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Koroly Fendler
«The End of North Korea» by Nicholas Eberstadt*
«North Korea's influence on world affairs in the second half of the twentieth century has surely been greater than would have been predicted on the basis of population and economic output alone» says N. Eberstadt, well-known American North-Korea researcher in the introduction of his new book «The End of North Korea», which was published last Autumn (P.3). The book will probably arouse widespread interest not only among scholars and politologists. This relatively short volume analyses the original «state-founding» objectives, unification and foreign economic-trade policy of the North Korean leaders, as well as the overwhelming role of militarization by elaborating a wide range of literature and news documentation.
He describes how all these led to complete bankruptcy in every field - in the development of the economy, in economic relations, and in the unification policy, which was defined as the «national top task». He also describes how political leaders led the country and population into a dead end road, how they pushed development into a straitjacket. The author had a really difficult work especially in the field of the economy, as for lack of Pyongyang's data, he often had to rely on «the partner's side», on «mirror statistics». So his analyses and conclusions are basically concentrated on fields and problems which are also (or may) directly connected with outside partners, to the current international situation, security policy. Of course, special attention is paid to the North Korea's policy of the great powers, especially to that of the USA and to their preparation for the forthcoming times after the present Pyongyang system, which is already the question of the day according to the author and for the preparation of the unification sooner or later.
In the introductory chapter the author shortly describes the political objectives of DPRK leaders (partly by using Kim II-sung's memoirs) and adds his critical view about their possible realisation. He declares that North Korea was not able to realise two fundamental tasks or missions which had been worked for more than fifty years and on which the state had based its legitimity and power. First and the most important task is «the unification of the entire Korean peninsula under an «independent socialist» regime» as an absolute imperative of the state, «for reasons of glory and security alike» (P.4, P.26). The second is «the implementation of a program of sustained socialist growth that would permit the state to amass steady power and allow the populace to enjoy a modicum of prosperity» (P.4).
These two tasks and their failure are analysed in the second and third chapters, and then in the fourth he writes about inter-Korean economic relations as the common vector of the two missions. He introduces the Pyongyang political leader's point of view or «vision» too, as well as their contradictory practices, tactics, the interpretation of which is made even more difficult by the fact that «The North Korean government has, for over fifty years, enshrouded itself in deliberately fashioned mystery» (P.4).
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And it hasn't been unsuccessful, which is proved by the fact that «...contemporary North Korea watchers can and often do arrive at dramatically different conclusions about the meaning and significance of given reports about, or pronouncements by, the DPRK» (P.5, P.28). It is quite understandable that the fifth chapter deals with the perspectives and reality of American-North Korean economic relations. The topics of the final sixth chapter are the prospects and consequences for unification and the policy of the great powers concerned. The author, as I have already mentioned, plugs the final conclusion of his book even into the Introduction: as the DPRK has always been systematically incapable of realising both its fundamental objectives mentioned above and other political and economic plans (although the state has had some tactical success), the system as such has historically lost its sense, and its collapse and disappearance have become the questions of the day.
In order to reach its objective North Korea has always preferred brute military force as it was demonstrated by the Korean War in 1950 - 1953, which proved to be a fatal miscalculation and it almost led to the complete collapse of the regime (it was only saved by Mao Cze-tung and the Chinese «people volunteers»!). We can agree with the author that «North Korea's «unification policy» from the very first was to insist on and prepare for the complete collapse of the ROK...» (P.5) and Pyongyang's own position is that the simple existence of the ROK qualifies as «anti-North confrontation» (P. 16). Not even the North - South relations and agreements of the 80th and 90th could change the viewpoint mentioned above.
