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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Sabina GARASHOVA
Ph.D. (Political Science), Senior Lecturer at the Chair of Diplomacy and Contemporary Integration Processes, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).
U.S. GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS IN THE CASPIAN REGION
Abstract
This article studies the gist and area of focus of U.S. geopolitics in the Caspian Region. However, it takes a general approach and does not examine U.S. relations with each of the Caspian states individually. It analyzes the reasons for the U.S.'s in-
creased interest in the region and determines the main trends of its political and economic activity. The article concludes that the U.S.'s successful geopolitical activity in the region has helped Europe to become the first major importer of Caspian oil.
KEYWORDS: U.S. interests, geopolitics, Caspian Region, oil, the Caucasus, Azerbaijan.
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Introduction
After the Soviet Union disappeared from the political map of the world, the Caspian Region became a major center of international rivalry. This is directly due to its enormous supplies of energy and other natural resources. In addition, the region has realistic prospects of becoming a vitally important hub of transcontinental transportation-communication systems in the North-South and East-West directions. Today the Caspian Region is an area of severe opposition, largely between the U.S. and Russia. In this respect, in recent years, the U.S.'s strivings to ensure its geopolitical and geo-economic interests have been particularly noticeable. So an analysis of the gist and trends in U.S. policy in the Caspian Region seems to be sufficiently important and pertinent.
After the Central Caucasian states declared their independence, the U.S. gained open access to the region. As already noted, the Caucasian-Caspian Region is not only of economic, but also of immense geopolitical significance for international players, particularly the U.S. This is also shown by the fact that in 1997, Washington designated the Caspian Region as a zone of its strategic interests. Sandy Berger, President Bill Clinton's National Security Advisor, said during his speech on 27 March, 1997 at the Center of Strategic and International Research that China, Turkey, and the Caucasus were of strategic importance for the U.S., while expanding its presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus was one of the U.S.'s foreign policy priorities.1 This was also clearly announced in President Barack Obama's U.S. energy doctrine.2 It is important that the U.S. has access to the region's potentially enormous natural resources, guarantees its geopolitical presence, achieves its national goals, and ensures security against the threats of international terrorism, particularly after the well-known events of 9/11 in New York and Washington. After these events, U.S. strategy regarding the region underwent significant changes, as a result of which expansion of military-technical cooperation with the Caspian states became an important trend in U.S. geopolitics in this region. In addition to the above-noted, one of the important trends in U.S. geopolitical activity in the region is limiting the Russia's presence and influence there in every way possible.
The United States does not want any single nation to have full control over this geopolitical area, while it would like the world community to have unhindered financial and economic access to it. Consequently, the U.S. is not only set on investing its national capital in the economy of the region, but also on the financial participation of its Western allies. This analysis of the problem focuses particular attention on studying the gist of U.S. strategy regarding the Azerbaijan Republic.
Imperatives of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Caspian Region
In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the appearance of the newly independent post-Soviet states, the Caspian Region assumed a central place in world politics. An East-West standoff began gradually building in the Caspian Region in the 1990s.3 This has been gradually turning the region into an arena of geopolitical rivalry among the leading nations on the planet. First of all, there is an open struggle between the strongest nation in the world, the U.S., and Russia, which is significantly weaker in the military-political and economic respect. As already noted, this is due to the re-
1 See: The Washington Times, 28 March, 1997.
2 See: "The Obama Dirty Energy Doctrine-Part 1: A Petroleum-Based National Security Policy," available at [http:// ecology.iww.org/node/270].
3 See: A.M. Temirbulatov, "Geopoliticheskie protivorechiia strategicheskogo razvitiia Kaspiiskogo regiona," Politika i obshchestvo, No. 3 (87), 2012, pp. 85-90.
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gion's extremely advantageous geopolitical location, as well as its large reserves of natural resources, primarily Azeri oil and gas. American strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski thinks that it is Azerbaijan and the strategic energy projects involving Baku that hold a central place in U.S. geo-economic policy.4 The U.S. political elite and scientific-analytical circles think that in order to efficiently ensure national interests in the Caspian Region, it is primarily important to establish closer contacts with Azerbaijan and dynamically develop relations.5
Without the Soviet Union, its main and powerful opponent in world politics, the U.S.'s role as the only superpower significantly grew at the beginning of the 21st century. The U.S. is playing a decisive role in forming a new world system.6
Despite the fact that the foreign political contours of U.S. strategy in the present century have pretty much already been defined, they are still nevertheless taking shape to this day. It appears that the geopolitical map of the world will ultimately be compiled by means of interaction among divergent forces both in America itself and in the rest of the world.
