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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Fikret SADYKHOV
Professor at Western University (Baku, Azerbaijan).
ON THE GEOPOLITICAL AND LEGAL FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
Abstract
This article discusses the geopolitical aspects of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its destructive consequences for the region as a whole and for Armenia in particular. It examines the origins and reasons for the many years of opposition, as well as the attempts the sides are making to reach a viable compromise. Particular focus is placed on comparing the social and eco-
nomic processes in the two countries, as well as on the actual conditions that have developed in the region. The author analyzes all the factors threatening peace and stability throughout the Caucasus and takes a look at the diplomatic efforts the Azerbaijan Republic has been exerting to settle the conflict by peaceful means, as well as the mediating activity of the Co-Chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Introduction
There can be no doubt that most of Azerbaijan's diplomatic efforts today are directed toward finding ways to settle the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This stands to reason since restoration of the country's territorial integrity is the main priority and key task of the Azerbaijan Republic's foreign policy. The conflict has graphically demonstrated the destructive consequences of the inadequate diplomatic steps taken by the leading states, their open reluctance to have any real influence on promoting fair settlement of the conflict, and their inconsistency in implementing the decisions of international organizations.1
Today some analysts think that the conflict is playing a pivotal role in the new geopolitics in Eurasia and is posing a growing threat to regional security and stability throughout the entire Caucasus and Middle East.2 Furthermore, people are beginning to wonder just who has benefited from the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and what has ultimately been gained by the two opposing sides: Armenia beleaguered with social and economic problems and an unrecognized separatist formation, on the one side, and Azerbaijan recognized within its territorial borders, gaining in economic weight, and strengthening its defense potential, on the other.
The Price of Enlarging the Country's Living Space
Armenia appears to be the winning side in the conflict. Indeed, it controls Nagorno-Karabakh, occupies 20% of Azerbaijani territory, and enjoys moral, political, and financial support from certain circles in the leading states.
But this has led Armenia into an impasse from which there seems to be no way out. The advantages gained in the war are not creating advantages at the negotiation table. Moreover, Armenia is missing one chance after another to achieve a real compromise. Azerbaijan's territorial and human losses do not compare with what the Armenians have lost. In the mid-1980s, there were around 350,000 Armenians living in Azerbaijan, and this is not counting the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. More than half of them lived in Baku. Now the Armenians who have left Azerbaijan only have their ideological and political leaders, as well as the "false historians," to thank for the situation that has developed. These people have paid too high a price for the outcome of the conflict. They have irreversibly lost the invaluable economic, administrative, cultural, and status positions they once held in Azerbaijan. Now even the most prosperous and successful are for the most part eking out a pitiful existence in Armenia, Russia, Ukraine, and the West.
As for Nagorno-Karabakh itself, at least one third of the Armenian citizens who lived there have also left. So the total number of Armenians who have departed Azerbaijan amounts to more than 400,000 people. But this is not all. The backsliding of the former Armenian S.S.R. into poverty, hardship, desertion from the army, and the general socioeconomic and psychological crisis have forced a large number of its own residents to leave Armenia.3 Unemployment reigns in the country amid growing external debt.4 According to the official data of Armenia itself, the number of em-
1 See: "Azerbaidzhan: novaia diplomatiia," available at [http://www.oqoniok.com/archive].
2 See: S.E. Cornell, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Report No. 46, Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 1999, available at [http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/1999_NK_Book.pdfj.
3 See: A. Goryanin, A. Sevastyanov, Russkomu ob Azerbaidzhane i azerbaidzhantsakh, Moscow, 2009, p. 94.
4 See: "M. Hancock, member of the PACE Monitoring Committee and Committee on Political Affairs (Great Britain): 'I do not like criticism of Azerbaijan,'" available at [http://www.today.az/news/politics/64470.html], 19 March, 2010.
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ployed in the country has dropped from 1,400,000 in 2001 to 1,200,000 in 2007. Whereas in 2001, 42% of the employed population worked in industry; in 2007, this index dropped to 16%. Such is reality.
According to The CIA WorldFactbook—2008, 2,967,000 people live in Armenia, while some experts put the country's population at no more than 2,400,000. Extrapolation of the dynamics of the size of the population, birth rate, and natural growth in the 1980s shows that if it had not been for the events of the past twenty years, Armenia would now boast a population of at least 4,000,000. For such a small republic as Armenia, this difference of 1.6 million is essentially catastrophic. The nation is not large enough to develop its culture, information environment, literature, education, and science. This is particularly true since the intelligentsia and number of economically and socially active residents, especially young people, are continuing to decline. According to a Gallup poll, as of July 2008, 23% of the country's residents were ready to leave Armenia. This is what Armenia has acquired from the political shortsightedness of its leaders and their disregard for the objectively developing reality in the region.
