CC BY
35THE DPRK'S NUCLEAR ISSUE: VIEWS FROM BEIJING, PYONGYANG AND SEOUL
Mher Sahakyan
China-DPRKEconomic Relations
China's government, as headed by President Xi Jinping, has deepened China-DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or North Korea) economic relations. The main aim of China's leadership in domestic Chinese affairs is to improve the economic situation in China's entire regions. One of the new ideologies of China is the Chinese Dream, (^H^, Zhongguo meng), which aims to create better living conditions for all Chinese citizens. From the perspective of Beijing, it is necessary to develop economic ties between China's northeastern regions and the DPRK for the development of those regions.
The website of Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) lists 172 Chinese firms with direct investments in North Korea in 2013. Among them, 59 are registered in Liaoning, including 4 in Dalian city, and 60 in Jilin. In a March 2012 report, the Open Source Center (OSC) of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) listed 351 foreign firms with direct investments in North Korea; the largest number, 205, came from China, distantly followed by Japan, with 15 firms [1, p. 31].
In 2005 China accounted for more than five hundred thousand tons of cross-border food aid to Pyongyang, and some US $1.5 billion in bilateral trade with North Korea. Despite Chinese opposition to the nuclear tests, those numbers increased after the first nuclear test in 2006; by 2008 China's trade with North Korea was some US $2.8 billion (73% of Pyongyang's total trade for that year). While numbers dipped a bit in 2009 because of UN sanctions following North Korea's second nuclear test in 2009, Sino-North Korean trade increased to US $3.5 billion in 2010 and has only risen since [2].
* PhD Candidate, School of International Relations, Nanjing University, China.
The trade between DPRK and China grew at an annual average rate of 18.2 percent from US $488 million dollars to US $5.93 billion-between 2000 and 2012. Even in 2013 when relations cooled due to DPRK's third nuclear test, bilateral trade increased by 10 percent compared to the previous year to reach US $6.5 billion [9, p. 31].
In terms of types of goods traded, major items exported to China from North Korea include primary products (natural resources and agricultural/marine products), such as coal, iron ore, cement, and fish. Major items that North Korea imports from China include petroleum, capital goods such as machinery and electrical devices, grains, and meat [3].
By developing China-DPRK economic cooperation, Beijing develops its regions neighboring to the DPRK; simultaneously it plays an important role on maintaining economic stability in the DPRK. Consequently, China is North Korea's number-one source of both aid and trade.
What do Chinese People Think about the DPRK?
Contributions of the Chinese researchers show that the opinions of China's researchers are divided on this issue. One segment of Chinese researchers believes that the DPRK is not China's friend and that its behavior and nuclear arsenal is a threat to Chinese security.
As Ex-deputy editor of Study Times, the journal of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China Deng Yuwen wrote, "North Korea's third nuclear test is a good moment for China to re-evaluate its longstanding alliance with the Kim dynasty. For several reasons, Beijing should give up on Pyongyang and press for the reunification of the Korean peninsula... Bringing about the peninsula's unification would help undermine the strategic alliance between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul; ease the geopolitical pressure on China from northeast Asia; and be helpful to the resolution of the Taiwan question."1 In turn, Chinese scholar Dong Xiangrong mentioned, "For a time, the Sino-North Korean alliance lacked a centripetal force. From China's perspective, although the government shows restraint in voicing such thoughts, there are still some voices in China calling for the end of the military alliance relationship with North Korea. The main arguments are as follows: first, China
1 Deng Yuwen, "China should Abandon North Korea," Financial Times, 27 February 2013. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9e2f68b2-7c5c-11e2-99f0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GGyjwV7j
might be dragged into a new war because of North Korea's provocations through its nuclear and war brinkmanship, which may disturb the peaceful development; 7 second, a 'war backyard' means less in today's military conflicts; third, foreign aid to North Korea has become an economic burden and China gets no appreciation from the latter; last, China's image is hurt by its 'axis of evil' ally" [4, p. 245].
The second segment of Chinese researchers believes that the DPRK is a buffer between China and Japan and between Chinese and US troops that are based in Japan and the ROK (Republic of Korea or South Korea) and that China must help the DPRK for this reason.
