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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Masoumeh Rad GOUDARZI
Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanity, University of Guilan
(Rasht, Iran).
Abdollah Baei LASHAKI
Research Fellow, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanity, University of Guilan
(Rasht, Iran).
Samira TALEBI
Research Fellow, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanity, University of Guilan
(Rasht, Iran).
THE MUTUAL CONTAINMENT POLICY OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES
IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND OBSTACLES
Abstract
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caucasian region1 has gained great strategic importance and become one of the main political, security, and economic competition arenas between Russia and the United States. Both countries have attempted to promote their influence in the region while destabilizing their rival's interests and
1 Unlike the author, the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus proceeds from the basic principle that the Caucasian region is divided into three sub-regions: the Northern Caucasus (the administrative units of the North Caucasian and Southern Federal Districts of the RF); the Central Caucasus (the independent states of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia); and the Southern Caucasus (the northeastern ils of Turkey and the northwestern ostans of Iran) (for more details, see: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press AB, Stockholm, 2006).
position. This complex and closed competition has resulted in a mutual indirect containment policy and aggravated the situation in a region that is suffering from internal crisis. In this article, the authors aim to examine the barriers and obstacles the United States and Russia have encountered in developing their desired economic, security, and political order in the Southern Caucasus, as well as how they have tried to contain the rival despite the existing obstacles. To do so, the researchers primarily discuss the importance of the Southern Caucasus in the foreign policy of both the United States and Russia and discuss why the region has become the center of their full-fledged competition in the past two decades. In addition, they investigate Russia and the United States' achievements and the structural obstacles
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they face within the region, as well as how they have attempted to reach their goals and interests during expansion of their control
over the region and containment of the rival by forming political and economic blocs and collective security organizations.
KEYWORDS: Southern Caucasus, Russia, United States, competition, NATO, CIS, GUAM, containment policy.
Introduction
Central Asia and the Caucasus are regions that in the past two decades, in the shadow generated by the political, economic, and security developments, have gained great geopolitical importance. Many regional and trans-regional powers have an interest in each of these regions and they have been arenas of competition for the world powers and alliances, including the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China. The latter have defined their fundamental goals in order to influence the region. However, the most intense competition has been created by the United States and Russia at the economic, geostrategic, and security levels.2 In recent years, many political analysts have examined the competition created between Russia and the United States from the point of view of a New Cold War.3 The gap created after the collapse of the Soviet Union could have given the United States the opportunity to play an important role in the area. But in the current decade, by recovering its power, Russia has tried to overshadow the influence gained by its competitor and once again seize its historical hegemony as the most influential country in the whole of East Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
However, the main competition in the Central Asia and the Caucasus seems to be concentrated on the Southern Caucasus, particularly due to the geographical, political, security, and economic importance of the region for both rivals. From the geographical point of view, the Southern Caucasus is connected to Iran, Turkey, the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and Russia. This region, which includes the three republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, is the main route for transporting the energy resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. This area is also strategically very important for both Russia and the United States, because it is adjacent to the highly tense borders of the southern part of Russia in the Northern Caucasus. Various security, economic, and political factors have made the region one of the central points of competition between the two rivals.
In this article, the authors aim to examine the barriers and obstacles the United States and Russia have encountered in developing their desired economic, security, and political order in the South Caucasian region, as well as how they have tried to contain the rival despite the existing obstacles. To do so, the researchers primarily discuss the political, security, and economic conditions and importance of the three republics in advance and investigate the foreign policy objectives and priorities of both the United States and Russia in the Southern Caucasus, as well as how they have pushed on to achieve their interests in the past two decades.
2 See: M. Vaezi, "New Geopolitics Changes and Crises in the Caucasus," Foreign Policy, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2009, p. 41.
3 See: V. Papava, "The End of the Frozen Cold War? A Comment," Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 98-102; F. Fukuyama, (2008). "They Can Only Go So Far," The Washington Post, 24 August, 2008, available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com]; St. Cohen, "The New American Cold War," The Nation, 10 July, 2006, available at [http:// www.thenation.com].
