. It is absolutely clear that the EU's policies in regions where it has no, or limited, interests and which it treats as its periphery are less consistent and vaguer with respect to conflict settlement.
The Central Caucasus and the EU: How Do Cooperation and Integration Promote Conflict Settlement?
It should be said that against the background of the increasingly intensive interaction between the EU and the Central Caucasus at the formal level, real integration has been slowing down and caused a lot of skepticism on both sides, which is explained, in turn, by retreats in the sphere of democratic reforms in many EU partner countries, apart from Moldova. Integration, however, is still
14 See: L. Alieva, "EU and the South Caucasus," Discussion Paper Bertelsmann CAP/Stiftung Berlin, 2006, available at [http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/events/2006/eastern-policy.php].
15 [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm#1.2].
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high on the list of official foreign policy priorities and the region's civil society. This means that the process of integration may promote conflict settlement in the Caucasus. Here is a more detailed analysis of successful conflict settlement in Europe, the experience of which can be borrowed.
Conflict settlement experts and those who are practically involved in the process frequently refer to the successful conflict settlement around the Aland Islands in Finland and Tyrol in Italy.16 The needs and interests of the border regions contested by two sovereign states were finally reflected in the creative application of different self-administration tools, which relied on an identical principle: the widest possible autonomy (with continued territorial integrity), the elements of which were the product of talks and compromises. The Central Caucasian states could have borrowed this experience had not three factors set this experience and the current situation in the Caucasus apart.
First, the relations between the EU and the Caucasus do not lead to EU membership, as was the case of Austria in the South Tyrolean conflict. This means that contract relations between the EU and the sides involved in the conflict were very different: the Caucasus is not strongly encouraged by the reward of EU membership.
On the other hand, the international factor in Europe was much more favorable: first, Western Europe was no longer divided as before World War II; it was united for the sake of security and common foreign policy orientations. There was a legal arbiter in the region (a formal structure/organization recognized by both sides in the conflict) that the sides could address and whose decisions were recognized as legitimate. The neighboring countries (in the case of Tyrol) behaved absolutely responsibly; they did not try to violate borders with the use of force and were, instead, looking for a mutually acceptable solution.
Nothing of the above was observed in the post-Soviet expanse. The EU as an important factor in the region has not yet become an attractive political center for the Caucasian states and autonomies. While the Caucasian countries are seeking European integration and settlement through mediation by European organizations (the OSCE and EU), the former autonomies are seeking the patronage of Russia, another regional power, which is competing with European structures for regional influence. This can be explained by the fact that the security problem remains pending (that is, there is no political solution or security guarantees for the people in the conflict zones) and European integration has not become a real alternative to Russian (even though all the sides in the conflict, the countries and its autonomies, probably prefer Europe).17
There is no regional or international arbiter in the Caucasus able to pass legally valid decisions (the Aland Islands, for example, sought the decision of the League of Nations) acceptable to both sides and treated as a guide to action. The U.N. acts as an arbiter in the Caucasus, but none of its resolutions have been fulfilled so far. The European structures (such as OSCE) are forums and intermediaries, which makes continued occupation, in violation of international principles and laws, legitimate.
During the latest open conflict between Russia and Georgia, the EU, for the first time, acted as an "honest broker;" it put its observers on the cease-fire line to ensure that the cease-fire regime and agreements were observed.
The domestic factor (the domestic policy factor) is no less important: the absence of liberalism as a state philosophy toward minorities and the minorities' political elites' extremely ethnocentric attitude toward citizenship and human rights, likewise, make the European conflicts mentioned above and the conflicts in Central Caucasus very different indeed.
This means that democratization, reforms, and institution-building, which encourage participation in a common foreign policy by forming a common political identity, are more ways the EU can have an impact on conflict settlement.
16 See: St. Wolff, "Complex Power Sharing as Conflict Resolution: South Tyrol in Comparative Perspective," available at [www. stefanwolff. com/working-papers/STCPS.pdf].
17 See: I. Khintba, "The EU and the Conflicts in the Eastern Neighborhood: The Case of Abkhazia," Heinrich Boell Foundation, International Politics, 23 September, 2010.
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Those in favor of European integration think that "the prospect of membership in European institutions, and in the first place the European Union, is supposed to transform the behavior and attitudes of the political actors involved in the conflict in such a way that a solution becomes more feasible. In principle, these institutions are offering secessionist parties an institutional framework that makes it easier for them to reach a compromise on sovereignty issues. ... It seems quite obvious that the difference of impact of the EU upon candidate and non-candidate countries should be rather sharp, as the EU cannot use conditionality linked to membership in its policies toward non-candidate countries."18 The European Neighborhood and Eastern Partnership programs do not promise EU membership to the countries participating in them, which weakens the EU's political impact on the social transformations in these countries, although its financial argument—money for reforms through the recently created Governance Facility—remains convincing. However, financial stimulus does not work in the case of oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan.
Worldwide conflict settlement practice has demonstrated that reforms and institutions as the least painful and non-violent tools are necessary and unavoidable. Indeed, the most successful European examples are based on various types of self-administration and decentralization combined with consociation; new political identities shaped by gradual European integration will finally iron out different approaches to foreign policy principles and security issues of autonomies and countries. The prospect of European integration and a "European" political identity for all sides in the conflict will make Russia's patronage unimportant for the people of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh. European integration, institutions related to human rights and the rights of minorities, as well as democratic institutions that presuppose people's involvement in governance will create an attractive model for all ethnicities to manifest their identity.
Integration will make state borders less important; so far the conflicts in the Central Caucasus are mainly territorial, in which the sides want "all or nothing." This makes a consensus practically unattainable; talks at which irreconcilable positions are encountered should be moved to a different level where formal boundaries are not as categorical, or to the level of EU integration.19 This approach worked well in the Baltic republics where the problem of the Russian minority was resolved by applying the advantages of EU citizenship, including protection of the rights of minorities, to all citizens of the Baltic states without exception.
