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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Martin HOREMUZ
Ph.D. (International Relations), Department of Political Science, Catholic University in Ruzomberok (Bratislava, Slovakia).
RUSSIA AND THE CONFLICTS IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS
Abstract
The aim of this article is to take a closer look at Russia's role in the frozen conflicts in the Central Caucasus: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The collapse of the U.S.S.R. meant the reopening of several conflicts that had been artificially conserved. In the new government-conditioned and geopolitical configuration, the Caucasus collided with several of the parties involved, as well as with the superpowers, which complicated the
resolution of these conflicts. Since 1991, Russia, within the framework of its own limits and available means, has been protecting its interests in accordance with its foreign policy concept, the so-called Near Abroad. According to this concept, Russia demands a dominant position in the postSoviet space. Therefore, Moscow has also been striving to assume the position of manager in each conflict and guiding it to its own benefit. This can be described as maintaining the status quo.
Introduction
The disintegration of the Soviet Union led, within the large geopolitical space of this former totalitarian state, to the launching of democratic processes and transformations that affected the crucial areas in a significant way and later conditioned further regional, political, economic, security,
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cultural, ethnic, religious, and social development. With the formation of15 newly independent countries, which were part of one state until 1991, new quantitative and qualitative preconditions and perspectives began taking shape in order to determine the relations among them. Along with this process came key changes in the local, regional, and global security environment, where new challenges, threats, and risks in the form of regional military conflicts, ethnic and religious separatism, organized crime, political extremism, and international terrorism started to occur more intensively.
However, several of these security threats and risks were not exclusively the consequence of the collapse of Communism, most of them were basically put on hold, i.e. "frozen," as a result of the enthroning of totalitarian power and the Communist ideology. J. Rupnik, a well-known French political scientist, expresses it in a succinct way when he, in the context of the collapse of the Communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe, talks about the effect of "a defrosted fridge." One of the problems that resulted directly from this effect was the sudden rise in nationalism and the expansion of nationalist rage that had long been repressed by Communist nationalities policy. The totalitarian Communist regime mostly froze the nationalities issue in the context of attempting "a solution," because no solution was possible within a non-democratic political system. The collapse of the Communist system, together with the failure of multinational empires, opened the question of searching for a national identity and forming nation-states, and not only in some of the Central European countries (the Czech Republic and Yugoslavia), but mainly directly within the Russian Federation, as well as in most of the republics of the former U.S.S.R. In particular, the unrestrained and politically minimally regulated development of events at the turn of the 1990s, on the part of the government center (Moscow), led to an explosion of long-repressed and subdued national and ethnic demands in the periphery—in the Caucasus and Central Asia in particular.1
Russia and the Caucasus from a Historical Perspective
The Caucasus remains the most troubled of Russia's peripheries. Both the Northern Caucasus (the republics of the Russian Federation) and the Central Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) are beset by a plethora of tribal, religious, and ethnic conflicts. Instability in the independent Central Caucasian states has had a direct impact on the security of the Russian Federation, and vice versa.2
For Russia, the Caucasus is historically a key area that formed a natural geographic barrier in the past, separating its Empire from the Ottoman Empire and Persia. From a historical perspective, the forming and building of the czarist regime was completed in the 19th century, when it became gradually consolidated and Russia's governmental-political and military position was strengthened as a consequence of easing the military pressure in the Caucasian and Central Asian geopolitical vector.
The collapse of the czarist regime meant that the Caucasian countries acquired independence, however, with a chaotic and total governmental configuration of power, which lasted for a relatively short time. From 1922 to 1936, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia became part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The Soviet era, or so-called Sovietization, afforded the states of the Central Caucasus very little opportunity to influence any of the processes going on in the region, even though the federation republics enjoyed formal autonomy. This had a serious impact on the sit-
1 See: S. Cornell, "Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism," in: The South Caucasus—Cases in Georgia, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 2002.
2 See: J. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy. The Return of Great Power Politics, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 2009.
