The Nagorno-Karabakh issue in Ukrainian Foreign policy (1992-2012) Текст научной статьи по специальности «Политологические науки»

Alexander DUDNIK

Ph.D. (Hist.), Senior Researcher of the Foundation of Ukrainian Presidents

at the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine

(Kiev, Ukraine).

THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ISSUE IN UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1992-2012)

Part Two

THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ISSUE IN UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO (2005-2009)

Viktor Yushchenko became the second president of Ukraine after Leonid Kravchuk and unequivocally oriented the country toward European integration. Moreover, it was during his presi-

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dency that official state documents, particularly the new version of the Ukrainian military doctrine (2005), indicated for the first time that Ukrainian-NATO and Ukrainian-European Union cooperation was aimed conclusively at the country's Euro-Atlantic integration. This meant that Ukraine officially rejected the status of a non-bloc state. In 2008, Viktor Yushchenko, along with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, made an attempt to sign a Membership Action Plan (MAP) with NATO, that is, obtain for Ukraine the status of associate member or accession country in the North Atlantic Alliance.

New Directions, Priorities, and Approaches in Ukrainian Foreign Policy

For the purpose of Euro-Atlantic integration under Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine tried to act like a regional leader, primarily intensifying and stepping up its activity in subregional integration in the post-Soviet expanse in the Black Sea-Caspian Region (BCR). In the words of Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine's new regional policy was to become one of the key elements of the state's European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The main focus was placed on intensifying economic cooperation and improving Ukraine's international image, as well as on making maximum use of its potential as a reliable country in ensuring stability and security in the Black Sea-Caspian Region.1 With this in mind, GUAM was transformed into an international organization. At the founding summit of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM (ODED-GUAM) in May 2006 in Kiev, Viktor Yushchenko emphasized in his speech that the organization's new status would strengthen the position of the member states and create prerequisites for positing the organization as an integral part of international security. So one of the Organization's primary tasks was to guarantee security and stability in the region. It was emphasized that the unsettled conflicts in the GUAM states could only be resolved by means of joint efforts. The states also confirmed their willingness to engage in active and constructive interaction in this area with the EU, OSCE, RF, and other states and international organizations.2 At the same time, Ukraine began to move out of the sphere of Russian influence in its regional policy. Whereas the previous Ukrainian leadership and country's political elite always took the Kremlin's reaction into account, under Viktor Yushchenko the country began to back away from this tradition, which irritated the Russian Federation. Viktor Yushchenko's striving to make Ukraine a regional center that could become an alternative to the CIS for other states in the post-Soviet expanse did not sit well with the Kremlin. However, Kiev tried to develop partnership, friendly, and good-neighborly relations on equal conditions with the Russian Federation.3

The peacekeeping policy aimed at looking for ways to settle the conflicts in Transnistria and the Central Caucasus, including the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, became a priority focus in Ukrainian foreign policy aimed at helping Kiev to acquire the status of leader in the CIS and, in particular, in the BCR.

Since 2007, Ukraine's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been determined by Ukraine's National Security Strategy (approved by a presidential decree of 27 February, 2007). According to this document, the main priorities of regional cooperation in the BCR are: establishing democracy and security, expanding and intensifying cooperation within the Democratic Choice Community and ODED-GUAM, stepping up interaction with European regional organizations, participating in the implementation of multilateral projects, and forming subregional collective security systems in the

1 See: "V. Yushchenko: Achievements and Blunders," available in Ukrainian at [www.oa.edu.ua/doc/policy/analit/ al_07.doc].

2 See: Ukraine in International Organizations: Textbook, ed. by Iu. Makar, PRUT Publishers, Chernovtsy, 2009, p. 571 (in Ukrainian).

3 See: "V. Yushchenko: Achievements and Blunders."

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interests of all the states of the region. The strategy envisaged that Ukraine should remain an active participant in the settlement of the frozen conflicts in the BCR.4

The country's leadership proceeded from the fact that the settlement of these conflicts should be based on respect for the generally accepted democratic principles: rule of law, fundamental freedoms, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states within the framework of peaceful negotiations. In order to ensure that peaceful settlement was open and transparent, Kiev, as before, placed priority on the extensive involvement of specialized international organizations and influential European players, one of which it thought to be the European Union (EU).5

As a result, in February 2007, Kiev joined the Caucasian-Caspian Commission created by the EU for developing Brussels' new approaches to policy in the BCR. Political and public figures of Azerbaijan, Russia, the U.S., Great Britain, Georgia, Armenia, Germany, Lithuania, Slovenia, Turkey, Iran, and other countries were also members of the Commission.

Kiev regarded Azerbaijan as an important strategic partner with which it intended to intensify and improve existing bilateral relations. Ukraine began insisting on more active resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict without interference by other states in the internal affairs of the opposing sides and based on the generally accepted regulations and principles of international law: respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of international state borders, as well as execution of the corresponding U.N. SC resolutions and OSCE decisions.6 Ukraine also stated that it considered Azerbaijan's position on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be justified (this primarily applied to liberation of part of the occupied Azeri territory, return of refugees, and determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh under international guarantee and with a high degree of autonomy)7 and actively supported it within the framework of international organizations.8 This was stated in 2005-2007 by President Viktor Yushchenko, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasiuk, and secretaries of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council (UNSDC) Pyotr Poroshenko and Anatoli Kinakh at international forums, joint briefings, and meetings with their Azeri colleagues, and even students.

Despite the fact that Ukraine refused the status of a non-bloc state, Kiev's impartibility gave it an advantage in regulating the conflicts in the GUAM area, particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moreover, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as of Georgia and Moldova, encouraged Ukraine's mediating and peacekeeping efforts. These states wanted to see a more balanced and objective approach to conflict settlement, keeping in mind the constant accusations, including from the U.N., that Russia was interfering in the internal affairs of these states and supporting the separatist movements. At the same time, Ukraine's successful mediation in the conflicts in the GUAM area could have raised its international authority and helped it to become a regional leader.9

Ukrainian Initiatives and Their Implementation

Under Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine put forward three initiatives for resolving the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. First, in view of Ukraine's successful participation in peacekeeping missions

4 See: Decree of the Ukrainian President of 12 February, 2007, No. 105/2007 on the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, available in Ukrainian at [http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5728.html].

5 See: Ibidem.

6 See: Ukraine Supports the Initiative of the Azeri Side in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict—interview with Viktor Yushchenko, available in Ukrainian at [http://www.president.gov.ua/news/data/17_10165.html].

7 See: "Azerbaijan is Willing to Grant Karabakh a Very High Degree of Autonomy," available in Ukrainian at [http:// www.day.kiev.ua/141665/].

8 See: "Ukraine Considers Azerbaijan's Position in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict to be Justified," available in Ukrainian at [http://ua.proua.com/news/2005/05/19/132237.html].

9 See: G. Shelest, "The Prospects for Involving Ukraine in Settlement of the Conflicts in the Caucasus," available in Ukrainian at [www.niss.od.ua/p/205.doc].

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under the U.N. and NATO aegis, Kiev suggested sending Ukrainian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh. This was first announced in 2005 by Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Pyotr Poroshenko. The corresponding proposal of the UNSDC was passed on to the government,10 while First Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces of the Ukrainian Army Lieutenant General V. Frolov said that the Defense Ministry might train and send peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh within two months if the Supreme Rada (parliament) of Ukraine adopted such a decision.11 The Supreme Rada, in turn, was willing to agree to Ukrainian peacekeepers being included in GUAM's peacekeeping contingent for participating in the Azeri-Armenian conflict settlement, but only with the approval and under the auspices of the U.N. or OSCE.

On 2 February, 2006, Anatoli Kinakh, the new secretary of the UNSDC, said after discussing the Nagorno-Karabakh issue with President Ilham Aliev, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister E. Mame-diarov, and other Azeri officials: "...if the U.N. and European security structures adopt a decision about deploying peacekeeping contingents in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, which is well-versed in peacekeeping operations, might send its own peacekeepers there." The UNSDC secretary emphasized that the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh must be examined with the participation of representatives of the OSCE, EU, and other international organizations and added that Ukraine's position regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue remains unchanged—strict adherence to the principle of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and unconditional resolution of this conflict in a peaceful and democratic way.12

Kiev was also willing to offer its territory for holding talks on this question and to draw up its own peace plan similar to the one it offered on the Transnistrian question.13

Viktor Yushchenko talked about this in 2006 during a meeting with Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian during his official visit to Ukraine, emphasizing that Kiev was in favor of peaceful settlement of the conflict and willing to offer its territory for holding talks aimed at its resolution.14

In September of the same year, at a joint press conference with Ilham Aliev, Viktor Yush-chenko said: "We are willing to be the side that acts most constructively for the conflict participants in its settlement—Ukraine, as before, is offering all it has available for settling this conflict, and we ask the Azeri side to keep this in mind."15

At that time, during a meeting with students and professors of Baku Slavic University, the Ukrainian president said that a necessary prerequisite for settling the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was recognizing the integrity of Azerbaijan's territory, withdrawing the troops from the occupied territory of Azerbaijan, and returning the refugees to their homeland. "Applying force or pressure to resolve this conflict is pointless. That will not yield results." The question of the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, according to the then Ukrainian president, should be examined within the framework of a referendum but, unquestionably, keeping in mind Azerbaijan's integrity.16

According to Viktor Yushchenko, the engagement of peacekeeping forces might also be an inviolable part of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. He confirmed that Ukraine was willing

10 See: "Poroshenko: Ukraine might Send Peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh," available in Ukrainian at [http:// ua.proua.com/news/2005/05/24/132925.html. - 2005. 24.05].

11 See: "If Ukraine Decides to Send Peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh, They Will Be Trained in Two Months," available in Ukrainian at [http://ua.proua.com/news/2005/05/26/145222.html].

12 See: "Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Must Be Carried Out Primarily in a Peaceful and Democratic Way—Anatoli Kinakh," available in Ukrainian at [http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/news/384.html].

13 See: G. Shelest, op. cit.

14 See: "The Karabakh Conflict May Be Resolved in Kiev," available in Ukrainian at [http://www.obozrevatel.com/ news_print/2006/6/19/119409.htm].

