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Asiet Ashkhamakhova, Irina Yakovenko,
Experts on Islam
THE PRESENT STATE OF RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
(On example of Adygea)
The development of religiousness in Russia at the present stage is manifested by several processes. The number of people who regard themselves adepts of religions is growing; today 60 to 65 percent of Russian citizens call themselves believers. The level of influence of atheistic outlook becomes lower. Religious organizations are now playing greater role in political and cultural life. According to M. Weber, religious principles are the determining ones in the political and economic activity of society.
Along with the increasing number of devout believers in modern society in the world, including in Russia, outward religiousness and enthusiasm for mysticism, theosophy and occultism still exist.
Inasmuch as the studies of the early 1990s revealed a considerable increase in the share of the population regarding themselves believers, some scholars made hurried statements about religious renaissance in Russia. They believe that turning to religion in the conditions of religious freedom which was established in the country in the early 1990s, was not so much a consequence of spiritual quest as the influence of a kind of "fashion of religion," inasmuch as everything what was not officially encouraged earlier, especially the attributes associated with the prerevolutionary past of Russia, has now become fashionable and prestigious. For example, M. Mchedlov, A. Shevchenko and Y. Gavrilov come to the conclusion that Orthodox Christianity in modern Russia is now an ethnic, but not a religious feature. They write: "While denying their religiousness in outlook self-identification, many respondents (about 20 percent), nevertheless,
regard themselves as adherents of traditional religious associations. They accept Orthodox Christianity or Islam not only as a religious system, but as their natural cultural sphere, national way of life ("Russian - therefore Orthodox Christian," "Tatar - therefore Muslim").
S. Filatov expresses similar opinion about the influence of Islam on people's consciousness. "Islam plays the same role of a symbol of national identity for the traditional Muslim population - the Tatars, Bashkirs, the Caucasian peoples, as Orthodox Christianity for the Russians (excluding the Chechens, Ingush and most Daghestani peoples). Surveillance polls show that real Islamic religiousness of these peoples is as weak as Orthodox Christian religious of the Russians."
In February 2009 one of the biggest and most reliable Russian surveillance centers (Yuri Levada Analytical Center) carried out a poll entitled "Religion and Religiousness in Russia." The results of the poll, which was conducted very strictly and thoroughly, made it possible to answer the question as to what significance Orthodox Christianity has for the hearts and minds of present-day Russians. First of all it is important to note that almost three-quarters of Russians identify their faith with Orthodox Christianity.
According to certain experts, there are two groups of reasons for increasing interest in religion. The first group is related to social being. The economic, ecological and political ill-being in most countries of the world causes uncertainty and fear for the future. Moreover, in the epoch of global problems this fear assumes eschatological scope. The other group of reasons concerns the spiritual state of society. The loss of identity, or to be more exact, pluralism in its interpretation characteristic of the epoch of Post-Modernism, makes the individual turn to religion as a universal means for self-identification. For one, this
is typical of Russian mass consciousness. It seems that despite all and sundry economic and political upheavals of the post-perestroika years, it is the latter group of reasons for increasing religious consciousness in this country has proved the most significant. As certain experts emphasize, at present "previous social ties are broken and people cease to understand what they believe in, what community they belong to, who their friends and who their enemies are. This is why fraternity, community or parish in religious life proves more important than the abstract symbol of faith." These words can well be applied to Russian religiousness these days.
Samuel Huntington believes that the late 20th century witnessed all-round revival of religions, which was manifested in an increase of religious consciousness and the stepping up of fundamentalist movements. In his view, religious revival is connected with the crisis of identity due to social changes in modernizing societies. Secondly, it is a reaction to atheism, moral relativism and connivance to once own weaknesses, confirming the values of order, discipline, labor, mutual aid and human solidarity.
Along with the growing number of adherents of Orthodox Christianity, the number of adherents of Islam also increases. For over 1,350 years Islam has been an inalienable component of the history of the Caucasus and one of the determining elements of the spiritual and material culture of many Caucasian peoples. Islam in the Caucasus has been playing a multifunctional role and is present in all spheres of public life. At present its influence is growing, it becomes politicized and is used in the national self-identification of the North-Caucasian peoples for fanning nationalistic and separatist sentiments. One of the reasons why part of Muslims takes the road of radicalism is their superfluous ideas about Islamic culture.
In the early 1990s the process of Islamic revival began in Russia, thus Russian Muslims realized their adherence to Islamic civilization and the world Islamic community. Among the main results of Islamic revival mention should be made of the growth of religious self-identification, the greater number of mosques and of people observing Muslim rites, the formation of a system of religious education, re-establishment of broken ties between Soviet and Russian Muslims and their foreign co-believers, and politicization of Islam.
