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Irina Zvyagelskaya,
Scholar of the Oriental Studies ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN CENTRAL ASIA
The problem of the relationship between the state and religious institutions in the process of building a national state is quite timely for the newly-independent Central Asian republics. Islam has its own special features in the nomadic and settled parts of the region. As is known, Islamization has been rather superficial among the nomadic peoples, whereas the territory of present Uzbekistan has always had the seats of Islamic lore and well-known Islamic scholars who have been teaching there.
The growing interest in Islam and its traditions is directly connected with a search for national identity and the birth and development of local nationalism. The latter exists in communities united by common culture which have cultural differences with other communities. In the epoch of the U.S.S.R. all republics, including those of Central Asia, had common cultural identity based on Russian culture (along with the preservation and development of local cultures), whereas after gaining independence its place was naturally taken by the culture of the titular ethnos.
Although the emergence of nationalism has certain determining features, nevertheless, nationalism formed in just one region can differ from nationalism in another part of this region. The Russian scholar S. Abashin studying differences and asymmetrical features of nationalism in various parts of Central Asia includes in their common sources "the initial understanding of statehood as 'national,' the description of nation in ethnic terms connected with Soviet Marxist tradition and the "theory of ethnos", special attention to the problem of the national language, interest in historical roots, ancient history, etc. All this makes it possible to qualify Central Asian nationalism in various parts of the
region as ethnonationalism. However, in reality things are not so simple. In the author's view, Uzbek nationalism, due to historical reasons, pays greater attention to the state for which 'linguistic and cultural differences can present a certain threat.' The only instrument of preserving the state is neglect of these differences and at the same time active political assimilation and integration of small groups in one community." In contrast to Uzbek nationalism, Tajik nationalism pays "much greater attention to the language, culture and history, which compensates its low interest in its small and weak state."
In this case ethnonationalism typical of Central Asian nationalism acquires special significance. This type of nationalism entrenches itself in the post-Soviet area due to specific features of historical development. Ethnic nationalism, which has become the principle of the formation of the post-Soviet states, engenders difficulties for other ethnic groups which are unable to become part and parcel of the changing social relations and the cultural paradigm and therefore are doomed to marginalization.
Search for national identity and confirmation of national originality and the right to independent development have led to the growth of religious sentiments and conservative consciousness. The Russian scholar Sergei Panarin wrote : "The area of the first civilization was one of modernization distinguished by freely established social ties, liberal values, individualism, secular views and cosmopolitan samples of culture. The second area was one of tradition distinguished by hereditary social ties, patriarchal values, collectivism, religious views and ethnic and sub-ethnic samples of culture."
Naturally, the first area could not be the source of national originality, rather to the contrary, it preserved universal values, whereas the area of traditions was characterized by mythological consciousness,
a special role of religion and strict observance of rites used as a yardstick of originality.
The retraditionalization of society which was a result of the difficult process of transformation, no less than search for identity, contributed to a greater role of the religious component. Traditional societies are conservative, their conservatism comes out as the system-forming element which unites this society and helps it function. Modernized social groups and the national creative and technical intelligentsia were unable to oppose traditionalism which was regarded in the epoch of crisis as the only reliable alternative to the disintegrating reality.
Close clan-family ties which ensured a definite social comfort and the possibility to survive cannot remain outside contradictions with the tasks of modernization and the creation of modern societies. It should be admitted that in Soviet times the modernization processes proceeded rapidly enough. The emergence of a great number of educated people, new industries and technologies, a relatively high social mobility, the drawing of young people to the new forms of public life, the generally common atheistic sentiments lowering interest in religion to the level of tradition - all this, taken together, contributed to the emergence of profound changes. Suffice it to compare the parts of Central Asian ethnoses which have found themselves on the territory of Afghanistan (Uzbeks and Tajiks), with their fellow-compatriots in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. However, traditional society has not been destroyed. It continued to exist, adapting itself to the new Soviet system.
The entry in a market economy proved rather painful for Central Asian societies. It was due to the fact that market meant much greater uncertainty and risk than the regulated economy of the "socialist period," and also because it proved to be quite specific with warped
forms which underwent the woeful evolution under the impact of clan structure, nepotism and bureaucratic distortions.
In a new pseudo-market medium traditional society preserves the habitual system of values. The accumulated wealth is not reinvested, but is indirectly redistributed between members of the collective in accordance with public demands and ideas (sumptuous feasts, luxurious presents, etc.).