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uation inside the individual republics, while also caused deep changes in the social structure, as well as within the economic, cultural, and religious-ethnic segments. These changes were the direct result of rapid industrialization and irrational and forced collectivization in agriculture, but were mainly caused by intensive secularism and ideological indoctrination.
Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, which attempted to democratize the Soviet system, resulted in certain national and ethnic demands that led to state-legal determination, while also opening up historical resentments and paving the way to disputes. In the Caucasus, this explosive mixture resulted in the outbreak of several conflicts: Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the military conflict in the separatist regions of Georgia—South Ossetia and Abkhazia—that acquired the character of a civil war being just a couple of them. Since, after a colonial empire or multinational state collapses, it is always difficult for the former center to accept the independence of the periphery,3 the problem of conflicts in the Caucasus qualitatively reached a new dimension after 1991.
The Development of Russian Foreign Policy toward the Caucasian Region after 1991
The Period between 1991-2000
In the broader sense of the word, Russian policy regarding the Caucasus is part of the concept of the so-called Near Abroad. However, until this concept came to fruition, the issue of the so-called Near Abroad was on the periphery of Moscow's interests, and this region was essentially left to "its own devices." The government did not show any keen interest in the countries of the Near Abroad until the beginning of 1993, which was expressed in a number of statements by President Boris Yeltsin and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev. They supported the idea that Russia held special responsibility for security and stability in the former Soviet space, where international and regional organizations (the U.N. and OSCE) must inevitably provide Moscow with an adequate mandate for ensuring this security. This way of thinking was immediately labeled "the Monroe Doctrine." After resolution of the internal political crisis at the end of 1993, this alleged approach became Moscow's official policy. The Russian Federation's new military doctrine was adopted at the same time (in the fall of 1993), being the first official document to pay comprehensive and special attention to the stability of the regions in direct proximity to Russia's borders. So, along with the Russia's foreign policy conception, which appeared in December 1992, the country's first military doctrine was labeled "the Kozyrev Doctrine," which was also considered to be a variant of "the Monroe Doctrine." The subject-matter of both documents indirectly envisaged that, from Russia's geopolitical perspective, the post-Soviet space represents the highest priority and is an exclusive area of Russia's national and security interests. Should Russia feel itself threatened, it had the right to undertake the necessary steps to defend itself.
The matter of local regional conflicts was also reflected from the national security viewpoint in the doctrinal documents adopted by the Russian Federation after 1996 (the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation of 1997 and 2000 and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2000). In particular, Russia's National Security Strategy of 1997 warns that the greatest threat in the security sphere is posed by the existing and potential hotbeds of local wars and military conflicts near
3 See: S. Cornell, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 1999.
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Russia's state borders, which Russia will try to resolve peacefully. According to the Strategy, one of the tools for resolving them was to have been strengthening and enhancing relations with the CIS states, which is an important factor in helping to settle ethnopolitical and international conflicts and ensuring sociopolitical stability on Russia's borders.4 The Strategy of 2000 also considered the rise and escalation of conflicts near Russia's state border and the peripheral borders of the CIS member states to be an imminent threat, as well as the existence of seats of military conflict mainly near the Russian borders and the borders of its allies.5
Russia's responsibility for development in the post-Soviet space as a whole was also supported by the increased attention focused on the CIS after 1993. Even though one of the aims of its establishment was to make use of the economic potential at that time and to retain the existing economic ties, Moscow gained the opportunity to enforce a different agenda on the CIS platform, including in the security sphere. In the context of the local military conflicts taking place in the post-Soviet space (including the Caucasus), the CIS strove to become the exclusive guarantor of the peacemaking system. What is more, the CIS enabled Russia to take on the role of a security moderator (manager) regarding these conflicts and at the same time hinder their excessive globalization by means of peaceful involvement of other players.
The Period between 2000-2010
After Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, the CIS strategy underwent radical reassessment. Foreign policy and multi-vector diplomacy concentrated on strengthening the bilateral dimension of political, security, and economic relations. The changed approach considerably influenced the Color Revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), and also affected the geopolitical rivalry in the Central Caucasus and Central Asia.