From the point of view of unification policy, of the «national strategy» N. Eberstadt divides the last almost fifty years into three periods: gathering strength (1953 - 1962), going for broke (1962 - 1979) and dead end (80th). The first phase coincides with the period of reconstruction after the war, when as the writer aptly remarks «unification policy» .. .was focused domestically - on North Korea itself» (P.30) and when even according to western evaluations North Korea seemed to overtake the South in the economic competition. Possibly, this fact also contributed to that in the second period, especially in the 60th the DPRK foreign policy was quite active (there were some other moments too). Eberstadt points out that at the same time Pyongyang missed the chance to use the one-year chaos in South Korea (1960 -1961) following the overthrown of Rhee Syng-man. Let me make a remark here. In my opinion the Soviet Union and China had important role both in «keeping back» Pyongyang and in ensuring the «leading wind» North Korea's international activity.
The DPRK made a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with both the Soviet Union and China in July 1961). However, from the late 60th the program of «parallel economic and military development» and the forced but out-of-date military build-up soon led to the stagnation and then the decline of economic development and, finally, to latent lasting crisis. And although in the spring and summer of 1972 high level meetings took place for the first time and then a Common Declaration was made by Pyongyang and Seoul,«.. .North Korea's unification strategy was a race against time.» (P.32).
The country's considerable foreign debt and insolvency made her international chances even narrower. At the same time, however, Pyongyang leadership were unwilling to accommodate the new conditions inside and outside the country and
not completely without basis she «...appears to be convinced that programs for economic revival ...would actually pose extreme - possibly mortal - peril to its system» (P.ll).
Later N. Eberstadt discusses Pyongyang's closing up, isolating economic policy and its consequences (agrarian crisis, food crisis, starvation, etc.) from this point of view. He is right when says that in the 90lh «...the pressing problem was now regime survival» (P.38). Let me remark that then the economic crisis was connected to a political one in DPRK. However, the leaders rigidly and consequently refused economic reforms and opening as they refuse them even now (at least on a political-doctrinal level) and they seem to be convinced that the only way out is militarization.
The author does not examine the internal — political and power background, but I agree with his statement: «Credible military menace ...is now at the heart of North Korea's economic strategy ...and of its very strategy for state survival» (P.19). So «...Pyongyang generated a wave of international alarm» (P.39) (nuclear drama of 1993 - 94 and missile crisis, etc.) and «...establishing itself as an ever more menacing international security threat ...to compel its neighbours and enemies to propitiate the DPRK with a constant and swelling stream of financial gifts» (P.19). Eberstadt does not believe that the «Agreed Framework» signed by the USA and DPRK in 1994 solved the nuclear problem since, as the events of recent years, he have proved «...North Korean nuclear problem, ...that problem will continue as long as the North Korean state holds power» (P.135). Even the past one and a half years demonstrate that Pyongyang leaders continue their military-centred internal-, economic- and foreign policy. N. Eberstadt is right when he says: «Without radical economic reform, longterm competition with or confrontation against South Korea would no longer be possible. Radical economic reform, however, would necessary weaken the North Korean leadership's political and ideological control - and might well set forces in motion that would eventually undermine the regime and the system» (P.35).
Analysing the questions of war economy and economic collapse the writer-compares DPRK with other states, for example Germany and Japan, which economically collapsed in the World War 2 and suffered defeat. But North Korea «...is not an economy on a full-pitched war footing» (P.47). And comparing her to other former socialist countries (Vietnam, Mongolia) is disadvantageous for her too. I agree with the author that «...the economic pressures and problems confronting the DPRK's socialist system today appear to have no precise analogy in recent historical experience» (P.68). It is particularly interesting that «...although the pressure on North Korea's politicaleconomy today are acute and still mounting, the DPRK's polity would also appear to be exceptionally well suited to dealing with economic stresses, it now endure» (P.68). In spite of all the negative phenomena and consequences Eberstadt warns us not to misunderstand the situation in North Korea and so «.. .it would seem absolutely essential to start with a better understanding of the performance and limitations of the DPRK economy before it entered into the present period of mounting economic stresses» (P.69). I must to mention that the statement above is one of the most important points in the book, about which we would like to read an author's other study.