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Objectives and Priorities of Russia's Foreign Policy in the Southern Caucasus
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, due to the changes in the regional and international arena, which meant a change in the international system from bipolar to unipolar, had to adopt and apply a new foreign policy strategy. There were different reasons for this, but the most considerable were loss of its hegemony in the international arena and the lack of an overall policy for setting goals and strategies. Weaknesses in the decision-making system and lack of understanding of the situation that Russia was experiencing are among the other main reasons that can be mentioned. Following Russia's weakness in various economic, political, and military aspects, the country's policymakers tried to cope with the problems by reconstructing their domestic and foreign policies, goals, and strategies. At the time, their main domestic and foreign concerns were rebuilding the country's economy, resisting the United States' unilateralism policy, and restoring their lost strength and hegemony as a great power in the international arena.4
At the end of the communist era, Soviet politicians who saw the danger of collapse tried to reform the old policies in order to save the country from falling into the abyss. These reforms included Glasnost and Perestroika, which failed to save the country. After the collapse of the old and rise of the new system, the endeavors of Russia's new politicians concentrated on adopting moderate policies in the political arena and forming good relations with the West. They also tried to retain the status of their country as an important power in the world. However, the adoption of these policies during Yeltsin's presidency caused Russia's place in the world to decline. The end of the Yeltsin era and the rise of Vladimir Putin was the starting point of fundamental changes in the country's policies, especially in international and foreign policy. Putin sought to rebuild and increase Russia's power in the international arena.5 To do so, Russia first looked at the newly independent republics, which are traditionally known as the Near Abroad in the political language of Russians and are regarded as its backyard.6
The presence of the United States as the third actor jeopardized Russia's political, economic, and security interests in the Southern Caucasus and led to Russia's special focus on the region in an attempt to reduce the influence of its rival.7 The events of 9/11 and the United States' direct military presence in the region to extend its security umbrella caused Russia concern. In addition to the above factor, Azerbaijan and Georgia's interest in joining NATO, which was welcomed by the Western countries, was interpreted in Moscow as a tactic to push Russia away from its backyard.8 It views all the above-mentioned plans and activities as a systematic effort to decrease its role and traditional hegemony in the region. Russia knows that the Southern Caucasus will have a very important place in its future and, therefore, the region is of primary importance for it in defining a successful foreign policy. Since Russia needs economic progress and energy resources to remain in the competition and rebuild its power, the Southern Caucasus, due to its strategic position and abundant energy resources, can provide Russia's security and political and economic interests to a large extent. One of Russia's
4 See: O. Oliker, K. Crane, L.H. Schwartz, C. Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy, Sources and Implications, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 2009, pp. 83-93.
5 See: D. Mancevic, "The Russians are Coming:" Russian Foreign Economic Policy to Ex-Soviet States—The Cases of Georgia and Ukraine, 2006, available at [http:// www.idec.gr/iier], p. 6.
6 See: C. Dadak, "A New Cold War?" The Independent Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2010, p. 90.
7 See: F. Shafee, "New Geopolitics of the South Caucasus," Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2010, pp. 24.
8 See: D. Yost, "NATO and the Anticipatory Use of Force," International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2007, p. 39.
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main goals in the region is to win over third countries in the energy sector in order to triumph in the competition in the Southern Caucasus.9
Generally speaking, in order to answer the question of why the Southern Caucasus is of particular importance in Russia's foreign policy, the following can be stated:
1. It borders on the Northern Caucasus, which poses heavy internal threats to Russia's security. In most areas of the Northern Caucasus, there are secessionist movements and active conflicts between the separatists and the Russian government. It stands to reason that threats such as gun trafficking, drugs, radical Islamism, Wahhabism, and terrorism have a negative impact on Russia's security. But Russia is more concerned about the expansion of NATO to the East, something that brings up memories of the Cold War and threatens loss of control over the area.
