CC BY-NC
36Law and Politics
Правильная ссылка на статью:
Malfait M.M. — The Armenian duduk sounds loud in Artsakh // Право и политика. - 2021. - № 1. DOI: 10.7256/24540706.2021.1.34505 URL: https://nbpublish.com'Hbrary_read_article.php?id=34505
The Armenian duduk sounds loud in Artsakh / Армянский дудук громко звучит в Арцахе
Malfait Milka Marie-Madeleine
Political scientist & attorney-at-law, Moscow State Institute of International relations (MGIMO), DLA Piper UK
LLP, The Brussels Bar.
1050, Бельгия, Bruxelles область, г. Ixelles, ул. Avenue Louise, 163, оф. 2
Статья из рубрики "Актуальный вопрос"
DOI:
10.7256/2454-0706.2021.1.34505
Дата направления статьи в редакцию:
03-12-2020
Дата публикации:
13-01-2021
Аннотация.
В своей истории Арцаху часто приходилось защищаться от внешних угроз неотоманизма. Сегодня это более чем правда. 27 сентября 2020 года армяно-азербайджанский конфликт обострился вокруг спорной территории Нагорного Карабаха, что в переводе с армянского означает Арцах. Это привело к шестинедельной войне, гуманитарной катастрофе, в которой погибло много людей и было уничтожено культурное и религиозное наследие Арцаха. Горный район окружен землей Азербайджана, но заселен армянским народом. В связи с политической новизной этого вопроса, в данной статье автор использовалa аналитический и описательный метод. Результаты показали, что история повторяется в нео-оттоманизме, который представляет угрозу для Арцаха и Армении с момента ее возникновения и по сей день. В последние годы концепция воссоединения с Арменией, а также независимость Арцаха открыли перспективы на будущее. Третьим решением конфликта стало соглашение о прекращении огня от 9 ноября 2020 года, благородно заключенное Россией, чтобы спасти Армению от военного коллапса. Однако это решение является более болезненным, чем статус-кво. Главный вывод заключается в том, что международное сообщество должно быть более бдительным, когда происходит расширение таких угроз, и предотвращать их возникновение.
Ключевые слова: Арцах, Нагорный Карабах, Армения, Азербайджан, история, международное право, неотоманизм, дипломатия, государственное признание, терроризм
The history of resilience
The cultivated country that with its tuff stone mountains gave rise to the Tigris and Euphrates and where the Ark of Noah saved mankind, had to provide throughout its history often resistance against surrounding Muslim peoples. The strong solidarity among their people and their extrovert nature are a result of the physical but also verbal resilience that Armenians have developed in their defense against external threats. The Armenian people
have lived continuously in the Armenian highlands for more than 2800 years [1, p- 13]. Since the fifth century B.C. Armenians lived in Artsakh and until the fourth century it was one of the fifteen provinces of the Armenian kingdom, which was considered a special realm of Tigran the Great. The legend goes that after the Punic Wars, the Phoenician Hannibal of Carthage fled to Armenia and helped the king Ardashes I in building the city of Artaxata, which became the political and religious center of the new Armenian kingdom in 189 B.C. ^ p- 29]. This empire was the first in the world to recognize in the year 301 Christianity, in the
form of the apostolic church, as an official state religion [1, p- 13]. Today, in Artsakh, one can speak of an ethnic conflict with a religious undertone and a political engine that keeps the fire going. The religious tension dates back to the seventh century when the region fell under the Muslim conquest of Persia, and later came under Ottoman rule, that a century ago lead to the reality and tragedy of the Armenian genocide as well as the devastation of the
Christian heritage [1, p- 11],[3, p- 76]. After being ruled by a number of meliks or princes since 1603, Artsakh became part of the Russian Empire under the Gulistan Peace Treaty as a
result of the outcome of the Russian-Persian war in 1813 [4, p- 85]. During the Soviet period J. Stalin's administration gave direction to the situation as it exists today. A Transcaucasian Republic was founded and shortly afterwards it disintegrated into Armenian, Georgian and
Azerbaijani areas [1, p- 12]. In 1923, Nagorno-Karabakh - first promised to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) - was assigned to the Azerbaijan SSR, among others, to appease Turkey. Azerbaijan is an ethnic Turkish nation that is mainly Muslim. The conflict began in February 1988 after the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (N KAR) voted for unification with Armenia and in 1991 declared independence and withdrew from the Azerbaijani SSR [3, p- 76]. The independence was based on a successful nationwide referendum in which the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh defended their right for self-determination [5, p- 48]. During those years, there remained a strong political movement in Yerevan for the reunification of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) with Armenia [1, p' 9-In 1992 the tensions resulted in large-scale military actions. The conflict only ended in 1994, with many civilian casualties, refugees and displaced persons [6, p- 204] and a ceasefire through Russian mediation but without a peace treaty [7, p- 85]. Baku appealed to
