CC BY
20THE RUSSIAN GEOSTRATEGIC INTEREST IN THE CONDUCTING FOREIN PROCESS
PhD in political sciences Svetlana Cebotari, PhD in political sciences Victoria Bevziuc
Republic of Moldova, Chisinau, Moldova State University, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Departament of International Relations;
1 Military Academy,,Alexandru cel Bun'', Associate professor; 2lecturer
Abstract. The "new geopolitical architecture " of the East European space has continued to be determined by the interests' evolution but also by the Russian Federation actions in that area. Therefore due to this international framework that are being influenced by the external and domestic factors, the geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation in the East European space are outlined.
This research analyzes the process of establishing the foreign policy and the interests of the Russian Federation in the Eastern European area.
Keywords: geopolitical architecture, international relations, the Russian Federation, foreign policy, interest
"The New Geopolitical Architecture" of the Eastern European space has been and it continues to be determined by the evolution of the interests, but also it is influenced by the acting strategies of the Russian Federation in the area. Thus, taking into account the international context, it continues the shaping processes of the geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation in the Eastern European area that are depending on the influence of external factors, but also of the internal ones. In order to better comprehend the development and formation of vectors of the geostrategic interest of the Russian Federation, it is necessary the retrospective analysis of this phenomenon. Due to the analyses of the geostrategic interests that are part of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, then it is to be noted that in the ' 90, there are profiling three political currents: the "Westerners", the "Stators" and the "Civilizers".
Thus, the "Westerners" current highlights the common elements of the Russian Federation with the West, considering the Western civilization as the most developed and viable in the world. The Western Liberals in Russia are focusing their ideas on the development model of the Western states, they believe that the Russian Federation, will achieve the same level over the course of 2-3 years. Also, the representatives of the" Westerners "current are standing for the deployment of partnership with the West, especially with France, Germany and the United States. A. Kozirev also formulates the main national interests in the spirit of liberalism, which consist in transforming Russia into a democratic, free, independent state, with democratic State institutions, with an efficient economy, ensuring and respecting Freedoms and Rights of citizens. The main element of the integration strategy is joining the main international organizations of the Russian Federation with the West. As the US and European states were considered, "allies," Russia seeks to achieve full membership in transatlantic economic institutions, IMF, G-7. The new concept for the integration of the Russian Federation into western structures will become a priority in the country's foreign policy [29, p. 76-77].
The second current, is the current, of the "Stators", or so-called, "Deijavnichi". This current is the most influential in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The State representatives pay great attention to the fortification of the power, stability and sovereignty of the Government, in comparison with the liberal and democratic values of the" Westerners". The most important is the National Security of the state for the representatives of this current. According to their ideology, the "Stators" are anti-Westerners. They are attempting to obtain the recognition of Russia from the West on another path, highlighting the role and importance of the economic and military power of the Russian Federation. The Liberal "Stators" of the post-Soviet period are no longer followers of the One-party system state. According to their opinion, the liberal values must contribute to strengthening, but not weakening of the state. The representatives of this current (Primakov, later and V. Putin) are pronounced for the political stability and the return of the second supremacy and the power status of the Russian Federation on the international arena.
The third current, the so-called "Civilizers", are considered the Russian values as the main features and opposed characteristics to the Western ones. The "Civilizers "are pronounced for a wide spread of Russian values throughout the world. The current, in turn, meets the representatives of two political groups: the National-Communists, united by the Communist ideas (leader Gh. Ziuganov) and the second group are formed by the Eurasians. The representatives of both groups are stated on the idea that, the world is a geopolitical division by the Maritime and Terrestrial battle of powers. The
representatives of both groups are pronounced for the geopolitical expansion of the Russian Federation. While the National-Communists are supporting the restoration of the USSR, the Eurasians tend to create a broader axis of the Russian Federation with allies such as Germany, Japan, Iran, in order to oppose to the American influence. They found allies from the representatives of nationalist movements, for example V. Jirinovskii's Liberal-Democrat party. Due to this, should be noted that both groups are following the critics of Kozarev's foreign policy course, they are defeating him by supporting and serving the interests of the West. According to the "Civilizers" ideology the Russia's national interest, is anti-Western [29, p. 81]. The pro-Western policy made by B. Yeltsin and A. Kozirev, which was the continuation of the first approach of M. Gorbachev that were promoted the rapprochement of Russia by the West, was criticized by the President adviser S. Stankevich. Stankevich believes that Russia must unite Europe with Asia, and become a cultural bridge, which will defend the Russians rights and interests in the former union republics [29, p. 85]. Already in the late ' 92 years, the pro-Western course of Russia's foreign policy loses its influence. It was happened because of the lack of practical results and the criticism of the opposition. President B. Yeltsin expresses his opinion that the US is the main actor on the international arena who dictates the conditions of the game. Yeltsin has mentioned that Russia's relations with the West must be balanced as a reflection on the external policy of the state.
According to this, the "Stators" program is becoming more popular. The B. Yeltsin and Kozirev hope that the Western support for the Russian Federation and its acceptance and integration into Western structures has not succeeded. The failure is also observed in the sphere of security, which is characterized by the lack of Russian support from the SCEO and the reserved relations between Russia and NATO [13, p. 85].
We can distinguish five stages due to the analysis of the process of forming the geostrategic interests and of the foreign policy vectors of the Russian Federation from the Russian political leaders perspectives (see annex 5), and of the electoral processes and from the perspective of the main documents,-"The conception of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation", in which are stipulated the main directions of the external politics.
The first stage of building the main directions of geostrategic interests and foreign policy coincides with the collapse of the USSR -the 1990-1993 years. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian diplomacy was indoctrinated by the not-so-distant past and it was not so developed. The first attempts to develop an external policy conception are carried out at the end of the 1980 years, that period was characterized by the presence of excess ideology. The diplomacy of the ' 90 years has contributed to one of the main roles to build a new Russia under the conditions of the international environment that is in a permanently dynamism. The USSR was manifested on the international arena as a superpower but it faced with a political-psychological problem, which was opposed to the capitalism, while to the new Russia was given the role of manifesting itself as a new democracy. According to the scientific sources framework, the period from 1992-1993 years is characterized as one with a lot of the changes and transformations in the post-Soviet space. The administration of the Russian Federation has avoided the fact which would indicate the directions, the vectors of the national interest in the sphere of foreign policy. The Russia is working to persuade Western partners identifying themselves with the interests of the western democracies community, but not taking into account the presence of mistrust on their part, which it intends to restructure and democratize the former union space. The foreign Minister Kozirev is playing the main role in the formation of the vectors of geostrategic interests and on the Russia's foreign policy stage. The logic of solidarity with Western states is seen in the support of Russia of all Western actions on the international arena: the Falling of Yugoslavia (1991-1992) and support for the formation of new States in the territory of the former federation (Slovenia and Croatia, then Bosnia and Macedonia). Moscow recognizes the formation of new states, along with the European Community.
