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55ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ
JAPAN AND NEIGHBORS: SOME HISTORICAL PROBLEMS
AND ASPECTS Osmanov E.M.
Osmanov Evgenii Magomedovich - PhD in History, Associate Professor, DEPARTMENT OF THEORY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF ASIA AND AFRICA COUNTRIES, SAINT PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY, SAINT PETERSBURG
Abstract: there has been a noticeable revival of Japanese political activity in recent years: the country is making significant efforts to position itself as an important part of international political relations. Now, it is a key point which determines the place of Japan in the regional security system. So, it is not correct to review modern Japanese political activity in US-Japan context only. Japan demonstrates the creation of a certain national policy, which in some complicated international issues directly related to the Japanese economic interests, is different from the Washington policy. It is domestic economical problems which force Japan to intensify the political contacts with the neighboring countries in the regional security sphere. But there are many points which seriously restrict Japanese regional activity.
The most controversial aspect with China connections is a problem of "military heritage", which includes a large number of different components, such as discussions about the number of victims of the so-called "Nanjing Massacre", a so-called "problem of Japanese politician's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the problem of disposal of Kwantung Army chemical weapons in China. However, the problems in the bilateral relationship are not limited by military past problems only. A key point is a territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands.
The same problems have an impact on Japanese connections with DPRK and Republic of Korea. So, between Pyongyang and Tokyo there are differences over many issues, including the so-called "problem of the colonial past". The Japanese connections with the Republic of Korea are complicated by the controversy about Takeshima islands. South Korea has a similar to PRC and the position about distortion and concealment of hot-button issues concerning Koreans historical problems in Japanese textbooks.
Thus, having serious friction with all neighboring countries Japan must make serious efforts to ensure its own security.
Keywords: regional security, territorial dispute, Japan, historical background.
The end of the "cold war" and the collapse of the bipolar world order in the 80-90's years of the last century had a negative impact on Japan, which for the first time in its post-war history has faced number of challenges related to its security. The Japanese political passivity of the 70-80's years was compensated by the rapid economic development. But today this mechanism, due to a number of external and internal reasons, does not work properly. The adaptation of Japan to a new political reality after the "cold war" was held quite painfully, because during the years of political and military alliance with the US, it has largely lost the skills of political interaction with other countries. In addition, the current Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, (Jap.
^fa) seriously limits the
Japanese possibilities for geopolitical maneuvering. It is these circumstances which explain imbalance and partly duality of Japanese regional policy and Japan's inability to develop a unique system of its own security with accounts of various factors. Consequently, today there is no single point of view on the Japanese foreign policy among the Russian researchers. A number of experts consider Japan's policy in the
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security field inert and reactive (Chugrov 2010). Others argue that Japan is a great power, but the realization of its potential is limited by external circumstances [19]. Anyway, even in Japan there is no common opinion about a country's place in the world and region. A lack of specific problems and ambiguity in the official foreign policy of the country is a clear evidence of such situation.
Despite the marked points, there has been a noticeable revival of Japanese political activity in recent years: the country is making significant efforts to position itself as an important part of international political relations. On the one hand, to achieve this goal Japan seeks to increase its own weight in the regional security system by showing signs of independence. But on the other hand, since Japan does not intend (at least in the short term) to seriously revise the basic stages of military-political alliance with the US, which guarantee the military security of Japan, such independence is extremely relative. This fact does not allow the neighboring countries to perceive Japan as a sovereign state, which is able to carry out its political line without coordination with Washington. It is a key point which determines the place of Japan in the regional security system.
However, today Japan demonstrates the creation of a certain national policy, which in some complicated international issues directly related to the Japanese economic interests, is different from the US policy. As examples of such policy we can note an existence of the Japanese own opinion in the Arab-Israeli confrontation, the support of the ethnic Japanese in Latin America, the friendly relations with the regime in Iran, etc. The evidence of this is the increasingly used in the Japanese press and in the speeches such terms as "country's interest" -"kokueki" (S and "kuni no rieki" (S © ill^), the use of which, due to the nature of the post-war Japanese political caution, was privately restricted. Moreover, today many Japanese politicians are recalling a so-called "Nixon shock" of 1972, when US President unexpectedly for Tokyo visited China and reached an agreement with the Chinese government to establish diplomatic relations (officially established in 1979). It was a bolt from the blue for Japan which continues to follow a pre-existing US course to support Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China. Today, there is concern in Japanese political groups that for its own sake United States once again can "blow" Japan. So it is extremely reckless to plan Japanese political course exclusively based on the Washington's view.
