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Summing up the brief analysis of the current period of Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation, it is significant to stress its creative factor, its target to extension of mutual action in various spheres. The strategic lines are determined by the leadership of Russia and Azerbaijan, while diplomats of both sides not in the last instance have been charged with implementation of the agreed plans. Russia and Azerbaijan are united by common historic destinies of the peoples, by invaluable political, economic and spiritual potential. Life has proved that, like beforehand, Russia needs Azerbaijan as Azerbaijan needs Russia. The relations between two sovereign countries - Russia and Azerbaijan - acquired pragmatic, business like and mutually beneficial characteristic with due account primarily of national interests of each country.
"Kavkaz i globalizatsiya ", Azerbaijan-Shvetsiya, 2010, vyp. 1-2, p. 31-41.
Dina Malysheva,
orientalist
THE INTERNATIONAL-POLITICAL LINKS
OF CENTRAL ASIAN STATES
AND THE ISLAMIC FACTOR
The Russian-soviet civilized tradition -being spread by force before- had privileges in spiritual and cultural spheres of peoples in Central Asia to mid 1990-ss. In many respects owing to it the peoples of the region absorbed many elements of the European civilization in their culture so the Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan were radically notable from their neighbors of the Moslem world by the beginning of 1990-ss having got ahead of them in world outlook, education, political process development and ideology. It isn't accidentally that the new
independent states of Central Asia were included in OSCE - the organization uniting the European countries as if considering their involvement to the European civilization like advance having confirmed it by a decision to charge Kazakhstan with a chairmanship in this organization in 2010.
The USSR dissolution on 8 December of 1991 and signing of Agreement on Commonwealth of Independent States establishing by the presidents of Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine (on 21 December the rest allied republics of the abolished USSR joined CIS after adoption Declaration on purposes and principles of CIS in Alma-Ata -except the Baltic countries and Georgia having become its full member only in 1993) changed cardinally the situation in Central Asia. The negative aspects of people socialization in the region were worsened after attaining independence being "granted from above" after all (the idea of national self-determination wasn't widely supported in Central Asia as one can observe in the Baltic countries or in Transcaucasus). As a result Central Asian countries like many states formed on the fragments of the USSR became closer to the countries of so-called the Third world for many indexes.
The Islamic paradigm wasn't, however, determinative in the development of these states in spite of the fact that Islam made itself known as a political force in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. But a priority was given to a development of relatively secular and modern culture in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and in the rest of Central Asian states and the local authorities resist to a threat of a foreign influence and aggression of Islamists though not always by democratic methods.
From the second half of 1990-ss the Russian-soviet civilized tradition gradually loses its position and the other competing foreign-policy and cultural trends take its place. During 1990-ss Central Asia as though tried a Turkish, Chinese, Korean and other models on itself.
Simultaneously, the countries of the region gradually draw up own economic and political priorities and search the new partners and allies. Having become full participants of CIS the developing countries of Central Asia didn't concentrate their interests on this structure uniting the former soviet republics. They began searching after the other variants to be united both at sub-regional level and in line of establishing partner relations with neighboring countries of the Moslem East.
However, the Russian factor is as usual when forming a foreign policy of Central Asian states. The relations of Russia with them can't be suddenly become purely intergovernmental: they are also tied by joint economic, political and military interests besides the human contacts.
For Russia itself the states of Central Asia are as usual an important and a privileged zone of its geopolitical interests and the national security of Russia depends on its stability. It is interested in maintaining and supporting economic ties with the regions where there are life-and-death communications and communication objects (for example, Baikonur), mineral resources, defense minerals and routes of oil and gas mains. Besides, it's important for Russia to strengthen its strategic positions in Central Asia in order to improve access to China, India, the countries of the Moslem East and to control over the territories being traditionally a sphere of its vital interests. Being a multinational and multi-confessional but a secular state Russia attaches great importance to cherishing a historically established tradition of secularity of a political rule and political regimes -also owing to Russia's presence here (both during imperial and soviet period). The necessity to oppose the radical religious-political movements in Afghanistan and non-governmental forces supporting them in Pakistan
and the Arabian states of the Persian Gulf is strategically important both for Moscow and the states of Central Asia.