The changes in foreign policy after 2000 also acknowledged adoption of a document called "Priority Tasks in the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" (2003). This document directly reflected the dynamics and changes in the security environment in international relations after 11 September, 2001, and at the same time meant a change in understanding the term "defense"—from territorial defense to defense of interests. What is more, the document signals that the Russian Federation is reserving itself the right to carry out preventive military strikes in the future if other states continue to apply forceful solutions in international relations. What is more, the then Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov mentioned the possibility of preventive strikes at the beginning of 2004 in an article written for the journal Russia in Global Affairs: "External threats require that the Russian armed forces perform different kinds of tasks in various regions of the world. One should not absolutely rule out the preventive use of force, if this is required by Russia's interests or its allied commitments."6 The stated words assumed practical form in August 2008 during the military conflict in Georgia, when Russia, for the first time in its most recent history, used military force outside of its own territory.
After 2003, the energy factor became an integral part of Russian foreign policy in connection with the gradual increase in oil and gas prices. During Putin's second term, energy was introduced as a doctrinal factor in the statements made in 2007 and 2008. In 2009, excerpts from the upcoming
4 See: "Kontseptsia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997 g.," in: Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost sovremennoi Rossii, 1991-2002, ed. by T.A. Shakleina, MGIMO, Moscow, 2002, pp. 51-76.
5 See: "Kontseptsia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2000 g.," in: Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost sovremennoi Rossii, 1991-2002.
6 S. Ivanov, "Russia's Geopolitical Priorities and Armed Forces," Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 4, 2004, pp. 38-51.
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doctrine placed an even stronger emphasis on energy.7 For obvious reasons, greater attention was also focused on the Caucasus and the Caspian region, the latter drawing additional attention with respect to export routes of so-called Caspian oil. The importance of oil and gas sites in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea skyrocketed, especially after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and particularly after unclear ideas about the possibilities of several sites developed into practical extraction and business within the span of a few years. The energy aspect became an integral part of the conflict issue in the Caucasus and at the same time confirmed that Russia will make greater use of so-called soft power—economic power—to realize its interests.
On the basis of the above, Russia's strategy in the Central Caucasus can be divided into the following key points:
(1) Formation of a zone of Russia-friendly states;
(2) Extraction regulation of mineral resources, supervision of their transportation, and preservation of the resulting economic effect;
(3) Moderation of military conflicts in the area;
(4) Exertion of political, economic, and military pressure on Azerbaijan, but mainly on Georgia;
(5) Reduction of the influence of other states and super powers (the U.S., EU, Turkey) in the region and the ensuing repression of the Caucasian states' (especially Georgia's and Azerbaijan's) attempts to carry out Euro-Atlantic integration;
(6) Regulation of migration and the fight against drugs;
(7) Preservation of the military presence in the region.8
Russia and Individual Conflicts in the Central Caucasus
In terms of Russia's security conception, the greatest threat to its national security comes from the historically unstable southern regions of the former U.S.S.R.—zones of traditional Islamic dominance. According to the data of Russia's ethnopolitical research center, more than 150 conflicts occurred in the former U.S.S.R. between 1988 and 1991, around 20 of which took human lives. The ethnic and interstate conflicts in the post-Soviet space posed the Russian Federation, as the largest and strongest CIS state, the problem of making an adequate response, despite the fact that at first some Russian experts (i.e. V. Alexandrov) evaluated the conflict level in the territory of the former Soviet Union as relatively low, as well as the level of Russia's imminent military involvement in solving the existing conflicts.9
In 1992, and especially in 1993, Russia was clearly trying to abandon the position of passive bystander in conflict situations, which was also evidenced by its increased focus on augmenting its influence in the military conflicts going on in the Near Abroad.10 Even so, Russian diplomacy required the U.N. to grant Russian forces the status of peacekeeping forces in individual conflict zones.
7 See: M. de Haas, "Russia's Military Doctrine Development (2000-2010)," in: Russian Military Politics and Russia's 2010 Defense Doctrine, ed. by S.J. Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle (PA), 2011.