Some confirmation of that can be seen in the materials of annually published by Japanese Foreign Ministry so-called "Blue Book", which represents an official Japanese foreign policy course and goals. So, if traditionally in these books a goal to maintain "stability in international politics" was promulgated as one of the fundamental principles of Japanese policy in ensuring national security, since 1996 we have been able to permanently see an idea that the goal of Japan is to "make diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and security". "The task of Japan in 2012 was already formulated as "... taking into account the international situation and the problems of security of East Asia, Japan will pursue such policy of regional security, which is based on principles of strengthening the Japan-US strategic partnership. Essential points of that policy are constructing stable ties with neighboring Asian countries, the expansion of economic diplomacy and dialogue with international organizations" [11]. Thus, it is clear that Japan desires to enhance its political presence in the region not only in the frames of treaty with US.
In Japan, the concept of regional security is traditionally associated with the concept of national security, which is defined as "the ability to avoid crises that can impair the basic foundations of the state "[21, 3]. At the same time, the concept of "security" ("andzen" widely used in Japan has no specific semantic content. There are no
clear answers to many questions of security, which directly depends on the tactics of Japan in the region. Among these issues should be named: the problem of determining the place of Japan in the world, Japanese readiness for independent political action, the future character of relations with the United States, etc. Thus, firstly Japan should clearly detect the own priorities, because, as Prime Minister of Japan in 1982-87 years
Yasuhiro Nakasone (^^ifi^A) rightly pointed out "if we do not understand ourselves, we can easily lose the path we walk along"[22, 23].
It is domestic economical problems which force Japan to intensify the political contacts with the neighboring countries in the regional security sphere. Even today Japan has not completely solved economical problems which emerged after the collapse of the so-called "Bubble economy" ("Baburu keizai" in the early 90's. A relatively stable
period of 2002-2007 years, so-called "prosperity Izanami" ("Izanami Keiko" was replaced by another recession caused by the global crisis of 2008-2010.
Today it is clear that due to China's economic growth, Japan has lost a leader position in the regional economy. In 2010 first time in post war history the Chinese GDP exceeded the Japanese one. Undoubtedly, this fact, coupled with a huge national debt, which now amounts to almost 200% of GDP, is painfully perceived in Japan, which holds a second place in the world economy after USA since 1968 [33, 292]. The Japanese politicians understand that economical potential of China in many ways surpasses the capabilities of Japan. The favorable demographic situation in China, the problem of "ageing of the nation" and the low birth rate in Japan, as well as availability of natural resources deposits in China and the lack of them in Japan are key features of such situation.
Another important factor of increasing Japanese efforts to take an active part in solving regional problems is the events of March 2011 in Fukushima. This tragedy has demonstrated a vulnerability of the country to such natural and man-made disasters. The disaster that flings the Japanese society into discussion about the future of nuclear energy has sharply outlined the importance of own energetic security. The significance of the energetic security was firstly realized in Japan during the oil crisis of 1973, after which Japan began to carry out a policy of diversification of energy suppliers and making efforts to develop alternative energy sources. In addition, Japan cannot ignore such common problems for the region, as nuclear proliferation, sea piracy, illegal migration, drug trafficking and other issues that require joint efforts.
The creation of its own security policy course has been influenced by a number of geographical, historical and ethnic factors. The main are the relative homogeneity and isolation of Japanese society, embodied in the formula of "one nation - one heart" ("ikkoku -isshin" — S —') and peculiar for Japanese nationalistic ideas.
In the regional security model organization Japan tries to use a traditional principle of loyalty to the suzerain, which was embodied in postulation that "nobody can serve two masters". It is important to note, that this formula lies in the base of alliance with USA.
Another important feature is the using of the characteristic for the Eastern societies collectivist principle of "linking roots" ("nemavashi" ft®L), which allows to achieve a full compromise between all the parties without public opened discussions. But removing possible friction between the various groups and fractions, this principle deprives Japan of mobility, i.e. a possibility of quick response to the situation. Its negative side is most clearly manifested in the economy, but it is also noticeable in the political sphere too.
Thus, all the noticed features allow us to understand why the Japanese concepts of national security are mostly passive and are realized on a "situational reflection and adaptation" [1, 42], base and do not contain any new elements.
Obviously, the most attractive model for Japan is renewing a version of the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine". The essence of that policy is a balance between relying on the USA in security policy and realization of its own moderate foreign policy line, which is based solely on Japanese economical interests. At the same time, the debate about whether the Japanese activity must be restricted by the Asian region or it must have a global dimension, still continues.
In January of 1996 the former Prime Minister Hashimoto said in the parliament: "...the Japanese-American relations are the most important bilateral relationship not only for Japan but also for the whole world ... and they are the cornerstone of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world too"(Hashimoto Ryutaro 1996). Less than three months
after this statement the "Declaration of the Japan-US strategic partnership in the XXI century" was signed (Japan-US Joint Declaration for the 21th Century
B^Iti^©^) and "Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation" were revised. These steps have allowed extending the sphere of the Japan-US security system for the entire Asia Pacific region. At the same time, as it was noted noted by G. Arin, military and political relations have ceased to be in the nature of Japan's unconditional subordination to USA. They are acquiring (though not yet purchased) full partnership treaties with the same strategic installations [2, 345].