Disruption of the balance of power on the world arena that began during the second half of the 20th century has led to an abrupt increase in the geopolitical activity of the West, primarily of NATO, throughout the entire post-Soviet area, particularly in the Caspian Region. As already noted in the introduction to this article, the geopolitical interest of NATO and the U.S. in this region is not accidental. It is precisely in this region of the post-Soviet expanse that the vitally important geostrategic and geo-economic interests of the leading countries of the world largely intercept. Granting West European and American companies free access to the oil and gas fields of the Caspian Region is the main imperative of the geopolitics of the Western states in this region. It stands to reason that this will allow the West to become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil and thus establish lower energy prices. In all likelihood, along with economic interests, the U.S. is also pursuing important political interests. When defining the situation in the region in keeping with U.S. tasks, American researcher and Director of the Strategic Studies Institute Douglas Lovelace writes that "a U.S. goal of irrevocably integrating these states into the Western state system ... can make them an intensifying focus of international rivalry with Russia."7
Senator Sam Brownback notes that it is also of strategic importance for the U.S. that the Caspian states become "strong, independent, economically viable, and politically sovereign." The senator explains the importance of this goal as follows8:
—the Caspian countries will be able to exert real efforts to reduce anti-Western extremism from Iran;
—the vast energy reserves of this region can reduce the energy dependence of the Western countries on Russia;
—strengthening the market economy in the region may have a positive effect on the political and economic situation in Russia and China;
—the Caspian Region is a favorable arena for spreading freedom and democracy. And this will make it possible to create conditions for developing pluralistic societies.
4 See: Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, Washington, 1997, p. 190.
5 See: L. Lupu, "Azerbaijan: An Essential Link on the East-West Strategic Corridor," Occasional Papers, Center for Conflict, Prevention and Early Warning, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2013, p. 10.
' See: A.D. Bogaturov, Sovremennaia mirovaiapolitika: Prikladnoi analiz, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2010, 592 pp.
7 "National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy," U.S. Army War College Key Strategic Issues List, 2011—
2012, p. 4.
8 See: S. Rose, "Brownback's Bill is a Geopolitical Hoax," Executive Intelligence Review, Vol. 26, No. 51, 24 December, 1999, p. 32.
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So when summing up all of the U.S.'s aims in the Caspian Region, four main factors can be identified:
■ first, assisting regional cooperation and resolving conflicts, which mainly applies to the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;
■ second, creating a situation in which the routes of Caspian energy sources would help to increase diversity and not concentration of world energy reserves;
■ third, creating as favorable opportunities as possible for American companies;
■ fourth, supporting the independence and economic prosperity of all the states in the region.
It is important to note that strengthening geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia was defined as one of the most important vectors in the U.S.'s foreign policy activity. The U.S. is striving to eliminate the possible development of hostile coalitions and independent blocs that could challenge the American government. This is precisely why Zbigniew Brzezinski thinks that the U.S.'s main aim in Eurasia is to create conditions "where no state or combination of states gains the capacity to expel the United States from Eurasia or even to diminish significantly its decisive arbitration role."9 In this context, ensuring strategic interests in the Caspian Region is very important. "Declaring the Caspian as a zone of U.S. vital interests will make it possible to spread American influence in Central Asia in the future. The most important component of Washington's policy in this respect is to render economic, financial, and political support to Azerbaijan, which occupies a strategically important position in the Transcau-casus due to the Caspian's energy resources and sea communication with Central Asia.10
The main provisions of the U.S.'s new national security strategy formulated as early as September 2002 by President George Bush are characterized by the intention to act independently, regardless of the position of the European allies, which it demonstrated very blatantly during the Iraqi war of 2003. In the spring of the same year, America's Rand Corporation prepared a forecast report at the request of the U.S. air force about the possible development of the situation in Russia and the CIS countries. The report noted that economic and ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus that are dangerous for the oil and gas pipelines of the region could severely disrupt the balance of power in the region and even lead to an armed conflict between Russia, on the one hand, and several GUAM member states, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, which supports them, on the other. In this situation, these countries might turn to NATO for help and would most likely receive it in the form of contingents of Turkish and American troops.