In spite of the fact that Russia relaxed its hold in Central Asia from the beginning of XXI it seeks to maintain its position here and to a certain degree Russia prospered in it: a level of the political and economic contacts of each of Central Asian countries with Russia is notably higher a level of intra-regional cooperation. It's probably that the most effective Russian efforts are in the energetic sphere. Russia managed to maintain its leading position in gas industry having persuaded Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to join "its" Caspian Coastal project and postpone their participation in Transcaspian gas consortia (Nabukko) lobbied by EU and USA for some period. Russia reserved the project of the Caspian pipelining consortia transiting the Kazakhstan oil via the Russian territory. At the same time EU and USA and also their regional allies - Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan completed the construction of a large pipeline project Baku-Tbilisi-Jeikhan but it continues to be underloaded yet. One more player, China, appeared on Central Asian scene and it managed to implement a project on construction of a pipeline in Kazakhstan and started on a similar gas project.
The Moslem states of a regional meaning -Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan having specific historical relations with the region have existed for a long time in Central Asia together with Russia and also with China, USA and EU.
1. Turkey historically connected with the Turkic-language countries of the region was traditionally the example of successful functioning of a secular political system with the elements of the western democracy. It's no wonder that a model of the Turkish state having succeeded in carrying out deep political and economic reforms when the Moslems dominated in the local society draws attention of
many followers in Central Asia. Immediately after the USSR dissolution Ankara suggested an idea for the Turkic-language states to be integrated more closely laying special stress on cultural-ethnic community with the Turkic peoples of the region and trying to occupy a leading position at the local market. Whereas this Turkish course with respect to Central Asia was interpreted very favorably in the western capitals Moscow's and Teheran's attitude was more than chilly. One should say that Central Asian states themselves weren't eager to have Turkey as a new Big brother preferring to carry out harmonious policy as far as possible equidistant from the world and regional "centers of force" as only such policy allowed them to deal with own resources freely and develop own identity.
Turkey admits the objective fact that Central Asian republics are interconnected with Russia and depend on it so Turkey doesn't seek to implement large-scale projects here. It considers that it's more preferable to promote less intensive, cultural and educational programs, gradually strengthen influence and enter into personal relations. In 2000-ss Turkey applied again to the idea to establish Commonwealth of the Turkish-language states: it was concerned, in particular, on 18 September 2006 in Antalya at the meeting of the Turkish-language states and peoples where the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan took participation.
The president Nazarbaev was a standby for the Turkic-language people uniting; he noted that the Turkic-language states have the unique possibility to turn from their geographical location and transit potential to advantage in order to be integrated more closely. Nazarbaev also suggested forming Inter-Parliamentary assembly of the Turkic-language states and Union of Aqsaqals where the most famous figures of the Turkic-language world would be included including the former president of Turkey, S. Demirel'. Such position of the Kazakhstan
leader is explained by his desire to play bigger role in the international affairs and also by his interest for supporting these ambitions by the Turkish leadership considering both Kazakhstan's advance in the position as chairman and this Central Asian country to be a member of WTO very favorably.
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan keep up with Kazakhstan. As for the last it pretends for special relations with Turkey. It's known that M. K. Atatyurk -"father of all the Turks" was initially selected as the example by the dead president of Turkmenistan, S. Niyazov. By his instructions the alphabet was translated into the Roman alphabet in its Turkish variant and investments were just from Turkey. The personnel for the young Turkmen state were mainly trained there. However later, the Turkish-Turkmen relations were submitted to serious examination: many Turkish schools and colleges were closed but the Turkish teachers accused of distribution pantyurkizm ideology were deported from the country. Now Turkey tries to restore its influence in Turkmenistan laying special stress on economic interaction - first of all, in the area of energy supply production and transportation. In particular, a visit of the prime-minister of Turkey, R.T. Erdogan, in Ashkhabad 3 October 2008 was aimed at a discussion of a possibility to build a pipeline Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey; the prime-minister also announced that Central Asian trend becomes one of the most privileged in the Turkish foreign policy.
As a whole recognition of the unquestionable successes of the Turkish "secular democracy" which relative stability helped Turkey to occupy its own niche in globalizing world system in 1990-ss doesn't mean at all that this Middle Eastern country has a chance to be a regional leader in Central Asia. In a way Turkey has already lost its years.
During 1990-ss Ankara prepared for be a member of EU and the relations with Central Asian countries weren't privileged for Turkey against this background. But after 2001 Turkey discovered an area where it could realize its ambitions in the region - a struggle against terrorism and religious extremism. It seemed that a Turkish model of "secular Moslem democracy" was well fit in the plans of the American administration according to many parameters to democratize and reconstruct the Middle East and Central Asia. However, some relations cooling with Washington in 2002 - first of all, because of Turkey's dissatisfaction with USA's course for unpublished encouragement for the Kurd irredentism - made corrections in the Turkish regional policy: it became less pro-American and more pro-European. Turkey began positioning itself as a bearer of the European values in Central Asia and as the single secular state in the Moslem world being capable of being "a bridge" between Europe and Central Asia. Turkey took the active efforts to promote energy routes controlled by the western companies. Meanwhile a changeable domestic policy situation in Turkey bothers Turkey in Central Asian area.