fighters from the Afghan mujahedin and Chechen mercenaries [8, p- 10]. History is repeating itself now. Turkish security firms employed Middle Eastern foreign fighters to fight for
Azerbaijan against Armenia This could have global consequences and fuel international terrorism, also in other confrontation-prone areas. Noteworthy is that, shortly afterwards, terrorist attacks happened in Paris, Nice and Vienna 1ЖШ11. Ankara's outspoken support for Baku, according to French President E. Macron is the crossing of the red line-^91. The assumption that among these mercenaries are also members of jihadist armed groups
active in northern Syria, is worrying. According to S. Naryshkin, the head of Russia's foreign security service, Artsakh will become in this way a magnet for jihadist mercenaries and a new launching pad for international terrorist organizations. "We are talking about hundreds
and even thousands of radicals hoping to capitalize on a new Karabakh war" J12!. According to experts, the initiation of this large-scale war can be attributed to Azerbaijan. According to T. De Waal it was highly unlikely that hostilities were launched by the Armenian side, as they were already in possession of the disputed territory because they won the war of the 1990s and were incentivized to normalize the status quo, while for various reasons, Azerbaijan calculated that military action would lead to win something. First of all, there is
the OSCE - that has been monitoring the conflict since 1992[13] - which is today in a leadership crisis that was triggered after Azerbaijan blocked the reappointment of the Frenchman H. Desir who until then held one of the four senior positions. Secondly, there was the political context of the US presidential elections of 2020. Azerbaijan calculated this moment to initiate military action so that this conflict would be placed at the US political
agenda After all, since the ceasefire of 1994 there have been a couple of attempts by Baku to disrupt the status quo through military means.
Neo-ottomanism
After the elimination of IS, there is an Arabic pursuit of the concept of neo-ottomanism t15-
p- 301], to position itself as a regional power in the former Ottoman empire. This is mainly happening in three regions: the Mediterranean, the Levant and the South Caucasus. A non-exhaustive list of examples of 2019-2020:
■ The ambiguous role of Turkey with regards to its membership in military alliances and purchase of arms;
■ The developments in early 2020 - as a result of the EU-Turkey Migration deal of 2016 -whereby Syrian refugees are no longer welcome in Turkey and consequently pushed over the
borders to find shelter on the Greek islands and finally elsewhere in Europe I16!;
■ The transformation of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque, in the summer of 2020;
■ Turkey's support of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war September-November 2020;
■ The call for the establishment of an independent Turkish state of the Cypriot North 117 on 15 November (5 days after the Ceasefire agreement of Nagorno-Karabakh of 10 November) destabilizing generations of peace efforts. It must be noted that this part of the island was - under operation Atilla - invaded by Turkey in 1947 but never recognized by any other nation than Turkey as Turkey's area.
It can be stated that this expansion drift has been destabilizing the region. A region, which reflects different interests. It is also remarkable that in 2020, a year which will be probably the most chaotic and unstable year of the 21st century due to the global pandemic, this did not stop the emissaries of neo-ottomanism to put oil on the fire in an already disrupted world and a fragile region. One can wonder if these moves were at the source of the tensions in the South-Caucasus. These manoeuvres certainly threatened to escalate the fragile status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh. This way of acting is a source of deep concern. The degeneration of the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 was in itself a tragic situation for local citizens, and, if not intelligently solved in the future, can have devastating consequences, and not only on the regional level. Once again there is thus a repetitive behavior or revival of the Ottoman past for which the international community should be vigilant and act
against it.