8 See: T. Smid, "Jizni Kavkaz," in: Rusko jako geopoliticky akter vpostsovetskemprostoru, ed. by P. Kuchynkova, T. Smid, Mezinarodni politologicky ustav, Brno, 2006.
9 See: V. Alexandrov, "Diskussia: 'Duga konfliktov' i Rossia," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, Vol. 7, 1993, pp. 88-95.
10 See: B. Bekmurzaev, "Mirotvorcheskaia ro% Rossii v uregulirovanii vooruzhenykh konfliktov v SNG," Pravo i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, Vol. 12, 1994, pp. 3-11.
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For example, at a Civil Union forum in September 1992, President Boris Yeltsin gave a speech in which he said: "the moment has come for responsible international organizations to provide Russia with special competences as a guarantor of peace and stability in the territory of the former Soviet Union."11 Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev claimed that Russia did not need the consent of international organizations for its peacekeeping operations, because it acts within the CIS and at the request of its concerned parties. The fact that the international community did not agree with this led Moscow to feel that the Western countries were ignoring its position concerning many important security issues. 12
Nagorno-Karabakh
The historically rooted ethnic tension between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh began escalating in the final years of the Soviet Union's existence. In 1988, the members of the Regional Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh declared the breakaway of the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, which neither Baku nor the Moscow center recognized. They tried to resolve the situation by transferring Nagorno-Karabakh under their direct administration (1989). However, at the end of the Soviet era, Moscow was on the side of Azerbaijan as its attitude represented preservation of the status quo. What is more, Baku did not show any inclination to pursue an independent policy, in contrast to Armenia, where it came to a quick awakening of nationalism and revisionism.13 The situation changed after the fall of the Soviet Union and the accession to power of President Abulfaz Elchibey, who introduced a strong anti-Russian bent in Baku's foreign policy, which was also expressed, inter alia, by Azerbaijan's refusal to join the CIS. This approach led Moscow to carry out a thorough reassessment of the situation and move toward a pro-Armenia position. Apart from that, Armenia alone began to realize after 1991 that, with regard to its foreign-policy orientation and geographical positioning, it must sustain good relations with Moscow. Since the first years of its independence, Erevan has had strong economic relations with Russia, which was also shown by the fact that the Armenian budget and its stability largely depend on loans from the Russian Central Bank.14 Therefore, Armenia is a traditional political and military ally of Russia in the Central Caucasus, which is the result not only of historical ties, but mainly of the country's geopolitical position. Armenia was considered one of the most loyal Soviet nations in the Soviet era.15
The non-involvement of the Soviet units, in particular the Soviet Army's 366th regiment inherited by the CIS forces, led to the conflict's gradual intensification (from the military perspective) in 1992-1993. In February 1992, Armenian units invaded several Azerbaijan villages and occupied the strategic village of Khodzhali, which became a victim of terror by the Armenian forces. Armenians achieved further important military accomplishments by repressing the town of Shusha and the Lachin corridor connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh. These were also the result of indirect military support from Moscow implemented in the form of illegal shipment of arms. Russia, however, greatly damaged its reputation with Azerbaijan by taking this step and de facto lost its position of a disinterested side. Under the influence of the military defeats, Baku attempted to overthrow Elchibey,
D. Malysheva, "Etnicheskie konflikty na iuge SNG i natsionalnaia bezopasnos* Rossii," MEMO, No. 3, 1994, p. 30.
ii -
12 See: A. Sergunin, International Relations in Post-Soviet Russia: Trends and Problems, Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, Nizhny Novgorod, 2007.
13 See: S. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, Richmond, 2001.
14 See: E. Herzing, The New Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, The Royal Institute of International affairs, London, 1999.
15 See: R. Suny, Looking Toward Ararat. Armenia in Modern History, Indiana University Press, Indianapolis,
1993.
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who fled to Nakhchivan. Heydar Aliev came to power, the former chief of Azerbaijan's Communist Party. Both externally and internally weak, Azerbaijan was not only compelled to join the CIS, but also to sign the Collective Security Treaty (1993).