Beside the economical and political component, Japan makes a serious effort now to gradual strengthening its military status in regional relations. A barrier to this process is the Article 9 of the Constitution, which reads: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized" [18, 532].
Despite some changes in the doctrine of national security of the 90-s (Russia ceased to be considered a major threat in Japan and its place is taken by North Korea and China), the structure of "self-defense forces" did not change. Moreover, the process of expanding their tasks and so-called "zones of responsibility" has begun. So, in 1996 the zone of responsibility of the Japanese-American treaty was exceeding the bounds of 1000-mile border, spreading virtually in the entire Asia-Pacific region. The local contingents of "self-defense forces" are acting in the UN peacekeeping operations in several countries in the Middle East. The USA plays the important role in expanding the powers of "self-defense forces". They want Japan to change the status of its own military organization in favor of increasing the elements of an offensive character in order to Japan could not only give a technical assistance and financial support, but could participate directly in US military operations.
It is clear that for the sake of union security, the presence of US troops in Japan will be progressively reduced. Of course, the decrease in their numbers will be offset by using the latest advances in military and military-technical sphere.
There was a meeting of the Advisory Committee of Safety in 2006 with participation of the Director of the Office of National Defense of Japan Nukaga Fukushiro Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. A result of it was an agreement to reduce the US direct military presence in Japan by 2014 and a claim to increase the role of "self-defense forces" in peacekeeping operations in the Asia-Pacific region. It is a main reason to revise the Article 9. The main instrument for it is the term "sovereignty" which also includes the right to defend its own territory. Since in the present situation the Japan defense from external attack lies on the USA shoulders, it appears that the sovereign - the people of Japan (Article 1 of the Constitution) does not have it to the full extent.
In 2005 a new constitution project was offered. According to this project the 9th article was revised in the following way: "The Japanese people will never resort to war or threat of the use of force to resolve international conflicts" [24, 81]. According to the opinion of LDP commission which was headed by Yoshiro Mori «Self-Defense Forces" should be
renamed in "Army of Japan Self-Defense", which, in addition to ensuring the country's security, will be able to "perform a variety tasks within the international cooperation [24, 81]". In this case, the former head of the legal office Akiyama OsamufAlft noted that: "... the Constitution does not prohibit an international contribution made by the self-defense forces" [37, 21].
In fact, Japan needed the revision of this article only as a legal position as it was urged by the United States. Today Japan has a significant military power. The total number of sea, air and land Self Defense Forces is 255.5 thousand soldiers and officers [4, 21]. Self
Defense Forces are one of the most well-armed and well-equipped armies in the world, and even though their funding is about 1% of Japan's GDP (in 2010 fiscal year this amounted to 54.5 billion U.S. dollars [23, 48], this amount is comparable to the military budgets of France (59.3 billion), Germany (45.2 billion) and Russia (58.7 billion dollars).
Gradual removal of restrictions in the legal status of Self Defense Force is already underway. In January 2009 on the base of Department of National Defense ("Boeiytyo" the Ministry of Defense of Japan ("Boeiysho" was created. In 2010 a
defense policy was partially revised. In fact, Japan has long violated the Constitution, and now there is a question about the design of the de jure situation, there is a de facto standard [24, 85]. Removing legal restrictions in Self Defense Forces status will allow Japan to greatly facilitate their use outside the country.
In this case, Self Defense Force peacekeepers must become a guide of the economical interests of Japan in the world, providing the country's natural resources and energetic security. The clearest example of such position is the work of Self Defense Forces troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. By participating in the recovery works Self Defense Forces are making efforts to create a favorable image of Japan, which provides Japanese direct access to the resources of the Middle East.
Thus, the current situation shows two related trends in the Japanese foreign policy. Firstly, it is a progressive acquisition of certain autonomy of Japan within the union with the United States, and secondly - a "creeping" globalization of Japan on a global level, which is lead by Self Defense Forces, as well as by cultural and financial diplomacy.
The current concept of regional security has possible alternatives. The best known is the model proposed by Hashimoto Ryutaro. It is actively lobbied by nationalist circles. Its idea can shortly be explained as the principle: "Japan must become a normal nation", i.e. a country with nuclear weapons. The focus of the apologists of the concept is the "traditional" idea of the uniqueness of Japan and its culture which is opposed to Western values. The supporters of moderate nationalism, a prominent representative of whom is Nakasone Yasuhiro, slightly modified this concept. They do not want to disintegrate the convenient alliance with the US, but they insist on a revision of Article 9 with a view of extending and increasing the Japanese military capabilities.
Another model which is attractive for the Japanese business groups is a modernized version of the concept of Asia-centrism that Japan tried to practically realize during the Second World War. Today, proponents of the theory believe that Japan should focus on creating such regional structures, which are based on the principle of comparative advantage of Asian people and give no place for the West. There are three different variants for realization of this concept. The first of them gives a regional leadership solely in Japanese hands. According to the second variant, this leadership can be shared with China and in the third - the leadership is shared with the countries of ASEAN, so, it will be possible to compensate the increased Chinese influence.
