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Sergei Karaganov:
People need well-being and freedom. Democracy is one of the means, one of the instruments to ensure this. What Elena said about judiciary is very important. There cannot be anything without it. Russia badly needs a judicial reform. One of the main problems of Russia is that property here has not been legitimate enough up to now. After all, the entire political struggle is waged ultimately for property, because it is not legitimate. In France after the revolution property was redistributed and became legitimate.
We must overcome ourselves and realize that we are the victorious people. We got rid of the Tatar-Mongolian yoke, we conquered the Polish invaders, we conquered the great French army of Napoleon, we conquered the Nazi Wehrmacht of Hitler, and finally we conquered communism. Now what we have to do are just trifles, but they are very important trifles.
"Obshchaya tetrad'. VestnikMoskovskoi shkoly politicheskikh issledovanii, " Moscow, 2012, No 4, pp. 8-21.
Victor Avksentyev,
Ph. D. (Philosophy), Director, Institute of Socioeconomic and Humanitarian Research, Southern Scientific Center, Russian Academy of Sciences REGIONAL SPECIFICS OF MODERN RELIGIOUS "RENAISSANCE" IN THE SOUTH: CONFLICT OR DIALOGUE
The differentiation of the population by confession is a mechanism of the actualization of socio-political risks connected with the religious revival in the South of Russia. The dividing potential of religion for countries and regions with a polyconfessional population
has been demonstrated by conflicts in the "hot spots" from Kosovo to Sudan. There has been no such situation in the South of Russia so far, but certain dangerous prerequisites for it can be observed.
The Orthodox Christian believers in the South of Russia number nearly 17million, Muslims - six million, and Buddhists - 200,000. The people of these faiths have been living in this macroregion for centuries. During the post-Soviet period affiliation to any concrete confession has become an inalienable and significant part of socio-cultural identification. Part of the population adheres to non-traditional faiths in the region. These data are relative, inasmuch as many people are adherents of scientific realism (materialism), or spontaneous materialism, and more often than not identify themselves with one or another confession by ethnic features.
During the post-Soviet period the growth of national identity was accompanied with the revival of religious identity - this cultural pivot of any civilization. Islam was such religion for most mountain peoples, and Orthodox Christianity - for the Russian population. Despite numerous statements of the clergy about the peaceable character of world religions, the actualization of confessional affiliation of the population of the southern macroregion has not only failed to contribute to society's consolidation, but on the contrary exacerbated cultural differences and created the inertia of cultural dissociation.
The main contradiction in relations between the traditional confessions of the South of Russia stems from the role which is played by one or another religion in the life of the population. In the Muslim Northeast Caucasus religion has been persistently introduced and strengthened in the life of society for the past twenty years. A whole generation has grown whose world outlook is based entirely on religion. As a result, a socio-cultural gap between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christians and Buddhists, on the other, has been
widening; it is based on a clash between secular society and society in which religion is playing the main role.
Russia is a country with a considerably large Muslim population. Experts of the National Intelligence Committee of the United States regard it a factor capable to destabilize the situation in a foreseeable future. The role of Islam as an element of modern North Caucasian culture lies in that it is ousting the dominating secular values in Russian society. It is especially typical of the republics of the Northeast Caucasus. By now Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, after the mass exodus of the Russian population, have turned into purely Muslim regions. The absence of intensive intercultural contacts and actions after the outflow of the Russian population from the North Caucasian republics has considerably reduced the possibilities for the full-fledged socialization of local young people. All this creates a ground for the emergence of various stereotypes, phobias and speculations.
The broad introduction of religious practices in the public life of the North Caucasian republics has been accompanied with the lowering of loyalty to the Federal government, ousting of general Russian identity, as well as archaic social relations, and growing violence. The greater influence of religion is directly connected with the increasing number of supporters of radical ideas and regular replenishment of the terrorist underground.
Change of ethno-confessional borders in the South of Russia and interethnic conflicts. During the post-Soviet period the areas of residence of peoples believing in Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Buddhism have changed due to mass migrations in the South of Russia within the bounds of the South and North Caucasian federal areas (about 300 municipal units having more than 5,800 religious organizations). The new configuration of the ethno-confessional
borders in the South of Russia now differs from the ethno-confessional landscape in the early 1990s, let alone one hundred years ago.