British journalist Thomas de Waal cites the words the then Defense Minister and now President of Armenia Serge Sargsyan said to him on 15 December, 2000 in his book on the Karabakh conflict called Black Garden: "The most important thing is not the territory. It's that one ethnic group is left in Armenia. In Vardenis and other regions, the Azerbaijanis used to be 70 percent of the population. Our cultures are not compatible. We can live side by side but not within each other... There are very few of us."5 Judging by everything, Armenians themselves are becoming fewer and fewer in Armenia.
This is the price Armenia is paying for its long years of efforts aimed at enlarging its living space, supporting separatism, and making territorial claims on Azerbaijan.
Vague Analogies and Ideological Myths
We will remind you that Azerbaijan's economic boom continues its uninterrupted and dynamic advance against this dramatic Armenian background. It is enough to note that between 1996 and 2006 alone GDP growth amounted to 13.6% a year. However this growth continued even after 2006. In 2007, Azerbaijan's GDP rose another 23.4%, while per capita GDP reached $7,700.
The results of January-April 2010 also indicate significant growth in Azerbaijan's GDP. During this period, this index reached 13 billion manats. According to the country's State Statistics Board, this is 5% higher than the GDP volume for the same period in 2009. At this time, the production volume in the oil industry increased by 4.9% and in the non-petroleum sector by 5%.6 According to many foreign experts, if it keeps up the same pace, Azerbaijan could reach the level of the most developed countries of the world in terms of this index by the end of this decade.
The longstanding opposition that is now called the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict essentially boils down to Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territory and open support by the aggressor of the separatist formation in Nagorno-Karabakh. This aggression has led to Azerbaijan losing 20% of its land and acquiring one million refugees and migrants. All of this could not help but have an impact on the overall situation in the Central Caucasus, which remains unstable, while from the geopolitical viewpoint it is tense and to some extent explosive.7
5 Th. De Waal, Black Garden, New York University Press, New York, London, 2003, p. 273.
6 See: "Goskomstat Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki. VVP Azerbaidzhana," 1news.az, 17 May, 2010.
7 See: "Glava tsentra strategicheskikh issledovanii Azerbaidzhana: 'Situatsiia na Iuzhnom Kavkaze ostaetsia vzry-voopasnoi,'" day.az, 20 April, 2010.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Furthermore, the main threat to security and stability in the region is that peaceful settlement of the conflict has still not been reached, which poses a serious threat not only to the countries of the region, but also to the international community as a whole. The Armenian side likes to resort to vague historical analogies and ideological myths, as well as make excursions into the distant past, in so doing presenting unsubstantiated arguments and flimsy references that smack of barefaced extravaganza. Unfortunately, such fabrications are also supported by some Russian experts when evaluating the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh. One of them, a certain A. Areshev, claims that at the beginning of the 1990s during adoption of the legislative acts on country's state independence, Azerbaijan "did not take into account the opinions of the autonomous formations and compactly residing national groups, which is a recognized worldwide practice!?"8
This gives rise to the legitimate question of where does the author put the 30% of Azeris living in Nagorno-Karabakh, the opinion of whom was not only not taken into account at the beginning of the campaign launched by the Miatsum (Reunion) initiative in 1988, but who were also subjected to ethnic cleansing and turned into displaced persons in their own country? Moreover, what does the Russian expert mean when he refers to so-called worldwide practice?
I am convinced that today we need an approach based not on virtual and unsubstantiated statements of certain experts, but on political and international legal assessments that take into account the current geopolitical features of the region and offer specific ways to extricate the country from the situation that has developed.
The Legal Aspect and Political Approaches
Azerbaijan is extremely pragmatic when assessing the situation and insists on conflict settlement based on respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized borders, as well as on peaceful coexistence of the Armenian and Azeri communities of Nagorno-Karabakh. To this end, Azerbaijan demands withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories and the return of internally displaced persons to their native lands.9 Furthermore, Nagorno-Karabakh could be granted a temporary intermediate status. This position is entirely reasonable, very precisely expressed, and, most important, is not disputed by the world community.
