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Magomed Daduyev,
Ph. D. (Political sciences),
Said-Hamzat Nunuyev,
Ph. D. (Political Sciences),
Chechen State University
ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS EXRREMISM
AS A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
IN POST-SOVIET SOCIETY
(On Materials of the North Caucasus)
Ethnic and religious factors have a strong influence on the political processes in globalized society. This is due to many reasons: weakness of secular projects for overcoming the crisis, activity of traditionalist organizations during the crisis periods, manifestations of the ethnic elites and clergy in defense of morality and the poor and against the destructive phenomena (drug addiction, corruption, absence of spiritual culture, etc.). This influence is widely used by the extremist ethnic and religious organizations in their unlawful activity.
In the conditions of post-Soviet communities of the North Caucasus the ethnic factors are constantly used by monocratic religious elites for the legitimization of their power and increase of the resources of their influence and power. Ethno-political mobilization is a means for the cohesion of community, suppression of the opposition, and the structuring of the socio-political area. Representational surveillance carried out by teachers of Stavropol State University in 2007 showed that among the reasons for politicization of ethnicity were the worsening of the socio-economic situation in Russia (42.3%), growing unemployment (31.1%), errors in nationalities policy (28.4%), the situation in Chechnya (24.5%), bias against certain peoples (24.1%), migration from abroad (23.4%), activity of local political figures (13.4%), the mass media publications and broadcasts provoking
interethnic tension (11.5%), activity of foreign forces (9.3%), and rise of ethnic self-consciousness (7.2%). In other words, in the mass consciousness of the inhabitants of the North Caucasus the reasons for ethnic conflicts are connected with the general Russian factors of an objective character. At the same time, one-third of all respondents agree with explanations of conflict-provoking type, namely, "the interaction of people of different nationalities is often a source of discontent and misunderstanding," and "the interaction of local inhabitants and migrants is also a source of trouble." Some people admit that they feel tense when they hear an alien speech around.
Among the ethnic factors provoking conflicts in the political processes going on in the North Caucasus are unresolved territorial disputes in the region and the uneven economic development of Russian territories, which entail unemployment and poverty, mass migration from poorer places to more well-to-do cities and districts, acute feeling of injustice, manifestations of ideological ethno-nationalism, ineffective nationalities policy at the general Russian and regional levels, etc. The ethno-political mobilization of the 1990s formed regional regimes in the republics of the North Caucasus, which have an autonomous structure of political opportunities, resources and strategies of action.
Ramazan Abdulatipov characterizes the place of religion in modern Russian society as follows: "Religion (Russian Orthodox Christian, Islam, and others) is today more than simply religion. It is a form of collective ideology, a means of not only spiritual, but also political mobilization, with which a whole number of social groups are trying to fill their ideological vacuum and take a place in political pluralism, in the social system and political processes going on in the country."
Complex and contradictory processes of modernization are going on in the course of the revival of religion, and radical movements emerge which not only exert a negative influence on relations between Slav and non-Slav peoples and the political structures representing them, but also strengthen ethno-nationalism of individual groups and provoke interconfessional conflicts. Social inequality, poverty, and modernization which put to trial traditional political systems - these are the basic reasons determining radical and extremist trends supported by the forces which have already exploded Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Egypt and are now acting in Syria.
Religion has the idea of exclusiveness based on doctrinal differences, which should not exclude the possibility of interconfessional dialogues and cooperation. Confessional culture possesses great peace-keeping potential which can be used for achieving social accord. For ethnic groups forming most Muslims, confessional self-identification is part of group self-identification. This is why it is difficult to separate the ethnic and confessional factors of political processes, and therefore the term "ethno-confessional" is used.
The role of Muslims in post-Soviet society has grown considerably: in 1988 there were 402 mosques functioning in the U.S.S.R., but by January 1, 2002, there were 3,186 Muslim associations registered, 2,734 mosques and 106 Muslim educational institutions registered in the Russian Federation. The population of the North Caucasus has the highest percentage of believing Muslims among the regions of the Russian Federation (42.9%). Most ethnic groups living there are traditionally Islamic: the Avars, Adygs, Balkars, Dargins, Ingush, Chechens, Cabardians, Karachai, Kumyks, Laktsy, Lezghin, and others. The significance of Islam for these peoples is very great. Dagestan has become the center of the revival of Islam in the North
Caucasus. It can be seen by the growing number of mosques in the republic: in 1988 there were 27 mosques functioning there, in 1992 -800, in 2001 - 1,585 (including 917 cathedral mosques), and 1.820 mosque communities.