Despite the fact that today these projects seem utopian, in certain circumstances they can be practically realized. The ongoing transformation of the Japanese world role clearly indicates the gradual and systematic enhancement of its policy in regional relations, including security aspects. However, in contrast to other regions, where Japan did not compromise itself in a historical perspective and where its policy is based on the formation of a positive image (Latin America, the Middle East, Africa), its actions in East Asia face a number of difficulties, which should be considered in detail.
All the concepts of national security mentioned above give the main role to Japan's cooperation with the East and South-East Asia. This cooperation can help Japan in a containment of China, in mitigation of the prevailing anti-Japanese sentiment in the region, in increasing its influence, etc. Despite following in the footsteps of US policy, Japan takes certain steps, which are different from the Washington position. It is especially evident in its relations with China, where the emphasis on the thesis of "cautious education" runs counter to the US policy of direct containment. The same can be said about the relations with the DPRK.
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Revising problems of regional security, it is necessary to take into account the strategic regional Japanese goals, which are considerably different from the officially declared position. So, when officially speaking about relieving the international tension, Japan, however, is interested in preserving the confrontation that was formed in the region in the post-war period.
Making the positions of China, Russia and the US closer is not beneficial for Japan because the containment policy between the countries allows Japan to construct bilateral relations freely and gives a good opportunity to receive benefits from the so-called "divide and rule" principle which is common in US policy.
"If China continues the construction and modernization of its military power at the current pace, the balance of power in East Asia will be changed and will bring with it instability and uncertainty in the region" [10, 65], was said in Tokyo. Formulated more than 15 years ago, this theory is quite popular in Japan now. Tokyo is closely monitoring China's military program and seeks ways to limit its activity by talks about possible region's destabilization which is aggravated by the existing military ambitions of Beijing.
Also Japan does not want a real union of the Korean peninsula, due to the fact that in addition to economical risk, it will not allow Tokyo to use the "Korean threat" to empower "Self Defense Forces."
The increasing activity of Japan in the discussions of regional security problems was caused by the certain China-US rapprochement as well as by the adoption in 1997 "The Japan-US defense cooperation guidelines", which greatly expanded the authority of Japan in the region.
East Asia has its own specific traits. Today the Asia-Pacific region is not as explosive as the Middle East, but, nevertheless, there are certain factors of tension and instability here, which Japan must take into account. In international relations there are differences of the political and ideological character along with serious territorial disputes that could, under certain circumstances, grow into armed conflicts.
Washington has made great efforts to develop a coordinated with Tokyo "China policy", the base of which is the political course aimed at the entry of China into the global political and economic system in accordance with the American rules of the game. Undoubtedly, the main goal of such policy is formation of greater predictability and controllability of Beijing. However, there are some differences in the common approach declared by the United States and Japan. A political side has a great importance for Washington whereas economic interests are essential for Tokyo. Also, there is a difference in such an aspect as how to implement the common US-Japan approach. In contradiction to quite aggressive and often coming into open confrontation with China United States policy, Japan tries to realize the policy called by Joseph Nye "soft power policy" [20, 5-6], which is based on avoiding any action that may be deemed in China as interference in its internal affairs. Moreover, Tokyo usually gives no serious response to Beijing's attempts to interfere in the internal Japanese affairs. Japanese officials explain such an attitude by its own desire to "not annoy" China, because Japan is allied to China, which is a close neighbor of Japan. Tokyo tries to keep up a relationship with Beijing as if there is no Japan-US alliance. In bilateral negotiations with the PRC Japan emphasizes the importance of the bilateral partnership in ensuring region stability. It was clearly noticeable during the negotiations on the conclusion of Joint Declaration ("Nittyu kyodo sengen" 0 in 1998 and joint press statement on
strengthening the "Japan-China cooperation forward XXI Century".
However, the political dialogue between Tokyo and Beijing lost its own dynamic character in the late 90's and almost completely interrupted in 2001. Such the Tokyo policy is perceived by Beijing as a sign of Japanese weakness. Due to different bilateral problems, in recent years a PRC political pressure on Japan increasingly grows. Grueling confrontation, which peaked in 2005, still remains.
The most controversial aspect is a problem of "military heritage", which includes a large number of different components. The PRC leadership gives to the anti-Japanese rhetoric one
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of the main places in the state ideology. Under this policy, the Chinese media regularly publishes historical materials about the crimes of Japan during the war occupation. It is common to organize meetings with war's eyewitnesses and mass visits to the prominent anti-Japanese struggle sites.