The changes of the ethno-confessional landscape of the South of Russia that have occurred during the post-Soviet period can be characterized as an expansion of the area of Islam at the expense of the territories of Orthodox Christianity and Buddhism, which took shape during the past two centuries. These changes are especially clearly seen and felt in rural districts. Such situation is fraught with conflicts, especially those of identity due to a complex socio-cultural and civilizatory identity of people in the South. Contacts between representatives of the two ethnocultural spheres - Islamic and Orthodox Christian - create tension which is manifested in occasional conflicts.
In the territories characterized by noticeable changes of the ethno-confessional composition conflicts flare up much more frequently than in other regions. However, interethnic conflicts have rarely a religious tint. Moreover, local clergymen of different faiths take part jointly in their settlement. The real reasons for these phenomena are hidden in different value orientations and the way of life of migrants and indigenous residents. Ethno-economic rivalry in rural districts also creates a general negative background. Nevertheless, confessional affiliation is an essential identity characteristic, although it is not openly declared by participants in a conflict.
An analysis of interethnic conflicts in this ethnocultural border region (2000 - 2010) has shown that there was no religious component in them. Of much greater significance was a considerable socio-cultural distance between migrants and indigenous residents increased by the loss of common ideology and identity. One of the triggers of conflicts is a violation by migrants of the standards of behavior accepted by the community of indigenous people. Mobilization of the sides of a conflict takes place mainly on the community principle, rarely by the ethnical
one ("locals - representatives of the North Caucasus"). For example, the attitude to migrants was quite clearly expressed in calls for eviction of all natives of the North Caucasus, but Muslims were not mentioned (Salsk, 2006, Stavropol, 2007).
The point is the growing civilizatory distance between people from plains and those from mountains. Religion is a powerful factor of identity, but it is not necessarily expressed in rites; it bolsters up spontaneous ethnocultural dissociation, although is rarely manifested in interethnic conflicts.
Today there are two levels in ethno-confessional relations: at the upper level - a constructive dialogue between representatives of religious confessions, between religious leaders and the authorities; at the lower level - the increasing influence of religion and ethno-confessional dissociation.
Confessional conflicts often develop as intra-confessional, and also between traditional confessions and new religious movements. Intra-confessional conflicts in the South of Russia develop mainly in the Muslim medium. There is a host of contradictions, which are difficult to resolve: between adherents to different mazhabs, sheikhs, ethnic leaders, radicals and law-abiding citizens. The growing number of conflicts raises socio-political tension in society.
Without diminishing the role of the Islamic component of identity in the North Caucasus, it should be noted that most people regard ethnic identity more important. The development of religious institutions of Islam in the region is taking place mainly within the bounds of various ethnic groups. This tendency is not absolute, but it increases religious differences as such. In multinational Dagestan representatives of the titular ethnic groups (Kumyk, Lak, Darghin, Lezghin, Nogai) do not like that most key posts in the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan are held by representatives of just one ethnos -
Avar. On the whole, "traditional" religions could not serve as the basis of identity for most people. Confessional identity only complements ethnic identity.
At the same time neo-Islamic identity (neo-Wahhabi trend) is rapidly spreading in this macroregion. The ideology of radical Islam is popularized with the help of modern social technologies and it answers the sentiments and aspirations of part of North Caucasian young people. This is a radical social protest in the conditions of the absence of real political alternatives.
Young people adhering to radical ideas oppose representatives of "traditional" Islam. But in conflicts among the urban young people the religious subject has not been present as yet.
Results of Islamic renaissance in the North Caucasus. Religious renaissance is taking place in the South of Russia in a heterogeneous form, as a result of which this macroregion has turned into a mosaic or religiousness and secularism. Religious revival is the most active in the Northeast Caucasus. This conclusion is based on the per capita number of Islamic institutions. Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia are now ahead of their own pre-revolutionary indices.
For example, the Republic of Dagestan with a population of 2.9 million has 2,500 mosques, whereas in Rostov region with an Orthodox Christian population of four million there are 260 churches. This means that in Dagestan there is one mosque per one thousand people, whereas in a "Russian" territory in the South one Orthodox Christian church is per10 to 15 thousand people.