The Chinese scholar Shi Yinhong believes, "China would like to maintain the DPRK as a 'strategic buffer zone,' or at least it would prefer not to have a hostile and troublesome DPRK on its border China must not allow the denuclearization process and its own role in this process to seriously damage China-DPRK relations, which would make China a loser in a major geopolitical game-even if the DPRK were by some 'miracle' really denuclearized. To Beijing, the best solution to the North Korean nuclear problem is peaceful denuclearization, in such a way as to avoid losing its relationship with the DPRK or creating a highly unstable or even chaotic situation in its neighbor across the Yalu River" [5].
In turn, the second segment of Chinese researchers can be further divided into two groups. The first group believes that China should help the people of the DPRK because of the longstanding Sino-Korean relationship, but representatives of this group like to add that the Chinese do not like the Kim dynasty. The second group of this segment of Chinese researchers believes that the DPRK is China's strategic partner, as evidenced by the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1961, and that China must continue to help the DPRK maintain its political system.
The Chinese scholars Fang Xiu-yu and Xin Hua believe, "The relations between China and the Korean Peninsula can be summarized into a single Chinese proverb: interdependence as close as the relationship between mouth and teeth. For China, the Korean Peninsula is a highly valuable geopolitical asset that directly influences or even shapes China's national security... The metropolitan area of Beijing and Tianjin, the Chinese core of politics and economy, is only separated from the Korean Peninsula by the narrow water stretch of the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Sea.
Therefore, China is very susceptible to any minor change or adjustment of the situation on the Korean Peninsula" [6].
Table 1
China's Voting Record on United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to DPRK
Affirmative Abstain Against
1695 (2006)
1718 (2006)
1874 (2009)
1928 (2010)
1985 (2011)
2087 (2013)
2094 (2013)
Total 7 0 0
The View from Pyongyang
What does the DPRK really want? Is there any need to further complicate the situation? What does the DPRK want to prove? It appears that Pyongyang finally decided to build its nuclear weapons after the Gulf War to deter the US from possible military action against it. Would the US have struck Iraq if Saddam had deployed his nuclear arsenal, or would Russia have organized a referendum in the Crimea if Ukraine had kept its nuclear warheads after the collapse of the Soviet Union?
It appears, Pyongyang has the same view as General Sundarji of the Indian Army. He similarly argued that "One principal lesson of the Gulf War is that, if a state intends to fight the United States, it should avoid doing so until and unless it possesses nuclear weapons" [7].
Soon after the NATO launched the air attack on Libya, North Korea announced that the Libyan crisis is teaching the international community a grave lesson. The Western coaxed Libya into demilitarization by the plausibility of "guaranteeing security" and "improving relationship", and then used the weapon to eliminate the regime. North Korea's "Songun" ideology of a powerful military was "proper in a thousand ways" and the only guarantor of peace on the Korean Peninsula [8].
The second reason for the DPRK's decision to build a nuclear arsenal may be the following argument of Dong Xiangrong: "From North Korea's perspective, is that North Korea views China's assurance of security protection grows increasingly uncertain. To North Korea, China is no longer trustworthy. North Korea worries that China may subjectively be unwilling, or objectively incapable, to maintain its treaty obligations to defend North Korea" [4, p. 247].
The DPRK's calculations are clear. It wants to maintain its political regime by the help of nuclear deterrence. The other question is whether nuclear weapons are the best choice for deterrence? The results of its nuclear tests are sanctions, which may destroy the DPRK's economy; in this case, a nuclear arsenal cannot help, just as it failed to help the Soviet Union. Some analysts believe that Kim Jong Un excluded and then executed the second-highest ranking political figure in the DPRK, Jang Song Theak, because he had opposed the launch of the long-range rocket and the third nuclear test.
Perhaps Jang Song Theak thought that because of the nuclear test, the UNSC would adopt new sanctions, and China would stop helping the DPRK with its economic hardship. As a result, the DPRK's economy would crash, which would be a real threat to the regime.