15 See: "The President Offers Ukraine in the Role of Peacekeeper," Ukraine information portal, 8 September, 2006, available in Ukrainian at [http://hghltd.yandex.net/yandbtm?url=http].

16 See: S. Mamedov, "Yushchenko podarit Alievu pamiatnik," Nezavizimaia gazeta, 11 September, 2006.

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to send its peacekeepers to Azerbaijan in order to settle the conflict providing that all the undertakings would be carried out under the auspices of the OSCE or the U.N. Security Council.17

However, in 2005-2006, Moscow and Erevan evaluated Ukraine's peacekeeping initiative in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as an attempt by the U.S. to take advantage of Kiev's forces and possibilities to advance its own interests in the Central Caucasus. Erevan, as the Kremlin's strategic partner, said that Ukraine could not be a neutral side in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In so doing, Armenia was against any peacekeeping mission, saying that the choice of peacekeepers could become a reason for conflict among the mediators themselves. After all, moving troops into the conflict region is a geopolitical task for superpowers called upon to increase their influence in a strategically important region. So the U.S., RF, and EU would end up competing with each other over this issue in order to ensure that the situation developed in the most beneficial way for themselves, which in itself could become a destabilizing factor. Erevan used the example of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia to show how ineffective peacekeeping could be.

What is more, in order to discredit Ukraine as a possible mediator and peacekeeper, Armenia recalled and again began accusing Kiev of illegally sending weapons and mercenaries to Azerbaijan during the military stage of the conflict. In particular, Erevan pointed to the fact that as early as 1993 Kiev admitted in a report to the U.N. Register of Conventional Weapons to delivering 100 tanks and 10 fighter planes to Azerbaijan. It was confirmed that information had been received, both before and after this, that Kiev had been making even larger deliveries of ammunition, artillery, heavy vehicles, combat aviation, and spare parts. According to Armenian data, hundreds of Ukrainian mercenaries, who had been brought together under the aegis of a nationalist group, the Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense (UNA-UNSD), the so-called "Kiev Patriarchy," fought on the side of Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war.18 Data from the military intelligence of the defense forces of the unrecognized "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" were presented, according to which the largest group of Ukrainian mercenaries arrived in Baku in February 1994. With their help, claimed the Armenian side, Abulfaz Elchibei wanted to interrupt the course of the war.19 Such information is not hushed up in Ukraine, although it is more objective, but little known since recruiting mercenaries by foreigners in Ukrainian territory is prohibited. Such action was and is persecuted by the state security bodies, falling under Art 447 of the country's Criminal Code on "Mercenarism." However, in the fall of 1994, an entire network of mercenary recruitment in Ukraine was exposed, headed by someone known as Fidel. He supplied "soldiers of fortune" (as the mercenaries were called) to both sides in the Karabakh war.20

Despite such statements by Erevan, in 2006, the Armenian side believed that Kiev, which had been trying to strengthen relations with Erevan as much as possible, particularly by asking Armenia to participate in a promising project to transit Iranian gas to Ukraine and on to the EU countries, could potentially replace Russia in the arms delivery plans for the Armenian army.21

The third initiative by Ukraine on the part of Viktor Yushchenko in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be considered Kiev's active lobbying of Baku's interests on the international arena. Kiev tried to step up and expand examination of this question within the framework of international organizations, primarily the U.N., OSCE, GUAM and EU, in order for them to coordinate, develop, and adopt a unified policy and approach regarding settlement of the conflicts in the GUAM

17 See: "Yushchenko Says that Ukraine is Willing to Provide Its Peacekeepers for Settling the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict," available in Ukrainian at [http://www.president.gov.ua/news/4001.html].

18 See: S. Martirosian, "Vozmozhnye stsenarii mirotvorcheskoi operatsii v zone karabakhskogo konflikta," available at [http://www.noravank.am/upload/pdf/144_ru.pdf].

19 See: "Ukrainian Nazis Promise to Fight against the Armenians on the Side of Azerbaijan," available in Russian at [http://karabakh-news.com/1071-ukrainskie-nacisty-obeshhajut-voevat.html. 05.2.2008].

20 See: "Ukrainian Mercenaries," available in Russian at [http://podrobnosti.ua/projects/arch/2005/09/13/243664.html], September 2005.

21 See: S. Martirosian, op. cit.

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area. The Ukrainian president called on the member countries of these organizations to take active and joint part in resolving the conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse.

Efforts began with stepping up GUAM's activity. In April 2005, the main issue discussed at the GUAM summit in Chisinau was settlement of regional conflicts—in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The participants in the meeting came to a unanimous conclusion: the format of the peace process in which Russia had been dominating since the beginning of the 1990s had to be changed by adding new participants to it from the U.S. and the European Union. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev also said: "The cave-dweller approach to their [the conflicts] settlement has no prospects. We must find a civilized mechanism to resolve these problems."22

For this purpose, a declaration was drawn up at the Organization's summit called "Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security, and Development." The document was submitted to the U.N. to be added to the agenda for the 60th session of the U.N. General Assembly. It expressed concern about the fact that the protracted conflicts in the territory of the region's countries—Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—had, for more than 15 years, been having unfavorable implications for their development, threatening their sovereignty and territorial integrity, having a detrimental effect on the lives of more than 16 million people, and creating a threat to international peace and security.

However, the General Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, which forms the agenda for the supreme U.N. body, the General Assembly, did not support examination of this question. This was one of the reasons that GUAM became a full-fledged international organization. The GUAM countries, proceeding from the U.N.'s peacekeeping practice, believed that the U.N. would examine this question only if it came from a full-fledged international organization that had a direct interest in resolving such conflicts and then delegate its peacekeeping powers to its military contingent, reserving only monitoring functions for itself.

In 2006-2007, when GUAM became the ODED-GUAM, Ukraine significantly stepped up its activity in order to accelerate settlement of the conflict. For example, in the spring of 2006, at a press conference of the heads of the ODED-GUAM member states, President Viktor Yushchenko said that questions relating to international terrorism, separatism, extremism, and transnational organized crime were regarded as the main obstacles hindering democratic reforms and economic development. Ukraine and the other GUAM states were in favor of stepping up joint efforts to remove these obstacles, and also confirmed their willingness to engage in active and constructive cooperation with the EU and U.S. in this area.23

At that time, at the founding summit of the ODED-GUAM in Kiev, during Ukraine' s chairmanship, a joint declaration of the Organization's member countries was revised and adopted again called "The Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security, and Development." In the document, the heads of the four ODED-GUAM countries stated the need to settle the conflicts in the territory of the GUAM states exclusively on the basis of respect for territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognized borders of these states. They also emphasized that the territories of the states should not be a target of seizure or military occupation and emphasized the incompatibility of the use of force, the practice of ethnic cleansing, and seizure of territory with universal and European values, principles, and ideals of peace, democracy, stability, and regional cooperation.24

The GUAM state leaders asked the Organization's Foreign Ministry Council to implement the Declaration's provisions. They proceeded from the fact that international mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group in resolving the conflicts in GUAM territory had not yielded any results,25 while the

22 See: "GUUAM Has Still Not Died—The People," available in Ukrainian at [http://ukrainanato.narod.ru/organizations/ guuam.htm].

23 See: Ukraine in International Organizations: Textbook, p. 571.

24 See: Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 60, 2006, p. 486.

25 See: S. Gamova, "GUAM appelliruet k OON," Nezavisimaia gazeta, 8 September, 2006.

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activity of the Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia was considered ineffective. So the GUAM states got the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a document that would make it binding on the OSCE to cooperate with the U.N. in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

As a result, on 10 August, 2006, the ODED-GUAM asked U.N. Secretary General to include a point in the agenda of the 61st session of the U.N. General Assembly on "The Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security, and Development."26

In September 2006, the foreign ministers of the GUAM member countries met in New York at the 61st session of the U.N. General Assembly and discussed the course of settlement of the frozen conflicts in the CIS. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasiuk said: "Ukraine rejects any attempts to draw parallels between the Kosovo problem and the unsettled conflicts in the GUAM area." This position contradicted the opinion of the Russian leadership, which insisted that if Kosovo had been granted independence, the regional conflicts in the CIS could be resolved in a similar way.27

On 22 December, 2006, the U.N. General Assembly resolved with decision 61/552 that the item on the agenda about protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development would be examined during the revived 61st session of the U.N. General Assembly in 2007.28 However, as the previous year, the General Committee of the U.N. GA 61st session did not support examination of this issue by the U.N. supreme body. Of its 28 members, Ukraine, Moldova, Great Britain, and the U.S. voted for this item to be included in the agenda of the U.N. GA, while Russia, Armenia, Angola, Myanmar, and Venezuela voted against. The other member countries of the committee abstained. The leading world countries blocked this document in the U.N. since they still did not have a unified position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. In contrast to the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, which are at least formally internal, the Armenian-Azeri opposition also has a clear interstate component, which essentially determines its nature.29 Examination in the U.N. of Armenia's occupation of part of the territory of Azerbaijan could lead to recognition of the first as an aggressor state and so threaten Erevan with international sanctions. Therefore, official Erevan and Moscow have always been against and are still against discussing this question outside the format of the OSCE Minsk Group and particularly in the U.N.

However, on 7 September, 2006, a resolution was adopted (by means of consensus) at the 98th plenary session of the 61st session of the U.N. GA called On the Situation in Azerbaijan's Occupied Territories.30 In it, the U.N. GA expressed concern about the fires occurring in the occupied territory of Azerbaijan, which were of immense environmental detriment to it. The General Assembly called on the U.N. member states to carry out an urgent environmental operation to prevent the fires and eliminate their consequences. It also approved of the willingness of the sides to cooperate in these endeavors and sent its mission of U.N. Environmental Program specialists.

Talking at discussions on behalf of the GUAM states, the Ukrainian representative expressed concern regarding the fires going on in Azeri territory and called on his colleagues to adopt the proposed resolution.31

The ODED-GUAM states continued to push for examination of their joint declaration at the next U.N. GA session. In June 2007, Viktor Yushchenko emphasized again that the Armenian-Azeri conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh could be resolved only within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and only in one way—by granting Nagorno-Karabakh a high degree of autonomy. In his

26 See: Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 60, p. 486.

27 See: "GUUAM Has Still Not Died—The People."

28 See: Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 60, p. 486.

29 See: Z. Rasulzade, "Mirkadyrov: mezhgosudarstvennoe sostavliaiushchee karabakhskogo konflikta iavliaetsia opre-deliaiushchim," available at [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/102343].