It is important to mention that, at that time, the US is not in a hurry to recognize the independence of these states [25, pp. 19-23]. The Russia's refusal to support Belgrade against separatists in Serbia and Croatia is a surprise for Western diplomacy. The logic of the new administration of the Russian Federation resides in, the determination of the State's position in the process of democratization. President B. Yeltsin is working to persuade the European Community and the US in its intentions for democratization and westernization of the Russian Federation. The Russian diplomacy activity in the early ' 90 years consisted in the intention of demonstrating compliance with the Moscow principle and the right of every nation to the self-determination, both inside and outside the former USSR.
The policy of decentralization was regarded as the principle, which conducted the nations to self-determination. Inside, the Russian government is playing a risky game. The local nationalists in Chechnya, the republics of the North Caucasus, Povolgia demand the right to self-determination. Due
to this policy, the elites of the autonomous republics and the developed economic regions gave support to President Yeltsin in the 1996 elections. During this period, Russia's foreign policy is characterized as a continuation of internal policy. The Russian government was destroying the remnants of the previous bipolarize world order of the Soviet system inside the state, and it was contributing to the creation of a new unipolar world order by strengthening the presence of the United States on the global arena as a unique Superpower. Each step carried out by the Russian Federation was regarded as evidence of the supporting the Western values. The US and the EU are discussing the new world order and the creation of the global democratic society.
The peculiar feature of the ' 90 years is that Russia cannot actively manifest its geostrategic interests and foreign policy on the international arena. It didn't even exceed the effort to manifest them. The increase of the US influence in the Central and Eastern Europe, and in the ex-Union countries, did not cause protests from the Russia Federation. Russia does not even manifest the opposition to the American conception regarding "the promotion of democratic values", which was asserted on September 1993, on the contrary, it welcomes this policy, considering it as a strategy that can benefit it. The concept promotes the democratic values and reforms in the States of the former socialist camp, especially in the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty, the main aim of which is to focus on the removal of the countries of Eastern Europe from Moscow. The countries in the region are reoriented from the economic perspective to the European area, and from the political and military perspective they need to collaborate with the US. Thus, in the newly created context, the US becomes the most influential political actor in this space, taking over the role of the old European states leaders Germany and France.
Due to the expansion of western democratic conception and values, Russia does not gain any advantage. On the contrary, the passive attitude and the loyalty of Russia towards this process lead to the fortification of the US presence in Europe. In turn, the US and the EU accept Russia's request to join the most important international financial bodies-the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) [27]. The Russia's cooperation with these institutions was the main precondition for resisting the economic crisis, as a result of the "shock" of E. T. Gaidar's government. It is important that the facilities awarded by the international financial institutions to the countries of South Eastern Europe do not also refer to the Russia case. The Western partners have their reasons regarding Russia:
1. firstly, it was important to finalize reforms in the former socialist states with the aid and support of the West;
2. secondly, the interest of international creditors, it was important to impose to Russia government to pay all the financial debts and with the percentages together with the basic amount of was to exceed the initial amount credited;
3. thirdly, the obligations assumed by Russia on the lending policy offered to the international financial institutions the opportunities to influence the economic policy of the Russian government. The credits were granted on the basis of harsh conditions which allowed the control by the international organizations on the debtor's state [14].
The first half of the years is characterized not only by the breaking up relations with the ex-socialist states, but also by the distant relations with the countries from the Near East, South Asia, Latin America. Firstly, Russia withdraws from the world's regions, from those States with which the former Soviet Union had not too distant political-military collaboration in the past. It also loses geostrategic positions on the international arena, including in the Eastern European area. This diplomatic withdrawal from the international arena is explained by the rational use of natural resources within the country. On the outside, this process is appreciated as a conscious retreat from the international arena to avoid competition with the US.
During this period, for the first time in history, the Russia's internal policy becomes the element present in Western political discussions. The former USSR was always led by the principle of not subjecting the state's internal situation to the discussions. This principle has also been fixed in the Helsinki Act of the 1975 year on the State law to choose its own political regime. In the 1992 year is signed the Charter of the Russian-American Partnership on Friendship Relations, during the visit of B. Yeltsin in Washington. In the preamble, but also in a few articles, the principles that the Russian Federation was going to respect in promoting the domestic policy with US support: the principles of society's democracy, respect for human rights and freedoms, respect for Minority rights, including national ones. Thus, it is the first case in the history of Russia when, in a document signed with a foreign state, it is subject to the analysis and regulation of the internal situation, both the political and economic spheres of the country. According to this document, Russia is basically taking responsibility for recognizing US law as an informal arbitrator in assessing the domestic reforms. Due to the sources from diplomatic frame, the theme "homework" was submitted to Russia-a set of the moral-political obligations which the Kremlin has assumed to pursue in order to set up the reforming and
democratization processes of the state, but also of closeness to the United States. The same document stipulates the issue of the Common Security of North America and Eurasia, according to which the security becomes inseparable from Vancouver (Pacific Ocean port at the American-Canadian frontier)-to Vladivostok. The Russia is related its national security to the security of NATO's Member States by signing this document. According to the conception of Russian administration, Russia's security will be ensured in the context of co-operation with the North Atlantic Alliance. Thus, it begins the formation of the "quasi-allied" relations between Russia and the US [8].
According to A. Pikaev, since the middle of ' 92 years, Russia has four specific goals-the withdrawal of the army as urgently as possible from the former union republics, the covert support of the passage of armed forces under the jurisdiction of former Union republics, ignoring the separatist tendencies, sanctioning the participation of external forces in resolving conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Initially, President B. Yeltsin does not oppose to the Ukraine's decision to pass under the state's jurisdiction a considerable part of the army of the former USSR. President Yeltsin signs the agreement on the collective security of the CIS thus creating in the 1992 the Ministry of Defense. Until the ' 93 years, the Russian Government supports the national identity policy, that was formulated by the Minister for National Affairs V. Tishkov, who admits the annulment of the ethnic principles and the autonomies of the new states. The Citizenship Law is adopted on the 1991 year by imposing the priority of individual and not collective priorities, according to which the Russian citizens are, recognized all the residents from the Russian Federation territory. Thus, the principle of ethnic identity is annulled [1, p. 104]. The Russian Government refuses any liability regarding citizens from the foreign States, despite B. Yeltsin's assertion to defend the interests and rights of citizens living outside Russia. A. Kozirev states that Russians outside Russia are not presented any threats, by the fall of ' 92 years.