Armenian experts often refer to the Meyendorff Declaration signed by the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia on 2 November, 2008 in Moscow and remind Azerbaijan of the importance of continuing the negotiation process in order to further elaborate the fundamental principles of political settlement.10 But is anyone in Azerbaijan really against this? It all boils down to just how much more time this will take. Talks have been going on for almost two decades now, while other documents that are much more important for our country are being overlooked. Azerbaijan has four U.N. Security Council resolutions of 1993 (Nos. 822, 853, 874, and 884) in its favor that call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian armed formations from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. As for the applicability of the right of the people to self-determination in the context of separation during settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan also has a statement in its favor made by the then OSCE chairman at the end of this organization's summit held in Lisbon in
8 A. Areshev, "Karabakhskii konflikt: istoricheskie i politiko-pravovye aspekty," in: Maiendorfskaia deklaratsiia, 2 noiabria 2008 goda i situatsiia vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, Russkaia panorama, Moscow, 2009, p. 98.
9 For more detail on the position of the Azerbaijani side on settlement of the conflict, see the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic, available at [http://mfa.gov.az/eng].
10 See: Maiendorfskaia deklaratsiia 2 noiabria 2008 goda i situatsiia vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, p. 12.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
1996.11 The statement set forth three principles that should form part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They are as follows:
"—territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic;
"—legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan;
"—guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all the Parties with the provisions of the settlement."12
These principles were supported by all the summit's participating states, apart from Armenia, and this statement was annexed to the documents of the Lisbon summit. So the Armenian side again demonstrated that the opinion of the world community does not coincide with its own understanding and interpretation of the principles and regulations of international law.
One of the most important achievements of Azerbaijan's membership in the Council of Europe was the adoption of a separate resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh in 2005. The resolution adopted as No. 1416 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is of enduring significance for Azerbaijan.13 It is enough to cite the first point set forth in this document, which reads as follows: "Considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces, and separatist forces are still in control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region."14
Of course, this document could have been formulated even more precisely and clearly. But even as it stands, its adoption was a significant diplomatic victory for Azerbaijan and official recognition of its territorial integrity. Moreover, despite Armenia's desperate attempts to prevent this, a corresponding subcommittee was formed in PACE to monitor execution of Resolution 1416 at one time and co-speakers were even appointed.15
On the diplomatic front, official Baku continued to work actively both with the leading world players and with influential international structures. It is enough to mention the adoption of the March resolution of 2008 by the U.N. General Assembly confirming Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Most important is that Azerbaijan's consistent policy has led to most members of the international community, including the Co-Chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group, understanding the need for taking Azerbaijan's territorial integrity into account as the main principle in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Resolution 2216 of the European Parliament adopted on 20 May, 2011 can also be considered a serious document in Azerbaijan's favor. It expresses concern about militarization of the region and is in favor of unequivocal withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.16 The opinion of the European Parliament deputies and resolution they adopted confirm again the legitimacy of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and the absurdity of Armenia's claims to our country.17 Erevan's reaction seemed rather hysterical, even though the resolution reflected the actual state of affairs in the Central Caucasus, that is, a reality that does not suit Erevan
11 See: T. Musaev, "Pravovye aspekty nagorno-karabakhskogo konflikta", available at [karabakh-doc.azerale.info/ ru/law/law001.htm].
12 OSCE DOC.S/1/96, p. 15, available at [http://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true].
13 See: "Rezoliutsiia PACE po Karabakhu: chto dalshe?" BBC Russian.com, 4 February, 2005.
14 Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1416 (2005), The Conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference, Point 1, available at [http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ ta05/eres1416.htm].
15 See: "Predstavitel delegatsii Azerbaidzhana v PASE ukazal prichiny nedovolstva armianskikh politikov," 1 news.az, Baku, 19 May, 2010.
16 See: "Evroparlament prizval Armeniiu vyvesti voiska iz Karabakha," Ekho, Social-Political Review, 21 May,
2010.
17 See: "Territorialnaia tselostnost Azerbaidzhana podtverzhdena," Trend.Az, 21 May, 2010.
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in the slightest.18 If Armenia considers itself a civilized member of the international community, it should immediately meet the demands of the European Parliament and withdraw from the Azerbaijani territories it has occupied.
And, finally, three important resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh were adopted on 19 May, 2010 in Dushanbe at the 37th session of the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.19
■ The first resolution is political, according to which Armenia is called an aggressor.
■ The second examines the issue of rendering financial and economic assistance to the victims of the Armenian aggression.