30 This item was first brought up on Azerbaijan's initiative at the 59th session of the U.N. GA in the fall of 2004.

31 See: Embassy of the Azerbaijan Republic, PRESS RELEASE, No. 8, 15 August, 2006, available at [www.azembassy. kz/data/file/press8.doc].

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words, political will had to be manifested in order to carry out such a decision. Attempts to resolve the problem in any other way were a pointless waste of time.32 Ukraine was willing to continue supporting the Azeri side, with respect to developing the agreements reached within GUAM, in order to attract the attention of the international community to the need to step up efforts in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as other frozen conflicts in the territory of the GUAM member states. At the same time, the Ukrainian president said at a plenary session of the ODED-GUAM summit in Baku: "We are offering joint efforts for settling the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, one of the steps in this direction being bringing the Nagorno-Karabakh issue up for discussion at the U.N. GA."33

As a result, on 7 December, 2007, the draft of a GA resolution "Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development" was distributed at the U.N. headquarters in New York as an official U.N. document. In it, the U.N. GA called on the member states, as well as international and regional organizations, to efficiently assist the settlement of these conflicts and confirmed its invariable support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, as well as the inviolability of their internationally recognized borders.34 However, this resolution draft was not included in the agenda until the 63rd session of the U.N. GA under item 13, while item 20 was another resolution On the Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan. The resolution on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan was examined in March 2008 at the 86th plenary meeting of the 62th session of the U.N. GA. Official Baku initiated examination of this question in the U.N. since Armenia was pursuing a policy aimed at changing the ethnic composition of the population in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (it was settling Armenians in them) and their historical and cultural heritage (the destruction and desecration of religious historical monuments, ancient manuscripts, and other cultural values), as well as exploiting natural resources (gold mines in the region of Kelbajar).

Ukraine, along with Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, and Turkey, was among the 39 U.N. states out of 146 to vote for Resolution 62/243 on the Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan.35 Kazakhstan was among the one hundred countries that abstained from supporting the document, while the RF and Armenia were among the seven states that voted against the resolution.

Permanent Representative of the Ukraine to the U.N. Yuri Sergeev was the only one who spoke on behalf of the post-Soviet states in support of this document. He said: " .the protracted conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova are still serious obstacles hindering the democratic and economic development of these states. We are convinced that examination of these questions belongs to the competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council. It is extremely important that the international community continues to take practical steps to assist the settlement of the protracted conflicts in the countries I have mentioned, relying on unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of these states. In our opinion, each of these conflicts has its own history and own character. So the mechanisms of their settlement might be different. But they should be firmly based on the unconditional priority of adherence to human rights. In this respect, Ukraine resolutely rejects attempts to link Kosovo with the conflicts in the territory of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova, and Georgia. Ukraine consistently supports the OSCE Minsk Group in the settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. We note that the potential of the Minsk process has not yet been exhausted. We

32 See: "Viktor Yushchenko: 'The Karabakh Problem can be Resolved Only within the Framework of Azerbaijan's Territorial Integrity,'" available in Russian at [http://www.day.az/news/politics/83062.html].

33 See: "Yushchenko Suggests that GUAM Restore the Silk Road," available in Ukrainian at [http://www.unian.net/ukr/ news/news-200238.html].

34 See: "Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine suggest adopting the General Assembly Resolution on Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Countries," U.N. News Center, available in Russian at [http://www.un.org/russian/news/story. asp?NewsID=8760#.Uq4QoSdP2XY].

35 See: "U.N. General Assembly," available at [http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/478/37/PDF/ N0747837.pdf?OpenElement].

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call on Azerbaijan and Armenia to show flexibility and not undermine the opportunities to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict."36

In response, Armenian representative Mr. Martirosian said that he failed to understand what relation Kosovo had to this resolution. But at the same time he said that the example of Kosovo intrigues Armenia, which is interested in it since, in his words, Kosovo showed that the principle of self-determination was already pertinent in the 21st century. However, Mr. Martirosian assured all the U.N. member states that Armenia would never use the instance of Kosovo as a precedent and would never examine the situation with Kosovo as a precedent.37

The U.S., France, and the RF chairing in the OSCE Minsk Group did not support this resolution, referring to the fact that the resolution draft selectively reproduced only a few of the elements of the balanced set of principles drawn up by the OSCE Minsk Group in 2007 in Madrid and taken as a basis by the sides for settling the conflict.38

The states that supported the draft proceeded from the fact that it was based on the principles and tasks of the U.N. Charter, the main guarantor of peace and stability on the planet, was in agreement with the corresponding previous U.N. resolutions on this question, and did not contain any elements that could be viewed as detrimental to the conflict settlement. In their view, any departure from U.N. principles should be well grounded in international law. In this case, there is no justification for such a departure from them, since Azerbaijan is a victim country.39

On 29 May, 2008, Ukrainian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Boris Klimchuk talked during a press conference for the Azeri media of Ukraine's unchanged position regarding settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and called Ukraine's support of the U.N. GA resolution on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan confirmation of this. According to the ambassador, support by the GUAM member countries of this resolution again emphasized the power and capacity of ODED-GUAM."40 In May 2008, during Azeri President Ilham Aliev's official visit to Ukraine, the heads of state signed a Declaration on Friendship and Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and Azerbaijan.41

At the beginning of July 2008, at the next ODED-GUAM summit in Batumi, the Ukrainian president noted that new initiatives were needed in the negotiations on settlement of the conflicts in the GUAM area. "The unsettled conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, along with the threat factor, are also a reason for instability. Some conflicts not only do not have a settlement plan, but talks are not even being held. GUAM needs to step up its efforts to organize a dialog."42

Ukraine and GUAM were just as active within the framework of the OSCE. In particular, in December 2005, the GUAM countries acted as a unified front at the meeting of the Council of OSCE Foreign Ministers in Ljubljana (Slovenia). They demanded that Moscow execute the decision of the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999 on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova and Georgia, which was also important for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh question. At that time, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasiuk said that the GUAM countries would continue to act jointly.43

36 See: U.N. General Assembly, 86th Plenary Session of 14 March, 2008. Sixty-Second Session of the U.N. GA. Official Reports. Item 20 on the Agenda. Resolution Draft (A/62/L.42) The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan, Doc. A/62/PV.86, p. 8.

37 See: Ibid., p. 11.

38 See: Ibid., p. 6.

39 See: Ibid., pp. 7-8.

40 See: "Ukrainian Embassy in the Azerbaijan Republic," available in Ukrainian at [http://www.mfa.gov.ua/azerbaijan/ ua/news/detail/13208.htm].

41 See: "Ukraine and Azerbaijan Sign a Set of Bilateral Documents," available in Ukrainian at [http://www.president. gov.ua/news/10017.html].

42 See: "Viktor Yushchenko: 'New Initiatives are Needed in the Talks to Settle the Conflicts in the GUAM Area'," available in Russian at [http://cpf.az/ru/xeber/187-neobkhodimy-novye-iniciativy.html].

43 See: "GUUAM Has Still Not Died—The People."

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In July 2007, the resolution on settlement of the conflicts in the member states was adopted in Kiev on the initiative of Ukraine at the next session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. It envisaged resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict within the framework of territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and sovereignty of Azerbaijan. The resolution also noted that the conflict should be resolved on the basis of decision adopted by the U.N., while the Kosovo model and methods of settling other conflicts could not be applied to Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the OSCE PA session rejected the proposals of the Armenian delegation to exclude from the indicated resolution the amendments on inviolability of Azerbaijan's borders and participation of the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh in the talks.44

Ukraine and the Self-Proclaimed "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic"

In 2006-2007, a certain strengthening in the political regimes in the unrecognized states was seen. In particular, at the December referendum of 2006, a new Constitution was adopted in Nagorno-Karabakh, and in the summer of 2007, the next presidential election was held.

As a result, during Ukraine's chairmanship in GUAM (2006-2007), a joint statement was drawn up by the member states on deeming the constitutional referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh illegal. In the document, Kiev, Tbilisi, and Chisinau expressed concern about this national survey. They thought that the referendum, no matter how Erevan and Stepanakert justified it, only aggravated the problem of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.45

On 20 July, 2007, Ukrainian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Azerbaijan Ste-pan Volkovetsky said that Ukraine did not recognize the separate presidential election held on 19 July in the "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic." "The government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people recognize the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic, and nothing can change this position."46

Ukraine also joined the EU statement that said that the presidential election in NKR was having a negative effect on peaceful settlement of the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Brussels and Kiev thought that for starters the refugees from this region should have the opportunity to return home safely and with dignity in order to be able to participate in the election processes.47

On 17 August, 2007, a letter from I. Mamedov, temporary charge d'affaires for the Permanent Representative Office of the Azerbaijan Republic at the U.N., to the Secretary General named Ukraine among the states and international organizations that criticized and did not deem the 2007 presidential election in the NKR legitimate.48

In those years, the approaches and policy of Ukraine and the Russian Federation regarding the self-proclaimed states directly opposed each other. On the international arena, Kiev spoke out actively against strengthening the political regimes in the unrecognized states, particularly in Nagorno-Karabakh, while Moscow strove to establish control over them by forming efficient managerial teams

44 See: "The OSCE PA Resolution Includes Important Points on Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict," available in Russian at [http://www.bizspravka.ru/view_article_print.php?id=260838].

45 See: V. Kravchenko, "Karabakhsky sindrom," available at [http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/karabahskiy_sindrom.

html].

46 "Ukraine Does Not Recognize the Presidential Election Held in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic," United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, Doc. A/61/1030-S/2007/505, 23 August, 2007, p. 15.

47 See: "Ukraine is Concerned about the Situation in the Congo and the Elections in Nagorno-Karabakh," available in Russian at [http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/199916?p=0&sort=ASC].

48 See: Letter of the Temporary Charge D'Affaires of the Permanent Representative Office of Azerbaijan at the United Nations of 17 August, 2007 to the Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, Doc. A/61/1030-S/2007/505, 23 August, 2007, p. 1.