Islam is used in the North Caucasian republics as the nucleus of political ideology, regional identity, ethnic self-consciousness, etc. The revival of Islamic values has become part and parcel of the political culture of many peoples of the North Caucasus, an important element of their psychology and way of life. Whereas Islam in many western countries is associated only with a threat and extremism, our country has a many-century experience of peaceful coexistence and cooperation of peoples of many faiths. As President V. Putin of the Russian Federation has noted, "we must oppose spirituality and tolerance to barbarity and desire to fan up a conflict of civilizations and religions. Russia has always been a country of original national cultures and faiths. Russia has united, and unites, peoples of Europe and Asia, Orthodox Christianity and Islam, Buddhism and Judaism. It is here that the wealth and spiritual strength of Russia are concentrated."
The confessional factor in the North Caucasus can become a factor dividing the Islamic area, which is coming closer to eastern civilization, and the Orthodox Christian area, which is gradually moving closer to western civilization, along with globalization processes going on in the world. At the same time, this factor could become one of integration of society. It is important to oppose the myth of the global Islamic threat with cooperation of confessions and the struggle against terrorism and extremism. Religions cannot be "good" or "bad" in themselves, but they can be used by political players for destructive purposes.
Sufi trends, which are mystical teachings, have been playing an important role since the first stages of the establishment of Islam in the
North Caucasus. At first, the nakshband version of Sufism became widespread in the region. At the time of the Caucasian war a new trend emerged - Sufism of Kadyr trend. Its founder was the Chechen Kunta Hajji Kishiyev, whose teaching rejected gazavat and was mainly aimed at establishing peace and fraternity. Imam Shamil declared Kunta-Hajji's teaching contradicting the foundations of Islam both in practice and theory and began to persecute him and his followers.
At the end of the 19th century several trends emerged from the two main Sufi fraternities (tariqats) - Nakshband and Kadyr, which had specific features in their rituals. Tariqat Islam is not dogmatic and assimilated local customs. This was why, along with the growing importance of trends adhering to "pure Islam," calls were heard more frequently to refuse from the new elements brought to Islam by Sufism. These differences have sharply worsened the confessional situation and taken the form of clashes between the members of traditionalist fraternities and Islamic radicals called "Wahhabi," after Muhammad ibn-al-Wahhab (many modern radicals do not agree with the name "Wahhabi" and regard it insulting. In scholarly parlance the term "salafism" is used.
The essence of radicalism lies in the absolutization of dogmas and intolerance toward other teachings. The activity of radical groups does not correspond to the principles of Islam and its spirit, and it is mainly widespread among, and supported by, the poorest sections of the population from which forces are recruited to be used in unlawful political aims. The emergence and development of radicalism is also due to the marginal consciousness of the intelligentsia who is losing ground in the conditions of the offensive of globalist values. The radicals orient Muslims to permanent jihad which is understood as a "sacred war." But the Arab word "jihad" is translated as "effort which
is not necessarily directed to war against the infidels." It means the spiritual, intellectual perfection of the individual.
The Salafites proclaim themselves the "defenders of pure Islam," who have the aim of cleansing it from impermissible innovations -Sufism, the cult of saints, returning to the standards of the time of Prophet Mohammed, and establishing the order of Sharia, hence the name "fundamentalism." A favorable social basis has been formed for the penetration of Salafism in the North Caucasus: there were many unemployed young men who were not integrated in community life and were victims to the socio-economic crisis, mountain dwellers who migrated to towns having lost their original roots - it was these elements that comprised the majority of adherents of Salafism. With the traditional non-separation of the spiritual sphere from the secular sphere, struggle between religious trends easily turns into political confrontation. The spreading of fundamentalism is observed after the attempts to westernize local life. The conflict of modernization grows into interconfessional confrontation.
Radicalism becomes an ideological utopia, inasmuch as it rejects any socio-cultural experience of non-Muslim societies, and everything coming from or connected with Islam is exaggerated and excluded from any criticism. Fundamentalism is easily transformed into religious fanaticism and extremism, especially when it is politicized. When the aim of a fundamentalist organization is to create a "true Islamic state" and expand Islam beyond the borders of its traditional area, such Islam is called "political," or "Islamism."
The activity of foreign Islamic organizations has played a great role in the revival of Islam. From the early 1990s they have been engaged in an active missionary work, distribution of religious literature, help to organize the hajj, and financial assistance to local religious organizations. Along with their contribution to the revival of
Islam, they set themselves political aims connected with the interests of the major Islamic states. Besides, the activity of foreign emissaries is directly connected with the penetration of the radical forms of Islam in the North Caucasus.