Already in the early years from the collapse of the former USSR, the Russian Federation manifests interest in the diplomatic perspectives to the Eastern European countries, particularly it manifested interest to the former union republics. Thus, on the April 23, 1993, the President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin approves, "The concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation" [19], the main objective being, "the establishment of positive diplomatic relations with the neighboring countries" for the purpose of overcoming and under non unintegrated processes in the former USSR's space. Another priority of foreign policy interest is the attribution and assurance of Russia's role in the world's influence balance, including the status of Super-power [34]. In the Yeltsin -Kozirev project, Russia had to co-operate with the West the becoming part of it by losing its own identity. As a result of the parliamentary elections on the ' 93 years, the trend of integration into Western space is replaced by the anti-Western. The victory of the Nationalist Party of V. Jirinovskii was a response to the neglect of the state of the armed forces. As a consequence, A. Kozarev seeks to improve the Russia's foreign policy vector, due to the voters ' wishes and preferences. The Foreign Minister Kozirev announces that the territories of the former USSR will become the sphere of primordial interests of the Russian Federation by imposing military presence in the regions where traditional Russia has dominated.
In this context, Russia elaborated the theoretical basis for its armed interventions, which in turn reinforce the political-military behavior of the Russian elite in Moscow and the Russian minorities in the new Independent States. Thus, on the November 2, 1993, the new Russian military Doctrine was adopted, which establishes ten sources of external military hazard, among which six offer the possibility of military intervention in the so-called immediate abroad:
a) Existing or potential local conflict zones, particularly near the borders of Russia;
b) Violation of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the Russian citizens abroad;
c) Attacking Russian military targets abroad;
d) Preparing military groups to enter into Russia or its allies;
e) Expanding military blocks at the expense of Russia;
f) Armed challenges at the borders of Russia or its allies [3, p. 310].
The Russia's government also initiates the signing of the Agreement on the creation of the Community of the Economic Union. The Russian Federation's leadership refuses to co-operate with NATO and, respectively, participation in the, Partnership for Peace because of the opposition within the state, drafted for military co-operation with NATO. The changing vector of the interests and foreign policy of the Russian Federation is a tactical cession at that moment, rather. As a result, the "Stators" or so-called, "Derjavniki" formulated an alternative plan of the Western course, the one, "the Eurasian", reorienting the vector of interests, but also the foreign policy of the Russian Federation versus the Asian and Middle Eastern space. The opposition has pronounced for more active cooperation with Asia and the Near East. In this context, the Russian foreign minister A. Kozirev is deciding to intensify the relations of the Russian Federation with China and India [8].
The cooperation with the former Union republics becomes the main strategic direction of the Russian interest and foreign policy. The Political leaders start from the rhetoric on the great responsibility of the Russian Federation for the post-Soviet states. B. Yeltsin announces under political pressure that Russia must intensify its military presence in Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and central Asia. In this context, Kozirev underlines the importance over of the territories of the former USSR as "areas of special status for Russia's interest", and he promoted idea that involving the NATO and OSCE forces to resolve the conflicts is no longer valid [33, p. 97-107].
The first elections on the December 12, 1993 in the state Duma have denoted a sharp decline in the popularity of the presidential force and an increase to the nationalist disposition. The enthusiasm is deception in, for co-operation with the West, from which the liberal society was awaiting support and help, the democratic solidarity, and the US are blamed on the involvement in the State affairs. The idea of national identity loses in actuality as a result of the parliamentary elections, and the notion regarding the integration with the West suffers failure, it being rejected by the Stators opposition coalition. Also, the numbers of events contributed to the victory of the state's Westerners: The West did not have an interest in Russia as an independent country. Secondly, the internal political context led to the victory of the Stators over Westerners [33, p. 108]. The conflictual areas are also appearing on the territory of the former USSR. The leftist opposition blames the president for neglecting the national interests and also for the promotion of a Western policy.
Due to this framework, on the 1994 years, foreign Minister A. Kozirev called the interests of Russia as "special interests" manifested over the territories of former republics. Though the Russian politics symbolize a new trend in the ISC area, the reality of the mid-'90 becomes more and more contradictory. The war in Bosnia on September 1995, with the intervention of NATO troops in this country, become the subject to harsh criticism in the Russian Federation, not just to the Western powers, but also to the President and Foreign Minister Kozirev who stay for the opportunity not to avoid this intervention. There is also a decrease in the popularity of President B. Yeltsin, and on the contrary, an increase in the popularity of anti-Western forces in the Russian Federation. In the West, however, the NATO enlargement perspectives processes to the East are considered a threat and pressure on Russia [8].
The period between 1996-2000 years becomes the second stage of the geopolitical interest and the extensive policy of the Russian Federation in the Eastern European area. The foreign policy takes a new course due to the presidential election of 1996 years and the appointment of E. Primakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The new minister is attempting to revive Russia's status of super power that previously was promoted by actively diplomacy; however, E. Primakov's policy does not bring reforms and successes in Russia's economic development. The intention for integrate of the former union republics into a common space is dictated by the geopolitical logic, but not by the economic one. The Russia's economy was in a decline, which did not attract the investors from the West [33, p. 43-44]. The appointment of E. Primakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia can be considered as the end of the pro-Western course of the Russian Federation. Although the central idea of the new foreign minister is focused on granting to the Russia the status of overlapping in the state's interim, Russia has faced with the phenomenon of separatism and instability (especially this instability is present in one of the most Southern regions-Chechnya). E. Primakov and his followers did not believe that the course of international politics is formed under the influence of cooperative tendencies. They considered Russia, as power capable of defending its land with its own forces from a historical perspective, and the main purpose which consisted in maintaining this Status [33, p. 115].
The Stators (a good ex- Westerners) were pronounced to keep the Russian Federation of overlapping status, which seeks to ensure and achieve its interests by emerging from the sphere of influence in the international relations frame. The terms of national idea, high power, Eurasia-terms are often used in the lexical of Stators in the speeches of politicians. E. Primakov, in the governance programmer, focuses on two elements: 1) The idea of bringing Russia back to the international arena and retaining the United States ' unipolar ambitions in the coalition with other States in the context of the multi-polar world, and 2) the integration of Post-Soviet space under Moscow control. Primakov believes that the Russian Federation must lead an active foreign policy coming out of these principles, and in relations with the West it must be driven to emerge from its own interests. He also exposes his opinion on the multipolar system. According to the new Russian minister of practice, Russia would soon become dependent on other stronger states, and Russia in order to preserve its geopolitical importance on the international arena had to become an independent power pole.
The logic of the Stators is simple-force dictates force; the Russian Federation lacks the sufficient strengths, the lacks voice on the international arena under the unipolar conditions. Therefore, according to the current opinion, the "Stators", Russia in relations with the West, must refrain with the
US from cooperating as the most powerful geopolitical actor. The Russian Federation must lead to the principles of influencing the creation of alliances, and Russia only needs to have benefits from the presence of potential conflicts and contradictions that exist in the world politics, such as between the West and the Muslim world, or Asian and Muslim states. According to the new conception, Russia had to lead a multilateral policy in the world and its important aim to develop balanced relations with both Western and Asian countries.