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subordinate to its interests. Russia was also thought to be trying to preserve "partial sovereignty" of the self-proclaimed states, including the NKR, in order to bring their status closer to the formulation of "partially recognized." The practice of socioeconomic subsidizing of the unrecognized states (issuing aid in the amount of $10 million every month for social needs) and upholding the interests of the ruling elites of the unrecognized states in international institutions served this end.49

Influence of the 2008 August Events on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Settlement

Moscow was looking for ways to oppose the activity of ODED-GUAM and called it anti-CIS. The Kremlin was also against the new EU Eastern Partnership initiative, which included the Central Caucasus. The Russian Federation did everything it could to preserve a tense situation in the region and strengthen its presence and, correspondingly, influence in it. In particular, on 13 July, 2007, the Russian president issued a decree On Suspension by the RF of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and Other Related International Treaties, and on 29 November, 2007, federal law On CFE Treaty was issued. Since 12 December, 2007, Russia has stopped providing information, as well as accepting and carrying out inspections in compliance with the CFE Treaty. But most important, this made it possible for it to continue delivering weapons to Erevan, and later to Baku, thus changing the balance of forces and strengthening its military presence in the region.50

At the same time, Moscow assured that suspension of the CFE Treaty would in no way mean an arms buildup, rather the cutback in the number of conventional armed forces in particular regions of Russia at that time would be based on the real military-political situation, including both external and internal factors. Moscow assured the OSCE and NATO that it did not have any plans to carry out a mass buildup of forces, but would make its actions dependent on how willing its partners, primarily NATO, were to show restraint in the military sphere.51

We will remind you that most of the OSCE states did not ratify the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty of 1999 in response to Moscow's non-execution of the decision of the Istanbul OSCE summit in 1999 on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. As a result, the existing CFE Treaty became the cornerstone of European security.52 Russia's refusal to execute the 1999 OSCE summit decision was also one of the reasons preventing resolution of the conflicts in the GUAM area and causing another spurt in the arms race in the world. For after that, the U.S. announced revival of the ABM system and the EU states demanded that Washington set up ABM systems in their territories too. So Moscow resorted to introducing a moratorium on the CFE Treaty, which made it possible for it to quickly resolve the conflict with Georgia in August 2008 in its favor.

After making sure that Ukraine and Georgia did not sign the NATO Membership Action Plan (spring 2008) and demonstrating its resolve regarding control over its sphere of influence, in the form

49 See: B. Parakhonsky, M. Gonchar, V. Kuznetsov, V. Maliarov, O. Manachinsky, O. Moskalets, Ukraine's Strategic Interests in the Black Sea Region Countries and National Security Problems, Administration of the President of Ukraine, National Institute of Strategic Research, Foreign Policy Strategy Series, Issue 7, 2007, available in Ukrainian at [http://eu. prostir.ua/library/1545 .html].

50 See: G. Perepelitsa, "Ukraine's Attitude toward Peacekeeping Activity and Conflict Settlement in the CIS," in: Ukraine's Peacekeeping Activity: Cooperation with NATO and Other European Security Structures, National Institute of Strategic Research under the Administration of the President of Ukraine, Royal Institute of International Affairs, available in Ukrainian at [http://0ld.Niss.Gov.Ua/Book/Perepel/009.Htm#A1].

51 See: "The OSCE Calls on Russia to Reexamine its Decision on the CFE Treaty," available in Russian at [http://top. rbc.ru/politics/12/12/2007/129543.shtml].

52 See: A. Sychev, "Dogovor ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope i perspektivy ukrepleniia evropeiskoi bezopasnoti," available at [http://evolutio.info/content/view/1058/181].

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of the short-term war with Tbilisi (August 2008), as well as recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Moscow tried to show its interest in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In order to distract the attention of the Russian and world community as quickly as possible from the political consequences of the Russian-Georgian war, as well as remove Kiev from a possible mediating role in the Azeri-Armenian opposition, in the fall of 2008, President Dmitri Medvedev initiated a new round of talks between Baku and Erevan. Although it was clear to everyone in advance that this tactical step by the Kremlin, in terms of its mediation, would end unproductively. Even some Russian diplomats and politicians recognized that the Kremlin was discrediting itself as a neutral mediator, not only in the eyes of the world community, but also of its ally—Armenia.53 In the war with Georgia, Russia, trying to show the whole world its unconditional leadership in the region, "shattered and humiliated a once fraternal republic." Many people in Russia regarded the Russian-Georgian 2008 war not as small and victorious, but as "hollow," since other Caucasian states, in their words, will never leave their backs exposed to Russia again.54 However, these statements proved to be erroneous. By trying to use hardline power in the region and demonstrating the ability to strike critically important targets of regional infrastructure that primarily serve the economic interests of Azerbaijan, Moscow's policy balanced out Baku's traditionally multidirectional foreign policy. In 20082010, the Russian factor acquired additional clout in Azerbaijan's strategic plans. Baku, which was concerned about how Russia's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia might affect the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, unlike its ODED-GUAM partners, Ukraine and Moldova, refrained from accusing and directly criticizing Moscow.55 This not only caused confusion among the GUAM partners, but also cast aspersions on further joint efforts to resolve the conflicts in the GUAM area, as well as Kiev's possible mediation and peacekeeping activity in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

The Kremlin managed to affect a split in the ODED-GUAM by weakening the Organization's authority and influence not only in the CIS, but also on the international arena as a whole. However, in so doing, it promoted a strengthening in the position and influence of the EU on the ODED-GUAM countries and, correspondingly, the European integration strivings of the latter. As a result, Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not put an end to the talk about the uniqueness of the Kosovo incident, nor was it a prompt to recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, no matter how much the Kremlin and Erevan might have wanted this.56 After all, even the Kremlin's allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia—did not recognize the independence of these regions of Georgia. Nevertheless, Moscow's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia's sovereignty made Armenia hopeful, as well as rather relieved about Georgia's failure to restore control over South Ossetia. The potential success of the Georgian army would undoubtedly have inspired the supporters of the hardline course in Azerbaijan and stimulated national pressure on the president to take action. Russia seemed to confirm by its actions that it was ready to defend its allies in the region.57

Moldovan researcher Stanislav Secrieru thinks that relying on Moscow's statement that it is an honest mediator-peacekeeper in Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan has decided to give the Russian Federation another chance and glean its support in order to change the status quo in the conflict zone. While Turkey's striving in 2008-2009 to normalize relations with Armenia and the U.S.'s auxiliary role, which stood behind this diplomatic initiative, prompted Baku to move closer to Moscow.58

53 See: S. Chernyavsky, Desiat let istorii Azerbaidzhana 2003-2013 gody, Flinta Publishers, Moscow, 2013, p. 223.

54 See: "Russia Today has Nothing to Offer its Neighbors," available in Russian at [http://rabkor.ru/debate/2013/09/21/ russia?fb_action_ids=10151861869887940%2C1015186153658294021.09.2013]

55 See: S. Secrieru, "Zatiazhnye konflikty v stranakh Vostochnogo partnerstva: mezhdu predotvrashcheniem voiny i postroeniem doveriia," available at [http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/NieghbourhoodPolicyPaper%2806%29R ussianVersion.pdf].

56 See: V. Sizov, "Piatidnevka protivostoianiia," available at [http://www.intertrends.ru/seventeenth/015.htm].

57 See: S. Secrieru, op. cit.

58 See: Ibidem.

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According to Russian researcher V. Sizov, Azerbaijan might suffer indirect consequences from the conflict. But at the same time, Baku's hope that Russia would not interfere in a possible conflict with Armenia over Karabakh essentially dissipated. He stated: "The country is wondering whether NATO can help to resolve territorial problems?"59 In our view, this claim is erroneous since Baku refused the U.S.'s initiative to create a naval group called "Caspian Guard" in the Caspian Sea for defending pipeline facilities.60 In this way, Azerbaijan supported the Kremlin's position on preventing the presence of military contingents of third, non-regional, countries, that is non-Caspian, in the Caspian Basin.

Of course, other determining factors in Baku's rapprochement with Moscow can be named after the August events of 2008, but I would like to concentrate on one—this is Russia's traditional use of the "stick and carrot" principle in interstate relations. Along with promising honest mediation and deliveries of new arms, the Kremlin was also putting latent political pressure on Baku. For example, at the time Kiev tried to present a resolution draft about the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine for discussion at the 63rd session of the U.N. GA.61 The Russian Federation began blackmailing President Ilham Aliev in order to force him not to recognize Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian people. This is shown in secret U.S. government documents published in Wikileaks, according to the words of British Prince Andrew. According to them, President Medvedev sent Ilham Aliev a document indicating that if Azerbaijan recognized the Bolshevik-controlled artificial holodomor in Ukraine in the U.N. as genocide, "then you can forget about Nagorno-Karabakh altogether." Prince Andrew confirmed that other CIS presidents also received corresponding directives from Moscow.62

President Ilham Aliev's press service, like that of several other CIS countries, called this information open provocation aimed at undermining Azerbaijan's relations with neighboring states and creating mistrust among the heads of state.63 However, Azerbaijan was not among the nations that recognized the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine as genocide, in contrast to Georgia and Moldova.64

THE PROSPECTS FOR UKRAINE'S MEDIATION MISSION IN RESOLVING THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT DURING VIKTOR YANUKOVICH'S PRESIDENCY (2010-2012)

Changes in Ukraine's Foreign Policy and International Status

In 2010, when a new president, Viktor Yanukovich, came to power in Ukraine, the country's foreign policy vector began to dramatically change. First, without rejecting European integration, in

59 See: V. Sizov, op. cit.

60 See: I. Velizade, "Azerbaidzhano-rossiiskie otnosheniia na novom etape: prioritety, aktsenty i realnaia politika," in: Rol Rossii i Turtsii v sisteme bezopasnosti Iuzhnogo Kavkaza, Center of Strategic Studies (CSS) under the President of Azerbaijan, Baku, 2012, pp. 11-12.

61 See: "The U.N. General Assembly is to Discuss the Resolution on Holodomor in Ukraine," available in Russian at [http://altai.regnum.ru/news/accidents/1056862.html].

62 See: "Wikileaks: Medvedev Blackmailed Aliev over Ukrainian Holodomor," available in Russian at [http://zn.ua/ POLITICS/wikileaks_medvedev_shantazhiroval_alieva_iz-za_ukrainskogo_golodomora.html], 14 January, 2011.