Conclusion
The above suggests several conclusions on the potential/resource of the EU's influence on the Central Caucasian conflicts to be used in the region for conflict resolution. The Treaty of Lisbon, which makes it possible for the EU to act on the international arena as a more consolidated political entity, increases its impact worldwide, including on conflict settlement in the Central Caucasus. Civil society and all forces interested in prompt settlement should follow the process and use every opportunity to establish peace in the region. The EU has not yet fully tapped its policy tool potential for settling the conflicts in the region.
During the August 2008 conflict and after Russia's occupation of Georgia's territories, the EU behaved as a political actor able to guide the crisis (so far in the sphere of "soft security") as an intermediary, through observers, etc.
18 G. Nodia, "Europeanization and (Not) Resolving the Secessionist Conflicts," Journal onEthnopolitics andMinorities Issues in Europe, No. 1, 2004 (European Center for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany), pp. 1-15.
19 In the past, this awareness gave rise to the ideas of a common Caucasian home, a common Central Caucasian parliament, or even a regional confederation. In the process of drawing closer to the European Union, the alternative of European integration became much more attractive than Caucasian integration: it offers much higher standards of living, tested values, sustainable laws, and stimulation of institutional reforms in the Central Caucasian states.
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Compared with its previous involvement in the settlement of regional conflicts, this is a big stride forward supported by programs that include these countries and also by awareness of the great threat to regional and European security.
The crisis in which military force was used demonstrated that what the EU had been doing for many years to prevent conflicts and weed out their roots was not enough to prevent conflicts from resuming or to settle them.
The armed crisis of 2008 can be described as a failure of the political logic the world community applies to conflict settlement brilliantly described by Ghia Nodia: "There is near-consensus on a scheme so that first the situation in post-violent conflicts should be stabilized and the parties should cool down. Then there should be a period of confidence-building. As a result, there will be 'conflict transformation,' attitudes of conflict parties will change, and only after that, under the guidance of the international community, responsible rational actors on both sides will sign a deal, legitimated by transformed communities on both sides." As a rule, the intermediary and the sides involved stop at the stabilization stage, which means that the conflict may be resumed as an armed conflict. This normally happens to conflicts on the periphery of European interests, which means that during a cease-fire (or stabilization) period, the EU does nothing to settle the conflict either through consistent social transformations or by changing the balance of power to achieve a compromise.
So far, the EU's involvement in the Caucasus has not been either effective or impartial: its decision-making mechanism has remained a blend of "power politics" and liberal approaches, while the region remains on the periphery of its attention. Today, the EU's increased interest in the Central Caucasus and its new programs for the region have created new opportunities for individualized approaches to conflict settlement on the basis of EU programs and instruments. This is acquiring special importance against the background of the increasingly vehement militarist rhetoric of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite the peace talks that are still going on.
The EU and the governments can do the following at the political level:
(1) The European Union should clearly express its attitude toward the involvement of third sides (countries) in secessionist conflicts as unacceptable from the viewpoint of international law and international agreements, as well as condemn a violation of internationally recognized borders. This should serve as a fundamental and uncontested basis that cannot and should not be negotiated. This means that Russia and Armenia, which have violated the borders of their neighbors, should become legally responsible rather than "rewarded" for the pull-out of their troops.
(2) The EU can emulate its own experience in Moldova to encourage the sides (rather than disunite them) with the prospect of EU membership for united Georgia and united Azerbaijan.
(3) The EU should promote or even create conditions for the development of civil (rather than ethnically homogeneous) societies in the autonomies; it should give grants and extend its aid not directly to the autonomies but through and with the help of the republic' s civil society and/ or only for projects implemented jointly with the civil societies of the corresponding republics. This will bring the two societies together rather than promote irredentism and secessionism.
(4) This means that the civil societies of the republics should first establish contacts and then start cooperating with the civil societies of the autonomies: Tbilisi and Baku should start working with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh to convince them that their safety and equal rights are guaranteed.
(5) Since the OSCE-guided process will probably end in nothing, the European Union should concentrate on:
—holding a broad discussion of successful models (Tyrol and the Aland Islands) of conflict settlement; organizing training sessions of all types of coexistence for ethnicities and cultural groups;
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—persuading Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh to quench their radicalism; putting pressure on Baku, Tbilisi, and Erevan to force them to elaborate a new policy for dealing with minorities and mechanisms for its implementation; discussing with minorities all the measures designed to satisfy their most urgent requirements;
—putting pressure on third countries (Russia and Armenia) to persuade them to admit that internationally recognized borders should not be violated, telling them in clear terms that only normal relations with neighbors and observation of international principles can lead to full economic prosperity and improve their relations with the EU;
—promoting a dialog between the center and the autonomies to decrease post-conflict animosity and help them find common denominators;
—applying its policy tools and programs (trans-border cooperation, regional cooperation, etc.) while taking into account the political reality.
The civil societies of the three republics should:
—put pressure on their governments to convince them to abandon the use of force in conflict settlement (Armenia should be persuaded to pull out its forces without preliminary conditions; Azerbaijan and Georgia should drop their aggressive rhetoric and attempts to restore territorial integrity by force) and start a dialog to convince people in Abkhazia, South Os-setia, and Nagorno-Karabakh that their safety is guaranteed and that they have equal rights and opportunities to develop their cultural identity and be involved on an equal footing in political and economic activities;
—promote successful European models and creatively apply them; create new models of coexistence and conflict settlement together with representatives of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh; and
—promote active democratization of society jointly with the civil societies of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