It concerns the accession to power of moderate Islamists in Ankara having won the election on the Turkish parliament; their member became president in 2007. The ruling elite in Central Asia couldn't help but become alerted with this fact orienting at a secular development and struggling against their Islamic opposition. To this moment the secular and pro-western Turkey was the model for them to imitate and a guideline to form and develop own statehood. The result of the Turkish political development during the last years shows: a secular pro-western model isn't stable even under a relatively liberal Turk Islam conditions but a balance between the followers of a secular way of a development and moderate Islamists is very fragile. It seems that Turkey's influence in Central Asia will hardly go beyond a
participation in energetic projects where Turkey is assigned a supplementary role - energetic corridor connecting Central Asia and Caucasus with Europe. Turkey itself isn't stable and here there is a threat of a confrontation between a secular state and Islamism weakening the Turkish positions in Central Asia especially taking consideration a fear of the state leaders before Islamism threat.
2. If Turkey's trump card in Central Asia is its secular model then the Islamic Republic Iran (IRI) initially perished hopes for its religious influence distribution in this vast region being considered as Moslem. However, with the lapse of time Teheran had to leave this part of its activity. The authorities of IRI also took into consideration a negative attitude of Central Asian leaders towards the attempts to impose a religious paradigm for their countries and Russia's role supporting a course to establish secular states in Central Asia. Generally Iran's strategy in Central Asia is aimed at position strengthening in zones of its traditional influence and USA's hold relaxing. Teheran acts in the same way in Shiite regions of Afghanistan and Iraq. IRI leadership plays a deep game being at great pains to persuade Central Asian leaders that IRI isn't going to initiate the Islamic revolution in their countries.
Iran pays a special attention to a gas giant of the region -Turkmenistan; though they are in disagreement greatly Iran intends to develop cooperation especially in fuel-energetic sphere. But, it's naturally that a top priority of the Iranian policy is Tajikistan as a state with allied language. Iran tries not only to resist a geopolitical influence of USA on the region of Central Asia but also to take over USA's initiative concerning integration of Central Asia and Afghanistan within the frame of Big Central Asia being projected by USA promoting their own project based in many respects on a community of cultural and historical contacts of the region peoples. So, the meeting of three
presidents -Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan- was a principal moment of M. Akhmadinezhada's visit in the Tajik capital in 2006. The leaders of three states having in many respects a common history, culture and traditions spoke in favor of economic, cultural and social integration as a natural process equitable to the interests of three country peoples. But though the leaders of IRI stake on the affinity of three peoples they consider a close dependence of Tajikistan on Russia but Afghanistan -on USA.
For the present the active convergence of Tajikistan with USA and NATO outlined during the last years didn't tell upon a level of the economic and cultural interaction of this country with Iran. However, taking into consideration the fact that USA strictly controls their partners' activity within the frame of fixed foreign-policy course there is every reason to suppose that in case of the American-Tajik interaction strengthening the connections of Tajikistan with IRI will be relaxed (and on the contrary- if the American-Tajik friendship runs out by some reason the Iran-Tajik contacts will be renewed).
As for the interaction of IRI with Uzbekistan here a religious component of a political system of the Islamic Republic was always a serious limit for more deepened cooperation in the political and cultural spheres.
3. Pakistan's policy in Central Asia isn't so notable for the present; on the one hand, Pakistan tries not to show its interest in natural resources of the region but on the other hand, it tries not to allow strengthening influence of its "eternal rival" - India. Pakistan's politicians try to represent their country as a reliable partner of that Islamic world not supporting the radical political trends of Islam and struggling against them but it means nothing for Central Asia. However, the relationship between Pakistan and Central Asia was somewhat clouded till recently because of the ancient support of
Pakistan's secret services for Taliban's movement. In Central Asia one considered such contacts of some part of Pakistan establishment with Taliby and also a tolerance of the Pakistan authorities to Taliby's presence in provinces of Pakistan being neighboring with Afghanistan to be as a direct threat for the region.