63 See: Aliev's Government Denies that Russia Put Pressure on It over Holodomor," available in Russian at [http://www. segodnya.ua/world/u-alieva-otritsajut-chto-roccija-davila-na-neho-iz-za-holodomora.html].

64 See: "Countries that Recognized the 1932-1933 Holodomor of the Ukrainian People as Genocide—Thank You," available in Russian at [http://pikabu.ru/story/stranyi_priznavshie_golodomor_193233_godov_genotsidom_ukrainskogo_ naroda_spasibo_vam_83623 8].

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the spring of 2010 the president signed and the parliament ratified, with violations and "scandalously," the so-called Kharkov Agreements with Moscow,65 which aroused doubts about the priority of the European (Western) vector in the foreign policy of the country' s new leadership. In addition, the head of state said that in the near future he intended to raise the question of the expediency of Ukraine's membership in the ODED-GUAM and that a meeting of the leaders and other high-ranking officials of the member states of this regional organization would be initiated for that purpose. Viktor Yanu-kovich said that he hoped this organization would learn to pursue a pragmatic, rather than romantic policy. He also noted that Ukraine would continue its membership in GUAM only if it gained practical benefit from this format of cooperation.66

Second, on 1 July, 2010, the president signed a new law adopted by the parliament On the Fundamental Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy. According to Art 11,The Fundamental Principles of Foreign Policy, the Ukrainian state would return to its non-bloc status, that is, Kiev refused to join NATO or any other military-political blocs. At the same time, the law did not exclude the country's participation in regional (European) collective security systems or continuing its constructive partnership with NATO.67

In keeping with the policy of the country' s new leadership, the priorities of the key departments, including the defense and security structures, also changed. According to the data in the media, in June 2010, the Ukrainian Security Service changed the priorities of its counterintelligence activity. The primary focus of the counterintelligence department was defense against the undertakings of the American special services, not the Russian.68

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the change in the country's foreign policy was an adequate reaction to the changes going on in the world, a kind of reset for both subjective and objective reasons. The main objective reason was the changes going on around the country, particularly in NATO, the U.S., and the Russian Federation. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantin Eliseev, Ukraine could not permit itself not to change and live by the laws of international relations of ten or even five years ago. However, in the Foreign Ministry, government, and parliament, the majority in Ukraine did not have a clear idea about how foreign policy should be changed.69 Consequently, until mid-2012, new versions of the National Security Strategy and Ukrainian Military Doctrine70 that would correspond to the new law On the Fundamental Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy were not adopted. At the same time, in the new version of Ukraine's National Security Strategy that appeared, Item 3.1.2. of Para 3 named the Black Sea-Caspian Region only as a dangerous regional environment around Ukraine that threatened its national security due to further escalation of the conflicts in it, the internal instability in many states of the region, as well as the uncertainty of their prospects and absence of a common vision regarding regional integration.71

Evaluating the changes in Ukraine's foreign policy, British analyst James Sherr stated that Viktor Yanukovich had not only made a complete U-turn in Ukraine's development, but also com-

65 According to the Kharkov Agreements of 2010, Ukraine agreed to extend the presence of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea until 2042, while Russia would lower the price of gas for Ukraine.

66 See: "Yanukovich Questions Ukraine's Membership in GUAM," available in Russian at [http://rus.ruvr. ru/2010/04/27/6974715/27].

67 See: On the Fundamental Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy (Vedomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy (VVR), 2010, No. 40, p. 527), in: Ukrainian Law, available in Russian at [http://uazakon.ru/zakon/zakon-o-printsipah-vnutrenney-i-vneshney-politike.html].

68 See: "Yanukovich Fired the Head of the USS Counterintelligence Department," available in Russian at [http://062. ua/news/v-ukraine/yanukovich-uvolil-nachal-nika-kontrrazvedki-sbu].

69 See: "The Foreign Ministry Explains the Reset of Foreign Policy as an Adequate Reaction to the Changes in the World," available in Russian at [http://rus.newsru.ua/ukraine/08jun2010/poyasniv.html].

70 See: Ukraine's Military Doctrine, available in Russian at [http://constitutions.ru/archives/7794].

71 Ukraine's National Security Strategy "Ukraine in a Changing World, " available in Ukrainian at [http://zakon4.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/105/2007].

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mitted a geopolitical blunder. This was because Kiev's concessions to Moscow had only increased its pressure on Ukraine. According to James Sherr, Viktor Yanukovich's approach to the agreements with Russia was improvised, everything was done with incredible incompetency, belligerence, and haste.72

Without putting the entire blame on Viktor Yanukovich, E. Zherebetsky, Ukrainian expert on international security problems, evaluated Ukraine's position after the first 100 days of Yanukovich's presidency as follows: "In the West, we see a Europe that is cool and indifferent to us, while in the East and North we have a Russia that is aggressive and hostile toward us with indulgence toward reintegration of the Soviet Union on the part of the West. We not only have no friends today along the perimeter of the borders and in the interior of the Eurasian continent, we do not have any worthy and reliable allies either."73

External Prerequisites for Ukraine's Possible Mediation Mission in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Settlement

At the same time, the changes in Kiev's foreign policy corresponded to the interests and expectations of the Russian Federation, which made use of them to advance its policy within the CIS, particularly in the Central Caucasus. After two years of essentially unsuccessful mediation in the Azeri-Armenian conflict, Moscow was ready to transfer the mediating role to Kiev. The Kremlin regarded Viktor Yanukovich as its own pro-Moscow president and even expected he would recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After all, at the end of August 2008, Viktor Yanu-kovich (the opposition leader at the time), in counterbalance to the official position of Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, called on Ukraine to take Russia's cue and recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and "act without double standards." He also drew parallels between declaration of the independence of Kosovo and, in his words," of the "rebel" Georgian autonomies.74 That is, in 2010, the Kremlin believed that the Ukrainian president, as well as the country's vector of foreign policy and return to a non-bloc status, best suited a mediating role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Erevan was also hoping for a change in Ukraine' s policy in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, correspondingly, wanted to improve Ukrainian-Armenian relations. Ukraine and Armenia stepped up bilateral cooperation in essentially all spheres: political, economic, cultural-humanitarian, and even military-technical. But the stakes the Kremlin and Erevan placed on Kiev recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and, correspondingly, supporting the Kosovo model for resolving all the Central Caucasian conflicts were not justified. One hundred days into his presidency, Viktor Yanukovich said that Georgia's territorial integrity remained a priority of Ukrainian foreign policy.75 Like the former leaders of the country, he based his considerations on the threat of internal separatism, Ukraine's loss of friendly and strategic relations with Baku and Tbilisi, and its prestige in international organizations and in the eyes of the world community.

72 See: "James Sherr: Yanukovich Made a Blunder When He Misunderstood Russia's Real Intentions," available in Ukrainian at [http://www.unian.ua/news/379501-djeyms-sherr-yanukovich-prorahuvavsya-ne-zrozumivshi-realnih-namiriv-rosiji.htmla-ne-zrozumivshi-realnih-namiriv-rosiji.html].

73 See: E. Zherebetsky, "The Death of Classical Geopolitics," available in Ukrainian at [http://www.ji-magazine.lviv. ua/seminary/2010/sem05-06.htm].

74 See: V. Portnikov, "Vozvrashchenie Yanukovicha," available at [http://politcom.ru/6768.html 27.08.2008].

75 See: D. Tavlui, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy Regarding Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Or Why Does Ukraine Need the Caucasus?" available in Ukrainian at [http://real-politics.org/tavluj-dmytro-zovnishnya-polityka-uk^ajiny-stosovno-hruzi-ji-virmeniji-azerbajdzhanu-abo-navischo-ukrajini-kavkaz/].

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At the same time, the upswing observed in Ukrainian-Armenian relations in 2011-2012 had positive results. In particular, on 10-11 February, 2011, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Grish-chenko paid an official visit to Armenia where he signed a Program of Ukrainian-Armenian Cooperation for 2011-2012 and a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding Regarding Cooperation between the Diplomatic Academies at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and the Armenian Foreign Ministry.

On 29-30 June, 2011, the fifth sitting of the Joint Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Armenian Commission on Economic Cooperation was held in Kiev. The sides expressed mutual interest in intensifying a bilateral political dialog. The importance of continuing the practice of regular contacts between the foreign ministries of the two countries was noted, as well as of holding consultations between the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and the Armenian Foreign Ministry on urgent issues on the bilateral agenda and regional problems.76

The activation of Ukrainian-Armenian relations was largely promoted by another breakdown in Russian diplomacy at the Azeri-Armenian talks on Nagorno-Karabakh held on 29-30 June, 2011 in Kazan. At that time, Moscow was unable to prove its unprejudiced and equidistant attitude to the conflict. In turn, the failure of the Kremlin's peacekeeping mission was also promoted by the large deliveries of Russian arms to Azerbaijan in 2009-2011. Azerbaijan made its first purchases of Russian weapons in 2008, and in 2010-2011 new contracts were signed.77

Whereas before 2008, Baku constantly accused the Kremlin of illegal arms deliveries to Erevan, in 2011 there were no irresolvable issues in military-technical cooperation or defense partnership between Baku and Moscow. However, due to the regional Azeri-Armenian opposition regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, this aroused an extremely negative reaction in Erevan.78 The situation on the line of contact between the conflicting sides flared up again, violations of the ceasefire regime on both sides became more frequent, and, correspondingly, the number of deaths among servicemen of both armies rose. This increased the likelihood of a new, military, stage in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. This situation was explained by the fact that around 2005 Baku and Erevan began actively engaging in an arms race and, after the Russian Federation introduced a moratorium on the CFE Treaty in 2007 and the Russian-Georgian war broke out in 2008, both sides in the conflict began making mass purchases of arms and military hardware. The well-known rule "If you want peace prepare for war" became the guide to action for both sides in the conflict. The arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan was constantly accompanied not only by mutual accusations of exceeding the military potential quota determined by the CFE Treaty in 1999, but also by accusations of those countries exporting arms to the opposing side in the conflict. For historical and political reasons, Azerbaijan's strategic partner in military-technical cooperation in the post-Soviet expanse was Ukraine, while Armenia's was Russia. So Erevan did not like Moscow cooperating with Baku in this sphere. Nor did such steps by the Kremlin fit either the role of strategic ally and guarantor of Armenia's security, or a mediating role in the conflict settlement, since they promoted aggravation of Azeri-Armenian relations and further escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia was concerned about the possibility of a change in the correlation of military forces in the region in favor of Azerbaijan as a result of exceeding the conventional forces quota, which meant a violation of international obligations according to the CFE Treaty terms.