Korean scholar Dong Wook Won mentioned, "After the Jang's execution there were two main viewpoints in Chinese media. The pessimistic view was that Jang was a Pro China figure in the DPRK, and his purge was a result of a decision by the DPRK's leadership to eliminate 'the China factor' in DPRK, so Jang's execution would adversely affect the future of the bilateral relationship. Optimistic view was that the DPRK-China relationship is an intimate one that can be described as that between 'the lips and the teeth', and if the DPRK cannot be protected by China-its only benefactor - then the regime would collapse upon American intervention. On the day after Jang was arrested, the agreement on the construction of the highway and railroad linking Sinuiju, Pyongyang and Kaesong was concluded, and the DPRK have sent signals to their Chinese counterparts that their bilateral economic cooperation will continue" [9, p. 35].
The Chinese scholar Dong Xiangrong has an interesting opinion regarding China's relations with the DPRK and ROK, and their attitude on China's behavior. He mentioned, "The dilemma of China's peninsular diplomacy was mainly caused
by the ambiguity of its foreign strategy. Ally or not, partner or not, any move by China angers one of the two parties on the Peninsula" [4, p. 244-245].
Generally, I believe that the DPRK's byungjin line, which aims at the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and its economy, is impossible because the UNSC sanctions de facto blocked the DPRK's opportunity to develop economic and trade ties with other countries. The best choice for the DPRK is to implement China's style of economic reforms and destroy its nuclear arsenal. This roadmap would provide an opportunity for the DPRK to improve its economy and return to the international community.
What Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev told Kennedy at the height of the Cuban missile crisis could also prove relevant to the DPRK-US confrontation: "Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the end of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it. And then it will be necessary to cut that knot." [10].
The View from Seoul
It appears that China and the ROK have the same goals in the Korean Peninsula: to maintain stability and to control the DPRK's aggressive and unpredictable behavior, which can quickly escalate tensions in the Peninsula.
According to American scholar Graham Allison, "South Korea preferred a non -nuclear North Korea, but not at the price of threatening war on the peninsula. South Korea was also fearful that rapid collapse of the North Korean regime would create unacceptable financial burdens for South Korean." [14].
The Obama administration has maintained the "strategic patience" approach to deal with the issue of North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) [17]. As ROK scholar Edward Kwon mentioned, "The strategic patience approach is a 'passive aggressive' mixture consisting of both engagement and pressure [17, p. 492]."
In describing US policy regarding the DPRK nuclear issue, ROK scholar Tae-Ho Kang mentioned, "Washington's policies toward DPRK had failed, because this failing grade applies equally to the 'strategic patience' approach adopted by Obama during his first term. North Korea beefed up its nuclear capabilities more in those years than
during any other period. Even so, the administration has yet to change policy approaches in its second term. On the eve of that second term, North Korea announced the prospect of 'all-out Armageddon', conducting a nuclear test and announcing a state of war on the Korean Peninsula. Washington evaporated, leaving only UN sanctions and the prospect of military reprisals. The North Korean nuclear issue became more serious ever, and at the same time was completely forgotten" [18, pp. 58-59].
It is worth mentioning that South Korea and the US signed a new joint military strategy, "Tailored Deterrence Strategy against North Korean Nuclear and other WMD Threats," on October 2, 2013. The strategy proposes a strategic framework for how the US and South Korea are to manage the North Korean nuclear threat and WMD during an armistice and in wartime. US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel reaffirmed the United States' firm commitment to use the nuclear umbrella, conventional strikes, and missile defense to fend off North Korean nuclear threats to South Korea [17, p. 497]. In this regard American scholar Donald Fuller mentioned, "The US will defend Japan and South Korea. While DPRK could cause a war by accident, no one wants refugees to come streaming into South Korea or China. Certainly China would not welcome such an egress in its direction. Unless the Great Leader is crazy, DPRK would be a hole in the ground, were it to start something. It would be desirable, however that the trajectory of their missiles was more accurate. The direction of their missiles can detour into Japanese waters or, conceivably, even onto the Japanese mainland" [15].
A segment of ROK society believes that nuclear weapons would repair the status quo with the DPRK.