An analysis of this problem shows that the American presidents before Obama were more active in protecting U.S. strategic interests in the Caspian Region. The opinion of Martha Brill Olcott can be presented as confirmation of this, who believes that Washington's influence in the Caspian Region is currently at the lowest level. This reality was created by the dynamism in Russia and China's foreign policy activity. According to the author, the U.S., having concentrated its attention on military reforms and creating security potential, could achieve much more success in the Caspian Region.11
Fortifying the U.S.'s Position in the Caspian Region
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the cultural and economic ties between the former Soviet republics and Russia did not break off immediately. When focusing its attention on the
9 Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 198.
10 See: A. Burk, "Stragegiia SShA v raione Kaspiiskogo moria," VestnikKaspiia, No. 2, 2000, pp. 24-25.
11 See: M.B. Olcott, A New Direction for U.S. Policy in the Caspian Region, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., February 2004, pp. 1-8.
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processes going on in the post-Soviet territory, the U.S. supposed that the countries of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus were all still essentially in Russia's sphere of influence. It was only several years later, after it became clear how weak and inefficient Russia's policy was in this vector and how the Central Asian and South Caucasian states were actively looking for ties with Western countries, that the U.S. began drawing up a more balanced and long-term policy in the region.
Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy John Wolf thought that when acquiring their independence, "the [Caspian] Region's governments inherited institutions and legal systems ill-suited for today's global economy. A mad rush toward exports that neglects the need for effective institutions, transparent and predictable laws, and balanced economic growth will only undermine that country's stability and distort economic development."12
We will note that in contrast to the Caspian states, which are primarily looking for political and economic benefits, the U.S. has mainly been directing its attention to the region for geopolitical considerations. Using the capital of its transnational corporations, it has begun to fortify its influence in the region, thus creating obstacles for Russian oil companies with respect to the exploration and production of the Caspian's energy resources and their transportation to the external markets.13
The goal of U.S. policy is to ensure its leading position in the key issues of the region's development. Naturally these issues include raw hydrocarbon production and transportation to the external markets, the establishment of new transportation systems and economic ties in the region, and so on. At the same time, U.S. policy has its long-term sights set on diversifying energy sources in order to reduce its dependence on Middle East oil.
The Caspian's problems include geo-economic, legal, geopolitical, and cultural issues that require in turn special approaches and solutions. However, they are rather complicated since they affect both the bilateral and multilateral relations of the states in the region.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the main problems of the Caspian Region included the following: the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea and the newly independent states' expectation that they would receive high profits from the development of hydrocarbon reserves.14
The first problem did not appear until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while its resolution was made difficult by the national interests of the Caspian states. The Caspian energy resource boom was largely maintained by the U.S., which did everything to keep it going, essentially provoking the countries of the Caspian Region to confront their neighbors and engage in unilateral actions. The U.S. stubbornly pursued its goal, taking advantage of the oil factor and the intention of the leaders of the region's countries to distance themselves from Russia.
Robert Blackwill, former special assistant to President George Bush, Sr. for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs noted when talking about the West's interests in the region that now that all nuclear weapons have been removed from Kazakhstan, the trilateral community no longer has vital interests either in the Caucasus or in Central Asia. The West's only interest in these regions lies in the large supplies of energy resources in the Caspian basin. Foreign companies are already trying to assist in the development of these resources, coming up against serious opposition from Russia. The governments of the countries of the trilateral community should render energy support through the efforts of private companies, since these resources could be of
12 "Wolf Tells Caspian Region 'Oil and Gas Story' at Senate Hearing," 12 April, 2000, available at [http://www. usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/congress/archive/20"00/april/uc10413.htm].
13 See: Ch. Bluth, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Politics, Energy and Security, I.B. Tauris, 2014, p. 81.
14 See: V.A. Huseinov, Kaspiiskaia neft. Ekonomika i geopolitika, OLMA PRESS, Moscow, 2002, p. 8.
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particular importance to Western Europe in the 21st century, when energy supplies from the Middle East begin to decrease.15
Increased interest in the region has also been generated by the dynamism in America's contacts with the regional states. In 1995, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Bill White made a trip around the Central Asian countries. The same year, Zbigniew Brzezinski went to Azerbaijan and held talks with President of the Azerbaijan Republic Heydar Aliev. He noted that the United States highly assessed Azerbaijan's geopolitical potential in the strategically important region of Central Asia and the Caucasus, in which it could become a regional backbone. A little while later, the American press began publishing information on extensive hydrocarbon reserves on this country's shelf, and this gave rise to the increased interest of American business and political circles. At the end of 1996, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for CIS Relations James Collins, who was in the Transcaucasus at that time, personally gave Heydar Aliev Bill Clinton's message offering begin partnership in oil production and oil transportation in the West direction.16
The signing of a Russian presidential decree in 1995 on the strategic course of the Russian Federation, which is considered a transitional result in the pursuit of Russia's foreign policy toward the CIS, can be considered important in the general evolution of American policy toward the countries of the region. It noted that Russia's main vital interests in the economy, defense, security, and protection of Russians' rights, the guarantee of which is the foundation of the country's national security, are concentrated in the CIS countries."17 The decree noted in particular the need for Russia's consolidation as a leading power in forming a new system of international political and economic relations in the post-Soviet expanse.