2. The Southern Caucasus is the border between this country and other important southern neighbors, including Iran and Turkey. Both countries have a special place and position in Russia's foreign policy. Since the new republics gained their independence, Turkey has been trying to increase its influence in the South Caucasian region with emphasis on the historical, cultural, and linguistic similarities with some of the countries in the region. Russia regards Turkey as a rival with a clear tendency toward West, therefore it keeps a close watch on this country in the Southern Caucasus. However, Iran's position in Russia's foreign policy is different from Turkey's, because this country can provide Russia with access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and does not have normal political relations with its regional rival, the United States. Therefore, Iran has a special place in Russia's foreign policy.
3. The Southern Caucasus is highly unstable due to internal conflicts and upheavals. These conflicts have also created potential roots of tension between the Southern Caucasus and its neighbors. One of Russia's main concerns in the region is that it could pave the way for external players, especially its rivals, to the region, thus destabilizing Russia's position and hegemony. It will also pose a risk to the region's energy security. That is why Russia is trying to control and manage the events in the region to prevent instability.
4. This region plays an important role in the development of energy resources in the Caspian Sea. Following the last decade of events in the Arab countries, the importance of Caspian energy resources has doubled, and the West also wishes to receive energy resources from the region. In previous years, there was rivalry between the regional and trans-regional powers to dominate the Caspian energy resources, which posed a dilemma for this region.10 Naturally, the transportation of energy resources is of crucial importance in this competition and Russia, by having dominance over the corridors, could have an important role to play in this process.
5. Because of the region's strategic position and energy resources, regional and trans-regional countries, especially the United States, are paying special attention to the Southern Cau-casus.11 With the arrival of new contenders, especially the United States, Russia is keeping a close watch on the developments in the region in its Near Abroad.
The special importance of the Southern Caucasus in Russia's foreign policy is not a reason for other regional and international powers to stop comprehensive competition with Russia in order to
9 See: R. Weitz, "Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2006, p. 156.
10 See: D. Shahnazaryan, "The South Caucasus: Problems of Stability and Regional Security," Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2006, p. 17.
11 See: V. Naumkin, "Russian Policy in the South Caucasus," The Quarterly Journal, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2002, p. 31.
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achieve their political, security, and economic goals and benefits, and to set the stage empty for Russia. Due to its particular geopolitical and geostrategic position, the Southern Caucasus is also of unique importance in the United States' foreign policy. Below, we will examine the reasons for and the subsequent competition and rivalry that has formed between the two powers to achieve their interests in the region.
The United States' Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities in the Southern Caucasus
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Southern Caucasus became particularly important for the Western countries, especially the United States. The influence of the United States in the Southern Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been growing gradually but consistently and has made it one of the most important players in the region.12 Due to the abundance of energy resources in the region, U.S. politicians have been trying to expand their influence in the area in order to gain access to and establish control over these resources. The Southern Caucasus is also particularly attractive for the United States as a new market for their products. Therefore, expanding economic ties with the republics of the region has been one of its priorities. Also, in order to pursue its special political-security goals and interests, the United States has been using its extensive presence in the region to put pressure on Russia and Iran. To do so, it introduced several economic and military agreement and projects. One of the fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy in the region is security, stability, and democratization of the government systems in the countries of the region that could provide safer access to the Southern Caucasus's energy resources. The United States has also been politically and economically supporting alternative energy transportation routes in the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, with the aim of weakening Russia and Iran's position as its main rivals in the region.13 Military cooperation with the South Caucasian countries, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan, has been another way to put pressure on these two countries. The 9/11 events increased the importance of the Southern Caucasus—especially Azerbaijan and Georgia—for the United States. After the invasion of Afghanistan, the military troops needed a number of bases close to Afghanistan in order to transport troops and military equipment.14 Although Russia did not seem to oppose the presence of the United States in the area at that time because of the threat of radical Islam within its own borders, the United States' plan to continue its presence even after withdrawal from Afghanistan made Russia angry.
Recognizing the importance of the Southern Caucasus in U.S. foreign policy involves the following:
1. Preserving the independence and security of the South Caucasian countries is important for the United States for two reasons: first, any kind of instability in the region paves the way for Russia to intervene and expand its control over the region, which goes against the United States' plans and policy in the region. The second reason is the security of trans-
12 See: S. Cornell, "US Engagement in the Caucasus: Changing Gears," Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2005, p. 111.