Discussions about the number of victims of the so-called "Nanjing Massacre" (Nanjing djiken of 1937 took important role in this PRC-Japan controversy. The public
attention to this problem was brought in 1998 by release of the book written by Iris Chang, American author of Chinese origin which is named "The rape of Nanking: the forgotten holocaust of World War II" in which the author claims that the Japanese were responsible for the deaths of more than 300,000 civilians, including at least 80,000 women (Iris Chang 1998: 89). Under the influence of this work, the US Senate passed a resolution calling the Japanese government for official apologizing of China. However, there was no official response from Japan. Moreover, in the Japanese interpretation the "Nanjing Incident" often means only a battle for Nanking, and does not include the killing of civilians. Masaaki Tanaka claims that "the number of victims, mentioned by the Iris Chang, is not real, because the Nanjing population at the time of arriving Japanese troops was no more than 200000" [35, 36]. Today Tanaka statement is an official opinion of Japan. The Japanese side argued the Chinese claimed number of victims. The Chinese authorities are blamed of historical falsification, because such mass massacre, according to the Japanese position, undoubtedly evokes protests from the League of Nations, the United States, Britain, France and other countries [13, 74]. Also it is important to note that Iris Chang's book was banned for publication in Japan till 2007.
One of the most important problems in Japanese-Chinese political relations is also a so-called "problem of Japanese politician's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (i#S)". Because these visits are estimated by China as equivalent to pay honors to holocaust perpetrators, they often cause an interruption of bilateral official visits. The Prime Minister of Japan in 2001-06 Koizumi Junichiro /J^M —№has took the annual visit to Yasukuni since 2001. Of course such practice has an extremely negative impact on Japan-China connections. So, Koizumi visit to Yasukuni in 2004 led to the disruption of the project to build Beijing - Shanghai high-speed rail line. After the visit of the temple in 2006, Koizumi said that his visits are nothing, but paying homage to the Japanese and he feels that in no case new wars should start. Also he expressed surprise that he was given such labels as "warlord" and "lover of war".
China's position on this issue was finally formulated in 2005, and since then it has not changed. For China the problem of Yasukuni Shrine visits is not only a dialogue issue between China and Japan. Will Japan be able to keep promises made to China in the normalization of Chinese-Japanese diplomatic relations, revise its own military historical background and follow the path of peaceful development? - are the key points of PRC position. "We have said on many occasions that the Yasukuni Shrine worshiped the class A war criminals in the World War II, whose hands were stained with the blood of the people in China and other Asian countries. What does it mean to visit such a venue that worships the class A war criminals? The Japanese leaders should give a serious thought over this question, over how to treat the sentiments of the people in Asia and other victimized countries, over the consensus forged at and the political foundation for the normalization of China-Japan relations and over the significant question of building China-Japan relations on the basis of "take history as a mirror and look forward to the future", which has been reaffirmed by the two countries on many occasions" [9].
After Koizumi resigned in 2006, his successor - Abe Shinzo^^WH (prime minister in 2006-07) refused the practice of Yasukuni Shrine visits, and has only sent bonsai as a symbolic gift to the temple. In 2009, Aso Taro# (prime minister in 2008-09), said
that "the more China will resist the temple visits, the stronger desire to visit it will be" [3]. In 2010, the shrine was visited by 66 MPs from different parties. Kan Naoto^^A (Prime
Minister from June 2010 to August 2011), in June 2010 stated refrain from the temple visits during their term of office. In April 2011, the LDP chairman Tanigaki Sadakadzu^S^— visited the Yasukuni Shrine. This visit caused widespread protests in several Asian countries, including China, Korea and Singapore. As result, in August 2011 Kan Naoto said that Japan regrets about the damage and suffering caused to Asian people. "During the war, we brought a lot of pain and suffering to many countries, especially to Asia, and we have to think hard about this, as well as to pay respect to the victims and their families" [15]. Thus, the visits of Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine are a litmus test that clearly reflects the dynamics of Sino-Japanese relations in the political field. The PRC leadership has pursued a consistent policy of full recognition of Japan's guilt for the events of the past and insists that the Japanese apologizes should be more clear and unambiguous. Meanwhile, as early as in 1992, the emperor expressed his "deep regret for the suffering" of the Chinese people and in 1993 Hosokawa Morihiro^HJIIfi! (prime minister in 1993-94) publicly acknowledged an act of Japanese aggression against China. In 1995, Murayama Tomiichi ^flil'gfl (prime minister in 1994-96.) confirmed that "the people of China and other Asian countries have been the victim of Japanese aggression and colonialism" [30, 142-143].
The problem of disposal of still remaining Kwantung Army chemical weapons in China also had an important place in bilateral relations. According to the Japanese side data, there are about 700 thousand shells (according to the Chinese - 2 million), 90% of which are in storage in the Jilin province. Wide response in China was caused by the case of August 2003, when more than 40 residents of Qiqihar city were poisoned by the mustard gas left over from the war [30, 146]. A Chinese demand to Japanese authorities to deactivate these weapons causes no adequate response, whereas shell storages are not able to prevent the spread of harmful substances from the rusted shells.
However, the problems in the bilateral relationship are not limited by military past problems only. A key point is a territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Chinese - Diaoyu Islands located in the East China Sea.