Independence under International law: a peaceful solution
The attacks on Artsakh are a violation of international humanitarian law. Yerevan - and the Armenian community worldwide - are in favor of security and consequently advocate for the reunification with Armenia or the independence of Artsakh - where martial law existed during the 2020 war. For Artsakh, the right to self-determination - as defined in article 1(2) of the UN Charter prevails. Baku, on the other hand, wants the region to remain an autonomous enclave within Azerbaijan and relies on the principle of territorial integrity, that challenges the principle of self-determination. In international law, the principle of territorial integrity, as enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, is inferior to Articles 51 and 73, which establish the right to self-defense and the primordial interests of citizens in
non-self-governing territories J18!. V. Gudeleviciute argues that in cases of non-self-governing peoples and foreign military occupation the principle of self-determination takes
precedence over territorial integrity J19!. In the case of this conflict, the right of self-determination, i.e. the right of people to choose their own destiny, should prevail over territorial integrity, moreover because Artsakh has been inhabited by the people of Armenia for more than 2500 years.
The legal basis on which Artsakh could rely for justice and independence, is thus international law. To be recognized as a state, Artsakh would have to meet the four criteria of Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the ability to establish relations with other states J20!. These criteria are expressing custom as they represent the minimum for a state to come into existence 1211,1221. international law refers to nations as states. Nations can be members of the United Nations (UN) as defined by the UN Charter, and then they are seen as states. In case the state is not a member of the UN, the issue of statehood may arise. In order to verify the statehood of Artsakh, the abovementioned criteria will be analyzed.
To begin with, a state must have a permanent and stable population. As mentioned earlier, Artsakh has a long history of being inhabited by the Armenian people - who are indigenous to the territory. All infrastructure, both ancient as modern was built by the Armenian people. All historical documents, architectural monuments and archaeological artifacts reflecting the history of Armenia, prove that Artsakh has been part of Armenia for thousands of years [23, p- 129]. The international community and the people of the Caucasus always considered Artsakh as an Armenian region [23, p- 129]. According to the 1989 census, before the declaration of the independence of Artsakh, the population was approximately 75 percent ethnic Armenian (145,000) and 25 percent ethnic Azerbaijani (40,688), aside from
thousands of Kurds, Russians, Greeks, and Assyrians 124]. Later on, during the time of the Ceasefire agreement of 1994 many Azerbaijanis of this region moved from the NKR to Azerbaijan [4, p- 87]. The majority of the indigenous population always have been the people of Armenia. In 1991 they represented 85 percent of the population [23, p- 129]. Today, 95
percent of the population is Armenian 125]. The other 5 percent are todat Assyrians, Kurds and Greeks. According to Y. Averyanov the population of Artsakh has become ethnically
homogenous of which 99,7 percent are Armenian 126]. The language is Armenian. The criterium of a permanent and stable population is thus successfully met.
Secondly, there must be a generally defined territory. A state's territory should have a sufficient consistency, yet its borders can be disputed. There is also no minimum
requirement for the size of the territory. For instance, Monaco has a territory of 1.5 square kilometer. Artsakh has a territory 11.500 square kilometers, albeit with disputed borders
[25!. Since Artsakh has a generally defined territory since its declaration of independence, the second criterium is also met.
Thirdly there must be a government. It is no prerequisite that the government has a particular form or structure. There should only be some control level over the state. After the independence in 1991, the people of Artsakh elected a parliament, the National Assembly, which maintained governance over the region. After the ceasefire agreement in 1994, the first president (i.e. head of state) was elected. Today, Artsakh has an operational government and constitution [27!, with a president leading the nation [28!. Before the voting for the presidential system in 2017, there was also an office of the Prime Minister (i.e. head of government). There are currently twelve ministries, ranging from: the Ministry of Military Patriotic Upbringing, Youth, Sports and Tourism; the Ministry of Economy and industrial infrastructures; the Ministry of Agriculture; the Ministry of Defense; the Ministry of Education Science and Culture; Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; The Ministry of Healthcare; Ministry of Justice; Minister of labour, social affairs and housing;
Ministry of Territorial Administration and Development to the Ministry of Urban Planning [29!. All these ministerial posts are held by representatives of the people of Artsakh and are Armenian. Aside from that, there are also law enforcement agencies present in the region. According to the Constitution, regular presidential and parliamentary elections are held. A legislative branch, with the Supreme Court crowning it, also exists in Artsakh130!. Although it is not necessary to have a state structure, Artsakh clearly has an executive, legislative and judicial branch. The entire governmental system, mainly based in the capital of Stepanakert, that is in force since the independence of 1991 testifies that the third criterium is easily met.
