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Farid SHAFIEV
Counselor at the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Canada. M.A. in History and Law from Baku State University, and MPA from Harvard University Kennedy School of Government.
In diplomatic service since 1996. Previously served in Azerbaijan’s Mission to the U.N. in New York. Headed the International Security Affairs Section
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Baku, Azerbaijan).
ETHNIC MYTHS AND PERCEPTIONS AS A HURDLE TO CONFLICT SETTLEMENT: THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI CASE
Abstract
In their search for conflict settlement, the parties and mediators concerned focus on political and economic formulae which address such major concerns as territorial arrangements, power sharing agreements, allocation of resources, and so forth. But in the case of ethnic conflicts, the myths and perceptions created both before and during the conflict are impeding the settlement process along with the very reasons for the conflict-territorial disputes and
minority problems. This essay explores the influence of these myths and perceptions on the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. It illustrates the perspectives of the two sides in the conflict on the history of Nagorno-Karabakh and on the past events related to the conflict. The author gives the theoretical background of the relations revolving around ethnic identity, myths, and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. He con-
cludes that in the case of the Armenia-Az-erbaijan conflict, it will be impossible to attain a sustainable peace without addressing the problems created by the myths, prejudices, and misperceptions. Therefore,
increasingly solving the problems through greater interaction between the two ethnic groups within the given territorial framework is the only possible option for complete and durable settlement.
History and Mediation
The contemporary phase of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan began in February 1988. On 13 February, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh staged their first demonstration, demanding the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (Region) from Azerbaijan to Armenia. On 20 February, 1988, the Armenian deputies to the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh voted to unite the region with Armenia. On 24 February, two young Azerbaijanis, killed in the settlement of Askeran in Nagorno-Karabakh during a standoff between Armenian and Azerbaijani demonstrators, became the first victims of the conflict. On 26-28 February, anti-Armenian riots in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgayit left 26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis dead. After that, the Soviet authorities took the situation under control until Novem-ber-December 1988. In November, information about an Armenian plan to build an industrial factory in Tophane—a territory in Nagorno-Karabakh, rich in natural resources, sparked a series of demonstrations in Baku—the capital of Azerbaijan. As the tension rose, more than 200,000 Azerbaijanis were expelled from Armenia. Then the Soviet authorities again took the situation under control and imposed a curfew. A new turn in the violence broke out in January 1990 when Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia attacked Armenian residents in Baku and forced them to leave Azerbaijan. Along with this, the opposition Popular Front of Azerbaijan was about to overthrow the communist authorities. Moscow sent troops into Azerbaijan on 20 January, killing 132 civilians, and soon restored its full control in Azerbaijan.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, full-scale armed hostilities began between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Better-prepared Armenian forces defeated the Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh, who were entangled in an internal fight for power, and then occupied seven regions outside the area. On 25-26 February, 1992, Armenian armed forces razed the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly to the ground, killing 613 Azerbaijanis. Armenians claim that this event occurred due to a conspiracy by the Azerbaijani opposition. In May 1992, Armenian armed forces captured Shusha—an Azerbaijani-populated and strategically located city in Nagorno-Karabakh—this was a huge blow to the Azerbaijanis. After a brief advancement by the Azerbaijanis in the summer of 1992, the Armenians carried out a successful armed operation in 1993, and Armenia occupied seven regions outside Nagorno-Karabakh.
In 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted four resolutions—Nos. 822, 853, 874, and 884, demanding the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. In May 1994, Russia brokered a cease-fire agreement in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Despite frequent violations on the line of contact, Azerbaijan and Armenia adhered to the cease-fire agreement.
This is a brief history of the conflict, highlighting the major events; in between these events were many others. Each is interpreted differently and emotionally by both the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis and linked to the personal tragedies of refugees, displaced persons, and families of those killed and wounded. Overall, experts estimate that the conflict has claimed the lives of 30,000 people.
There are about 220,000 Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia and more than 700 000 internally displaced persons (IDP) in Azerbaijan, as well as 300 000 Armenian refugees from Azerbai-
jan.1 These figures are also subject to dispute: Armenia estimates that its refugees from Azerbaijan total as many as 400,000 and put the number of Azerbaijani IDPs as low as 500,000.