This decree prompted the U.S. to activate its efforts in the Caspian region. It was after this that the U.S. began balancing its policy and looking for different ways to gain a stronger foothold in the region.
According to Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State under Bill Clinton, four vectors in which the U.S. should focus particular attention in the Caspian Region can be singled out18:
—developing democracy;
—creating a free market economy;
—promoting peace and cooperation among the countries of the region and beyond it;
—integrating regional states into the world community.
We will note that Russian researchers have a specific approach to the American presence in the region. For example, well-known political analyst V. Pisarev identifies three main groups of aims in U.S. foreign policy in the Caspian Region. "The first group consists of making use of the changing geopolitical situation in the world and growing strategic role of the Caspian Region. The second group includes the U.S. penetrating, establishing its presence, and strengthening its position in the Caspian Region in every vector affecting the U.S.'s resolution of its international problems. The third group envisages acquiring the opportunity to control the establishment and prospects for developing the region's resource potential by littoral states, including the Russian Federation, creating spheres of dependence of the former Soviet republics on American economic, political, scientific-technical, and other forms of assistance, and increasing influence on the nature and dimen-
15 See: The New York Times, 10 November, 2002.
16 See: F. Pene, "Politika SShA v Kaspiiskom regione," Delovaia nedelia, 3 June, 1998.
17 Russian Presidential Decree No. 940 of 14.09.95 On the Approval of the Russian Federation's Strategic Course with CIS Member States.
18 See: S.F. Starr, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian," The National Interest, No. 47, Spring 1997.
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sions of Russia's participation in the economic and political development of the region and its adjacent states."19
It should also be noted that U.S. foreign policy in the Caspian states has applied several key tools. The main one was aimed at simplifying the economic and political systems in the Caspian Region. This topic encompasses such issues as establishing democracy, protecting human rights, and building a market economy. These tools of U.S. foreign policy were supported by a powerful propaganda campaign. What is more, for a long time, the Bill Clinton administration was the only judge for the Caspian states and these tools gave it the opportunity to manipulate the Caspian states.20
The gist of the following element of U.S. policy was that if a state is not democratic, it cannot be stable, prosperous, or develop favorably. Thus,
■ first, America began opposing countries with authoritarian regimes, launching various sanctions against them.
■ Second, having assumed responsibility for forming the state systems of the region's countries, the U.S. thus acquired a safe lever of direct influence by assisting in drawing up constitutions and other regulatory acts.21
And it was the U.S. that presumed the need for conducting political reforms in the region by implementing assistance programs, carrying out public and private diplomacy, and supporting nongovernmental organizations. So the U.S. acquired the opportunity to gain a stronger foothold in the region based on both government and nongovernment legal organizations and funds.
All of the above shows that the importance of the Caspian region for the U.S. has been sufficiently widely discussed in various scientific and political circles. Such keen attention from the U.S. gradually made it possible for it to fortify its position in the region. The stronger the U.S. became in the region, the more aggressive its policy.
An analysis of the political reality in the region gives grounds to conclude that since the beginning of the 1990s, the U.S. has mainly been supporting the sovereignty and independence of the regional states. It has also been helping to carry out strategic oil and gas projects in the Caspian Region. In our opinion, a perceptible achievement of U.S. geopolitics in the region is that Europe has become the first major importer of Caspian oil. This goal was largely pursued under presidents Clinton and Bush.
We also believe that after Barack Obama was elected president, the dynamism of U.S. political activity in ensuring strategic interests in the region perceptibly diminished. Several factors can explain this.
■ First, before the Ukrainian events, the U.S. put particular emphasis on resetting relations with Russia. In so doing, the U.S. decreased its military-political activity in the post-Soviet expanse to a certain extent.