In recent years, the number of incidents in the waters of the archipelago, which Japanese ownership has challenged the PRC and Taiwan, dramatically increases. The Japanese central government formally annexed the islands on 14 January 1895, naming them Senkaku, or "Pinnacled Pavilions. Until 70's years of XX century there were no discussions about their territorial jurisdiction. The situation changed when the UN Economic Commission came to the conclusion that rich oil deposits can be found in the archipelago territorial waters. So, in 1971 Taiwan claimed the right to the island and a few months later a similar statement was made by the PRC. In 1978, during the signing of the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty, China took a demonstrative action, concentrating about 140 war ships in the area of the archipelago. During a visit to Tokyo, the actual leader of China from the late 1970-s to the early 1990-s Deng Xiaoping said: "Let it always be like it is now. Japan can own
islands for 20 - 30 years" [8, 172]. Thus the question of ownership of the islands was "freeze" for a while. In the 90-s the territorial dispute emerged once again. A cause of that was the decision of Tokyo in 1996 to introduce a regime of 200-mile exclusive economic zone around Japan. In July 1996 members of the organization named "Association of Japanese youth" ("Nihon seinensha" 0 established a lighthouse on an island in
the archipelago. In response to this decision PRC and Taiwan organized a mass protest and volunteer teams of "defenders of the archipelago" were formed.
In 1999 and 2000 there were other incidents. The reason for one of them was a Chinese claim to destroy the Shinto shrine erected in the archipelago and dedicated to the Japanese died at war. There was no official response from the Tokyo.
Today in Japan dominates the view that the territorial dispute over Senkaku Islands is a part of China's strategy to establish its supremacy in the East China and South China seas. Therefore, a possibility of returning the archipelago to PRC is not planed by Tokyo even in theory. Such territorial conflict can be used in a future Chinese policy as a kind of
"diplomatic trump card" which allows China to put pressure on Tokyo in obtaining concessions from him in those areas that will be of greatest relevance to China.
The Tokyo policy on Taiwan issue also causes a Beijing's serious concern. Despite that according to agreements of 1972 Japan has no official state relations with Taiwan; Tokyo continues to strengthen informal ties with the island. Following the formula of "one China", Japan expanding trade ties with Taiwan, supported its political initiatives, making efforts to include Taiwan in the number of international organizations (WHO). In 2005 the Taiwanese tourists were allowed to be on the Japanese territory without a visa for 90 days. In 2010 after a 30-year interruption, flights Tokyo-Taipei were restored. In January 2012 Japanese Foreign Minister Gemba Koichiro —№ said that "Japan and Taiwan will
consistently develop unofficial relationships" and stressed that Taiwan is an important economic region for Japan.
The expansion of the Japanese Self Defense Forces responsibility zone and the existence of US military bases in Japan also was sensitively perceived in PRC. China tries to compensate it by making efforts to modernize its armed forces with a significant annual increase in their funding [32, 135]. Since the role of the Japanese-American alliance in restricting economical and political power of China is steadily growing, such Chinese politics is fully justified.
It is obvious that the current intractable controversies between the countries are "ticking time bomb" that could explode under certain conditions. Economic ties that are currently holding back both sides of the deteriorating relations are very vulnerable and cannot guarantee the regional stability in the future. We can also assume that the marked problems are still not resolved partly because they are a necessary element in controlling China-Japan relations.
A situation on the Korean peninsula also attracts Japanese attention. Following the USA security doctrine, Japan has to build a relationship with North Korea as with an enemy state, which is a Chinese strategic partner. Of course, this fact seriously complicates Tokyo-Pyongyang relations. Japan is extremely sensitive about North Korea's nuclear program. Tokyo fears that a possible war collision with South Korea may drag the peninsula into war, and this, in turn, will involve in the conflict the United States and Japan, the South Korean military and political allies. Therefore, any North Korea's missile program, including the last launch of an orbit satellite, has oversensitively been perceived in Tokyo.
However, the attitude to North Korea as to an enemy state is useful for Japan because it allows doing the revision of the Constitution and changing the status of Self Defense Forces. Thus, North Korea's ballistic missiles launching in 1993 and 1998 made it possible for Tokyo to adopt a new missile defense program, which is an important part of joint Japanese-US anti-Chinese strategy. Of course, such situation is contrary to the rules of Japanese collective security laws.