Mediation efforts are being undertaken under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group cochaired by France, Russia, and the U.S. Despite a number of proposals put forward, the sides in the conflict have not reached any agreement on a peace plan.
The main hurdle involves the opposing demands for territorial arrangement—Armenia wants Nagorno-Karabakh to become independent and rejects any deal on an autonomous status for the region, while Azerbaijan wants to preserve its territorial integrity and similarly declines any proposal which might lead to independence of the region. Legal experts argue over the clash of two irreconcilable principles of international law—territorial integrity vs. self-determination. A middle line, in the light of the extreme positions, is hard to achieve, though from time to time the sides in the conflict have manifested some flexibility. In 1997, Armenian President Ter-Petrosian was about to agree on a Minsk Group proposal on stage-by-stage settlement, and the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan adopted a joint statement in October 1997 in Strasbourg. However, as a result of this policy, Ter-Petrosian was ousted from power in February 1998. The second time the parties manifested flexibility was in November 1999, but after the shootings in the Armenian parliament, when the speaker of the parliament and the prime minister were killed, the negotiation process was broken. Mediators believe that a third chance occurred during the negotiations in Key-West, the U.S. in April 2001, but no agreement was reached there either. The recent talks between Armenian President Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev in Rambouillet, France in February 2006 were also invested with high hopes, but failed to produce any positive results. However, the parties agreed to continue peaceful negotiations in search of a final solution.
Dangerous Triangle: Ethnic Identity, Myths, and Conflict
Legal questions surrounding the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh are believed to be the main hurdle interfering with conflict settlement. Historical grievances—namely, the perceived grievances distorted by myths (as I will show below, the Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived peacefully for centuries)—play equally important roles, as the two nations depict each other in monstrous images. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is one of the bloodiest and cruelest conflicts in the world, not in terms of numbers killed, but in the intensity and occurrence of the ethnic cleansing. The memory of past quarrels is exacerbated by the mass killings and tortures during the conflict between the two countries. The Azerbaijanis see themselves as the aggrieved party in the conflict, with some 20 percent of their country occupied by Armenian forces and one million refugees and IDPs. The Armenians regard the Azerbaijanis as Turks (they call them “Turks” in the Armenian language), whom they blame for the mass killings in 1915 during World War I.
Historians and experts from both sides give different interpretations of the history of the two peoples and of the conflict itself. Foreign academics and observers are caught in the propaganda war and sometimes fall victim to it, some intentionally favor one of the sides, some unintentionally, some are confused by the opposing versions, although pro-Armenian writings dominate due to the strong
1 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “2003 Statistical Yearbook,” 304,000 Armenians were displaced from Azerbaijan to Armenia and 894,737 Azerbaijanis from Armenia, occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions to Azerbaijan (see: [http://www.unhcr.ch/ cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/ opendoc.htm? tbl=STATISTICS &id=42aff7e84 ]).
lobby and long presence of Armenian communities in the Western countries. The conflict created a whole slew of myths; ethnic identity became a matter of obsession, pride, and hatred.
Ethnic identity has a pivotal role in the conflict. Despite the volume of research on the notion of ethnicity, there is no conventional agreement on its exact term. “The difficulty in defining ethnicity is that it is a dynamic concept encompassing both subjective and objective elements. It is the mixture of perception and external contextual reality which provides it with meaning. In political theory, ‘ethnicity’ describes a group possessing some degree of coherence and solidarity, composed of people who are aware, perhaps only latently, of having common origins and interests. Thus, an ethnic group is not a mere aggregate of people but a self-conscious collection of people united, or closely related, by shared experiences and a common history.”2
Dell Hymes points to subjective factors such as perception, belonging, and self-identifica-tion.3 In a place like the Caucasus, the notion of nation and ethnicity is highly emotional and contentious. Valery A. Tishkov writes: “Because of the multi-ethnic composition of almost all major areas of the former Soviet Union (the only exception is Armenia after the exodus of the Azeris from this territory), practically all kinds of conflicts and clashes—social or political (from young men’s fights in local discotheques to collisions at the highest levels of power)—easily acquire an ethnic manifestation and flavor, making these conflicts and contradictions deeper, more complex, and extremely hard to resolve.”4
Stuart Kaufman stresses in his international award-winning book Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War5 that people did not identify themselves as Serbs or Croats, because there was no sense of national identity before the twentieth century. But myths justify the hostility and fears of group extinction and lie at the root of the hostilities, and politicians play on these to obtain support. Kaufman denounces the idea that the real cause of the conflicts in the former U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia lies in historical grievances. Yet ethnic hatred can be falsely perceived as a prolongation of historical animosity. He mentions other factors—the role of political elites, economic problems, and security vulnerability. But the real cause, in his opinion, is “symbolic politics” of conflicts. Kaufman argues that existing perceptions about neighboring ethnic groups provoke violence, and once violence breaks out those perceptions justify themselves.