According to E. Primakov the Russian Federation is a Western state, but also Asian one from the geographic location perspective. It is also Europe and Asia, and this geopolitical location plays an important role in the formation of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and in the process of training its national interest. Thus, the geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation, according to the external policy concept of 1998 [22], it includes the relations not only with the US or Europe, but also with China, India, Japan. Russia would cease to be a power to hold the role on the international arena outside on this geopolitical framework. The Russian Federation must take into account the geopolitical and historical values in the process of establishing the relations with all these States. The Stators are pronouncing for the creation in the post-Soviet space of a well-integrated area, where Russia would return its main role of establishing the relations between the former Union republics. The geopolitical interests of Russia have a more pragmatic character extend beyond the boundaries, the sovereignty area, and the foreign policy course [33, p. 118-122].
The new minister leads a moderate foreign policy, thereby consolidating the position of the Russian Federation on the international arena, cooperating with the west where possible and avoiding conflicts, where it might arise. The priority of E. Primakov policy include two aspects towards the relations with the West,: 1) The UN's support as a basic institution, which imposes the rules of international conduct on States, and 2) the development of close relations with influential States outside the Western sphere, such as China and India [24].
An important role of Primakov's policy is the adaptation of Russia to new realities under the conditions of NATO's eastward enlargement. The NATO's enlargement was seen as a direct threat to the security of the Russian Federation. Due to that in the 1997 years Primakov is signing the document regarding the relations and cooperation in the security field between the Russian Federation and NATO. According to the document, the Russian Federation lacks the right of veto, however, and NATO's intervention in the Balkans has demonstrated this fact. The document is subject to criticism in Russia, especially by Ziuganov. Primakov strives to increase the economic and military potential of Russia, as a Stators. Although, Primacov does not continue Kozirev's policy of accession to the Western organizations in the economic sphere, but it creates Russia's independence from these institutions, because of the intention to bring Russia back to the international arena through the supply of raw materials on the West markets.
Despite Primakov's efforts to restore Russia's economic independents, however, at that time, the country held a debt of 17, 5 billion U.S. dollars, while the internal budget constituted $20 billion U.S. The difficult budget is increasing, as a result of the government's inability to demand credit; it is starting with Yeltsin's reforms. The IMF requires the exact execution of the lending conditions, in turn.
In regards with the US relations, E. Primakov expresses its disagreement with the imposed sanctions made by the US to the Yugoslavia and Iraq. According to Minister Primakov, there were three reasons why Russia did not advocate American intervention in these states: 1) The negative attitude of the Russian Federation towards "One polarity", unwilling to follow the US; 2) The imposing debts of the Iraq 7 billion against Russia, which could not be returned without the annulment of sanctions; 3) The increasing economic agents such as "Lukoil", which tended to conclude the agreements with Iran and the Arab market in general. The NATO's intervention in Belgrade in March 1999 changed the structure of the Russian-NATO-Russia relations. The NATO's actions were considered by Russia as violating the of the Helsinki Act rules on respect for the States sovereignty. Russia ceases its work in the "Basic Act", reaffirming its mission in Brussels and urging the NATO representatives to leave the territory of the Russian Federation [33, p. 127-131]. The Russia's failure to oppose NATO's intervention in Iraq and Yugoslavia, as well as its dependence on Western financial organizations, makes Russia isolate itself on the international arena.
I consider the extending NATO processes to the East as the main threat to Russia's security, many Stators, under the newly created conditions, considered timely integration of the ex-Soviet space for the purpose of self-defense. Primakov's active policy was also supposed to have the geostrategic cooperation in the economic sphere with China and the Near East.
Moscow considers it necessary to preserve the military presence in these spaces from the presence of conflictual areas in the territory of the ex-Republic of union states and under the pretext of defending the ethnic Russians interests outside Russia. Primakov considered it necessary to defend the interests of over 25 million Russians outside the Russia. On the territory of the Russian Federation
lived 140 ethnicities. The problem lies in finding a means to restore the transnational identity of the community on the territories of the former Union states. In 1996, by Order No. 909 is approved the conception of the national policy of the Russian Federation, which are formulated and guaranteeing the main multiethnic aspects,, the cultural preservation and development of national traditions, the cooperation of Slavic, Turkic peoples, Caucasian, Ugro-Fenice, and other peoples of the Russian Federation living in the Eurasian space". This project was not so successfully implemented, however, as Yeltsin and Primakov wanted [20].
The Russian Federation is also interested in returning the valuable economic patrimony of the postSoviet area. The conception of integration becomes clear on September 14, 1995, when President B. Yeltsin signs the Order No. 940 on, the strategic course of the Russian Federation and the CIS States [28]. "Since the collapse of the USSR the Russian Federation officially declares priority relations with the ISC States for the first time, in order to achieve the national interests of the Russian Federation and to create an economic and political union of the integrated States, able to occupy a place on the international arena". For Primakov, the integration of the post-Soviet space is dictated by the necessity of ensuring State security. Primakov's policy was accompanied by the changes in the establishments of Russia's geostrategic interest and the return of power status to the international arena. Although this course, it was different, it had some common traits with that of Soviet politics. Even in the frameworks of co-operation with the Western states, all attempts to obtain high-power recognition have been unsuccessfully, with only a limited effect. The majority of the agreements signed by the ISC states practically are not efficient, and the States accomplished their national self-interest.
The new military doctrine of the Russian Federation was a document that fully supports the efforts of the Kremlin leaders to ensure the national interests of the Russian Federation that had approved by the Dmitri Medvedev. The similar stipulations were included in the National security Strategy [17] and the maritime doctrine [23], both documents remaining valid until the 2020 year. The peculiar thing of these documents is the fact that the main emphasis does not focus on ideological confrontation, but more on the ability of participants in international life to secure their own security through the use of nuclear weapons. The inequality that were resulting from the military capabilities that hold different participants on the international political processes and phenomena gives them the possibility of great powers not only to adopt protective positions, but also to use for this purpose all the means and instruments that emerge from this statute.
The new military doctrine approved by decree of the Russian President on April 21, 2000, it detects, 13 sources of danger unlike the Kozirev doctrine of 1993, (following the evolution of the Post Yugoslav and Chechen) and it reconfirmed, in large part, the militant attitude towards of the protection of Russian citizens abroad, and, in general, against the attempts to undermine Russia's consolidation on the world's influential Multipolar center. The Russian experts believe that Russia has the opportunity to maintain its strength and even high power status, one of the arguments being the existence of historical heritage, the political potential of influence in the world, that are accumulated by the Russian Empire and by the former USSR. A serious danger is the growing tendency of the Independent States Community (ISC) from the Moscow's view to exert joint pressure on Russia, i.e. political integration against Russia (it is significant Russia's negative attitude towards the group GUAM, insignia under political or military report). According to Moscow's vision, the emphasis, in relation to the States of the former USSR, must be put on bilateral relations, firmly defending the national economic interests [3, p. 310]. One of the objectives of foreign policy remains to be the defense of the rights of the Russian population and of Russia in the new independent States.