After perestroika and the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. thousands of young men from the national republics of the North Caucasus have gone to Muslim countries to study at Islamic centers. From Dagestan alone four hundred men went to study at foreign Islamic institutions in 1995. Upon returning many of them began to spread radical ideas, and developed a struggle against traditional Islam with a view to weakening the positions of the local clergy and take their place in society. Some time later, more than two hundred Wahhabi Muslims have arrived to Chechnya from Saudi Arabia.
In the 1990s Dagestan became the Center of "Wahhabism" in the South of Russia. Until the middle of 1999 a number of branches of foreign Islamic organizations, including the international Islamic organization "Salvation" (its headquarters is in Saudi Arabia) worked actively in Dagestan. Apart from it, there were "Saar Foundation," "Taibat al-Hairia," (its headquarters is in the United States), "Ibrahim al-Hairia (its headquarters is in Egypt) also worked in the republic. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Arab Gulf states regarded Dagestan as a springboard for stepping up religious and political influence on the North Caucasus and other Muslim regions of Russia. We mean the destructive activity of the adepts of religious-political Islamism who are striving for forcible seizure of power, replacement of constitutional legislation with the Sharia norms, and the creation of Islamic caliphate.
The ideological and political position of the "Wahhabi" Muslims and also foreign influence have given rise to conflicts in the communities of the North Caucasus. K. Khanbabayev writes that "Wahhabism" in Dagestan has revealed itself as an aggressive and
coercive religious-political trend whose supporters waged an armed struggle with the constitutional system and with rank-and-file believers, who did not share their views and way of life. In 1991-1997 the number of Wahhabi Muslims considerably increased in Dagestan. As K. Khanbabayev noted, there were 2,931 supporters of B. Kebedov, an active Wahhabi leader, in 31 districts, 442 supporters of Ayub Astrakhansky in ten districts, and so on. In eleven districts of Dagestan there were 71.6 percent of the total number of Wahhabi Muslims, or 2,775 men.
The reason for the conflict character of Salafism in the North Caucasus lies, above all, in its aim to abolish all innovations in Islam. The aim of the introduction of unified religious culture contradicts the desire to preserve the achievements of secular civilization and ethnic specificity. This is why Salafism is alien to most Muslims in Dagestan which is inhabited by many peoples adhering to their own traditions and views.
But fundamentalism does not directly leads to radical, extremist actions. Quite often Wahhabi Muslims and their organizations -jamaats - are referred to fundamentalists, opposing traditional Islam to them, which has been the case of Dagestan, Chechnya, and Karachay-Cherkessia. After the clashes between Wahhabi Muslims and traditionalists in Buinak district in 1997, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan addressed the government of the Republic of Dagestan with a demand to ban legislatively aggressive religious trends, and after the clashes between Wahhabi Muslims with the Federal forces in 1999 the People's Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan adopted the law "On Banning Wahhabism and Other Extremist Activity on the Terreitory of the Republic of Dagestan." At the end of September 1999. a special section to fight Wahhabism was organized at the republican Ministry for the Interior.
Wahhabism in Chechnya has not been widespread at first. Wahhabi Muslims suffered defeat in their religious confrontation with the traditional clergy, and by 1996 people simply forgot about them. But some time later ideological differences between the two main trends in Islamic theology - traditionalism and fundamentalism -became more pronounced. Later, between the first and second Chechen wars (1996-1999) the positions of Wahhabi Muslims became stronger, but they were unable to conquer their opponents. Some field commanders (Khattab, A. Barayev, Sh. Basayev, and others) were Wahhabi adherents, others were on the side of Sufi fraternities. Thus dual power emerged for some time.
When bodies of state power in Dagestan began to persecute radically-minded Muslims, their leader B. Kebedov transferred their activity to the territory of Chechnya, where he was supported by adherents of radical Islam. Thanks to them he organized Sharia courts run by Wahhabi Muslims. According to their plans, Chechnya had to become an Islamic state, and secularized Chechen society would be transformed into religious one. This policy reflected the ideological and military-political intervention organized in the North Caucasus by the forces who were striving to wrest the region from Russia.
Such course of events could not have happened if there had been a strong state power and political will in the leadership of our country in the 1990s. As M. Makhkamov notes, "the self-removal of the state from solving the questions connected with the Islamic factor has contributed to the uncontrolled and unhampered interference of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan in the affairs of the Muslim community in Russia. He asserts that within a short period of time a widely ramified network of Muslim radical organizations have been formed in Russia, among them "Al-Igasa al-Islami" ("International Islamic organization of salvation") with the
headquarters in Jidda (Saudi Arabia), "Young People's Organization for building mosques" (the United States), etc.