In this respect, Erevan made inquiries of the Russian Federation at the level of legislative and executive power, and even wanted to discuss Russia's arms sales to Azerbaijan within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

In response, Russian politicians and political scientists emphasized that arms deliveries to Azerbaijan would not affect relations between Moscow and Erevan or the breakdown in forces in the region, since Russia and Armenia were bound by the collective security treaty, to which Azerbaijan does not

76 See: "Political Cooperation between Ukraine and Armenia," available in Russian at [http://armenia.mfa.gov.ua/ru/ ukraine-am/diplomacy].

77 See: "Russia has Begun Sending Batches of Military Hardware to Azerbaijan," available in Russian at [http:// newsland.com/news/detail/id/1197619].

78 See: S. Davydov, "Bratstvo po oruzhiiu," available at [http://kavpolit.com/bratstvo-po-oruzhiyu/?print].

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belong. Russia continues to sell arms to Armenia and they are more powerful than those being sent to Azerbaijan. The sale of weapons to Baku was called a commercial project that gave Russia's high-tech enterprises the necessary resource, while refusing it would encourage other suppliers to come to Azerbaijan (K. Zatulin).79

Arms sales to Azerbaijan is a major achievement on Russia's part that politically unifies, rather than separates, the states (Russia and Azerbaijan), who are strategic partners. Sales are also beneficial and necessary for Baku, keeping in mind several unresolved territorial problems both with Armenia and in the water area of the Caspian Sea (I. Shishkin and M. Khodarenok).80

Arms deliveries to Azerbaijan allow the Russian Federation to keep the country under its influence and reduce the amount of military purchases Baku makes in the international market (A. Kiylov). Russian expert K. Makienko even drew a parallel in this respect with the policy of the U.S. and NATO countries that are delivering large batches of weapons to antagonistic states—Egypt and Israel, Greece and Turkey. He claims that the dependence of these countries on one supplier will allow the U.S. and the West to prevent conflicts between them.81 However, the expert does not keep in mind that Turkey, Greece, and the U.S. are members of NATO. In addition, Washington does not have borders with all the said states and, correspondingly, no territorial claims against them, even at the unofficial level. While Russian political scientist and Director of the International Institute of Newly Established States (IINES) Alexei Martynov states: "Isn't it time for Russia to claim its sovereign rights to Karabakh, Baku, and Ganja?"82 Third, in contrast to Russia, the U.S. is not acting as mediator in the peace talks in the mentioned conflicts, which significantly differ from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in nature, time, geopolitical, and other characteristics.

So the strong military-technical cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan has helped to bring Kiev and Erevan closer together. At the same time, Ukraine, which was about to take the chair in the OSCE in 2013, wanted both conflicting sides to recognize it as one of the mediators in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. At the end of April 2011, Viktor Yanukovich paid an official visit to Baku. The joint statement of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Ukraine on further development of strategic partnership relations between the two countries said that Ukraine was still in favor of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the basis of the regulations of international law, keeping in mind the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and inviolability of borders. For this purpose, Baku and Kiev also came to terms about continuing to cooperate within the framework of international organizations.83

At the beginning of July 2011, after the failure of the Azeri-Armenian talks in Kazan, Erevan and Baku expressed a common interest in replacing the mediator in the negotiation process. Armenian President Serzh Sargsian went straight to Ukraine from Kazan on an official visit. At a joint press conference with him, Viktor Yanukovich said: "We have wonderful partner, friendly, and economic trade relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is in our interests, in the interests of the Ukrainian people that this conflict is resolved peacefully. We would really hope that our friends find these solutions within the OSCE Minsk Group. Ukraine will chair the OSCE in 2013, and we will exert maximum efforts to advance this negotiation process."84

79 See: "Erevan is Asking Moscow to Explain its Arms Deliveries to Baku," available in Russian at [http://izvestia.ru/ news/552627/].

80 See: "Russian 'Urans-E' for Azerbaijan's Navy," available in Russian at [http://rus.ruvr.ru/2013_10_16/Rossijskie-Urani-JE-dlja-VMS-Azerbajdzhana-8754].

81 See: A. Nikolsky, P. Khimshiashvili, "Rossiia vooruzhaet Azerbaidzhan," available at [http://www.vedomosti.ru/ politics/news/13199631/v_baku_idet_smerch].

82 See: "Nagorno-Karabakh Still Belongs to the Russian Empire—Alexei Martynov," available in Russian at [http:// www.iarex.ru/articles/38385.html].

83 See: "Ilham Aliev Relays Ukraine's Position on the Karabakh Problem," available in Russian at [http://www.memo. ru/d/76036.html].

84 See: "The Media: Ukraine is Looking at the Possibility of Becoming a Mediator in the Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh," available in Russian at [http://www.iines.org/node/470].

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Armenian President Serzh Sargsian noted in turn: "We are very much hoping that during its chairmanship in the OSCE, Ukraine will make its contribution to establishing peace and order in our region. The people of Nagorno-Karabakh have the internationally recognized right to self-determination. This right should be put into practice, should be fully realized. There is no other solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem."85

The Armenian leader also stated that there could have been a breakthrough in settlement of the conflict at the meeting in Kazan, but that did not happen. "I think that the chance, at least one chance, was lost. This does not mean an end to the negotiation process, this does not mean that we will not continue our talks. It means that the time until the next meeting has been lost."86

President Serzh Sargsian's visit to Ukraine gave a boost to further development of Ukrainian-Armenian cooperation. First of all, Days of Armenian Culture were held in Ukraine for the first time in the history of the two countries. Later a meeting of the intergovernmental Ukrainian-Armenian commission was held, and a Ukrainian-Armenian business forum was organized. In 2012, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Grishchenko and Chairman of the Supreme Rada (parliament) Vladimir Litvin paid visits to Armenia. While in March 2012, Days of Ukrainian Culture were held in Armenia. One of the squares in Spitak (in the restoration of which after the 1988 earthquake Ukrainian builders took active part, one of them being current head of the Ukrainian state Viktor Yanukovich) is called after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich.87

Russia did not view the visit by the Armenian president to Ukraine as an attempt by Erevan to dramatically change Ukraine's policy on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It saw it as Armenia's striving to create a basis in advance for cooperating with Kiev on the eve of its chairmanship in the OSCE, as well as to acquire a certain diplomatic counterbalance to Baku after almost a decade of cool Ukrainian-Armenian relations.88

After that, Kiev began posing itself actively as a potential mediator by stepping up its policy in the Central Caucasus. A delegation of Ukrainian diplomats visited Baku, Erevan, and Khankendi (Stepanakert), where they clarified on the spot whether Ukraine could participate in the peacekeeping process in the region.

The Ukrainian presidential administration presumed that the country' s participation in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would significantly raise its prestige not only in the post-Soviet expanse.89

Ukrainian Arms Sales to Armenia: Reality or Fantasy, Reasons and Consequences

However, at the end of the summer 2011, a political scandal arose between Kiev and Baku regarding Ukraine's arms sales to Armenia. Guided by the regulations of international law regarding the transfer of military and dual-use hardware, Ukraine was successfully carrying out military-technical cooperation with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. This is also shown by the 2010 data Ukraine

85 See: "CIS News. Armenia is Asking Ukraine to Help Settle the Karabakh Problem," available in Russian at [http:// umma.ua/ru/news/SNG/2011/07/01/1013].

86 See: "The Media: Ukraine is Looking at the Possibility of Becoming a Mediator in the Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh."

87 See: I. Kukhta, "I fell in Love with Armenia and its Wonderful People from the Very First Time I was There," available in Russian at [http://armenpress.am/rus/news/696977/ 23.10.12].

88 See: S. Markedonov, "Ukraine: between Azerbaijan and Armenia," available in Russian at [http://www.kontinent. org/article_rus_4e 17f1784ff19.html].

89 See: E. Rustamov, "Will Ukraine Become a Mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement?" available in Russian at [http://www.1news.az/politics/karabakh/20110704034407048.htmlA].

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presented to the U.N.90 However, in February 2011, when Dmitri Peregudov became the new general director at the Ukrspetseksport State Company, cooperation in this sphere between Kiev and Erevan, according to Baku, increased. This primarily concerned the amounts and types of arms Ukraine was supplying. So at the end of August 2011, during Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Grishchenko's visit to Baku, the Azeri leadership expressed extreme concern about the increase in volume of deliveries of Ukrainian arms and military hardware to Armenia. The Azeri leadership, referring to documents of the Ukrainian state export control service that journalists became privy to, gave several examples of an increase in Ukrainian arms deliveries to Armenia. Baku called on the Ukrainian Foreign Minister to take the necessary steps to prevent such activity in the future, since this threatened to undermine the negotiations on peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, aggravate the situation, and even disrupt the status quo in the conflict zone as the result of possible revival of the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan.91 That is, now Azerbaijan, as Armenia in the past, was concerned about the possibility of a change in the correlation of military forces in the region in favor of Erevan as the result of the unpredictable action of its strategic ally.

Experts called the military-technical cooperation between Kiev and Erevan political shortsightedness and irresponsibility that could lead to serious deterioration in Ukraine's relations with Azerbaijan. They were unable to understand the logic of the steps taken by the head of Ukrspetseksport to enter contracts with Armenia, even in view of the commercial gain for the state company and the Ukrainian government. According to their assessments, the total sum of the current contracts with Azerbaijan for deliveries of arms and military hardware by the Ukrainian side amounted to around $70 million, while the sum of the deliveries of Ukrainian arms to Armenia was much less, despite their significant increase over the past year. The only and presumable explanation was "personal interest," since the head of Ukrspetseksport was a successful businessman with long partner relations with representatives of Armenia's arms business (which the media repeatedly reported).92

In this way, Ukraine, following Russia's example, risked looking like an "igniter" of the "smoldering" regional conflict in the eyes of the world community. However, whereas it was economically and geopolitically advantageous for Russia and its exporters to deliver military hardware to Azerbaijan, it was not for Ukraine and Ukrspetseksport. The impression was created that Kiev was being drawn into a gamble.