The period between 2000-2012 years constitutes the third stage of the geostrategic interest of the Russian Federation formation. The enter to power of President V. Putin and his team make the Russian Federation approaches more explicit and pragmatic, and the national-Russian chauvinism is directed towards the management of relations involving the complete subordination of former republics Russian to Russia [4, p. 311]. Due to the new leader V. Putin appointment, the geostrategic interest and foreign policy of the Russian Federation take a course focused on pragmatism, which is a continuation of the previous policy, but which also has its specificity [34], focusing on pragmatism, the main Value of the state being patriotism.
The President Putin focuses not only on the ideas of Westerners, in carrying out his interests and foreign policy, but also he sustained the Stators ideas, intending to create a great power in Russia [33, p. 157]. Putin is pronounced for the relations of the Russian Federation with the states of Asia, China, India, Mongolia, North Korea and Brunei in the spirit of the Stators and the politics of Primakov. Unlike its predecessor B. Yeltsin, V. Putin sees the possibilities and prospects that open up to Russia, considering the need for the Russian Federation to achieve success in the economic sphere, not only in the military frame. Thus, according to Putin's statements "to the contemporary international relations the main characteristic is competition-for markets, investment, political and economic
influence... and no one will help Russia, alone we're fighting to get a place on the international arena. With regard to the security threats, the main threat is a terrorist action on the outside. Asserting, no one intends to fight Russia, "he referred to the States, but not to terrorists". That is why the Western support in the fight against terrorism is one of the principles of foreign interests and policy of the Russian Federation.
Putin's policy is focused on the ideology of Liberals ready to suppress the pro-Western course, but also of the Stators, who are deciding to bring the Russian Federation back to the international arena as super power [12]. Russia is drafting a new document after the conception of foreign policy was made and launched in August 2008, giving it an additional incentive in terms of the role and mission of Russia's as a pro-active, first-rate actor on the International stage. Russia reconfirms the desire to build a multi-polar world, in which the international order will be ensured by 5-6 players, through its national security strategy. Also, the Russian Federation considers that the United Nations is the central element of the system of stability of international relations, so that there are the equal opportunities from the point of view of the National Security Strategy, for the states that are based on the civilizational instruments for resolving global and regional crisis situations.
According to the Russia's new security vision, an increased emphasis of the Russian state would be expressed by increasing interaction in multilateral formats, such as G-8 (7 + 1), G-20, RIC (Russia, India, China), BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), but also by the use of other non-formal, international institutes. The key reference is the building on the footing of a strategic partnership with the US on the basis of the interests that coincide to the Russia's National Security Strategy in addressing to the environment security. The Russian Federation "is deciding on a quantified consolidation of the interaction mechanisms with the European Union, including the consistent formation of common spaces in the spheres of economy, internal and international security, education, sciences, culture" at European level. Therefore the Russia's national interests, in the short term, claim the formation of a transparent collective security system in the Euro-Atlantic area that would have a basis of contractual law. The Russian Federation is looking for a new role, so that by the 2020 year, it wants to be propelled as one of the greatest powers. As a result, we could say that the adjustment of all its strategic acts has a well-established term, the year 2020, and, at the same time, the Eurasian emancipation trends are visible complemented by the efforts of the European area [5].
According to the military doctrine on April 21, 2000, compartment "The political military basis" paragraph 5 the main external threats to the security of the Russian Federation are: the territorial claims against the Russian Federation; the Involvement in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation; the intentions to ignore the interests of the Russian Federation in resolving issues aimed at ensuring international security, the resisting the strengthening of the Russian Federation on the international arena as a Super power in a multi-centrist world; The presence of conflictual points, firstly, near the Russian Federation and its allies; The growth and formation of groups/forces leading to the destabilization of the balance of power in the neighboring of the decisions of the Russian Federation and its Allied and maritime territories; Expanding the military blocks and alliances against the security of the Russian Federation; Introduction of foreign military forces and violations of UN status in the territory of the nearby States or the Russian Federation's friends; Creation and preparation in the territory of other States of armed formations and groups in order to be deployed in the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies; The attack (armed challenges) on the military objects of the Russian Federation located on the territories of the foreign States and on the objects and constructions located near the decisions of the Russian Federation or its allied decisions, as well as in Planetary Ocean; The movements, directed towards violations of global and regional stability, including the imposition of obstacles to the activity of the State and military administration system, on the violation of the functioning of the nuclear strategic forces, The systems for the pre-launch of missile attacks, the missile defense system, the control of the cosmic space, the storage objects of nuclear armaments, nuclear energy, nuclear and chemical industries and other objects presenting Danger. According to the doctrine may be listed as threats to the security of the Russian Federation also: discrimination, violation of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign States and international terrorism [11].
The notions such as military danger, military conflict, military threat, armed conflict, local war or regional war effectively contribute to the attainment and maintenance of a certain region under political influence. However, Russia is trying to adapt to the new international security conditions, where other actors are fighting for political, economic and military supremacy, and here I do not mean those from the cold scraping period.
According to the text of the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation, the North Atlantic Alliance violates certain principles and norms of international law, through its activities in various regions. In this context, it is mentioned that there are tendencies to separate the foreign
military forces near the borders of the allies of Russia or perhaps even their own countries. For these reasons, the Kremlin leaders will no accept the interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation at all, but also in those of its partners. In this case, the greatest danger is the expansion of NATO and the proximity of the military infrastructure of this organization of Russia's borders to the military security of the Russian Federation, as the process of extending the North-Atlantic Alliance Contrary to Moscow's political and security interests.
Due to the analysis of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, it is to be noted that, in the text of this document, no internal hazards were excluded, which mainly pertain to the institutional construction of State bodies. The authors of the document do not exclude the possibility of attempts to violate the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, which leads to the possibility of there being certain subjects of the Russian Federation who may wish to have a higher status the document that provides the territorial autonomy, which Moscow's leadership does not accept in any way.
According to the new doctrine, the conceptual theses are based on a fundamental interrelationship and interdependence between the national security strategy of the Russian Federation from 2000 to 2020 years [17] and the conception of Socio-economic development of the Russian Federation for the period up to the 2020 year [21] from the perspective of the Russian National Security. The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation would be a mobilizer for the development of the national economy, improving the quality of life of the population, ensuring political stability in society, strengthening the national defense, State Security and public order, enhancing the competitive capacities and international prestige for the Russian Federation [5] all of these should be achieved by the 2020 year.