In the fourth and shortest chapter, which deals with inter-Korean economic relations, the author doubts the increasing role of trade in the reconciliation of North and South, and this doubt is expressed by the question in the title (Rapprochement through Trade?). He describes the role of foreign trade in the former DDR, Soviet Union and China, saying that Pyongyang leaders have never offered prominent roles to mutually beneficial economic relations, neither with South Korea no with other states, as there were afraid of their impact on internal policy. As long as there is no radical change in the internal and foreign policy of the DPRK. Eberstadt stresses «...it will be unrealistic and unreasonable to expect commerce to serve as a diplomatic vehicle for improving relations between two Koreas» (P.74).
In chapter five the author discusses the questions of «prospects for US - DPRK economic relations» in details and in a many-fielded way. He informs the reader about the US «...sanctions against North Korea» between 1950 and the 1990th and also points out that between the two states «.. .the economic linkages are essentially non-existent» (P.86). We get an overall picture of Washington's food and other aids (between 1994 and early 1999.. .totalled $140 million with another $ 100 million pledged in the pipeline» (P. 169), but this compared to past and present US aids to other countries «...can be described as modest» (P.88). It is in this part that the writer speaks about the foreign trade relations of the DPRK in the last quarter of the century (1970 - 1997). He points out again «...that the regime has maintained an abidingly suspicious, if not actively hostile, posture toward commerce with other countries» (P.97). He also touches upon the role of militarization and weapon in North Korean economic relations and foreign trade. By drawing parallel with the early stage of development of South Korea, Eberstadt points out that«.. .North Korea today appears to be guided by an «aid-maximising» economic strategy» (P.100) and this strategy is supported by different political tricks and some armed provocations. According to the author in spite of expectations we cannot count on any serious of f-set of American and North Korean trade - not even if there are radical political changes. Pyongyang needs to normalise its relations in order to get more aids.
Finally the writer concentrates on the post DPRK era: «Can Korean unification promote stability in North Asia?" (Chapter 6). Looking back on the dividedness of Korea he writes «.. .division of Korea has already reached the limits of its viability» (P. 116), in the forthcoming years we must expect the disappearance of the political system of the DPRK, and the appearance of a unified Korea in international politics. At the same time the collapse of the North Korean system may lead to a crisis between the great powers concerned in the area, and a successful unification may dramatically change the political and military term of power of the area (P.I 17). So, it seems that the five governments concerned (South Korea, USA, Japan, China and Russia) are not interested in the fast unification of the two Koreas at present, they would rather the two Koreas approached each other gradually. In the connection with the Korea policy of the above-mentioned states the author draws our attention to the tragic miscalculations and their possible danger in the Korean peninsula.
In connection with the Northern events to be and/or possibly expected, Eberstadt refers to something quite important (which we are going to refer later:
«In no other modern country has the identity between a state and its ruling family been purposely fused» (P.122). The situation is made even more serious by the fact that«.. .then longer the North Korean state survives, the greater the economic chasm that will separate North and South» and «...growing divergence between the two systems implies greater economic burdens the longer reunification is postponed» (P.128). As a summary the author says: «...there is no strategy that can honestly promise perpetual peace in the Korean peninsula or Northeast Asia» (P.131) and the situation greatly depends on the future events in China and in Russia. And as «...for Northeast Asia, perhaps the most dramatic implications of a successful Korean reunification would be military ...preparing for the post-DPRK era is not only a prudent task but an urgent one» (P. 131 -133) «.. .because a Korean reunification lies is store in the years ahead» (P.139).
Of course, in the given, relatively narrow frames I could not discuss all the important issues. So, by describing the author's point of view about the given topic we wanted to arouse further interest in the readers for both the book and the extremely contradictory North Korean situation.