Social uncertainty and a great gap in incomes, new risks and threats to an individual used to living in a paternalist state exert the determining influence on the socio-political situation in the region as a whole and in separate states. They prompt the turning to religion as the only reliable consolation and protection from injustice.
The strengthening of Islam noticeable in all newly-independent states of Central Asia has also been determined by foreign factors. Among them were greater openness to the foreign Moslem world, including wider distribution of religious literature, organization of hajj, the emergence of new rites, and the appearance of various missionaries.
Headscarves become more widespread. Many girls and young women in Moslem scarves can now be seen in the streets of Dushanbe (in Soviet times they went about with heads uncovered).
Education has become a major element of greater public attention to Islam. During the first years of independence the Central Asian population, cut as they had been from the Moslem world, had a rather indiscriminate attitude to the great flow of literature which flooded the region and contained quite a few works written by radical Islamists. There were also grants for education received from abroad. I happened to spend some time in Yemen in the mid-1990s. While visiting Hidramaut, I learned to my surprise that two citizens of Uzbekistan, a country with a very great Islamic tradition, studied at an old madrasah in a medieval town. What could they learn there? Islamic
foundations of Pakistan carried on active work among Tajik refugees in Afghanistan. Children were able to receive a religious education free of charge. Then they came back to Tajikistan and began to preach in accordance with what they had learnt. In 1992-2008 about 2,200 young men from Tajikistan enrolled in various educational institutions in Islamic countries, and only 650 of them were officially sent to study. No surprise that the authorities are cautious to such volunteers.
The appearance of illegal Islamic schools on the territory of Central Asian countries is no less dangerous from the point of view of maintaining social stability. It is practically impossible to control what is taught at such schools.
In the early 1990s Islamic political organizations of a radical type began to appear in Central Asia, and the foreign forces played a no small role in this business. Quite a few religious groups and currents emerged in Uzbekistan during that period (among them "Adolat," "Islom lashkarlari," "Tablih," "Tovba," "Nur" etc.) They functioned mainly in the Ferghana Valley (Namangan and Andizhan). In Tajikistan, the Party of Islamic revival joined the political life of the republic by the 1990s, and it became the main force of the opposition which unleashed a civil war.
The Islamic movement IDU was created in Uzbekistan in 1996. It had the aim to overthrow the existing secular regime by force of arms and establish an Islamic state in the republic. By the late 1990s IDU began to orient itself to using forcible terrorist methods of struggle. IDU retained the features characteristic of the first Islamic organizations of the Ferghana Valley ("Adolat"). Among them were Islamic Salaphite Puritanism and strict observance of all Islamic rules. Secondly, local power should demonstrate to the population the ability of Islamists to eradicate corruption and crime. Thirdly, it should preach
the ideals of social justice and equality. And fourthly, it should strive to create the Islamic regime in the country based on the Sharia law.
Having lost the opportunity to continue their participation in the armed struggle going on in Tajikistan after signing a national truce there, the IDU fighters have moved to the bases in Afghanistan, but repeatedly used Tajik territory for invading Kyrgyzstan and further on Uzbekistan again, where they tried to intensify combat operations.
In 1999 they entered into clashes with the government troops in the south of Kyrgyzstan and in the Surkhan-Darya region of Uzbekistan. On February 19, 1999, IDU fighters carried out a series of explosions in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan.
A new attempt of the IDU fighters to make a breakthrough in Uzbekistan took place in the autumn of 2000; they wanted to battle through to the Ferghana Valley where they hoped to be supported by the local Islamists. There were several clandestine store-houses of arms and ammunition. The attempt of breakthrough failed, but in 2001 a real threat of unfolding large-scale guerilla operations against the central government of Uzbekistan reemerged. The Taliban fighters in Afghanistan who supported IDU have defeated the army group of General Dustum and reached the border with Uzbekistan. Using this success, IDU has set up several training camps of its fighters in northern Afghanistan.
During the operation of the international coalition forces in Afghanistan, the IDU fighters took part in the military hostilities on the Taliban side. Many leaders and fighters of the Taliban and UDU were killed, their bases in Afghanistan and in districts bordering on Central Asia were destroyed, and the remnants of their forces had to move to Pakistan.
The Party of Islamic revival of Tajikistan was organized in 1990. During the civil war it was banned and returned to political activity
after national reconciliation in Tajikistan. The party is taking an active part in election campaigns and puts forward its candidates to legislative and municipal bodies.