Thus, according to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation conception, approved by the President V. Putin on June 28, 2000, the priorities of foreign interests and policy, according to chapter IV, "The regional priorities", the relations with the Member States Members of the ISC, based on the neighborhood relations and strategic partnership with each particular state and coming out of the interests of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is also ruling on the integration of the post-Soviet space, firstly, through the customs Union, the collective Security treaty, the Union of Russia-Belarus. The priority will be the joint efforts to resolve conflicts of the ISC member States, the fight against security threats such as international terrorism. Of major importance remain relations with the EU as the main economic partner. In this context, the Russian Federation develops friendship and Cooperation relations with Western European states such as Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, but also with the Baltic States and Central and south-Eastern Europe. For some reason, NATO policy it does not fall within the scope of security of the Russian Federation, often becoming adversarial. The constructive dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Russia are possible only if the interests of the Russian Federation with the US and NATO coincides. The Russian Federation is willing to overcome the times of crisis in relations with those of the US, preserve and expand the infrastructure developed over the last 10 years. Important for Russia are relations with the states of Asia and the East, as well as relations with China, India, Japan, and Iran [17].
Due to the analysis of the evolution of the geostrategic interest of the Russian Federation, we can consider that the period of the 2012-2014 years is the fourth stage. On 12 July 2008, the president of D. Medvedev approves the concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the new editorial. Thus, analyzing the text of the document, it is to be noted that, instead of the term "high power", the Russian Federation for the first time is called (the important fact) and the largest Eurasian power. The document discusses the prospects and loss of the Western monopoly on global processes. The creation of the Union State with Belarus disappears from the list of priorities of Russian Federation policy. This priority is replaced by the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union, the CSTO, and the ISC. The document is indicated for the first time by the energy security policy and it is underlined that the Russian Federation uses all the resources it has at its disposal for the purpose of achieving its geostrategic interests [16].
Thus, according to the conception of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013, chapter II,,,Sovremennii mir i vnesneaia politika Rossiskoi Federatii'', chapter IV„,ReghionaHme prioriteti'', art. 42, The Russian Federation considers the development of two-and multilateral relations with ISC member States to be prioritized for further deepening them at the regional level, which have not only a common historical past, but also they have a common potential for integration with the Russian Federation in different spheres. According to the 43 article of the conception, Russia has friendship relations with each ISC Member State, on the basis of equality, mutual interest, it tends to intensify the integrationist processes in the post-Soviet space, and Russia will develop strategic partnership and collaboration relations with the states available to these processes [18].
Russia will strive to strengthen also the cooperation and integration in the area of the Eurasian Economic Union (art. 44), it will actively cooperate with the ISC States on the humanitarian sphere, preserving the national traditions and heritage (art. 45), it will cooperate in the sphere to ensure the mutual security, by jointly agreeing against security threats, in the first place of international terrorism, extremism, illegal trade in narcotic substances, will combat international crime, Illegal migration. According to the conception, the Russian Federation, will not allow the destabilization of the situation in the Caucasus in this context. As guarantor of security insurance in the post-Soviet space is the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) organization and its transformation into a universal organization (art. 47). Russia (48 article, PC. A.) will endeavor and work on achieving the potential of the CIS as a main goal, by strengthening this organization at the regional level, in a forum of multilateral political dialogue, and a mechanism for cooperation in the economic, humanitarian sphere, the fight against traditional and new threats. Russia will promote to resolve conflicts in the post-Soviet area in addition to all cooperation activities with the CIS countries, it would seek the means to resolve the Transnistrian conflict, based on the respect for sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Moldova, by granting a special status to the Transnistrian area, that will contribute to resolving the conflict in the Mountain Karabachos (art. 49). The Russia's policy priority is to establish and develop relations with Georgia in those spheres where the Georgian side is available to cooperate (art. 52) [18].
The Russian Federation will hold partnership relations with the US and the EU (art. 54) due to the realities of international politics. According to the 55 art., the Russian foreign policy is oriented towards the formation of a single space of peace, security and stability, focused on the principles of equality and mutual trust. The Russia Euro-Atlantic direction however, has a negative attitude towards extending NATO to the East (art. 79, 82) [18].
The new restart of Russian-American relations was halted by the return of V. Putin to leadership in 2012 year with the coming to power of B. Obama in the U.S. and D. Medvedev in Russia. Thus, the relations between the Russian Federation and the US are in progress again. There are obstacles which are an impediment in the relations of the Russian Federation with the US. The main impediment is the US tendency to limit geostrategic and geopolitical actions, including Russia's position on the international arena of NATO enlargement and missile shield placement in Eastern Europe, which is contrary to the interests of Geostrategic of the Russian Federation on the international arena. The event in the Near East makes the Russian Federation limited in its actions from the former Soviet space, on which the US is trying to impose control.
The period from the 2014 to 2016 years can be considered as the fifth stage of training for the geostrategic interest of the Russian Federation. It can be characterized by the manifestation of Russia's aggressive policy and actions on the international arena by comparing this stage to the previous stages, especially in the ISC area. The occupation of Crimea in 2014 can practically be regarded as a second cold war between Russia and the West and the actions to support separatist forces in the regions of Lugansk and Donetsk of Ukraine by imposing embarks on the wine products and fruits originating from the Republic of Moldova and by reacting to the International sanctions. This stage is also characterized by the cooling of Russian relations with the West, this process caused by conflicting disputes regarding NATO enlargement in the East. The Russo-Ukrainian crisis of 2014 year contributed to the isolation of the Russian Federation, including the cooling of relations with the US and European States. The embargo imposed by the US and the EU in the context to the Russian Federation following the occupation of Crimea, President V. Putin brings a series of steps to the Western powers on extending NATO to the east. As a pretext, the cartel is invoked between the leaders Great Powers (in format 2 + 4)-German Democratic Republic And the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the USA, the USSR and the United Kingdom of 12 September 1990 in Moscow on the signing of the Treaty of sovereignty [7] which provided for the non-admission of NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe and the non-admission of development Military infrastructure in the neighboring of the Russian Federation's decisions.
The NATO enlargement has become quite contradictory. In the circles of the politicians of the great powers, but also in the literature, this subject is given the greater attention. NATO states that such a promise did not exist [9]. However, there are also the opinions that the US and the EU, with the aim of granting support to the Russian Federation in the ' 90 years, have given the guarantee of non-enlargement to NATO in the East. The Soviet side either inadvertently or because of the confidence it had against the Western powers, it did not sign these decisions. NATO's expansion to the East, considers some specialists, was possible due to the protocol of the USSR leader, M. Gorbachev. In the 1990 year, in the discussions of the US, Germany and USSR leaders on the unification of Germany, M. Gorbachev was convinced," to bring the guarantees and promises that NATO would not expand to the East, nor by a step", but did not sign any agreement. The NATO non-enlargement to the East was the condition submitted by the USSR to the Agreement on unification of Germany [35]. Even though
the West has pledged the NATO non-enlargement, from the 1990 year to now, 10 former European states of the Warsaw Treaty have joined the alliance.