■ And the third condemns the destruction of historical Islamic monuments on Azerbaijani territory as a result of the Armenian aggression.
It takes little imagination to understand what the Armenian side would do, which continues with paranoiac obstinacy to insist on the events of one hundred years ago being called "genocide," if it had even the most recent resolutions and decisions of such important and prestigious international organizations to support it.
Pragmatism and Demonstration of Strategic Patience
Has the above-mentioned negotiation process withdrawn from its impasse and come closer to a fair solution to the long years of conflict? Unfortunately, it has not. The unconstructive political course steered by the Armenian leadership deprived of elementary logic and flexibility and blinkered by ideological myths, as well as the speculative policy of the leading states that is encouraging this country's whims have been making it impossible to achieve progress in this matter for almost 20 years now. Moreover, as for the resolutions and decisions adopted by international organizations in Azerbaijan's favor, foreign experts often voice the opinion that none of them have binding force, are advisory in nature, and are unlikely to be put into practice.20 That is, some analysts are a priori resorting to different forms of verbal hairsplitting proving the unacceptability of this development of the situation instead of objectively assessing the circumstances and supporting the position of the world community, as though worried that Armenia will have to liberate the territory it has occupied.
Something else is also clear. The leading states are in favor of implementing any resolution adopted at the level of international organizations. Is it not obvious that precisely they have a determining role in putting these decisions into practice? The events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now in Iran are vivid proof of this.
Armenia's reaction to resolution 2216 on the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories adopted by the European Parliament on 20 May, 2010 also seems rather peculiar. It turns out that according to the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "the resolution does not correspond either to the Madrid Principles, or to the statement in L'Aquila, or to the Moscow (Mey-endorff) Declaration"!?21 And this is the official viewpoint of a country that is neither fulfilling any
18 See: Politog F. Sadykhov: "Reaktsiia Erevana okazalas dostatochno isterichnoi," available at [day.az/new/poli-tics/210963.html], 25 May, 2010.
19 See: "OIC priniala tri rezoliutsii po Nagornomu Karabakhu," available at [www.azer.az/news], 20 May, 2010.
20 See: M. Emerson, "Expert: European Parliament's Resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh Process Not To Affect Course of Negotiations," available at [http://rn.trend.az/en/news/politics/1692051.html], 21 May, 2010.
21 "Armeniia raskritikovala rezoliutsiiu Evroparlamenta po Iuzhnomu Kavkazu," available at [rambler.ru], 20 May,
2010.
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of the resolutions offered by international organizations, nor is responding to the renewed Madrid Principles proposed by the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group as early as January 2010.
Unfortunately it must also be stated that the activity of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been carrying out mediating functions since 1992, paying shuttle visits to the region, and making proposals that are absolutely unacceptable to Azerbaijan with enviable persistence, leaves something to be desired. In my view, the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group have been doing everything to draw the conflict out for as long as possible. Most ludicrous and unrealistic was the OSCE Minsk Group's proposal in November 1998 on the establishment of a unified state, according to which Nagorno-Karabakh would become a state and territorial entity in the form of a republic and establish a union state with Azerbaijan?!22
Then, as early as 2001, attempts were made to impose the so-called Paris and then Key West principles on Azerbaijan, which boiled down to joining Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and bargaining over the status of the transit transportation corridor from mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Meghri. It goes without saying that Azerbaijan entirely rejected all these proposals. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan, remaining loyal to the agreements signed earlier and adhering to the regulations of international law as a civil actor in international relations, has been participating in the negotiation process for almost two decades and periodically meeting with the Armenian leaders under the mediation of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Furthermore, Azerbaijan has always been constructive, upheld a pragmatic position, and demonstrated strategic patience.23 But a situation of "neither peace, nor war" is significantly complicating circumstances in the region and cannot last forever. Azerbaijan will not tolerate occupation of its territory and Armenia's absurd and unsubstantiated claims endlessly. Unfortunately, the mediators from the OSCE Minsk Group are doing nothing more than maintaining the semblance of a dialog. The impression is created that the Co-Chairs are not only unconcerned about reaching a fair settlement of the conflict, but are also openly encouraging the irrepressible ambitions of the Armenian side.
Official Baku has repeatedly stated that it supports gradual settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since it understands that all the problems which have accumulated over long years cannot be resolved in one fell swoop.24
It is also known that the so-called Prague Process was launched six years ago, which resulted in validation of the Madrid Principles in 2007. For the next two years, meetings of the presidents and heads of the foreign affairs ministry were held and the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group made intensive visits to the region, all of which resulted in the sides being offered a renewed version of the Madrid Principles.