Baku, however, entered the so-called Tashkent Agreement, although it refused to adopt the security strategy approved at the CIS summit in February 1995. In particular, the Strategy confirmed that the signatories would coordinate their security policy to prevent reoccurrence of the military conflicts and at the same time secure protection of the interests, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the concerned states. Azerbaijan did not adopt this Strategy, mainly because it was concerned about possible aggressors "from the outside," i.e. outside the CIS, and not aggression from the inside, hinting at the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this respect, as early as June 1992, Armenia appealed for the mutual security pact to be used against Azerbaijan, which was not a signatory at that time.
After depletion of both fighting sides, the conflict itself was quenched and frozen with Russia's assistance during 1994 by the signing of a truce. However, Moscow did not succeed in deploying peacekeeping forces in the area, as it did in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and could not even enforce a monopoly to resolve the conflict. Despite this, it retained a strong influence on the conflict's resolution. During the peace process, the so-called OSCE Minsk Group tried to establish a long-term peace treaty and resolve the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and is still engaged in this process today. However, it has been unable to reach an agreement so far not only due to the non-compliance of the conflicting sides, but also because of Russia's attempts to preserve the status quo.16
Georgia
Georgia's importance stems from its geopolitical position, as it borders on all of the states in this geographic area, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and also Russia itself. What is more, Georgia has direct access to the Black Sea and, in the context of the tense Armenian-Azerbaijan relations resulting from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, seems to be a crucial state from the perspective of laying existing and future oil and gas pipelines.
The situation in Georgia was the most complicated of all of the states of the Central Caucasus after the U.S.S.R.'s disintegration. At the beginning of the 1990s, the political events developed rather unfavorably for the central government in Tbilisi with regard to its autonomous republics. The attempts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to develop politically outside of Georgia's institutional structures resulted in a military conflict. What is more, the entire situation was further complicated by the power dualism and disunity inside the state of Georgia (the political ambitions of Zviad Gamsakhur-dia). Even though it was unable to subdue the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia during 1992 and 1993, Tbilisi de facto lost all control over both of these territorial parts and also, due to Ajaria's autarkic position, had to realistically face up to a state of disintegration.
Russia used the extensive internal political weakening of the power center to force Tbilisi to join the CIS (1993) and accede to the Collective Security Treaty and an agreement on the deployment of peacemaking units in Abkhazia and South Ossetia officially operating under the CIS. The strengthening of Russia's position in the region was confirmed in 1995 by the drawing up of Russia-Georgia and Russia-Armenia agreements concerning the establishment of a total of six Russian military bases, four of which were in Georgia. In addition, both agreements contained a provision on border protection. Eduard Shevardnadze tried to weaken Moscow's influence by globalizing the conflict, i.e. by involving the U.N., the OSCE, and the U.S. when mediating discussions regarding the future status of
16 See: E. Souleimanov, "The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh," in: OSCE Yearbook 2004, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Baden-Baden, 2005, pp. 203-220.
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both separatist republics; however, he did not manage to achieve this goal to its full extent. On the other hand, he was able to draw greater international attention to this issue since the economic and raw material factor (oil and natural gas) gained momentum as a result of this.
Another indisputable achievement was gaining Russia's consent to carry out a two- fold reduction in Russian military bases in the territory of Georgia at the Istanbul OSCE summit (1999). In the foreign policy area, Tbilisi actively participated in establishing the so- called GUAM alignment (1997), a clear-cut political, economic, and strategic alliance, the aim of which was to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of its member states. In the energy sphere, the GUAM states established the Eurasian Trans-Caucasian corridor and began to cooperate on developing an energy network and building the Eurasian Trans-Caucasian corridor for oil transportation.
Tbilisi's foreign policy demarche against Moscow continued in 1999, when Georgia, together with Azerbaijan, did not extend the Collective Security Treaty (the so-called Tashkent Agreement). Even the alleged support of Chechen rebels, of which Moscow accused Tbilisi, did not help the overall development of relations between Russia and Georgia during this period.