Due to the analysis of the enlargement waves of the alliance in the East this process can be justified by art. 6 of Chapter 2, the conclusion of the Treaties of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the right of States to conclude treaties [2] and by art. 3 of the Vienna Convention of 1986 on the right of States to accede to the international organizations [10].
Currently, NATO's strengthening policy in the East is considered by the Russian Federation as a failure to comply with promises from the 1990 year by the US and poses a danger to its security. According to Russian officials, the changes made in the doctrine were necessary due to real threats that are facing Russia. The modification of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation was made in accordance with the decision of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on the July 5, 2013. The final version of the document was approved at the Russian Federation Security Council meeting on December 19, 2014 and signed by the President V. Putin on December 26, 2014. The geopolitical context of the adoption of the doctrine was the political crisis in Ukraine, a prolonged armed conflict in the Eastern region, which resulted in deterioration of relations with the US, the EU, as well as with NATO, but also of changes in the International relations and the International security environment [5].
The overall context of the adoption of the document relates to the way for the exploitation of the principles of the categories of resources, especially oil and gas, it is combined with some strategic errors of the United States, and it led to recreation of geopolitical counterfeits, which it is conditioned the end of the economic expansion period, integration and European partnership, which began with the end of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 1989 year. The social instability has been installed due to a political system that has proved incapable of adapting to new changes. As a result, the instability and social contagion complement each other, which is what the people who took action with the organization of the Arab Spring have staked out. Thus, the instability started from North Africa to the Middle East, causing the new wave of Islamic terrorism, this time more violently than the conflict from Syria in which Moscow's opinion was initially diametrically opposed to that of the United States. The Russian-Syrian bilateral relations brought the Russian Federation a much-coveted ascent to the international arena, but also the possible desire for revenge on the part of Russia to compensate for the vote in the UN Security Council on Libya.
According to the military doctrine another threat to the security is related to the rise of the Islamic state, the main security threat not only for the Middle and near Middle East, for the European Union, but also the Caucasus region in the sphere of Influence of Russia. The regional context promoted a weakened EU economic account of austerity policies that have not had an expected effect; on the contrary, it has exacerbated the economic disparities between States. For example, Eastern Europe is perceived as an important outlet and a supplier of cheap forces, but it comes with the problems of the large number of migrants. We can note that the European aspirations of countries such as the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, are quite complicated to put into practice and are a dissension generator even among the leaders of the European Union, and this cannot be in the advantage of the Russian Federation, which wants to maintain them in its own sphere of influence. Another moment, which we can remark, is the location of the missile shield in Romania and Poland, which has caused a great deal of discontent for Russia. From the 2012 year, through the voice of Deputy Prime Minister D. Rogozin, the Kremlin announces that NATO is one step away from reaching the limit that will provoke a strong response from Russia. Another moment that stressed the cooling of Russia-EU relations are sanctions that were imposed to the Russian Federation by the West [6].
In this context, can also be analyzed the national strategy of the Russian Federation on the December 31, 2015, NR,. 683 [30], approved in accordance with federal laws on December 28, 2010, No. 390-F3, "Security"[31] and from June 28, 2014, nr. 172 F-3, "The strategic planning of the Russian Federation" [32] that aims, according to section 3 of the compartment I 'The general situation",... creating the internal and external conditions for the achievement of national interests and geostrategic priorities of the Russian Federation. Thus, according to point 8 of the compartment II "The Russian Federation in the contemporary world" "it increased the role of the Russian Federation on the international arena, increased its role in resolving military conflicts, ensuring the strategic stability and supremacy on the International law on the interstate relations". According to the paragraph 12 of the same compartment, the fortification of the Russian Federation takes place on the part of new threats to security, the threats that have a complex character. The internal and external policy course of the Russian Federation is criticized by the US and its allies, who tend to maintain the dominance on the international arena. According to the paragraph 13, compartment II, the process of forming the multicenter system is conditional on the global processes and regional instability. The international arena does not diminish the role of the factor of power (paragraph 14) "... near the borders of the Russian Federation, the militarization and armament process is taking place, it is
increasing NATO's potential, but also it is violating the principles of International law, the actions of the Member States of the NATO bloc are taking place near the borders of the Russian Federation, the location of the US anti-missile system in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region and the Near East are considered, according to the Strategy, true threats to the security of the Russian Federation. According to the paragraph 27, in order to achieve national interests, the Russian Federation will focus the course of foreign policy on the reason and pragmatism. The same ideas are also exhibited in the conception of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation on December 12, 2016 [15].
Concluzions. Thus, researching the evolution of the geostrategic interest and foreign policy of Russia, we could conclude that the Russian Federation, over the course of more than 25 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has made efforts to restore the status of the Superpower. Regardless of the period, the foreign policy guidelines and the visions of the political leaders in the Kremlin, Russia aimed to prioritize its manifestation not only as a high-level regional power by restoring influence in the close proximity neighboring, but also by restoring the status and image of world power. The Russian Federation has structured its foreign policy on five major guidelines of action, namely: two of them concern the relationship with the United States of America and the EU, while the other three are targeting East Asia/Far East and mainly China, the East and last but not least, with the former exSoviet states.
REFERENCES
1. Aspecte ale conflictului transnistrean'', Chisinau: IPP, 2001, 140 p.
2. Conventia de la Viena din 1969 privind dreptul statelor de a incheia tratate In: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/law_treaties.shtml (accesat: 15. 09. 2017).
3. Fruntasu, I. O istorie etnopolitica a Basarabiei 1812-2002. Chisinau: Cartier istoric, 2002, 624 p.
4. Politica externa a Republicii Moldova 2009-2011 : in sinteze §i dezbateri red. Chi§inau: : MS Logo SRL, 2011, 320 p.
5. Savu, A., Tanase,T. Schimbari in strategiile de securitate ale unor state ale UE datorita aplicarii unor noi documente strategice de catre Federatia Rusa. Strategii de aparare si securitate la frontiera rasariteana a NATO si UE. Lucrari prezentate in cadrul Sesiunii international de comunicari §tiintifice organizate de Centrul de Studii Strategice de Aparare §i Securitate, 23-24 noiembrie 2006. Universitatea Nationala de Aparare,, Carol I", Bucuresti, 2006. In: http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_carti/nov2006-vol 1.pdf (accesat: 22.04.2017).