■ Second, in addition to the Caspian Region, the U.S. acquired other problem zones (the events in the Middle East, the Iranian factor, and unfinished affairs in Iraq and Afghanistan). It is obvious that in such difficult circumstances, the U.S. was unable to ensure its important interests in the Caspian as necessary.
■ Third, by making efficient use of the energy factor and applying improved military political technology, the U.S. acquired a real opportunity to ensure its interests more actively in the region.
19
V.D. Pisarev, "Politika SShA v Kaspiiskom regione," in: Evropa i Rossia: problemy iuzhnogo napravleniia. "Sredizemnomorie-Chernomorie-diplomatiia SShA," SShA i Kanada, No. 2, 2000, pp. 72-94.
20 See: A.I. Utkin, Amerikanskaia strategiia dliaXXI veka, Moscow, 2000, p. 81.
21 See: "The State of the World: A Framework," Geopolitical Weekly, Tuesday, 21 February, 2012, available at [http:// www.stratfor.com/weekly/state-world-framework].
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Against the background of all these new conditions, the U.S.'s position in the region under Obama looks much weaker. Our opinion coincides with the position of Ariel Cohen, a well-known American expert on foreign policy, who thinks that the Obama administration has de facto recognized the CIS as a sphere of Russia's dominating influence. This reality was observed after the U.S. began carrying out its reset policy. In his opinion, the reset policy essentially meant refusing to promote U.S. strategic interests in Eurasia. The U.S. was to give its activity throughout the post-Soviet area, particularly in the Caspian Region, perceptible dynamism. It stands to reason that in doing this it had to pursue its own strategic interests. Ariel Cohen thinks it is important for U.S. strategic interests to render all kinds of support to energy diversification and integration of the Caspian Region in the world energy market and pipeline building, as well as to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states of the region.22
We think that at this stage, that is, in the context of the Ukrainian events, the resetting of relations with Russia does not hold any further promise, and the U.S. will continue to be active in the Caspian Region. It stands to reason that U.S. policy will no longer be designed with Russian interests in mind. Most important, we think, the need is felt for resetting relations with the Caspian states. Otherwise it will be impossible to talk about the efficiency of U.S. geopolitics in the region.
When analyzing the essence and trends of U.S. geopolitics in the Caspian Region, it is particularly important to note that, although it has vitally important strategic interests in the region, the U.S. is not openly showing any concern about the unsettled conflicts. The U.S. has repeatedly stated the importance of settling all of the conflicts, including the Armenian-Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The U.S. has also repeatedly announced that peaceful settlement of all conflicts in the region meets its interests. But despite this, as one of the cochairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group said, the U.S. has still not taken one decisive step toward fair settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This reality gives reason to believe that U.S. passivity in resolving regional conflicts is giving Russia good opportunities for maneuver. Many Western experts even think that the U.S. has essentially removed itself from the problem of the frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasia and in so doing surrendered its position to Russia.
Conclusion
The major geopolitical changes relating to the collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of the independent Caspian states have drastically transformed the entire geopolitical situation in this region, which has become an arena of acute geopolitical rivalry among world and regional powers. The situation that developed at the beginning of the 21st century is inevitably leading to more intense competition between the U.S. and Russia in this region. This is particularly true since the situation is becoming aggravated, first, by the fight to gain control over potential sources of energy resources, second, by the fact that the region is the epicenter of the geopolitical fault line in the post-Soviet expanse, and, third, by the high conflict potential both in the Northern and the Southern Caucasus.
The geopolitical factor is playing a vital role in the West's increased interest in the Southern Caucasus. Bordering on Russia in the north and on Iran and Turkey in the south, this region is ad hoc a buffer, a sphere of geopolitical rivalry, and a constructive link between them. What is more, the advantageous geographic location of the Caspian states, particularly the Azerbaijan Republic, makes it possible to use its territory for laying transport routes that begin in Baku, which is one of
22 See: A. Cohen, "The U.S. Must Stand against the Eurasian Empire," available at [http://watchingamerica.com/ News/119105/], 29 August, 2011.
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the most important prerequisites for the economic development of this region in the context of the growing globalization of the world economy. In so doing, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route holds a key place in oil transportation, which is fully supported by the West and arouses undisguised discontent in Russia. And this is not accidental, for the geography of Caspian oil deliveries and their transportation routes are directly related both to the geopolitical and the geo-economic interests of the main players in this region.
However, despite the fact that in recent years American influence in the Caspian Sea basin has weakened to some extent, the U.S. continues to show a great interest in it, since it regards the Caspian Region as the main guarantor of the West's energy security.