After Taliby's removal from power in Afghanistan Central Asian relations came to normal, however, the distrust to a regional policy of Pakistan has continued. At the same time one can note improvement in relations of Pakistan with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - the states having mostly suffered from the Islamic extremism. In March 2005 visiting Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan the former president of Pakistan P. Musharraf tried to break a barrier of distrust and persuade the authorities of these states that Pakistan together with them is concerned with the problems to secure security in the region. It's possible that just this step the Pakistan leadership took helped Pakistan to join SOC in 2006 - as an observer for the present.
The relations between Pakistan and Uzbekistan became especially close when official Islamabad supported the actions of the president I. Karimov in crushing the riot in May 2005 in Andizhan having been inspired by the Islamist organizations being based in Afghanistan. Information about annihilation of militarized units of the Uzbek-participants of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan having sought shelter in Pakistan province Yuzhny Viziristan in spring 2007 evoke a positive response in Uzbekistan.
4. Afghanistan is a "bridge" between Central and the South Asia according to the American project of Big Central Asia. But practically it makes the West penetration to the natural resources of Central Asia easier; the states of Central Asia put themselves at quite concrete risks under such geopolitical transformation. The assurances of the American administration that Afghanistan is pacified and can participate in both
economic projects and in processes to support a regional security are only a political rhetoric. Khamid's government doesn't even control the country in full. There are no conditions for investments, potential points for increasing and the country survives only for the account of the western donors and permanent injections from the West. Afghanistan itself is a threat because of being a main producer and carrier of the drugs in the world absorbing not only bordering states more deep in the black hole of drug dealing but also the countries having no borders with it - Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey.
In case of situation worsening in Afghanistan this country can be a more serious threat for its near neighbors concerning drug distribution commercially, religious extremism rooting at a large territory and migrant flow being capable of giving Central Asian states a lot of trouble as it is not quite successful.
It would be naively to suppose that the foreign troop presence in Afghanistan being brought within the framework of the operation "Unassailable freedom" under slogans of Ben Laden catching headed by USA and NATO can bring a peace into the region. However, the new American administration in the lead of Barak Obama is going to use infrastructural possibilities of Central Asian countries more actively to ensure their troops in Afghanistan where USA plan to increase their grouping in two times (to 60 thousands). Washington needs a reliable route via the CIS countries to equip this grouping as goods transit is practically impossible from the point of security because of political instability in Pakistan and relation complication between Islamabad and Delhi.
In April 2008 a conception of "transit bridge" was approved via Russia's territory and the countries of Central Asia at the summit NATO in Bucharest in April 2008. The presidents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan invited at the meeting announced about a readiness to
give a transit corridor for the alliance to deliver non-military goods in Afghanistan. Moscow also signed the agreement with NATO to transit non-military goods mainly humanitarian ones, in Afghanistan via the territory of Russia for supporting the International forces in promotion security in Afghanistan. But in the middle of January 2009 the leader of Unified central command of the Armed forces of USA, general D. Petreus, visited the capitals practically of all Central Asian countries. Petreus managed to achieve bilateral agreements on a participation in "Afghan transit" almost with all the states of Central Asia.
The hopes of Central Asian countries for a considerable increase of the American help and investments were strengthened owing to USA's plans for Afghanistan. But there is also anxiety that Washington uses anti-terrorist operation for its military grouping rooting in Central Asia as it had been in 2001. Besides, there is much to say that a struggle against "international terrorism" and drug traffic isn't a main thing for USA in Afghanistan. Here they solve more global problems: establish a control over nuclear Pakistan and India and energetic state of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan because it may give a powerful instrument to control many processes both economic and political in Eurasia.
Afghanistan problem solving can be the only one- to establish integrated, independent and powerful country. It can be achieved by initiating forced modernization and also an active infrastructure restoring being practically annihilated what will promote stability and economic prosperity of Afghanistan. It's also important to enhance the central authorities in the states entering the region of post-soviet Central Asia; it's necessary to fortify borders between them as a means of struggle against transnational criminal syndicates, transnational drug mafia and terrorism in guise of religion.
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As a whole above all things the peoples of Central Asia figure on to change their region in the area for cooperation but not for rivalry. Central Asia itself is the region where independent self-sufficient states are developing trying to be not an object but a subject of the international relations and the different global and regional players acting in Central Asia should understand this factor.
Most probably that maneuvering between the world centers of a force having carried Central Asian ruling elites forward until recently (notorious "multi-vector" policy) as it helped to achieve concrete preferences from the different sources will be upset not least because that geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia is worsened too far now; in its turn it stimulates a struggle within elites in each state.
The external factor is almost determining in a development of economic and political process globalization; it favors stability but simultaneously it can disrupt it.
"Islamsky factor v istorii i sovremennosti", M, 2011, p. 99-108.