The final criterium addresses the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Artsakh proves to be capable of doing this. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Artsakh has permanent representations in Armenia, Russia, the United States, France, Germany, Australia and in the Middle East -131!. The fourth criteria is thus also met.
Artsakh meets all the objective criteria of statehood, without any problems. Is international recognition imminent? In international law there is a discrepancy between de jure and de facto statehood -132!. States that have both de facto and de jure statehood can enforce their rights and duties under international law. A de facto state exists in reality, which mean all four criteria of the Montevideo Convention are met. A de jure state is a legitimate state
recognized by other states. It exists legally [33!. Artsakh is thus a de facto state, but is it a de jure state? For the recognition of statehood there exist two theories in international law. The constitutive theory declares a state obtains international personality if it is recognized as a sovereign state by at least one other sovereign state. This is the equivalent of de jure statehood. This is a subjective theory, based on political decisions. Under the declarative
theory, a state is a person of international law if it meets the four Montevideo criteria [34!. This is the equivalent of de facto statehood. This is also embodied by Article 6 of the Montevideo Convention that states that the recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it, accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. This objective theory is widely supported by international courts and academics. The aim of independence is to become a Westphalian sovereignty, i.e. the concept of the nation-state that excludes external intervention in internal affairs, as repeated by Article 8 of the Montevideo Convention. Thus far, Artsakh has not been
recognized as an independent state by a sovereign nation. Miatsum - an Armenian desire for unity
As mentioned earlier, there are two interesting options for Armenia: the international recognition of Artsakh or the reunification with Armenia 135]. The second option seems logic as it was advocated by the Armenian government in 2019 that 'Artsakh is Armenia' 136]. Miatsum in the figurative sense means thinking in one direction, working together, one passport for two countries. In Armenia and Artsakh there is support for unity, but if this is realized, the threat of another Ottoman attack will be imminent. Between Armenia and Artsakh there have been ongoing negotiations to reach the end goal of either Artsakh's reunification with Armenia or Artsakh's independence - depending on what the people of Artsakh would prefer. It can be concluded that, with regard to independence, the declarative conditions are met, yet not the constitutive. Armenia could - in theory - be the first state
to declare Artsakh as an independent sovereign state 137], but until thus far this did not happen as Armenia and Artsakh are one and the same historical and contemporary unity. Despite the deep linkages, there is no clear position among the people whether to be one
or two countries 138]. The recognition of Artsakh's independence by Armenia as the first sovereign country as well as the unification option, are too delicate options for Armenia given their geographical and geopolitical situation.
Whether or not, there will ever be independence or reunification, Artsakh still has a political existence. Following Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention, "the political existence of a state is independent of the recognition by other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts." This is how the future will develop further under Russian peacekeeping according to the recent ceasefire agreement of 9 November 2020 (see infra ).
Russian diplomacy - a solid value
The solution to the problem is diplomacy. In order to guarantee peace, security and stability in this region after those six weeks of war, the international community must resolve the conflict diplomatically and on a humanitarian basis, not militarily and certainly not through third actors supplying firepower. It is important that the civilians there feel safe. On 10 October 2020, under the auspices of Russia, a first ceasefire was reached between Yerevan and Baku (on the level of ministries of foreign affairs), which was violated shortly
afterwards 139]. The UN Security Council had also previously called for a ceasefire. This conflict has been under diplomatic monitoring by the OSCE Minsk Group led by Russia,
France and the United States since 1992 140]. On 16 October of this year, Baku proposed that Turkey should also be part of it. The chances of a deteriorating of the conflict would then be real. At the end of October 2020, Russia expressed its willingness to provide assistance to Armenia on the basis of Article 2 of the 1997 Mutual Friendship Treaty. This was negotiated at the request of Prime Minister N. Pashinyan. Cultural and strategic cities like Stepanakert, and since early November also Shushi, were bombed. Armenian churches were destroyed, which are not only part of the cultural-historical heritage but also part of everyday life. This is an outright attack on the Armenian soul. On 9 November 2020 a final ceasefire agreement - on the level of the heads of state - was signed under Russian mediation to stop the war in Nagorno-Karabakh 141]. It must be noted that Russia