In 1999 in the South of Russia the activity of armed Wahhabi Muslim groupings, which organized the "Islamic army of the Caucasus" posed a real threat of the country's disintegration. It was only the resolute state opposition to the separatist activity of religious and political radical groups, which were threatening society and the state, that prevented this turn of events. Most Chechens headed by Mufti A. Kadyrov did not support the ideology and practices of Salafism as an alien system undermining the ethno-cultural identity of the people.
The main vector of terrorist activity in the region is directed, first and foremost, against the officials and employees of the law-enforcement agencies and special services, representatives of state power and management, and the Muslim clergy. This trend is seen especially clearly in the activity of the terrorist groupings of young people, such as "Sharia," and "Jennet" (Dagestan), "Yarmuk" (Kabardino-Balkaria), and "Caliphate" (Ingushetia). The number of terrorist acts was rapidly growing especially in 2004-2005. The peak of terrorist activity was reached in Nalchik on October 13-14, 2005; at that time many officials and employees of law-enforcement agencies died, and more than one hundred Islamist militants were killed.
Although in the view of many analysts and representatives of law-enforcement agencies, the effectiveness of the struggle against and opposition to terrorism and religious-political extremism became greater and more efficient, the situation remains very tense today. Despite the death of many leaders of separatism and representatives of the international terrorist networks and mass amnesty, the religious extremist underground has not been destroyed. According to the law-enforcement agencies of the Chechen Republic, nine thousand people
were killed in the fight against Wahhabi extremists, including more than sixty administration heads and representatives of the Muslim clergy.
The use of the positive potential of Islam in modern Russia can definitely contribute to the improvement of the ethno-confessional situation. For this purpose it should be absolutely clearly understood and declared that there is no "Islamic terrorism," but there is "terrorism under cover of Islam," which is using its attributes. This is terrorism from which all citizens, including Muslims, suffer greatly. In May 2004, the Unified Council of spiritual boards of Muslims of Russia to oppose extremism and terrorism was set up. It issued a number of statements expressing resolute support to and readiness to join the efforts of the Russian state in its fight against extremism and terrorism. The spiritual boards of Muslims and the Council of muftis of Russia resolutely denounce terror and extremism which do moral, psychological and material damage to our society.
The risks and threats to national security are contained in the ideology of religious extremism, religious fanaticism and intolerance, and violations of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation. Radical and extremist organizations are using social problems for planting and popularizing archaic ideology, theocratic ideas and ethnic separatism in mass consciousness.
The ideological premises of radical and extremist organizations in the North Caucasus express the doctrine of Salafism. It presupposes strict regimentation of all spheres of life by the Sharia norms, the creation of a world theocratic state (caliphate) by wars ad terrorism. The basic structure of Salafism is "jamaat," a religious community using traditional institutions of rural community and sub-ethnic territorial units. But the organizational centers of radical groupings are far beyond the borders of Russia.
There are reliable and sound conditions in the Russian Federation for the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of all peoples and confessions so that a representative of each ethnos could feel his/her unity not on the ethnic basis, but on the basis of the general Russian civic nation. This task cannot be solved by forcible means alone. It is necessary to set up information and ideological opposition to ethno-confessional extremism. In this aspect it would be useful to resort to inter-ethnic dialogue, create Christian-Muslim cultural and research centers to study ways and mechanisms of establishing tolerant relations between peoples and religions. It would be expedient to evolve tangible recommendations, contributing to a more efficient ethno-confessional policy in the country. Among them, organization of bodies at government level which will foster tolerant attitude of citizens to different cultures and religions; elaboration and implementation of a well-substantiated ethno-political concept of the development of the North Caucasus, with due account of its regional, ethno-confessional and ethno-national interests; education, training and retraining of Muslim clergy; elaboration of study aids and writing and publication of books on cultures and religions of the peoples of the North Caucasus; organization of regular TV and radio programs at federal and republican level describing and reflecting spiritual and cultural forms of the poly-ethnic and poly-confessional North Caucasus; disclosure of the entire ethical and humanistic potential of Islam in the course of its study at religious and secular educational institutions; study of common social orientations of Islam and Christianity; participation of the clergy, both Muslim and Christian, in fighting extremism and religious radicalism; regular intra-confessional and inter-confessional dialogue in Russia.
"Kaspiiskii region: Politika, ekonomika, kultura ", Astrakhan, 2012, No 2, pp. 88-93.