The renaissance of Islamic education in Russia after a long interval began in the mid-1980s and proceeded in two directions: first, the education was organized via summer schools at mosques, where the basics of Islam were taught to adults and children; secondly, through the system of religious education at Islamic madrasahs, colleges and universities where Muslim clergy was trained.
The restoration of professional Islamic education in Russia had certain advantages. It was possible to organize the contemporary religious education without restoring old forms, which is often not easy to do.
All Russian professional educational institutions - both madrasahs and universities - are concerned with the dissemination of general religious knowledge of Islam as a whole.
An analysis of the socio-political situation in our country shows that Islam is the basis of national-religious self-identification for a definite part of the population of the Russian Federation.
The number of the Muslim population of Russia, according to the 2002 census, was 14.5 million. By 2006 it exceeded 15 million. Muslim spiritual leaders claim that the number of Muslims in Russia reaches 20 million, which amounts to 12 percent of its entire population. The total number of Muslims in the North Caucasian region amounts to six million.
The situation in the Republic of Adygea is rather original. In 1999-2000 a sociological surveillance was carried out in the republic under the title "The State and Prospects of Islam in Adygea". The first tendency revealed by the poll was that there was no total Islamization in Adygea. Only 35 percent of those polled called themselves adherents of Islam and ten percent followed the precepts of Islam. Thus, there is a frequent paradox when people regard themselves adherents of one or another faith, but are sort of "outside it". They do not follow the strict standards of religious behavior and know badly, or not at all, their religious cult. According to the well-known American expert on the religious situation in the CIS countries, Kent R. Hill, "...the words 'I believe in God' should be understood as a form of denial of atheism rather than confession of deep faith". The surveillance mentioned made it possible to confirm conclusions that ethnic identity is more widespread among the Adygea people and it is founded on traditional cultural values rather than on religious ones. Answers of respondents also point to this, because only six percent of them maintain than Islam is more important that traditional culture.
The results of the poll have been summed up as follows: "Most of those polled view Islam primarily as the opportunity to realize their spiritual and ethical requirements. There is no total Islamization in Adygea today. The assertion 'I believe in God' should be understood as a form of turning down atheism rather than admission to being deeply religious. Most respondents believe that in some 10 to 20 years Adygs will hardly become 'true, devout Muslims".
In 2010 a poll was carried out on "Interethnic and Interconfessional Relations in the Republic of Adygea as Viewed by the Leaders of Public Organizations." As a result, of the poll it was concluded that within the Islamic community of Adygea contradictions become noticeable between "popular" Islam and Koran Islam.
Penetration and spreading of radical ideologies, including radical Islam, seems quite possible, inasmuch as radicalism is more often than not a form of active protest against the existing injustice and drawbacks of the social order.
Another form of social protest is departure from reality to a "sect." In the present conditions a reduction in the number of adherents of "non-traditional confessions" can hardly be expected. Rather, the contrary, their number may increase.
In April 2011 the Adygea Republican Institute of Humanitarian Research carried out a sociological investigation on the subject "The Situation in the Muslim Community of the Republic of Adygea as Assessed by Muslims and Municipal Officials." According to the data received, the overwhelming number of Adygs regards themselves Muslims. However, according to approximate data, only from two to five percent of them visit mosques regularly. Twenty percent regularly attend prayers. In this lies the main difference of Adygea from the republics of the eastern part of the North Caucasus where Islam is more deeply-rooted and more influential.
According to polls and interviews, the situation in the Islamic community is satisfactory. This view was expressed by all respondents without exception, although some voiced serious reservations and ambiguities. They boiled down to reports that a small number of orthodox (non-traditional) Muslims (bearded and scull-capped men) emerged in several populated centers, whose views run counter to "traditional Islam" in Adygea.
Ambiguity of certain answers could be seen and felt in that in response to request to give an assessment of the situation in a local Islamic community, respondents used different criteria. At the same time, the positive aspect for Muslim believers was the fact that their number was growing, and this was why the situation in the community,
from their point of view, was satisfactory, and officials proceeded from the fact that the positive situation was determined by the absence of religious extremists. Most respondents (48 percent) were sure that there was no real threat to socio-political stability in the republic due to "radicalization of part of Muslims". Only 15 percent believe that such threat does exist.
Speaking about the development prospects of the situation in the Islamic community of the Republic of Adygea, researchers come to the following conclusion: "In our view Adygea will inevitable repeat the path which has been traversed in this sphere by other republics of the North Caucasus.
"The emerging trend of drawing young people to Islam will grow, inasmuch as turning to religion remains the only way of spiritual existence in the world which encroaches, from the point of view of many people, on the very foundations of human morality and ethics.