demonstrated again its excellence in diplomatic skills in this conflict. The complete termination of all hostilities was declared starting 12:00 am Moscow time on November 10,
2020 -141!. The agreement was signed by the heads of state of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, the same night a Russian helicopter was shot down by Azerbaijan. The agreement comes also three days after the Azerbaijani army tried to take control over Shushi. If the fighting had continued, there was an imminent danger of the conquering of Stepanakert, the capital of the region. There was also a very high probability that Martuni, and Askeran
would have fallen [42!. According to Russian President V. Putin, the reached agreement stipulates the necessary conditions for a lasting and full settlement of the crisis. A Russian peacekeeping mission will oversee the end of the fighting, with Russia deploying 1,960 soldiers, 90 armoured vehicles and 380 motor vehicles and units of special equipment along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin Corridor - a route connecting
Artsakh to Armenia [23, p- 129]. According to Russian President V. Putin, internally displaced persons and refugees will return to Nagorno-Karabakh's territory and adjacent areas under
control of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [43!. A swap of prisoners of war and other detainees and bodies should be carried out. Yerevan will get control of the Lachin Corridor
[44!. Within the coming three years, a new route will be built via that corridor, monitored by the Russian peacemaking forces. Azerbaijan will have to guarantee the security of persons, vehicles and cargo moving along the corridor. Baku, on its turn, received transport corridors, such as the most important one, the route leading to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic
[44!. All economic and transport ties of the region will be unblocked. This is positive as this
will improve the economic development of Artsakh, which is geographically isolated [4, p- 87]. Control over transport services will be ensured also with the assistance of the Border Service of Russia. According to the Armenian Prime Minister N. Pashinyan, the agreement was signed based on a thorough analysis of the battle situation and in cooperation with the best experts, among which the General Staff and the leadership of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic. -142!. There was no other way of preventing a military collapse. However, he described the agreement as incredibly painful for him and the people. Instead of a status-quo Armenia should transfer seven pr ovincesto Azerbaijan. The Agdam District, the Kalbajar District and the Lachin District will have to be transferred to Azerbaijan,
respectively by November 20, November 15 and December 1, 2020141!. The agreement also states that Azerbaijan may retain all its territorial conquests in the region. This Agreement will be in force for the next ten years, unless either party notifies about its intention to
terminate the agreement, six months before the expiration of the first five years -141!. To oversee the ceasefire, a humanitarian response center - which will be the central body for
fulfilling the peace deal - shall be established, employing 1,200 field specialists -145!.
The Armenian government hopes for the beginning of an area of more national unity and
renaissance -143!. Hopefully this agreement - which was successfully brokered by Russia -provides stability in the region, yet it is a third option, aside from the two other options of reunification and independence that were closer to the heart of the people of Armenia and Artsakh. The agreement prevented a deterioration of the situation. It should also be noted that the media, political elite and academics in the West showed during those six weeks of war little attention to the conflict. More attention went to the pandemic and the US elections. However, this issue may not become a blind angle phenomenon in journalism and scientific literature. Other nations should therefore not turn a blind eye to the tragedies which happen in the Hayastan highlands. The Armenian people must be given a special place in the world. They are so rich in culture, rich in history and rich in their soul. On a
human level they should be supported much more by their allies.
As the sacred rivers of Eden are flowing from the Armenian mountains through Turkey, Babylon (Iraq), Syria and finally reaching the Persian Gulf, the countries in this Fertile Crescent region - where the first human civilization emerged - should be more human towards the Armenian people, to whom they owe the water and life. Adam and Eve would not be delighted if they would know that the irrigation systems descending from the Armenian garden of Eden no longer lead to peace in the environment.
Библиография
1. Galichian R. Historic maps of Armenia. The cartographic heritage.-London-Yerevan: Bennett & Bloom, 2014.-105 p.
2. Bournoutian G.A. A Concise History of the Armenian People: From Ancient Times to the Present.-Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2006.-517 p.
3. De Waal T. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War.-New York: New York University Press, 2003. - 406 p.
4. Kolosov V.A., Zotova M.V.-Multiple Borders Of Nagorno-Karabakh // Geography, Environment, Sustainability. - 2020.-№1 (13).-P. 84 - 91.
5. Melander E. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict revisited: was the war inevitable? // Journal of Cold War Studies. - 2001.-№ 3(2).-P. 48-75.