Also between Pyongyang and Tokyo there are differences over many issues, including the so-called "problem of the colonial past". So, following the Chinese policy, North Korea's leadership has regularly appeared with the requirements to Japan to apologize and pay compensation for the actions of the Japanese during the peninsula occupation (1910-1945) as well as for the years of non-recognition (1945-1990). In October 2011 the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea - "Rodong Sinmun" noted that for the normalization of relations with Japan, "Japan's rulers need to review its criminal past, bring sincere apologizes to Koreans and pay appropriate compensation" [27]. It should be noted that the sum of compensation, which required by North Korea is quite impressive and is about $ 10 billion. Sometimes Tokyo was ready to pay no more than half of that sum but in the form of official development assistance (ODA) only. However, such Japanese decision caused an extremely negative reaction from the DPRK. It should be added that the typical for the Western scholars view, according to which North Korea is planning its political strategy in relation with Japan, based on exclusively pragmatic goals cannot be entirely correct. Indeed, the North Korean leadership is pleased to receive Japanese help and
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the delay or interruption of this leads to an increase of anti-Japanese propaganda in Korea. But, we also have to consider that anti-Japanese rhetoric is an important component of the North Korea's state ideology and the rejection of this policy is not possible without changing the entire North Korean foreign policy paradigm.
Pyongyang dissatisfaction was expressed by the Japanese proposal at the meeting of the Third Committee of the 66th UN General Assembly in November 2011 to adopt a resolution on human rights violations in North Korea. This case is directly related to one of the cornerstones in the Japan-North Korean relations with the so-called "North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens" ("Rati Mondai" ti&P^M).
This problem includes a number of incidents that occurred from 1977 to 1983, when North Korean security forces abducted 17 Japanese citizens. DPRK leadership recognized facts of such abductions in 2002 for the first time, during Junichiro Koizumi visit to Pyongyang. As a result, five Japanese citizens returned to Japan, but the fate of the rest unfortunately is unknown. Although it's been 11 years since the time when the DPRK leadership recognized facts of such abductions, there are still a lot of unclear points in this story. So, abduction in November 1977 of 13-year-old schoolgirl Megumi Yokota fcC^ causes many questions. Recognizing the abduction fact, Pyongyang handed Megumi remains to Japanese authorities, and said that she had committed a suicide in 1994. However, a genetic test which was done in Japan showed that the returned remains were not authentic.
It seems that the ongoing discussion of the abductions problem in Japan is largely a political matter. This is a rare situation in which Japan is the injured party, and it is reasonable that Tokyo seeks to derive maximum benefit from it.
The Japanese connections with the Republic of Korea are complicated by the controversy about Takeshima islands^^ (Korean - Dokdo ^S)). This problem is much more important than the territorial dispute with China. Now islands are owned by the Republic of Korea but Japan demonstrates a strong desire to receive them, because the islands were officially incorporated into its territory in the 1905. The Supreme Command of the Allied occupation forces (SCAP) in a Directive number 677 of January 29, 1946 took these territories from the Japanese control. However, the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not mention them as territories seized from under the Japanese jurisdiction. Such situation gives Tokyo a theoretical right to demand their return. It is should be added that the day on 22 February 2005 was announced as "Takeshima Day" ("Takeshima no hi" ) in Japan.
Annually on that day there are mass anti-Korean demonstrations on the island which geographically belong to Shimane prefecture. .It is important to note that the situation is almost identical to the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan over the Lesser Kuril Islands and February 7 in Japan is declared "the day of the Northern Territories" ("Hopporyodo no hi" ).
The situation around the Takeshima islands has been escalating since February 2005, when during the press conference in Seoul, Japanese Ambassador Takano Toshiyuki^Sf^T said that "Dokdo - Takeshima is historically and geographically a Japanese territory" [16]. In response, the President of Republic Korea in 2003-08 Roh Moo-hyun (t^^) threatened Japan with a "diplomatic war" and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ban Ki-moon ^7] current Secretary-General of the United Nations, said that for the Dokdo Seoul is willing to take any steps to prevent a serious deterioration of relations with Japan, because it is "a matter of national sovereignty" [25]. Massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in Korea took place, and some private companies announced boycott to Japanese goods. Seoul actions were supported in Pyongyang too.
In February 2008 Japan formulated 10 points which prove its right to the islands [17], and in July of the same year the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan approved the comment on the methodical manual for teachers, in which they were recommended to draw student's attention to the territorial problem. As a result, a large number of joint bilateral activities were canceled and political relations cooled.
44
South Korea has a similar to PRC and the DPRK position about distortion and concealment of hot-button issues concerning Koreans historical problems in Japanese textbooks. Since the problem is one of the major points in the regional relations, it is worth considering more comprehensively.
The dispute began in 1982, when the newspaper "Asahi" reported that Japan's Ministry of Education has required the textbook in which the characters "invasion" ("sinryaku" iS^) applied to the Japanese aggression in China, would be replaced with more neutral characters "to promote the penetration" ("sinsyutsu"^®). In response to the Chinese protest, Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi^P #—made a statement, in which he said: "The Japanese Government and the Japanese people are deeply aware of the fact that the acts of our country in the past caused tremendous suffering and damage to the peoples of Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China... These statements confirm Japan's remorse and determination which I stated above and this recognition has not changed to this day. Recently, however, the Republic of Korea, China, and others have been criticizing some descriptions in Japanese textbooks. From the perspective of building friendship and goodwill with neighboring countries, Japan will pay due attention to these criticism and make corrections to the textbooks [34]. After that the problem of presenting information in Japanese school textbooks during more than 10 years did not seem an essential issue of international political relations.