After the 2003 Rose Revolution, the new leadership under President Mikhail Saakashvili made restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity a priority. Despite the withdrawal of Russian troops from Batumi and Akhalkalaki, relations between Russia and Georgia did not improve. From Russia's viewpoint, Georgia's aspirations for NATO membership became the most contentious issue in Russian-Georgian relations.17 The tension between Moscow and Tbilisi continuously intensified after 2006 as a consequence of a series of incidents and provocations (invasion of the air space by Russian planes, shooting down of a non-piloted Georgian plane, explosions on the transit gas pipeline from Russia to Georgia, espionage, and more). On the other hand, Russia, in an attempt to intensify the pressure on Georgia, did not hesitate to use not only economic sanctions in the form of wine and mineral water import bans, but also cut off postal and supply line communications, as well as apply labor migration measures. Even the remittances sent home by Georgians working in Russia alone were an important source of income for those who stayed behind. The Russian sanctions led to the expulsion of Georgians from Russia and created difficulties in transferring funds.18
For Georgia, international recognition of Kosovo in February 2008 had fatal implications, as did the failure to invite Tbilisi to participate in the NATO Membership Action Plan in April of the same year. Saakashvili, encouraged by the earlier successful re-integration of Ajaria and by international support, mainly from the U.S., carried out an unexpected military attack on South Ossetia in August 2008, which evoked a response from Moscow. Russia's military response, which Georgia was unable to rebuff, expressly confirmed the conclusions of several experts that Moscow will continue to intensively reinforce its influence in the future and not allow anyone to doubt its economic, political, and military-security interests in any key point of the post-Soviet geopolitical space. The aforementioned evaluation also applies to Moscow's unchanged policy regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Conclusion
For Moscow, the Caucasian region has dual importance: on the one hand, as a source of instability related above all to the simmering conflict in Chechnia, and on the other, as a result of the compet-
17 See: L. Kuzmicheva, "Unresolved Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space: Russia's Engagement in Conflict Management before and after Caucasus Crisis of 2008," in: Panorama of Global Security Environment 2011, ed. by M. Majer, R. Ondrejcsák, V. Tarasovic, T. Valástek, CENAA, Bratislava, 2010.
18 See: O. Oiker, K. Crane, L. Schwartz, C. Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy. Sources and Implications, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2009.
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ing geopolitical ambitions of the Central Caucasian states. The countries of the Central Caucasus not only represent an important buffer zone for Russia between the Russian Northern Caucasus and the Islamic world, especially its main rival Turkey, but also an area in which Russia feels threatened by the possible growth in influence of other players. In a certain sense, the Central Caucasus forms a gate for Russia's influence on the Middle East and Central Asia. And last but not least, to retain its influence in the geopolitical space of the Caucasus, Russia also needs to maintain control over the transportation routes of energy resources.19
Russian foreign and security policy in the Caucasus has undergone many changes during the twenty-year period since the fall of the Soviet Union, a significant number of which were imposed by outside circumstances and factors. The concept of the so-called Near Abroad adopted at the turning point of 1992/1993 introduced a thesis regarding Russia's right to hold a dominant position in the post-Soviet space. Practical fulfillment of this goal, however, was significantly limited by internal, as well as external, power-political skills and possibilities. Also, for this reason, the status of "neither war, nor peace" of the local military conflicts in the Caucasus is more than convenient for Moscow, because it can "reactivate" these conflicts at any moment and skillfully use them to its own benefit.
As for peacekeeping, Russia's long-term goal is to eliminate existing or potential players (states and international organizations) that are politically, security-wise, or economically involved in the process of conflict resolution. Several provisions set forth in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation adopted in May 2009 also confirm this, which states, among other things, that "there is an increasing tendency to seek resolutions to existing problems and regulate crisis situations on a regional basis, without the participation of non-regional powers."20
19 See: S.M. Birgerson, After the Breakup of a Multi-Ethnic Empire: Russia, Successor States & Eurasian Security, Greenwood Press, 2001
20 See English text of Russia's National Security Strategy, available at [http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-nation-al-security-strategy-to-2020].