6. Engel F. The Karabakh Dilemma: Right to Self-Determination, Imperative of Territorial Integrity, or a Caucasian New Deal? / Ed. by Kambeck M., Ghazaryan Europe's Next Avoidable War. - London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.-277 p.
7. De Waal T. Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process //Survival. - 2010.-№52 (4). - P.159-176.
8. Taarnby M. The Mujahedin in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad // Elcano Royal Institute (working paper). - 2008.-P. 1-12.
9. Syrian recruit describes role of foreign fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh // The Guardian. -2020. - URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/syrian-recruit-describes-role-of-foreign-fighters-in-nagorno-karabakh
10. Vienna mosque shut after terror attack //Politico. - 2020. - URL: https ://www.politico.eu/article/vienna-mosque-shut-after-terror-attack/
11. France Terrorist Attack: What Happened in Nice at the Notre Dame Basilica? //WSJ.-2020. - URL: https://www.wsj.com/articles/france-knife-attack-in-nice-what-we-know-so-fa r-about-the-deadly-stabbing-11603975141
12. Russia warns that Nagorno-Karabakh could become Islamist militant stronghold //Reuters. - 2020.-URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-armenia-azerbaijan/russia-warns-that-nagorno-karabakh-could-become-islamist-militant-stronghold-idUKKBN26R1EJ
13. Broers L. Confidence-building in the Karabakh Conflict: What Next? // Journal of Conflict transformation. - 2014.-Caucasus Edition.
14. De Waal T. Armenia lacks incentives to launch military action now, Azerbaijan moved in first // Ahval News. - 2020. - URL: https://ahvalnews.com/azerbaijan-armenia/armenia-lacks-incentives-launch-military-action-now-azerbaijan-moved-first
15. Hoffmann C. Neo-Ottomanism, Eurasianism or securing the region? A longer view on Turkey's interventionism // Conflict, Security & Development. - 2019.-№19 (3), P. 301307.
16. Adar S. et al. The Refugee Drama in Syria, Turkey, and Greece. Why a Comprehensive
Approach Is Needed // Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). - 2020. DOI: 10.18449/2020C16.
17. John Hughes-Wilson. The Forgotten War// The RUSI Joumal.-2011.-№156 (5).-P. 8493.
18. UN Charter //UN.-URL: https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/
19. Gudeleviciute V. Does the Principle of Self-determination Prevail over the Principle of Territorial Integrity? // International Journal of Baltic Law. - 2005.-№ 2 (2). - P. 48-74.
20. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1934 // ILSA. - URL: https ://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf
21. Harris D. Cases and Materials on International Law. - London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010.
- 990 p.
22. Lowe V. International Law. - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.-298 p.
23. Zargarian R.A. Principles for conflict resolution in Nagorno Karabakh // International Peacekeeping. - 1999.-№ 6 (3). - P.129-133.
24. Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh // Human Rights Watch. - 1994. -URL:https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/AZER%20Conflict%20in%20N-K%20Dec94.pdf
25. Country Overview // Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. - URL: http://www.nkrusa.org/country_profile/overview.shtml
26. Averyanov Y. (2014). Ethno-demographic processes in Nagorno-Karabakh: history and contemporary situation // Nakhichevan-on-the Don. - 2014.
27. Constitution of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic// Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. - URL: http://www.nkrusa.org/country_profile/constitution.shtml
28. President // Official Website of the President of the Artsakh Republic. - URL: http://president.nkr.am
29. Ministries // The Government of the Artsakh Republic. - URL: http://gov.nkr.am/en/ministries/
30. Supreme Court // Supreme Court of Artsakh. - URL: https://courtnkr.am
31. Permanent representations // Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Artsakh. - URL: http://www.nkr.am/ka rabakh-permanent-representations
32. Knotter L. The de facto Sovereignty of Unrecognised States: Towards a Classical Realist Perspective? // Ethnopolitics. - 2019.-№ 18(2).-P. 119-138.
33. Bartmann B. Between De Jure and De Facto Statehood: Revisiting the Status of Taiwan // Island Studies Journal. - 2008.-№ 3(1).-P. 113-128.
34. Murphy A., Stancescu V. State formation and recognition in international law //Juridical Tribune (Tribuna Juridica) of the Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies. - 2017.-№. 7(1). - P. 6-14.
35. Harutyunyan A. Two state disputes and outside intervention: the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict // Eurasian Economic Review. - 2017. - № 7.-P. 69-93.