In August 2012, secret information appeared in the Ukrainian and Azeri media about Ukraine selling arms to Armenia. They reported that Head of the Main Intelligence Administration of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Major General Sergei Gmyza recommended that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich use dummy companies in the EU and CIS for delivering arms to Armenia.93

Ukrainian military experts diverged in their opinions, which ranged from complete denial of such deliveries to actual admission. However, they were all sure that other states were interested in the appearance of the letter that compromised Ukraine. In particular, retired colonel A. Manachinsky said that Kiev and Baku had established such close partnership ties that Ukraine could not have deceived Azerbaijan. In his words, the purpose of the scandal was to create a negative image of Ukraine in the world community as a state that does not keep its word, as well as to resolve private issues. The expert said he thought that many countries with powerful military-industrial complexes were interested in a deterioration in Ukrainian-Azeri relations, since the arms market, "which is fought over to the last drop of blood, does not tolerate profanation."94

90 See: D. Tavlui, op. cit.

91 See: "Ukraine is Increasing Arms Deliveries to Armenia," available in Russian at [http://fundmarket.ua/news/ukraina-narashivayet-postavki-vooruzhyeniya-v-armyeniyu-20110902155534].

92 See: Ibidem.

93 See: "Details are Known of a Letter from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry about Arms Deliveries to Armenia," available in Russian at [http://www.trend.az/news/politics/2055843.html].

94 U. Akhundova, "Mozhet li Ukraina podvesti Azerbaidzhan," Zerkalo, 17 August, 2012, available at [http://www. zerkalo.az/2012/mozhet-li-ukraina-podvesti-azerbaydzhan/].

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Another Ukrainian military expert, V. Badrak, offers a different interpretation: "... keeping in mind that the total volume of Ukrainian arms export in 2011 continued to rise, the economic effect from the speculative delivery of 12 old systems of volley fire and a small batch of portable anti-air missile systems to Armenia looks absurd. No one was fighting for the Armenian arms and military hardware market, in contrast to that of Azerbaijan. Arms exporters are not interested in Armenia's potential. It is considered an insolvent customer in the arms business. But, most important, it has long been Moscow's protégé, military-technical cooperation with which is aimed at creating joint Armenian-Russian enterprises of the military-technical complex for producing military materiel, as well as repairing and servicing military hardware. Between 2006 and 2011, the Russian Federation did not sell anything at all to Armenia, but delivered weapons and hardware several times free of charge. For example, in 2008, for a total of $800 million. So Erevan bought 12 old installations in order to stop or undermine the deliveries of Ukrainian arms to Azerbaijan, as well as the military-technical cooperation between Kiev and Baku."95

V. Badrak claimed that the appearance of the "letter" of the head of the Main Intelligence Administration was of interest not only to Erevan, but also to the Russian Federation, which was irritated by Ukrainian-Azeri military-technical cooperation, particularly in terms of modernization of military hardware. For example, Azerbaijan also began taking part in modernization of the MiG-29 bombers and Mi-24 helicopters that Ukraine was sending to the republic, while the results of R&D were being used to carry out modernization of airplanes and helicopters for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. That is, the ideology of military-technical cooperation was beginning to be applied in the Ukrainian army. Moscow, on the other hand, was claiming modernization (or at least control) of all Soviet arms and military hardware, the elaborators of which just happened not to be in the Russian Federation. Moreover, Baku and Kiev were looking at the possibility of creating enterprises of light armored vehicles in Azerbaijan, which Ukraine had been successful manufacturing in recent years. It was among the five countries with which Azerbaijan had expanded military-technical cooperation. So it was advantageous primarily for Russia to stick a spoke in the wheels of Ukrainian-Azeri relations. It is no accident that the scandal provoked by publication of the "letter" happened on the eve of Russian Vice Premier Dmitri Rogozin and Head of Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Alexander Fomin's visit to Baku. The Kremlin tried to cool the attitude toward the Ukrainian leader on the eve of his fall trip to Baku and occupy not only Ukraine's place in the Azeri market, but also that of other suppliers. It was an opportune moment since not all of the West, on the brink of a possible war with Iran, unconditionally trusted Baku and not all the Western players were interested in close military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ukraine.96

Other Ukrainian experts were of the same opinion. In particular, S. Zgurets believed that "the initiators of the information compromising Ukraine could be found in the Russian Federation, which was itself stepping up cooperation lately with Azerbaijan in detriment to the Collective Security Treaty, according to which it does not have the right to send weapons to that country. It is for this very reason that attempts are being made to switch all attention to the nonexistent deliveries of Ukrainian weapons to Armenia. The only problem is that Kiev was not quick enough on the uptake."97

According to the Azerbaijani military analyst Fikret Mamedov, ".it is up to Ukraine to whom it sells its old equipment and how. Smerch systems may be all well and good, but they are already a thing of the past compared to Israel's RSZO Extra (150 km range) and Delilah (280 km range), which are actively being purchased for the Azeri army. We hope that the Azeri Defense Ministry will draw

95 See: V. Badrak, "Eto on, eto on, Leningradsky Pochtalion...," 17 August, 2012, available at [http://gazeta.zn.ua/ POLITICS/eto_on,_eto_on,_leningradskiy_pochtalon__o_pisme,_prizvannom_rassorit_azerbaydzhan_s_ukrainoy.html].

96 See: Ibidem.

97 See: K. Lazorenko, "Kiev is Being Accused of Selling Arms to Armenia. In Whose Interests is This?" 15 August, 2012, available in Russian at [http://finforum.org/page/index.html/_/politics/kiev-obvinili-v-prodazhe-oruzhija-armenii-v-chih-at-r43874].

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corresponding conclusions and exclude Ukraine from all tenders and military-industrial cooperation projects for the next few years."98

Azerbaijani experts agree with their Ukrainian colleagues. They also think that the information on Ukraine delivering weapons to Armenia in amounts exceeding the quotas is a result of the policy of the Kremlin and Erevan. The goal of this policy is to undermine Ukrainian-Azeri partnership. In particular, Mubariz Akhmedoglu thought that Armenia deliberately purchased weapons in Ukraine in order to interfere in the bilateral relations between Kiev and Baku. "Erevan was not buying weapons for defense purposes since Russia is supplying the republic's armed forces with them. We can clearly see the political motives of this step by the Armenian side."99

Like some Ukrainians, Azeri experts and politicians did not exclude arms sales by Ukraine to Armenia, despite the justification of Ukrainian officials. For example, I. Mamedli said that he believes that Ukraine sold its weapons to Armenia, since this is to its benefit, while Russia is simply making skillful use of the moment to undermine Ukraine' s authority again. The expert concluded that the arms business has always encountered such scandals and said it was a pity that the president and Ukrainian Defense Ministry could not make a painless recovery from this conflict that had struck a perceptible blow to their image.100

Milli Mejlis deputy and political scientist Rasim Musabekov also said: "I do not doubt Ukraine' s inclination to sell arms to foreign countries. Every state wants to earn money. But the clarity introduced by the Ukrainian embassy calmed the Azeri side down somewhat."101

The appearance of the letter compromising Ukraine was also explained by different internal factors: the failure of Ukrainian counterintelligence, the result of an extremely negative reaction to monopolization of Ukraine's military-industrial complex (2010) by one of the business groups removed from the arms market, the severe rivalry among groups claiming control over the country's arms market, as well as the work of pro-Moscow general director of the Ukroboronprom state concern,102 a Russian called Dmitri Salamatin.103 According to information in the Ukrainian media, his activity was defined as "wrecking and sabotage."104

As a result of the scandal, Ukrainian experts began claiming that in order to avoid losses from monopolization of the arms market, it was advantageous for Ukraine to cooperate with Russia in this area. As early as December 2011, the Ukrainian media reported that in the past year Ukraine had gone down a few rungs in the arms suppliers rating due to the limitation of sales. Experts also said that more changes and adjustments evidently occurred in Ukraine's foreign policy after which the Ukrainian government made the decision to cooperate with the Russian Federation in arms deliveries. "It is unlikely that Ukrainian companies will be able to deliver independently to Azerbaijan and particularly to Georgia. Arms export to the region is advantageous for Ukraine economically, but not geo-politically. This shows that Ukraine, like before, greatly depends on Russia."105

98 See: "Yanukovich is Supplying Arms for New Ethnic Cleansing in the Caucasus," available in Russian at [http:// uainforg.livejournal.com/641626.html] (see also [http://echo.msk.ru/blog/imho1/919168-echo/]).

99 See: I. Ragimova, "So Has Ukraine Been Selling Arms to Armenia or Not?" available in Russian at [http://www.aze. az/news_80917.html].

100 See: Ibidem.

101 Ibidem.

102 Ukrspetseksport belongs to Ukroboronprom.

103 It is not known how, but Dmitri Salamatin became a Ukrainian citizen in 2005 while continuing to live in Moscow with his family, the members of whom did not have Ukrainian citizenship. As a deputy of the Ukrainian parliament, Dmitri Salamatin was known for taking active part in the fights in the Supreme Rada. His real claim to fame came after the brutal fight in the Rada during ratification of the Kharkov agreements of 2010. At that time, in the fervor of the parliament fight he broke an opposition deputy's nose.

104 See: K. Ivanchenko, "Ukraine's Arms Business: Embezzlement of State Property, Disorder and Bawdy House—2," available in Russian at [http://argumentua.com/stati/oruzheinyi-biznes-ukrainy-kaznokradstvo-bardak-i-bordel-2].