As Edvard Kwon stated, "Although the United States has confirmed its strong commitment to defend South Korea with its extended deterrence and nuclear umbrella commitment, Seoul should do more to withstand any threat of nuclear attack from the North. Many South Koreans are skeptical of the effectiveness of US extended deterrence. Their most serious concern is whether the United States would defend South Korea unless the US mainland was targeted by North Korean nuclear ICBMs. In response, some conservative South Korean politicians argue that Seoul should develop its own nuclear weapons. However, the United States and other regional powers would not accept such a drastic option" [17, p. 488].
Because of the nuclear arms race, which was begun by Pyongyang in the Far East, the main vulnerable country is the ROK. The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) remains the main economic bridge for the divided Korean Peninsula. Regarding inter-Korean relations, it is important to mention citizen contact, as well the framework of the family reunion policy. After the UNSC sanctions, it was difficult to develop inter-Korean economic relations, but the main problem underlying this issue is that the ROK has established a clear prerequisite that further development of inter-Korean relations can occur only if there are solutions regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Following a temporary suspension of operations in the KIC in 2013 inter-Korean trade fell by 42 percent compared to the previous year to US $1.15 billion, about one-sixth the amount of North Korea-China trade [9, pp. 31-32].
ROK position on the DPRK's nuclear issue well summarized by ROK scholars John Kun Choi and Jong-Yun Bae, "Broad consensus exists in South Korea on three indisputable matters of the nation's interests regarding its policies toward Pyongyang: intolerance of an operational North Korean nuclear capability, the desirability of resolving the nuclear issue in a peaceful and diplomatic manner, and maintaining a proactive stance in dealing with crisis [19, p. 61].
Conclusion
The following question arises: Why did China vote affirmatively for the UNSC sanctions against a so-called ally, the DPRK, while continuing to strengthen economic ties with the country, as the DPRK instigated a nuclear arms race in the Far East?
In the UNSC, China voted affirmatively for the economic and military sanctions that were imposed against the DPRK. It proved once again that the main role of a responsible power is to maintain stability and peace, halting the proliferation of WMDs, even if doing so is against the interests of its ally. China is disappointed because Seoul and Tokyo can follow Pyongyang's suit and create their own nuclear arsenals. These possible developments would change the balance of power in the Far East. It appears that China is quite disappointed by the fact that nuclear weapon technologies are being disseminated into neighboring states, because this fact can stand as a reason for a possible nuclear arms race in Far East.
During the Korean War (1950-1953), China was also keen about keeping the US troops far from its eastern borders. It seemed that China must be interested in changing the DPRK's regime, but Beijing could not allow an unstable situation in the DPRK, which would cause thousands of refugees to flee from the DPRK to China. Thus, China has invested interest in the DPRK's stability. For this reason, China continues to help the DPRK to develop its economy, and China-DPRK economic cooperation continues to grow [21].
China invests in the DPRK's economy to maintain stability. From Beijing's perspective, if China does not continue to help the DPRK, the US may attempt to fill the vacuum, and the DPRK would move to the US camp or unite with the ROK. I believe that China voted affirmatively for heavy UNSC sanctions against the DPRK, before China could calculate future developments and find new ways to improve China-DPRK economic relations. The result of these calculations gave an opportunity to China, with the help of the UNSC-imposed sanctions, to eliminate other players in the DPRK's economy, to take control of the DPRK market (24 million people), to obtain permission from DPRK officials to operate the DPRK's rich mines, and to use the DPRK's cheap labor force. In return, the DPRK can receive Chinese investments and maintain stability. It is important to note that in China-DPRK relations; communism is no longer the main unifying factor.
It is worth mentioning, that China maintains good relations with the DPRK and the ROK; thus, China has served as a mediator between the two sides, strengthening its role as a responsible and important player in modern international relations.
The ROK, on the one hand wants to maintain stable situation in the Korean Peninsula by cooperating with China and for this goal it uses economic tools, but on the other hand it gives the green light to the US to maintain troops in ROK territory, as its leaders see the US as its protector in the event of a DPRK attack.
ROK society appears to have begun discussions about the possibility of its own nuclear arsenal. These discussions must stand as a signal to the UNSC that it must attempt to find new ways to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
Aagust 2016
References
1. Mathieu Duchatel and Phillip Shell, China's Policy on North Korea, Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament, SIPRI, Policy Paper 40, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013.