Being in opposition, the party can find a common language with the ruling elite. This helps it survive, but narrows down its opposition activity and belittles its attractiveness to young people. There are quite a few pragmatic persons in the leadership of the party. Although remaining Islamists in spirit, they recognize the need for the modernization of the country. They maintain connections with the leading Moslem countries and continue to receive assistance (including financial help) from Islamic foundations, grants, literature and stipends for students at religious schools, but also orient themselves to western countries and develop relations with the OSCE. Moreover, the party gives an example of a political and religious organization of moderate Islamists who are now regarded in the West and in Russia as a counterbalance to the radicals and extremists. The party is now considered as a respectable and responsible partner, which is reflected in the relations of international actors with the regime of E. Rahmon. The Party of Islamic revival hoped to win seven and more seats in the new parliament, however, it is now represented there by only two persons (in all, there are 99 members in the two-chamber parliament of Tajikistan).
The party does not fully answer the hopes of its electorate, and this is why the more impatient and less tolerant younger generation, which did not live through the horrors of the civil war, is ready to fight more resolutely for justice and form an additional reserve for the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir organization. Besides, there are two opposing trends clashing with each other within the party itself, which will have the decisive influence on its future. The desire to modernize the party causes a different reaction among its members and supporters. For a
socially successful part of them it is a pledge to preserve the party on the political scene of Tajikistan, whereas for the older generation and people of traditional views new trends are hardly acceptable.
Hizb ut-Tahrir began to act in the region in the 1990s and its main aim was to establish an Islamic caliphate there. The party declared its adherence to peaceful political methods of struggle and centered attention on propaganda of its ideas and the creation of a ramified organizational infrastructure. The positions and prestige of Hizb ut-Tahrir have gradually been growing in Central Asia against the backdrop of the transformation of IDU into a terrorist organization.
Hiuzb ut-Tahrir al-Islami was created in Palestine in the early 1950s. Its main aim was to fight Zionism, which, naturally, could hardly interest anyone in Central Asia, but the organization changed, although it preserved one of the principal premises of its program, namely, the creation of an Islamic caliphate. At the same time Hizb ut-Tahrir is a transnational party and a community of national organizations weakly connected with one another in their activities. But all of them are united by one ideological and political platform. Hizb ut-Tahrir is a really ideologically party, in contrast to IDU.
The idea of caliphate is not regarded by the party supporters in Central Asia as an exclusively abstract one. The Islamists do not recognize national or clan closeness, they do not need customs barriers or strong governments. For people tired of the rivalry and struggle between various clans, for those who have been deprived of contacts with their kith and kin by state borders, who have lost customary pursuits, the slogan of unified Moslem area could be regarded as a real and desirable alternative. The greater interest of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the political realities of the Middle Eastern region does not deter people in Central Asia. At first Hizb ut-Tahrir was supported by people in
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but recently its influence began to spread to southern regions of Kazakhstan.
In Tajikistan Hizb ut-Tahrir has become a serious rival of the Party of Islamic revival. The former draws new members and promises to help resolve social problems. It relies on young people, intellectuals, and even women, who, due to ideological work among them, can become active propagandists of the party's ideas. Special attention is paid to those studying at Moslem religious schools. Hizb ut-Tahrir is opposed to the very idea of secular power, which should be replaced by caliphate everywhere. It is also against capitalism, democracy, tolerance, a dialogue of cultures, etc. The party has created a patronage network. These networks of a clan character are typical of Central Asia, playing an important role in public and political life. Hizb ut-Tahrir is financed by foreign sponsors, but there are also local sources of its financing. Recently, Hizb ut-Tahrir has frequently been accused of extremism and its activity is now banned in Central Asia.
"Akramiya" is a radical Islamic organization which became widely known in Uzbekistan after the suppression of an uprising in Andizhan, one of the cities in the Ferghana Valley, on May 13-14th, 2005. The uprising was provoked by the arrest of businessmen who were members of "Akramiya". In the view of the Uzbek scholar of Islam B. Babajanov, "Akramiya" came into being in the context of the Islamic renaissance of the late 1980s - early 1990s, which touched all sections of society, including young intellectuals with a higher education from marginal sections. Their spiritual quests and maturing coincided with the time of "perestroika" and the subsequent period of "ideological ferment." It was at that time that the phenomenon of "returning to the religion of our fathers" acquired special features. That time and medium gave birth to "Akramiya" and similar groups. B.