N. Eberstadt (as even the title of his book shows) considers the situation, policy and perspectives of North Korea quite negative, even though he himself refers to the fact, how differently and in what a contradictory way different watchers evaluate them. In fact, among South Korean and American researches a wide range of opinions exists about the issues dealt in the book. For example, Prof. Jo Eun-ho points out that «...the possibility that Pyongyang may alter its policy toward South Korea in order to preserve the existence of its own system is greater than ever» (Jo Eun-ho. North Korean External Economic Policy // East Asian Survey. - Summer 1999, P.113). Bruce Cumings emphasises «...a North Korean collapse, has not occurred, and will not occur and it should not» (Cumings B. Current History. - December 1999, P. 408). And Prof. Robert A. Scalapino asks: «Who desired either a collapsed DPRK, with the horrendous costs to the ROK and others, or a nuclear DPRK?» (Asian Survey, Vol. XXIX, № 1. - January -February 1999, P.9).
Even the above mentioned examples prove that N. Eberstadt by elaborating extensive and overall literature analyses a really current issue. However some of his statements and conclusions may seem disputable, for example the negative judgement of the role of foreign trade. Some others, like the question of militarization need to be complemented. So, in the realisation of the first two «missions», in the survival of the separative North Korean state a third mission was also at least as important as the previous two, the fact that the Soviet Union/ Russia and China have needed a «buffer state», a «bridgehead» on the peninsula.
And finally, the fourth and today probably the only mission of the North Korean system, which has a dominant role against the other three: to ensure the continuity of the rule of the Kim dynasty. Everything is subordinated, submitted to that objective in internal and foreign policy, as well as in the social and economic-political field. It defines primarily the role of militarisation, the military-political tactics of the leaders. Besides the «...methodical export of strategic insecurity» (P.22) militarization originally and mainly serves as the upkeeping force of inner tension and dictatorship. The main obstacle in the way of any real economic or political reform or opening is the rule of the Kim-clan. In China or Vietnam there
has not been any attempt to establish such a dynasty! But I must mention that in spite of all this, in my opinion on the one hand there are significant reserves for survival, and on the other hand the rule of the military elite cannot ensure the survival of Kim Jong-il's system on the long way. Unfortunately, N. Eberstadt does not go into details when speaking about the internal social, economic and other factors. One reason for this can be the limited length of his book.
In connection of the analysis of the North Korean situation a «methodological problem» also arises: is it all right to compare the development and the situation of the DPRK only with those of the former East-European socialist countries? According to the writer of this article, in spite of some general (mainly political) common features, it can be questioned (doubted) if the DPRK and the former East-European socialist countries can be typologically or structurally identical, not to mention the «socialist» type of the North-Korean society, state, economy etc. North Korea can be evaluated and characterised, first of all, if it is compared to its own past — the same way as researches (and politicians) do it in the case of South Korea, regardless of their views.
Finally, N. Eberstadt offers a clear analysis of the North Korea policy of the big powers concerned (first of all, USA), and their standpoints in connection with reunification. I would like to make some remarks and add some «logical consequences» here. «The export of insecurity» tactics of Pyongyang leaders «gets hold of» the attention and forces of South Korea, Japan etc. and given reason for the military presence of the USA (and of the big powers in general). A «quite», «peaceful» North co-operating with the South or the reunited Korea would make the presence of American military forces unnecessary in Korea (and in the whole area).
The reunification of Germany did not question the NATO membership and commitment of the FRG. Nevertheless, the Korean question, has been an «underground stream» in American and international politics, which can burst sometimes as a cold spring, and sometimes as a hot geyser. Each of four great powers takes North Korea for the «sick patient» of East Asia, but here and now we may ask the question of classical history of diplomacy: do they do this as a doctor or as a heir?!
As a summary I can say that N. Eberstadt's new book offers well established analyses to several current questions in connection with Korea, it brings up even more theoretical and practical political questions and this is one of its main virtue: it makes you think.
К. Фендлер. «Конец Северной Кореи» Николая Эберштадта
В рецензии К. Фендлера дан подробный анализ вышедшей в 1999 г. монографии известного американского исследователя-политолога Н. Эберштадта «Конец Северной Кореи», посвященной современному состоянию и дальнейшим перспективам северокорейского режима. Критический подход к монографии и собственные убеждения рецензента позволяют читателю получить полное представление не только о труде Н. Эберштадта, но и о сущности самой проблемы.