The Dagestani rural settlement of Dylym has built a mosque for 5,000 people, whereas its population numbers only 7,500. The most interesting thing is that this is the tenth mosque functioning in the settlement.
The Republic of Dagestan is first among all republics and regions of Russia with Muslim population in the number of people taking hajj. Uzbekistan, which is an independent state with the titular Muslim population ten times bigger that that of Dagestan, sends half as many pilgrims to Mecca annually than Dagestan.
Thus, we have heterogeneous processes of religious revival in the republics of the North Caucasus with the titular Islamic population. A new sociocultural split has emerged in the North Caucasus between societies in which Islam is playing a system-forming role, and societies preserving the secular foundations of life. This forms a serious conflict potential in the ethno-confessional sphere.
In contrast to the Russian Orthodox Church oriented to the high hierarchy of the state and church, Islam has no single center of attraction and is politically dependent on regional leaders.
Factually, from the very beginning of the post-Soviet period the political elite of the North Caucasian republics and leaders of "traditional" Islam have established close and mutually beneficial ties. The "traditional" nature of some or other Muslim spiritual leaders was often determined by their affiliation to official Islamic structures, as well as support they received from the authorities.
A considerable role in the development of the situation in the North Caucasus according to an unfavorable scenario has been played by the Federal authorities who placed stakes on supporting traditional Islam as against radical Islam. As a result of this policy Islamic values and the Islamic way of life have become widely popular in the North Caucasus, and the local population (first and foremost young people) has become susceptible to propaganda of radical ideas.
During the past decade representatives of the authorities and the academic community have time and again pointed to the unfavorable socio-economic situation, particularly unemployment, as one of the
main causes of the tumultuous religious revival. Of course, there is certain connection between the socio-economic situation of the population and the level of religiousness. But it is tied not so much with unemployment as with the non-competitiveness of a considerable part of the able-bodied population (young people, first of all).
The lower quality of labor resources is a general Russian problem. But in the North Caucasus this problem has reached a simply critical level during the post-Soviet period as compared with the general Russian level. This clash with objective social problems and the absence of clear prospects for North Caucasian young people have taken the form of a specific intellectual and psychological reaction: a young people's counter-culture is being created on the basis of Islam. The radical ideas typical of it cannot be properly combined with the actual social agenda. And this situation is used by the ideologists of radical Islam to their advantage.
There is a threat of marginalization of a considerable part of the population of certain regions of Russia which are geostrategically important. One of the alarming signals of the situation is the rapid growth of criminal activity which is due to the fact that the new generation of young people has no positive social program and aims. This can be explained, to a certain degree, by the fact that in the crisis years of the present reforms the North Caucasian population has discarded everything that was not connected with the task of survival. In these conditions there were no incentives for the development of human capital.
The ideologists of radical Islam exploit frustrated expectations of contemporary people. Islamist propaganda creates aesthetically attractive image of religiously motivated violence and has simple aims for perception. No matter how absurd and unfeasible these aims could be, they become an effective instrument, especially when society and
the powers that be have no clear development priorities understood and shared by a majority of the population.
The system-forming role of Islam in the North Caucasian republics is not the chief characteristic of the region, but a result of the spontaneous and directed religious revival. Twenty years ago manifestations of religiousness were not going beyond the personal or family boundaries, and religiousness as such was relatively moderate. Today, manifestations of Islamic culture have become an encouraged practice. However, the scope of the cultural transformations in postSoviet years should not be exaggerated, just as the cultural gap between "religious" and "secular" territories of the South of Russia. First, the population of the republics has largely been urbanized. Secondly, the factor of global cultural exchanges, the growing scope of information and the development of technical means of communications exert a considerable influence. Thirdly, Islamic culture and ideology (including their radical trends) are spread and perceived as a modern intellectual fashion and become part of modern mass culture. Indicative in this respect is that the culture of young people in the North Caucasus (as can be seen from various materials in the Internet) is a fusion of postmodernist and traditional cultures where religion is presented as a modern brand.
The spreading of Islamic radicalism and extremism in the North Caucasus is a result of urbanization, and radicals and extremists themselves are socially mobilized sections of the population with greater opportunities and higher expectations which can be realized for political aims by using means and methods which are not acceptable for illiterate peasants.