Babajanov describes them as small religious communities in original socio-religious variants.
One can agree with the assertion that "Akramiya" and similar groups fulfill certain socio-religious functions. They are sufficiently well organized as part of the traditional sector and help their members tackle social and economic problems. They are a kind of an alternative to government and state bodies which are not efficient enough in this sphere.
In the view of Russian experts, a new generation of radical Islamic organizations has been formed in Central Asia at present, which are active in popularizing Islamism in the Internet, in recruiting representatives of administrative bodies to these organizations, and in forming local cells of five or six persons to spread the ideas of social equality ("Islamic socialism"), etc.
Representatives of Islamic parties begin to take part in political struggle, using the legal channels of elections. The electoral lists of the parties which took part in the parliamentary elections in December 2007 included members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organization banned in Kyrgyzstan. On the eve of the elections on December 16 in Bishkek and other big cities leaflets were distributed calling for the creation of an Islamic state and support of the party "Erkin Kyrgyzstan" (the second person on the list was the ombudsman Tursunbai Barkir uulu. He has earlier defended Hizb ut-Tahrir, asserting that it rejects violence and does not resort to armed struggle to attain its goals. In his words, the activity of the party was only a form of freedom of speech.
"The Islamists in the northern districts of Kyrgyzstan are represented by people, who have specially been trained in Pakistan, and also by graduates from western institutes and universities. In the south of the republic and in the zone close to the Ferghana Valley there are representatives of radical Uzbek organizations. However, it goes
without saying that both wings of the Islamic movement in Kyrgyzstan can duly respond to financial assistance from third countries which are interested in destabilizing the situation in the country." This was the view of the Kyrgyz political analyst Turat Akimov.
The processes of re-Islamization are quite noticeable. They can lead to a conclusion that Central Asian states are doomed to increasing influence of political Islam and the emergence of new forms of its interaction with secular power. Public opinion polls show that more and more young people, even in the former nomadic communities of Kyrgyzstan, identify themselves first as Moslems and only then as Kyrgyzstan's citizens.
Inasmuch as Islam remains the major factor of national identity, there are no grounds to expect the weakening of its influence on all sides of life. It exerts influence on the implementation of reforms, the choice of the political development way, and ideological orientation. The authorities cannot ignore the fact that the growth of political Islam is a kind of protest against poverty, unemployment, the absence of social guarantees, and also a demonstration of unity. In the conditions of the growing impoverishment of the popular masses, socio-economic inequality, the greater authoritarianism of the powers that be, corruption, and fewer possibilities to express legitimate protest the activities of Islamic groupings are the major means of social protest.
At the same time there are no grounds to think that the Central Asian states are doomed to the emergence of theocratic regimes, and regard their societies as exclusively backward and traditional. First of all, they are different, despite certain affinity of individual elements of their history and culture. The level of modernization (different in different states), the formation of scientific communities, the opportunity to get a good education, including in other countries, industrial and technological development, and the emergence of
political parties and the mass media in opposition should not be ignored either. The problem is that the features of modernization often bear an enclave character far removed from the main part of the rural population, which represents that very area of tradition whose impact on public life is still to be properly assessed.
"Islamsky factor v istorii i sovremennosti", Moscow, 2011, pp. 475-484.
A. Klimenko,
Cand. Sc. (Military Sciences) (IFES RAS) TURKMENISTAN AS A POTENTIAL PARTICIPANT IN SCO AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL ASIA
Turkmenistan borders on Kazakhstan in the North, Uzbekistan in the north and east, and Iran and Afghanistan in the south. It is washed by the Caspian Sea in the west. By its geographical position, humanitarian and economic ties with other Central Asian states and also by having a common border with Iran, Turkmenistan could logically have been a member of the SCO.
There are no exact information and data about the numerical strength of its armed forces or their supply of arms, ammunition and military hardware. The land forces, according to various sources, number about 15,000 men and officers, they are armed with up to 540 tanks, 1,300 armored vehicles, and 520 units of various artillery systems of Soviet make. Coast-guard units are set up. The air forces and anti-aircraft defense units number about 3,000 men and officers. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. Turkmenistan received the biggest Air Force grouping in Central Asia deployed in two large bases - near Ashkhabad and in the city of Mary and having about