13 See: A. Cordesman, B. Gold, R. Shelala, M. Gibbs, "U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Turkey and the South Caucasus," Center for Strategic & International Studies, 12 June, 2013, available at [http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-turkey-and-south-caucasus], p. 48.
14 See: S. Cornell, op. cit., p. 113.
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portation routes for the Caspian Sea's energy resources. The United States is deeply concerned that any kind of instability in the region will also affect the security of energy resources.
2. Extending energy transportation pipelines, such as the East-West corridor, and ensuring access and control over the resources in Caspian Sea. Many schemes have been proposed for transporting Caspian energy resources, two routes of which, the northern and western, are supported by Russia and the United States, respectively. The northern corridor passes through Russian territory, while the western corridor is connected to the Black Sea through the Southern Caucasus. The two countries are trying to maintain their energy security by controlling the energy corridors of the region. The United States tries to downplay the importance of the Russian energy transportation corridor by supporting the Baku-Tbilisi-Cey-han pipeline.
3. Decline of Russia's influence in the newly independent states.15 According to the U.S. authorities, Russia's control over the Caucasian region and Central Asia, as well as the management of security concerns and threats that it faces in the region, can improve the political status of the country at the regional and political levels, which contradicts U.S. foreign policy objectives in dealing with Russia.
4. Preventing the expansion of Iranian influence in the region.16 Because of Iran's religious and cultural commonalities with the Southern Caucasian countries, it could play an important role in regional affairs; this is unacceptable to the United States and its active allies in the region, such as Israel. In the past two decades, the United States has tried to contain and reduce Iran's influence and role in the region using political, economic, and propaganda leverages, which has been successful.17
5. The United States' deep and strategic interests in the Southern Caucasus is a warning for Russia that shows the Americans are looking for a long and effective presence in the region and are trying to encourage the regional states to join NATO, as well as the European Union as a means to contain Russia's influence and interests in its back yard.
Competition of the United States and Russia in the Southern Caucasus
The United States and Russia, in line with their adopted foreign policies, are looking to achieve maximum interests in the region. Challenges between the two countries have emerged in the Southern Caucasus and continue in many dimensions. In this competition, the United States is aiming for its key goals, such as ensuring security of production and transportation of energy, fighting terrorism, and establishing a direct presence on the borders of Iran and Russia.18 In contrast, Russia is seeking
15 See: P. Dadandish, M. Vaezi, "Geopolitical Changes and Crises in the Caucasus," International Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011, pp. 11-24; M. Vaezi, op. cit., p. 19.
16 See: B. Shaffer, "Iran's Role in the South Caucasus and Caspian Region," in: Iran and its Neighbors: Diverging Views on a Strategic Region, ed. by E. Whitlock, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2003, p. 17.
17 See: B. Shaffer, "From Pipedream to Pipeline: A Caspian Story," Current History, Vol. 104, No. 684, 2005, pp. 343346.
18 See: J. Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 2010, p. 10.
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to recover its lost power of the former Soviet era and dispel security concerns, as well as establish control over the energy resources of the region. The major challenges of these countries are formed in security and the economy, which are somewhat related to each other. The following is a review of these challenges.
After the Soviet collapse, the newly independent countries of the South Caucasian region faced many economic problems. One of these problems was the significant number of people of Russian origin in these countries and their loyalty and sympathy toward Russia, as well as their better economic conditions compared with other ethnic groups, which gave them greater dominance over the economic affairs of the states.19 The major economic problems of these newly independent states were due to their dependence on the economic and monetary systems of the former Soviet Union. The economic effects inherited from the communist system caused the continued dependence of these countries on Russia. The importance of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea for the West and the importance of the Southern Caucasus for transporting these resources to the European Union have enabled the regional countries to reduce their economic dependence on Russia and tend toward the West.20 The tendency of the South Caucasian countries toward the West is economically very important for Russia, because Russia is the most important exporter of the products these countries require. Prior to this, Russia cut its fuel exports to these countries and imposed pressure on them in crisis situations, using this factor as a means to maintain control over the regional countries. With the arrival of the West in the region and the possibility of reducing the economic dependence of these countries, Russia lost one of the most important means for preserving its hegemony in the region.