6. 231 Savu, A., Tanase,T. Schimbari in strategiile de securitate ale unor state ale UE datorita aplicarii unor noi documente strategice de catre Federatia Rusa. Strategii de aparare si securitate la frontiera rasariteana a NATO si UE. Lucrari prezentate in cadrul Sesiunii international de comunicari §tiintifice organizate de Centrul de Studii Strategice de Aparare §i Securitate, 23-24 noiembrie 2006. Universitatea Nationala de Aparare,,Carol I", Bucuresti, 2006. In: http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_carti/nov2006-vol1.pdf(accesat: 22.04.2017).
7. Tratatul a intrat in vigoare la 15 martie 1991. In: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ %D0 %94 %D0 %BE %D0 %B3 %D0 %BE %D0 %B2 %D0 %BE %D 1 %80_ %D0 %BE %D0 %B1_ %D0 %BE %D0 %BA %D0 %BE %D0 %BD %D1 %87 %D0 %B0 %D1 %82 %D0 %B5 %D0 %BB %D1 %8C %D0 %BD %D0 %BE %D0 %BC_ %D1 %83 %D1 %8 0 %D0 %B5 %D0 %B3 %D1 %83 %D0 %BB %D0 %B8 %D1 %80 %D0 %BE %D0 %B2 %D0 %B 0 %D0 %BD %D0 %B8 %D0 %B8_ %D0 %B2_ %D0 %BE %D1 %82 %D0 %BD %D0 %BE %D1 %88 %D0 %B5 %D0 %BD %D0 %B8 %D0 %B8_ %D0 %93 %D0 %B5 %D1 %80 %D0 %BC %D0 %B0 %D0 %BD %D0 %B8 %D0 %B8 (accesat: 28.02.2017).
8. Богатуров, А. Три поколения внешнеполитических доктрин России In: http://www.intertrends.ru/thirteen/005.htm (accesat 01.07.2017).
9. В НАТО заявили, что не давали России никаких гарантий о нерасширении на восток. In : http://www.unian.net/world/907556-v-nato-zayavili-chto-ne-davali-rossii-nikakih-garantiy-o-nerasshirenii-na-vostok.html (accesat 01.07.2017).
10. Венская конвенция о праве договоров между государствами и междунородными организациями или между междунородными организациями (вместе с процедурой и примирения в соответствии со статьей) (заключена в городе Вене 21.03. 86). In:
11. http://www.lawrussia.ru/texts/legal_673/doc673a825x878.htm. (accesat 01.07.2017).
12. Военная доктрина Россиской Федерации 2000. In : http://www.ng.ru/politics/2000-04-22/5_doktrina.html(accesat 01.07.2017).
13. Глава российского МИД Сергей Лавров в ходе пресс-конференции в среду пояснил, что ведомство разработало новую редакцию, а не новую концепцию внешней политики России. ^ : http://vz.rU/news/2013/1/23/617113.html (accesat 01.07. 2017).
14. Договор о дружбе, сотрудничестве и партнерстве между Российской Федерацией и Украиной. 1п: http://sevkrimrus.narod.ru/ZAKON/1997god.htm (accesat: 28.08.2017).
15. Когда и на каких условиях Россия получала кредиты от МВФ http://ria.ru/spravka/20140224/996722123.html (accesat: 16.10. 2017).
16. Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации 2016 года. 1п: http://www.mid.rU/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248 (accesat 03.01.2017).
17. Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации 15 июля 2008 года. 1п:
18. http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/785(accesat 01.07.2017).
19. Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации от 10 января 2000 г. №24. 1п: http://archive.mid.ru//Bl.nsf/arh/19DCF61BEFED61134325699C003B5FA3 (accesat 01.07.2017).
20. Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации от 12 февраля 2013 г. conceptia-12 --http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d447a0ce9f5a96bdc3.pdf) (accesat 01.07.2017).
21. Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации 1996 года. 1п: http://www.russia.edu.ru/information/legal/law/up/909/2051/ (accesat 01.07.2017)
22. Концепция государственной национальной политики Российской Федерации от 15.06.1996 N 909. к http://www.russia.edu.ru/information/legal/law/up/909/2051/ (accesat 01.07.2017).
23. Концепция долгосрочного социально-экономического развития Российской Федерации до 2020 г. (проект основных положений концепции). 1п: http://www.intelros.ru/subject/ross_rasput/2026-koncepcija-dolgosrochnogo-socialno.html
24. Концепция национальной безопасности Российской Федерации 2000 г. 1п: http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2000-01-14/6_concept.html. (accesat 01.07.2017).
25. Морская доктрина Российской Федерации на период до 2020 года от 27 июля 2001 г. 1п: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/34.html (accesat: 20.05.2017).
26. Пашковский, П. И. Эволюция доктринальных основ интеграционной политики России на постсоветском пространстве. : 1п:
http://science.crimea.edu/zapiski/2011/philos_kulturol/fil_24_1/24_pash.pdf (accesat: 01.03.2017).
27. Работяжев, Н. Украина между Россией и Западом: опыт геополитического анализа. 1п: Мировая Экономика и Междунородные Отношения, № 9, 2008.
28. Современная внешняя политика РФ 1991-2006 гг.: этапы становления. 1п: http://lektsii.net/3-53071.html (accesat: 01.03.2017).
29. Сорокин, К.Э. Геополитика современности и геостратегия России. Москва: РОССПЭН, 2009. 170 с.
30. Стратегический курс России с государствами - участниками Содружества Независимых Государств 1п: http://archive.mid.ru//ns-osndoc.ns^0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/ 4e3d23b880479224c325707a00310fad (accesat: 01.03.2017).
31. Торкунов, А. В. Современные международные отношения и мировая политика. Москва: Просвещение, 2004, ^ 668.
32. Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 31 декабря 2015 года № 683,,О Стратегии национальной безопасности Российской Федерации''. 1п: https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html (accesat: 10. 07. 2017).
33. Федеральный закон от 28.12.2010 № 390-Ф3 (ред. от 05.10.2015) "О безопасности". 1п: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_108546/(accesat: 10. 07. 2017).
34. Федеральный закон от 28 июня 2014 г. № 172-ФЗ "О стратегическом планировании в Российской Федерации" (с изменениями и дополнениями). 1п: http://base.garant.ru/70684666/ (accesat: 10. 07. 2017).
35. Цыганков, А. Внешняя политика России от Горбачева до Путина. Формирование национального интереса. Москва: Научная книга. 2008, 272 с.
36. Эволюция внешнеполитической идентичности России: конец постсоветского периода? Пространство и время в мировой политике и международных отношениях : материалы 4 Конвента РАМИ. В 10 т. https://publications.hse.ru/books/80283609(accesat: 10. 07. 2017).
37. Эксперт: Расширение НАТО на восток возникло из-за ошибки Горбачева. 1п: http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1010280.html (accesat: 10. 07. 2017).