105 See: D. Tavlui, op. cit.

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Moreover, some political scientists began claiming that there was no point in Ukraine participating in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, or in the entire Caucasian question in general, because the Russian Federation was hindering this. "Ukraine's interests in the Caucasus have been undergoing 'filtration' in Moscow for more than one year now, which makes it impossible to squeeze the most out of those opportunities Ukraine has in this region. The matter primarily concerns the sales market of domestic weapons."106

Other experts believe that Ukraine's mediation or peacekeeping mission in the Nagorno-Karabakh or any other conflict in the Caucasus that is not coordinated with Moscow will only cause problems for Ukraine. Should Azerbaijan or Armenia be supported in the war for Nagorno-Karabakh, "which, according to different evaluations, will definitely break out in 2013-2014 if it does not erupt in 2012, or should they wait for the terrorists to come? This is not very safe... Trying to strengthen the presence of Ukraine in the Caucasus is like playing on the rim of an active volcano." Sometimes caution in international policy is better than ambition. Why look for adventures that go against common sense? For simple worldly wisdom says that "an outsider in a fight between neighbors will also

suffer."107

The Nagorno-Karabakh Issue in Ukrainian Policy on the Eve of Its Chairmanship

in the OSCE

The scandal with deliveries of Ukrainian arms to Armenia did not dramatically change Ukrai-nian-Azeri relations. Ukraine's official position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remained unchanged. Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament Vladimir Litvin brought this up again in April 2012 during his visit to Azerbaijan. "Official Kiev has always supported Azerbaijan's fair position and been in favor of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and sovereignty." Vladimir Litvin promised Baku that in 2013, during its chairmanship in the OSCE, Ukraine would focus maximum attention on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He saw the negotiation problem in the fact that the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs engaged in its resolution were placing top priority on the political interests of their countries.108

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Grishchenko also talked about Ukraine's interest in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its priority during the country's future chairmanship in the OSCE when he paid an official visit to Azerbaijan in June 2012. "Ukraine will do everything at the OSCE level to make progress in this issue," he said.109

On 24 August, 2012, when congratulating Ukraine on its Independence Day, Viktor Yanukov-ich said: "Thanks to its non-bloc status, Ukraine can actively participate in settling international conflicts as a mediator." In his words, times of transformation and change in the world are often accompanied by an increase in conflict in international relations. "Ukraine as a responsible participant in international relations must exert maximum effort to maintain peace and prevent new global op-

106 D. Tavlui, op. cit.

107 See: V. Filonov, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy Regarding Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Or Why does Ukraine Need the Caucasus?" available in Ukrainian at [http://real-politics.org/mykola-filonov-zovnishnya-polityka-ukrajiny-stosovno-hmziji-virmeniji-azerbajdzhanu-abo-navischo-ukrajini-kavkaz/], 7 December, 2011.

108 See: M. Aliev, "Ukraine is Exerting Maximum Effort to Resolve the Karabakh Conflict, says Rada speaker," available in Russian at [http://www.trend.az/news/karabakh/2016409.html].

109 See: "The Karabakh Issue Will Be a Priority of Ukraine's Chairmanship in the OSCE, says head of the Foreign Ministry," available in Russian at [http://newsazerbaijan.ru/politic/20120605/297420590.html 05/06/2012].

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position. The state's non-bloc status is opening up prospects for more active participation in settling international conflicts as a mediator."110

At the end of September 2010, when talking at the 67th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Viktor Yanukovich said that Ukraine would promote settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in every way it could during its chairmanship in the OSCE in 2013, as well as focus attention on the Geneva discussions on security and stability in the Caucasus. The Ukrainian side would do everything possible to settle this problem peacefully, or at least push for its realistic resolution. Ukraine would try to find points that would unite the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group member states, lead to a change in the status quo, and promote the beginning of realistic talks on conflict settlement. Ukraine understood that during its chairmanship in the OSCE, it would not be able to resolve all the questions relating to the Karabakh problem, but set the goal of achieving progress in this question, primarily by stepping up efforts in the Minsk Group format. Peaceful conflict settlement and prevention will also be a starting point for Ukraine's activity if it is elected as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in 2016-2017.

At the same time, the president reminded everyone that a contemporary and civilized approach to resolving interstate conflicts lay in offering and guaranteeing national minorities every civilian right, including local and autonomous self-government. In the same context, Ukraine would achieve full execution of the CFE Treaty.111

At the end of 2012, Ukraine and Azerbaijan chairing in the ODED-GUAM tried to step up the Organization's activity in conflict settlement in its territory. On 1 December, 2012, at the 26th session of the GUAM Council of National Coordinators in Kiev, the "Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development" resolution was approved again.112 However, the U.N. General Assembly never did discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

At the same time, at the beginning of 2013, deputy of the Ukrainian Supreme Rada from the ruling Party of the Regions Vadim Kolesnichenko said that Ukraine essentially did not have the opportunity to participate actively in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem even during its chairmanship in the OSCE. He gave the Russian Federation, as a major mediating state playing an important role in the conflict from the very beginning, a determining and decisive role in this issue. Ukraine's role, in the deputy's words, was "to demonstrate support of the efforts of Azerbaijan and Armenia in peaceful settlement of the conflict." The more the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is discussed within the framework of international organizations, including in the OSCE, the more opinions will form about the need to resolve it, and politicians will exert increasing efforts in this area. But the world community is not rushing to resolve this conflict, since there are many hotspots that are considered more important.113

Conclusion

Ukraine has repeatedly supported and even initiated reexamination of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and elimination of its consequences within the framework of international organizations. It has

110 See: K. Kokhan, "Ukraine Might Be a Mediator in Settling International Conflicts," available in Russian at [http:// ura-inform.com/ru/politics/2012/08/24/ukraina-mozhet-byt-posrednikom-v-uregulirovanii-mezhdunarodnykh-konfliktov].

111 See: "The President's Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the 67th Session of the U.N. General Assembly," available in Russian at [http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/25545.html].

112 See: E. Huseinov, "A Draft of the Resolution on Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area Will Be Presented at the U.N.," available in Russian at [http://www.trend.az/news/politics/2096233.html]; "The GUAM Countries are Gaining Wide Support of their Resolution in the U.N. General Assembly," available in Russian at [http://www.contact.az/docs/2012/ Politics/120600020540ru.htm#.Uq4eVydP2XY].

113 See: N. Huseinov, "Deputy from the Party of the Regions: 'Ukraine Will Also Support Azerbaijan's Territorial Integrity during its Chairmanship in the OSCE'," available in Russian at [http://aze.az/news_deputat_ukraina_vo_86383.html].

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actively supported coordinating the activity of all international global and regional organizations engaged in security (the OSCE, U.N., EU, and ODED-GUAM) in settlement of this conflict. Kiev has not only supported all the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly on Nagorno-Karabakh, but has also actively upheld them during meetings of the highest bodies of these organizations.

Support of Azerbaijan in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during the rule of Ukraine's first three presidents sometimes took the form of direct and indirect upholding of the interests of a friendly country on the international arena. In the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, no other post-Soviet state like Ukraine supported Azerbaijan, or Georgia either, within the framework of international organizations. In so doing, the Ukrainian state took advantage of its much greater diplomatic potential and work experience on the international arena compared with other former Soviet republics, since along with the Soviet Union and Belarus, it has been a member and one of the founders of the U.N. since 1945.

Ukraine's policy regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue since the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union until 2010 dramatically differed from Russia's policy on the same problem, which is clearly seen in the activity of the Ukrainian and Russian representatives within the framework of international organizations. Nor did it in general meet Armenia's interests, which did not promote the development of Ukrainian-Armenian relations.

Beginning with President Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine has been actively against forming and engaging a CIS peacekeeping contingent in the conflict zones in the Central Caucasus. This contradicted Russia's plans, which was trying to preserve its military presence in this region.

At the same time, Kiev has not always been claiming either a mediating mission in the negotiations on resolution of the problem, or a peacekeeping role in the conflict zone. Ukraine offered its mediating services in this issue, proceeding from its status as a non-bloc state, while the participants in the conflict viewed Kiev as one of the possible mediators in its settlement. For a short time, Ukraine was recognized by both sides in the conflict as a unbiased mediator and got ready to perform the corresponding functions. But whereas in the first case this was primarily prevented by external factors, in the second it was hindered by internal. During Leonid Kuchma's second presidential term, Ukraine no longer intended assuming the role of one of the main mediator negotiators, but only offered its territory for holding the talks.

During Leonid Kuchma's presidency, the idea of forming a joint military contingent of three GUAM member states was first put forward for carrying out a peacekeeping mission in the Central Caucasus, as well as the demand to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of the GUAM states approved by the OSCE Istanbul summit of 1999 and arousing an extremely negative reaction in the Kremlin.

Ukraine was the most active and efficient in terms of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency until August 2008. However, Kiev and Baku were unable to achieve the main goal of engaging Ukrainian peacekeepers under the auspices of the U.N. in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone due to the position of Moscow and Erevan. Because of Viktor Yush-chenko, Armenia no longer considered Kiev an unbiased side regarding all the participants in the conflict, while the Russian Federation itself wanted and wants, no matter what, to send its troops, as peacekeepers, into the Azeri territories occupied by Armenia. This will allow it to achieve its main goal in this region of full control over the countries of the Central Caucasus and primarily over Azerbaijan. For this is the only territory where there are no Russian troops, which makes it possible for Baku to pursue a policy independent of Moscow. Engaging Russian peacekeepers in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone will make Baku more conceding in its relations with the Kremlin. This primarily explained Moscow's striving not only to oppose, but also split GUAM. The Kremlin also successfully used the moratorium on the CFE Treaty in 2007 for this purpose, as well as the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008.

THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The changes in foreign policy and international status of Ukraine in 2010-2012, which promoted Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Armenian rapprochement, as well as active military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation and the ineffectiveness of Russian mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, created conditions for Ukraine's mediating mission. But Ukraine's policy, which did not correspond to all the Kremlin's plans, soon forced Moscow to look for ways to aggravate Ukrainian-Azeri relations. This search ended in the Ukrainian-Azeri scandal over Kiev's arms sales to Erevan. Despite the fact that the scandal did not achieve the desired result, it dealt a blow to Ukraine's image as an unbiased mediator. Moreover, real rapprochement and improvement of relations between Kiev and Erevan did nothing to preserve the traditional trust between Kiev and Baku.

Despite Ukraine's unchanged position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Ukraine's real policy during Yanukovich's presidency became unpredictable not only for Moscow, but also for both sides in the conflict. Moreover, not only experts, but also Ukrainian government representatives began to doubt that Kiev had any real possibility of resolving the Azeri-Armenian conflict. So, against this background, neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia took any of Ukraine's statements and assurances of its intentions to advance settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during its chairmanship in the OSCE in 2013 seriously. Ukraine had lost their trust. The promises of Ukraine's high-ranking officials were not in sync with their actions and began looking very much like Moscow's policy.