36. Pashinyan calls for unification between Armenia and Karabakh //Eurasianet. - 2019.-URL: https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-calls-for-unification-between-armenia-and-karabakh
37. Armenia's recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh depends on military presence//Tass. -2020.-URL: https://tass.com/world/1206147
38. The fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh is about local territories //Washington Post. - 2020.
- URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?
next_url = https%3a%2f%2fwww.washingtonpost.com%2fpolitics%2f2020%2f10%2f02
%2ffighting-nagorno-karabakh-is-about-local-territories-wider-rivalries%2f
39. Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia and Azerbaijan agree to ceasefire //The Guardian. - 2020. - URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/10/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-and-azerbaijan-agree-to-ceasefire
40. Cavanaugh C. OSCE and the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process //Security and Human Rights.-2016.-№ 27(3-4).-P. 422-424
41. Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation// Official website of the Kremlin. -2020.-URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384
42. Armenian PM says there was probability of losing Stepanakert without Karabakh deal //Tass. - 2020. - URL: https://tass.com/world/1222347
43. Karabakh deal stipulates refugees' return and swap of detainees, Putin says //Tass. -2020. - URL: https://tass.com/politics/1221723
44. Russia brokers truce to end Karabakh conflict //Tass. - 2020.-URL: https ://tass.com/pressreview/1221823
45. Russia's humanitarian response in Karabakh // Tass. - 2020. - URL: https ://tass.com/pressreview/1225391
Результаты процедуры рецензирования статьи
В связи с политикой двойного слепого рецензирования личность рецензента не раскрывается.
Со списком рецензентов издательства можно ознакомиться здесь.
Научная статья автора на тему «Армянский дудук громко звучит в Арцахе» представляет собой исследование, актуальность которого обусловлена разморозкой карабахского конфликта — самого, вероятно, тяжелого и не поддающегося урегулированию конфликта на постсоветском пространстве. Более чем четверть века безрезультатных усилий Минской группы ОБСЕ (сопредседатели — Россия, Франция, США; первое её заседание прошло 1 июня 1992 г.) не привели к прогрессу в переговорном процессе; более того, позиции сторон продолжали ужесточаться и становились взаимоисключающими. Более того, инициатива в конфликте явно перешла к Баку, именно он, по сути, определял, когда настало время обострить ситуацию, а когда — чуть ослабить напор и пойти на попятную. Как справедливо отметил автор, ни от Еревана, ни, тем более, от Степанакерта, не исходили новые инициативы, поддержание статус-кво их вполне устраивало, но уже давно не устраивало Баку. Стоит отметить, что работ, анализирующих карабахский конфликт в рамках международного права, пока еще явно недостаточно, что и обуславливает научную актуальность рецензируемой работы. Н аучная новизна работы заключается в определении вариантов разрешения карабахского конфликта, тенденций будущего развития данной ситуации в контексте современных политических процессов. Структура и содержание работы последовательно раскрывает авторский замысел. Исследование состоит из пяти параграфов и списка источников и литературы. Собранная автором литература по данной проблеме (45 наименований) помогла всесторонне изучить карабахский вопрос и пути разрешения этой проблемы. Однако, хотелось в качестве пожелания отметить, что обязательной частью такого рода работы являются введение с формулировкой цели, задач, методологической основы исследования, предмета и объекта исследования и заключение с представленными результатами исследования. Первый параграф посвящен историческому аспекту карабахского конфликта. Во втором параграфе автор
обращается к концепции неоосманизма, которая, по мнению автора, проживает возрождение, «в отношении которого международное сообщество должно проявлять бдительность и действовать против него». Третий параграф посвящен независимости в соответствии с международным правом. Согласно обоснованному мнению автора, «правовой основой, на которой Арцах может полагаться в вопросах справедливости и независимости, является международное право». Следующий параграф посвящен вопросу воссоединения с Арменией, как вариант разрешения данного вопроса. И, наконец, автор раскрыл вопрос российской дипломатии в карабахском конфликте. Как совершенно справедливо отмечается автором, «чтобы гарантировать мир, безопасность и стабильность в этом регионе, международное сообщество должно урегулировать конфликт дипломатическим и гуманитарным путем, а не военным путем. Важно, чтобы мирные жители чувствовали себя в безопасности».