Since the Soviet Union collapsed and the importance of the energy resources available in the region was revealed, the United States has been trying to expand its influence over it. In order to control the economic resources, the United States is forced to compete with Russia and is trying to attract the South Caucasian regional countries by offering different schemes such as providing financial assistance.21
After the South Caucasian republics gained their independence, Azerbaijan acquired greater economic importance than Georgia and Armenia due to its significant amount of energy resources in the Caspian Sea, which could be a good replacement for the energy delivered from Russia or the Middle East to the West. This country could also provide alternative access to the energy corridors from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to Europe that pass through Russian territory. Due to the importance of the issue, U.S. foreign policy officials have been offering Azerbaijan financial assistance and encouraging it to apply for NATO membership, thus undermining the role of the Russian economy in the region.22 Therefore, the Western countries have been seriously considering the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline projects that pass from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, as well as the Nabucco gas pipeline that passes from Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Austria, and trans-Caspian and trans-Anatolian pipelines. Because of the pivotal role of the country's territory and oil and gas resources in all of these projects, implementation of these projects will either undermine Russia's dominance over Azerbaijan or destroy Russia's monopoly on energy transmission projects and its sale to European states. In fact, Russia has sought to replace the European
19 See: D. Sammut, P. Amanda, "Addressing the Security Challenges in the South Caucasus: The Case for a Comprehensive, Multilateral and Inclusive Approach," Policy Brief, March 2011, European Policy Center (EPC), Brussels, Belgium.
20 See: J. Nixey, "The South Caucasus: Drama on Three Stages," in: America and a Changed World: A Question of Leadership, ed. by Robin Niblett, Wiley-Blackwell, London, 2010, pp. 126.
21 See: Z. Baran, "The Caucasus Ten Years after Independence," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2002,
p. 232.
22 See: I. Baban, Z. Shiriyev, "The South Caucasus Strategy and Azerbaijan," Turkish Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2010, pp. 96-97.
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Union as a purchaser of its energy resources and China is one of the main choices in this regard. One of China's special features is that despite its large population, the country is poor in terms of energy sources and this is considered a major threat to its economic growth and development.23 So Russia considers China to be one of the best alternatives to the European Union market for exporting its energy resources.
Georgia is another republic of the South Caucasian region that has turned into a center of the economic competition between Russia and the United States. After it gained its independence, this state had close relations with Russia, but after the Rose Revolution, which led to the rise of a new generation of political elites with closer ties to the Western countries, the United States has gained a foothold for itself in Georgia. Georgia is the only country in the South Caucasian region with open access to the sea, which can facilitate the transportation of energy from the region to the West, which has increased its importance.
Economically, Armenia is in different situation from the two other countries in the region. It was one of the most developed and industrialized regions of the former Soviet Union. However, in terms of energy resources, it is a poor country, although it is rich in natural resources such as gold, copper, iron, zinc, and tin. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia was confronted with serious economic problems similar to the other countries in the Southern Caucasus. Russia tried to retain its control and influence over Armenia by rendering financial support and by means of energy exports, but in recent years Armenia's economic and political ties with the United States and the European Union have upset the balance with Russia. This convergence led Armenia to receive loans and assistance from Europe and the United States to reduce its dependence on Russia and adopt its own economic policies more independently.
As mentioned above, the competition between the United States and Russia is not only shaped by economic competition, but also by political and security rivalry. Due to the ethnic and separatist conflicts throughout the region, the Southern Caucasus has encountered heavy clashes and conflicts that have led to instability and threaten security in these countries. The United States and Russia have always tried to manage the security crises to strengthen their foothold in the region and, in this regard, both sides have tried to surpass each other with their own introduced plans. Meanwhile, 9/11 was the turning point in the region's security policy and plans. This incident led to the establishment of U.S. military bases in the Southern Caucasus that created a new level of security concern, and, as a result, the competition between Russia and the United States is assuming a new form. Following this incident and the subsequent changes, the authorities of the two countries have tried to improve their position and pursue their goals and plans in the region more effectively. The United States' plans are mostly about expanding NATO and the OSCE's activities to the East, while Russia's plans are mainly focused on the cooperation of collective security, previously within the framework of the Commonwealth in the form of the CIS and during the last ten years within the CSTO and potentially the SCO. In this regard, the two powers have tried to encourage other countries to join the mentioned organizations.