Another round of conflict began in 1992, when for the first time in the post-war Japanese history the information about the forced relocation of Koreans in Japan ("kyosei renko" ^^JSt) and about the so-called "Comfort women" ("jugun ianfu" for
Japanese troops appeared in textbooks.
Firstly the information about the forced relocation of Koreans was raised in the media of South Korea immediately after the Japanese occupation and Japan was blamed of forced use of the Koreans [36, 116]. At the same time, the marked above characters, which were until the 80-s familiar mainly to specialists, began circulating. Since the late 80-s these expressions have been widely used in the Japanese media. They were clearly linked to the compensation problems of victims of Japanese aggression and have been the subject of debate between the left and right political wing.
The current stage of controversy began in 2001, when a new history textbook for secondary schools was issued by the Society for creation of new history textbooks (fLl ffi^ £ o<5 in the Fusosya publishing house [5, 3]. This textbook
ignored many facts of the Japanese military past, proving the legitimacy of Japanese claims to the disputed territory, praised the imperial system of Japan, etc. The second edition of this textbook in 2005 led to a further manifestation of the anti-Japanese statements in Asian countries. Although the share of the textbook is only 0.04% of all school history textbooks, its appearance has led to serious discussions, which went far beyond the Asia-Pacific region.
As an example, it will be appropriate to mention serious battles inside the Japanese society which took place in 2004. Thus, a section of a 2004 National test for admission to colleges (A^Af^^^ — ff^) contained a question, the correct answer to that said: "During the Second World War there was a process of Koreans resettlement from the occupied Korea territory [29, 52]. In response to this, protests from many organizations, including the National Council for the rescue of the Japanese abducted by DPRK
who noted that: "The
question with such response should be excluded when calculating the final score, because its presence is associated with unreasonable North Korea claims" [28] fell to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
We should add that the information which appeared in the early 90-s in Japanese school textbooks about "comfort women" in 2001 was removed from the textbooks of main publishers, and since 2005 has ceased to be mentioned in all school history textbooks. In this
case, the term "forcible resettlement" (^^iJS^T) was replaced with the more neutral expression "brought accompanied by [the troops]" ("tsuretekorare" S^T^b^).
In 2007, the former Minister of Education of Japan Nakayama Nariaki W said
that he was proud of the Liberal Democratic Party success in that "comfort women" were no longer mentioned in school history textbooks [26]. It should be added that in 2005, he said that was excited by the message that came to him in an e-mail from a Japanese woman studying in Canada in which she wrote that: "Affected Asian women should be proud of the fact that they were the" comfort women"" [7]. Of course, it all gives rise to another wave of tension with Korea and China.
A booklet named "Problematic aspects of Chinese and Korean history textbooks» (n^fe^L^^i-Silitftt) was published by the Center for Policy Research of Japan ( 0 In that booklet the countries neighboring to
Japan were blamed of the specially organized anti-Japanese propaganda.
In 2010, the Japanese Foreign Ministry released the information that "from 600000 Koreans who were in the war years in Japan, only 245 people were brought by force [38]. The rest came on a voluntary basis". In response, the Korean leadership said that "due to unbearable conditions on the peninsula, these people had no choice but to move to Japan," and attempts to distort the historical truth were connected with the Tokyo desire to get archipelago Dokdo [38].
According to South Korea, among other arguments of the history textbooks, such aspects as the territorial problem, the presence of a Japanese outpost Mimana on the Korean peninsula in ancient times, the activity of Japanese pirates, the Korean War of 1592-98 years, the Japanese-Korean relations in the second half of the XIX - early XX century, murder of the Koreans and the Chinese in the time of Tokyo earthquake in 1923, the
Korean assimilation policy and a number of other issues should be reviewed.
***
Thus, having serious friction with all neighboring countries (China, North Korea, South Korea and Russia) Japan must make serious efforts to ensure its own security. Tokyo has to plan its regional policy taking into account all the regional problems and contradictions. Nevertheless, today Japan is not ready to give a well-defined solution of regional problems. In this situation, the only defender of the Japanese interests is the United States. In the past, Japan was used by Washington solely as a financial donor for solving USA problems, and its territory was important for the quartering of US military bases. But now US are seeking ways to shift a part of the burden of Japan's "international and regional responsibility to Tokyo's shoulders. Such USA wishes are the true reason for demanding from Japan to expand the powers of Self Defense Forces, revising 9 Article and activating foreign policy. According to the USA program named "return to Asia" (2010), the Japanese role is to conduct American interests in those countries, where direct connections with the United States would be politically difficult (e.g. India).
However, taking into account a historical Japanese background, there is some possibility that an accretion of Japanese power will lead eventually to the totally different results than expected by US. Today, Japan is a country that does not fully meet the global status quo and the main goal of Japan is to completely restore its own sovereignty.
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