Indicative in this respect is the example of the latest Chechen emigration which is concentrated not in Islamic countries, but mostly in Europe. Why do "devout Muslims" feel better in countries dominated
by secular culture? In actual fact, they are more modern than they consider themselves to be. They have a relatively high educational level and quite normally integrate in contemporary society. They will hardly feel better in more religious countries, like, say, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia. Actually, it means that the civilizatory identity of North Caucasian Muslims is dual: they are both Muslims and Europeans in a brad sense of the word simultaneously.
Ways and means to lower the influence of the religious factor on security in the South of Russia. The growing influence of Islam on all spheres of life of North Caucasian society causes concern among representatives of the authorities and the expert community. Sometimes it leads to rejecting all attempts to regulate the religious sphere.
However, to apply prohibitive and restricting measures to traditional Islam would be a crude mistake. The point is to make a clear distinction between the sphere of competence of religion and the secular authorities and revive secular values.
The main tasks of state policy in the sphere of religious relations at the present stage can be formulated as follows:
a) depoliticization of religion, restriction of support of religiousness on the part of the authorities, reduced participation of religious figures in official state functions;
b) protection and strengthening of secular values on a countrywide scale, as well as in the North Caucasus;
c) revival of public interest in science and support of scientific world outlook;
d) placing religious subjects to the periphery of the mass media activity;
In other words, there should be serious changes in the relations between the state and religion. The main aim of these changes is to achieve consolidation of society not on the basis of limiting religious freedom, but
by protecting the values of civil secular society and the state. It is necessary not to allow interference of religious figures of any confession with state affairs, problems of land, the school, or electoral matters.
It is also necessary to renounce the thesis that morality is only connected with religiousness and promulgate secular values more actively.
The reform of the state-confessional relations in the North Caucasus will require considerable resources. The main one of them is the high degree of loyalty of North Caucasian societies. Today many people believe that promotion of secular values in the Islamic societies of the North Caucasus is not possible. Meanwhile, we can offer several theses and arguments which could be used in political and ideological work in the North Caucasian region:
Islam has not become a viable alternative to globalization and modernization. Not a single project (global jihad, mass Islamic resistance, Islamic state structure, etc.) has been realized. An Islamic alternative has never been implemented;
Radical slogans are short-lived, they rapidly vanish in public consciousness. Where is now the stubbornness and perseverance expected from Muslims in the ideology of Islamist projects? Numerous examples all over the world show that people get tired very soon of radical slogans. Not a single ideology, not a single propaganda campaign can force people to forget their vital interests;
Religiousness is exaggerated. The way of life taking shape on the basis of a uniform educational, cultural and political area forms similar attitude to religion and similar characteristics of religious behavior among representatives of the main traditional confessions, thus leveling the conflict potential of religious differences. Russian citizens adhering to traditional confessions (Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Buddhists) are characterized by different levels of religiousness. Their religiousness is confined to the formal (rite) aspect;
Considerable part of the Soviet population (this concerns mainly representatives of middle and older age groups). Prolonged existence within the framework of one state - the U.S.S.R. - exerted considerable influence on Muslim peoples. This can be seen in comparing Islamic communities of the North Caucasus (or Central Asia) with Muslim communities in the Middle East. For instance, in most cases post-Soviet Muslims do not deem it necessary to observe religious rites or religious restrictions or bans regularly.
In our view, it is necessary to affirm secular values in the sphere of education, politics, the mass media, and way of life constantly and consistently. This task seems the most important to us. The point is that cultural factors, in contrast to socio-economic ones, can exert a more profound influence on society's life and determine its development for a long time. In recent years we have come across the very first results of Islamic renaissance in the South of Russia; the mechanism of cultural inertia has been started, and prolonged efforts will be required to overcome the existing situation.
"Problemy sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo i etnopoliticheskogo razvitiya yuzhnogo makroregiona," Rostov-on-Don, 2012, pp. 444-452.
A. Yunusova,
D. Sc. (Hist.), Director, Institute of Ethnopolitical Studies, RAS, Ufa MUSLIMS OF THE URALS-VOLGA AREA IN EARLY 21st CENTURY
The traditional characteristics of Russian Islam have regional specific features according to which one can single out Islam in the North Caucasus, Islam in the Volga area, Islam in the Southern Urals