In contrast to Armenia, Azerbaijan adopted this document, albeit with some reservations, and believes that it offers opportunities for signing a more extensive document in the future.25 This indicates that official Baku will continue to choose a peaceful, diplomatic path for resolving the problem and strictly adhere to it. If Armenia gradually begins to withdraw its troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories, this will open up broad opportunities for the entire region, both from the economic viewpoint and with respect to security and stability. Can official Erevan offer the Armenians of Karabakh something specific, other than fairy tales about independence? I do not think so. "They have proven hostages of the Armenian leadership and warlords in Karabakh. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is asking them to be part of the process of economic development and infrastructure transformation."26
22 See: "Wikipedia, Karabakhskiy konflikt, poslevoennyy period," available at [http://ru.wikipedia.orq/wiki].
23 See: "Samoopredelenie Karabakha vozmozhno iskliuchitelno v ramkakh territorialnoi tselostnosti Azerbaidzhana," available at [http://ru.apa.az/news 163357 html], 20 May, 2010.
24 See: "E. Mamedyarov: 'Azerbaidzhan podderzhivaet poetapnyi protsess,'" trend.news, 15 March, 2010.
25 See: Ibidem.
26 "E. Aslanov: 'Armiane Karabakha okazalis zalozhnikami rukovodstva Armenii i polevykh komandirov v Kara-bakhe,'" available at [ru.trend.az/news/karabakh/1647652.html], 2 March, 2010.
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It should also be emphasized that Azerbaijan's territorial integrity will never become a topic of discussion, never mind of any compromises. Our position relies both on the regulations of international law and on historical justice and real logic. Azerbaijan's territorial integrity must be restored.27
We would do well to recall that at the end of 2009 Armenia also signed a document adopted at a meeting of the OSCE Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs that called for resolving the problem only within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, showing that Armenia recognized this possibility.28
Azerbaijan thought the joint statement on Nagorno-Karabakh made by the presidents of the U.S., Russia, and France in Toronto at the G-8 summit in June 2010 to be important. The statement emphasized once more the need to liberate the occupied Azerbaijani territories and grant Nagorno-Karabakh an intermediate status that guarantees security and self-government.
The statement itself emphasized again the attitude of these nations to the problem of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, to the fact that it is inviolable, and there should be no doubts in anyone's mind about this. But this is not enough for Azerbaijan, which is used to numerous resolutions, decisions, and statements. These statements must be put into practice in order for Azerbaijan's territory to be ultimately liberated. Everyone is well aware that Azerbaijan will never agree to occupation of its land. Furthermore, everything must be done to render Azerbaijan the necessary assistance and put significant pressure on Armenia to liberate this territory and not indulge in the whims of the aggressor state.
Conclusion
Armenia's position shows that the Armenian side does not want peace, is striving to maintain the existing status quo, does not want to withdraw from the Azerbaijani territory it has seized, is complicating the negotiation process, and is doing everything it can to ensure things stay this way.
Official Baku has repeatedly announced that it will participate in talks as long as real results are forthcoming. The Azerbaijani side has always demonstrated and is still demonstrating an extremely constructive approach. The greatest compromise is that Azerbaijan has been committed to the peace process throughout the almost twenty years its territory has been occupied.
It is also true that no other issue in the region can be resolved without settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. And this is not because Azerbaijan will impede this, it is just that the conflict is having the gravest negative influence on the processes going on in the region. No regional initiative or event will be possible without resolution of this problem, particularly without the participation of Azerbaijan.
Such is the geopolitical reality in which Azerbaijan has played an exclusive role in creating, and disregarding it is the height of blatant folly. The policy Azerbaijan has been conducting in recent years, its stronger position in the region, its efforts to build a potent state, its economic opportunities, and reinforcement of its defense position have significantly strengthened Azerbaijan, making it not only a key regional player, but also an important strategic partner for many leading world nations.
Today, this is the reality that Armenia and those powers so solicitously caring for its prosperity should ultimately acknowledge.
27 See: Speech of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev at a meeting of the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense on army-building, available at [http://www.aze.az/news 35183 html], 24 April, 2010.
28 See: R. Mekhtiev, "Svoboda natsii, samoopredelenie vozmozhno tolko pri territorialnoi tselostnosti strany," available at [http://xronika.az/wain/9773], 22 January, 2010.