"Differentiation within the Muslim community will also increase: there will be adherents of traditional Islam, "young Muslims", that is, adherents of hanafism, traditional for Adygea, but devoid of pagan traces, and adherents of "pure Islam" claiming that Islam is not religion of Abu Hanifa. Islam is religion of Allah. We have the Koran and Sunna of the Prophet".
However, global re-Islamization of Adygea, as it was the case of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, will not take place in the foreseeable future. The number of adherents of Islam is growing too slowly.
With growing differentiation of the republican Muslims into "traditional", "young Muslims" and "pure Muslims", the possibility of conflicts between them is also growing, but it is far from menacing so far.
Islam is used for anti-state, destructive purposes, but not in the interests of the consolidation of society and the state. Expert N. Volodina writes: "This takes place not due to the nature of Islam, but because the Russian authorities proved to be unprepared to the large-scale intrusion of Islam into political life". One can observe numerous trends of Islam, which are non-traditional for Russia. According to various estimates, the Wahhabis account for from two to ten percent of all Russian Muslims. Their share is especially high among Muslims in Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Stavropol Territory, as well as among novice Muslims (in the latter case it reaches 50 to 60 percent. Wahhabism is a fundamentalist religious movement in Sunna Islam based on social organizations in the form of small communities embodying the idea of fraternity, equality and justice. It has a strong ideological potential capable to mobilize individual social groups (unemployed young people and students). One of the central places in the ideological platform of Wahhabism is non-recognition of any power deviating from the Sharia law. Characterizing North Caucasian Wahhabism, A. Yarlykapov writes: "Extremism of the North Caucasian Wahhabites is an important and complex problem. It can hardly be solved through negotiations, inasmuch as Wahhabi ideology denies the possibility of talking with infidels. The state based on human laws should, in their view, be destroyed. The world should be dominated and live only by divine laws".
The factors contributing to popularization and distribution of fundamentalism manifest themselves especially clearly in the conditions of a systemic crisis of society. Z. Brzhezinski believes that the general growth of popular discontent caused by a drop in the living standards, feelings of the loss of hope, prospects and confidence in the morrow create prerequisites for the strengthening of social tension. And awareness of vast differences in the material well-being of individual
groups of society evokes natural feelings of envy, indignation and enmity. Z. Brzhezinski thinks that the social basis for the adherents of fundamentalism is formed by the lower sections of society. Among them are simply failures, criminals, and those who have no place in society. Similar view is expressed by M. Kerimov. He names social inequality, poverty and western modernization, which violated the established social and cultural systems of traditions, as the main reasons for the emergence of radical and extremist trend in the North Caucasus. It should be noted that Muslim culture is based on general human values and means and methods of the socio-cultural organization of society and it is in close interaction with other civilizations types. The extremist trends in Islam have nothing to do with its values oriented to bringing people closer together. In modern Russia Islam is regarded as one of the spiritual pillars of society and the state.
Along with the popularization and distribution of religious faiths traditional for Russia - Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism - new forms of religious and spiritual life began to emerge. New religious groups and movements have entrenched themselves in Russia and they should also be investigated. A. Ozhiganova and Y. Filippov characterize them in the following way: "New religions strive to be not only supra-ethnic, thus imitating world religions, but also supra-confessional. However, despite their 'universalism', many new religious movements have either vivid ethnocultural or evident confessional tint".
Thus, in a sociocultural measure religion as a tradition is one of the most important mechanisms of the reproduction and translation of moral standards and spiritual values without which it would be impossible to imagine any culture. Many national states use the sociocultural potential of religion for consolidation of society, its greater stability, and also for legitimization of their political actions.
At present a state policy which does not take into account the religious factor is regarded near-sighted. In the conditions of globalization the preservation of the national and religious way of life traditional for a given country is absolutely necessary for its survival as a unified state.
In modern Russia mutual understanding between different confessions and creation of ways and means to establish respectful and tolerant relations between confessions is a task of great urgency.
"Etnos. Religiya. Politika", Krasnodar, 2012 pp. 50-63.
E. Baboshina,
D.Sc.(Law) - Kizlyar branch of DSU, Kizlyar THE CONFESSIONAL FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (THE REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN AS AN EXAMPLE)
Russia represents a striking instance of poly-ethnic and poly-confessional state, where internal confessional and inter-confessional relations acquired a great significance.
The contemporary model of state-confessional relations has been enriched by the diversity of regional models depending on specificity of confessional space of individual region. In particular, it is characteristic for the republics of the RF with higher political-legal status, where ethnic and confessional belonging had a great influence on formation of the national-regional identity. For instance, it concerns Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia.
In terms of ethnic-confessional relations, Dagestan was always regarded as one of the complicated republics, since representatives of 100 peoples living there, including 32 indigenous peoples, form almost