Georgian-NATO relations officially began in 1994 when Georgia joined the NATO-run Partnership for Peace. It was the first state in the South Caucasian region that asked for NATO membership, a request that made its powerful northern neighbor, Russia, angry. The eastward expansion of NATO was contrary to the top-level assurances that Mikhail Gorbachev was given in 1990 when the West promised it would not enlarge NATO to the East.24 The Georgian authorities knew that after joining NATO their country, which borders on Southeastern Europe, would enjoy greater strategic
23 See: M. Tazhin, "The Geopolitical Role of the Main Global Players in Central Asia," American Foreign Policy Interest, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2008, p. 64.
24 See: M. MccGwire, "NATO Expansion: A Policy Error of Historic Importance," Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1998, p. 26.
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importance and would have a guarantee of security and stability in the region and against Russia. After the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, Georgia became even more aware of the need to cooperate with other countries and organizations to establish security in the country. Security establishment is also important from the economic perspective for the Georgian authorities. By realizing that cooperation with NATO could expand their country's chance of becoming a main corridor of energy pipelines to Europe, Georgia's foreign policymakers requested NATO membership. In addition, Georgia found participation in this organization to be a necessary step to joining the European Union and receiving financial aid. The ongoing conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are major obstacles for this country in its accession to NATO. Considering the fact that one of NATO's provisions for countries joining the organization is the settlement of internal, ethnic, or external territorial disputes before full membership is granted, Russia is trying to prevent Georgia from joining NATO by fueling its conflicts. The Russia-Georgia war was designed not only to thwart Georgia's bid for NATO membership, but also to take revenge on NATO itself for violating the "top-level assurances" given Gorbachev in 1990.25
However, Georgia is not the only country in the region that has cooperation with NATO. The Republic of Azerbaijan is another South Caucasian country that joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992. Even though the authorities of this country have not taken a formal position to join the organization, Azerbaijan is engaged in broad cooperation with NATO. After the 9/11 events, this cooperation took on a new form and, subsequently, the Republic of Azerbaijan has been the host of military training exercises. But this military cooperation could create some challenges in the region. One of the major challenges is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a supporter of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the United States is faced with the fact that supporting Azerbaijan could directly affect its relationship with Armenia, and this caused Erevan to move closer to Russia. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the resulting problems can be described as a lever of control in the region, because there will never be any peace in the region until the conflict is resolved. By using this lever, Russia is trying to halt the momentum of U.S. influence in the region. And by offering its own proposals, it is strengthening its own position in the South Caucasian region. The Commonwealth of Independent States, or CIS, was one of Russia's tools for competing with the United States and preventing NATO from gaining influence in the Southern Caucasus. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan originally formed the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Georgia also joined the alliance in 1993, but withdrew in 2008 as a result of war with Russia.
In recent years, Russia has tried to continue its cooperation with the member states, especially in the form of economic cooperation, but the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, which includes Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, resists Russia's ambition to expand its hegemony to all of the new republics of Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. The military cooperation established within the GUAM framework was described by Tedo Japaridze, Ambassador of the Republic of Georgia to the United States in 2000, as a strategic alliance of countries with common problems and common threat perceptions. In the military area, GUAM countries primarily sought to build a viable alternative to the regional security organization dominated by Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States.26 As a common strategy, GUAM members refused to join, or subsequently withdrew, from the CIS security arrangements. "Military cooperation within GUAM serves as a stepping-stone to the ultimate goal of establishing institutional ties with or actually joining NATO."27 It is believed that the GUAM formation was "essentially tantamount to an attempt to turn
25 M. Kramer, "The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2009, p. 54.
26 See: T. Valasek, "Military Cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in the GUUAM Framework," Policy Brief, Caspian Studies Program, December 2000.