2. Gregory J. Moore, "Beijing's Problem with an Operationally Nuclear North Korea," in North Korean Nuclear Operationally: Regional Security and Nonproliferation, Edited by Gregory J. Moore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, pp. 77-103.
3. Kim Jin Moo, "North Korea's Reliance on China and China's Influence on North Korea," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 23, #2, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2011, pp. 257-271.
4. Dong Xiangrong, "China's Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 25, # 2, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2013, pp. 243255.
5. Shi Yinhong, "China and the North Korean Nuclear Issue: Competing Interests and Persistent Policy Dilemmas," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 21, #1, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2009, pp. 33-47.
6. FangXiu-yu andXn Hua, "China-U.S. Relations and the Security of the Korean Peninsula," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 25, #3, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2013, pp. 351-367.
7. John Baylis, "From Arms Control to Counterproliferation," in Strategy in the Contemporary World, Edited by John Baylis et al, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 220-229.
8. Teng Jianqun, "A Brief Assessment of Global Nuclear Posture in 2011," in Global Nuclear Posture Review: 2011/2012, Beijing, China Institute of International Studies, Current Affairs Press, 2012, pp. 27-48.
9. Dong Wook Won, "Will the Jang Execution Affect Beijing's Economic Ties with Pyongyang?" in Dark and Mysterious: How Kim Jong Un is Reforming North Korea, Global Asia, Volume 9, #1, Spring 2014, pp. 30-37.
10. Robert Jervis, "Getting to Yes with Iran," in Iran and Bomb 2: A New Hope, Edited by Gideon Rose, Foreign Affairs, The Council on Foreign Relations, 14 January 2014, pp. 42-54.
11. Bonnie Glaser and David Szerlip, "US Allies Respond Japanese, Australian, and South Korean Reactions to China's Military Modernisation," in The Modernisation of the People's Liberation Army and its Repercussions, China Perspective, #2011/4, pp. 17-29.
12. Chung Eun-sook, "Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program: Positions of Countries Involved," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 25, #1, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2013, pp. 1-15.
13. Liu Junbo, "DPRK Nuclear Issue: Retrospect and Prospect," in Global Nuclear Posture Review: 2012/2013, Beijing, China Institute of International Studies, Current Affairs Press, 2013, pp. 175-202.
14. Graham Allison, "North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Bush Administration Failure; China's Opportunity," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 18, #3, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Fall 2006, pp. 7-34.
15. Interview with Donald Fuller, Provost of the American University of Armenia, 29 June 2015.
16. Shi Yinhong, "New Games in Tightly Fixed Structures: North Korea's Volatile Desperation and China's Cornered Strategy," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 23, #3, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2011, pp. 353-368.
17. EdwardKwon, "The U.S.-ROK Alliance in Coping with North Korea's Nuclear Threat," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 26, #4, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, December 2014, pp. 487-503.
18. Tae-Ho Kang, "North Korea Inches toward Negotiations on Its Nuclear Ambitions," in Dark and Mysterious: How Kim Jong Un is Reforming North Korea, Global Asia, Volume 9, # 1, Spring 2014, pp. 58-67.
19. John Kun Choi and Jong-Yun Bae, "The Implications for Seoul of an Operationally Nuclear North Korea," Edited by Gregory J. Moore, North Korean Nuclear Operationality, Jothn Hopkins University Press, 2013, pp. 53-76.
20. Zheng Jiyong, "The 'Conflict-Reconciliation' Cycle on the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese Perspective," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 24, #1, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2012, pp. 123-139.
21. Uhhp UmhmljMU,«Umntfm]^U nnttfpp ^hpmqmnUnttf t, imtf InphmlmU pU?nil», q-tnpnm #4 (49), 2014, t? 16-20:
http://www.noravank.am/arm/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12707
22. Uhhp UmhmljmU, «3^UmummU-"W^Z mUmhumlmU hmpmphpntpjntUUhpp UU^ Uft ^mmdmtf^?ngUhp^ hmümmhpumntü», q-jnpnm #11-12, 2014, t? 38-44: http://noravank.am/arm/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=13069&sphrase_id=51119