27 Ibidem.
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the CIS into a bipolar structure."28 The member states hoped to form a pole in the region and expand the conception of regionalism to indirectly jeopardize Moscow's position in the post-Soviet countries. One of the common economic interests of the member countries was joint participation in transportation of the Caspian Basin energy resources, as well as building new transit routes through the Caucasus and the Black Sea. They also aimed to form a security structure within the countries. The United States welcomed the GUAM formation and viewed it as a unique opportunity to achieve its economic, security, and political goals and interests in the region. It also hoped that the organization would promote the stability, political and economic development, and independence of the member states, resulting in a weakening of Russia's influence.
Perhaps the main reason for adopting the current form of competition in the South Caucasian region is the tendency of both powers, Russia and the United States, to avoid disrupting the security of the region at a level that affects the achievement of their own goals and interests. The United States is mainly concerned about the geopolitical importance of the region, as well as its unique economic importance. The security of energy transportation corridors in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea is very important for this country, although Russia is also concerned about the disruption of security in the region or, more likely, the appearance of transregional contenders.
Conclusion
The political and geopolitical facts of the Caucasian region and the vast and multi-dimensional goals and interests of Russia and the United States have caused the two powers to face many opportunities and threats, none of which has been successful in containing the rival. As the main and most influential regional actor, Russia has attached great importance to the Caucasus due to security, strategic and economic considerations, and political desires. Russia has adopted a pragmatic strategy guided by geopolitical considerations and following its security, economic, and political interests and priorities in the region. The main priorities are to maintain sovereignty, territorial integrity, and border security in the Northern Caucasus, and political stability and economic dominance over the region. Keeping in mind the importance of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, as well as the security challenges in the region, Russia is attempting to reduce the dominance and intervention of transregional powers, especially the United States. Despite the fact that the political and economic dependence of the regional countries provides a potential opportunity for dominance over the region and achieving its goals and interests, Russia also faces barriers and limitations to developing its desired security-political order in the Southern Caucasus. The political differences and conflicts among the South Caucasian states, as well as between them and Russia, and their different interpretations of the security, economic, and political threats and opportunities are the most important barriers to the formation of Russia's desired security and political order. Unequal distribution of power and economic resources and the political and military conflicts among the three countries of the South Caucasian region and Russia have caused great distrust as well as vulnerability of these countries toward each other and toward Russia. Thus, by forming close ties with transregional powers, especially the United States, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia have tried to create a balance of power in the region, which is another obstacle to the formation and establishment of Russia's desired order in the region. Another major factor that challenges Russia's intended order is the conflict of interests and extended competition with the United States in the Southern Caucasus and Caspian Sea.
As a transregional actor, the United States has been developing its foreign policy priorities in the Caucasian region in the last two decades. These main priorities are political containment of Rus-
28 A. Skakov, "Russia and GUAM," Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3-4 (51-52), 2008, p. 143.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
sia, stopping Russia from regaining its power in the newly independent republics, gaining control over the vast energy resources of the region, preventing political and security instability as disruptive factors for energy transformation, and creating political and military blocs to extend its influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Despite the U.S. achievements in establishing its political and economic ties with the countries in the region and imposing its plans regarding energy transportation corridors to Russia, it has simultaneously encountered potential and structural obstacles to reaching its objectives. The major obstacles for the United States' desired security and political order in the region, such as expansion of NATO to the East or membership in the European Union, include the political and military conflicts in the region, as well as the unequal distribution of power and economic facilities among the three countries. Another obstacle to the United States' objectives is Russia's efforts to limit the abilities of the three countries in their rapid political turns toward the West by using the economic and security levers that have been a big part of Soviet legacy. Collective cooperation agreements formed under the leadership of Russia after the Soviet Union collapsed are another containment tool to reduce the military and security influence of the United States in the region. Competition over energy resources and transportation corridors, the security dependence of the regional countries on Russia or the United States, the formation of conflict blocs, the attempts to eliminate or weaken other regional players, such as Iran and Turkey, militarization of the region in the shadow of the conflicts between Russia and Georgia, as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have created competition and increased the complexity of the situation in the Caucasus.