“If you read Armenian history it sounds as though the Turks have been slaughtering the Armenians for hundreds of years,” Kaufman said. That myth has been used to justify the Armenian hostilities in Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan. “You need to change the way history is taught so it does not reinforce hostile myths.”6 Charles King, in a Foreign Affairs article entitled “The Myths of Ethnic Warfare,” argues that the ethnic wars were caused by “entrepreneurs who benefit from violence, arms supplied by foreign powers, charismatic leadership, and plenty of bored young men,” rather than by ethnic myths. Although he agrees that “in some cases, the cultural myths that Kaufman identifies as essential to violence are long-standing—as between the Armenians and the Azerbaijani ‘Turks,’ for example. But in plenty of others, the myths were manufactured in relatively short order, and usually after the violence had already started.”7
2 K. Rupesinghe, “Governance and Conflict Resolution in Multi-Ethnic Societies,” in: Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, ed. by K. Rupesinghe, V. Tishkov, United Nations University Press, New York, 1996. (Here and hereinafter is quoted from online edition at [http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee00.htm#Contents].)
3 See: D. Hymes, “Linguistic Problems in Defining the Concept of Tribe,” in: Essays on the Problem of “Tribe,” ed. by J. Helm, Washington University Press, Washington DC, 1968.
4 V. Tishkov, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Context of Social Science Theories,” in: Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World.
5 See: S. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001.
6 L.B. Blackford, “UK Teacher Wins Award for Ideas on Peace,” Herald-Leader Education Writer, 4 December,
2002.
7 Ch. King, “The Myth of Ethnic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001, pp. 165-170.
Despite the fact that the first clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century, in earlier history we hardly find any animosity between the Turks and the Armenians. Many historical myths have been manufactured by a group of jingoists and then successfully exploited by public leaders, especially when Armenian scholars and dissidents began the Karabakh campaign in 1987-1988.
Myth creation and heroic behavior has an accumulating effect and is imitated in a chainlike way within the masses. That mimetic pattern ofbehavior in conflict, described by Rene Girard,8 prevents any attempt to uncover the truth, which increasingly falls under many layers of tales and stereotypes. The question of land exacerbates rivalry between groups. Where the question of land causes the conflict, it reinforces the myths. Land becomes crucial to identity—it interacts with all other categories implicated in ethnonationalism,9 bearing the symbol of ancestral graveyards (even with respect to new settlers) and religious rituals, as well as the source of income (even if the territory is barren). “The territory is considered not only a source of subsistence, especially under contemporary conditions, where the market economy effectively fails to recognize ethnic and political boundaries. The struggle between the Armenians and the Azeris for Karabakh, the Japanese desire for the return of the northern territories, or the Russians’ feelings towards the Crimea spring from symbolic rather than pragmatic interests. But these symbolic interests are not mere irrational mystifications; they can acquire a real strength.”10
There are two main reasons—land and minority discrimination—for the initial sources of discontent in ethnic and interstate conflicts becoming veiled in perceptions, sometimes distorted ones. Valery Tishkov points out: “Probably the aspects of behavioural psychology and socio-psychological mechanisms play a more significant role in ethnic conflicts than traditional interpretations have suggested. We have enough evidence to prove that groups with diminished status and who are subject to discrimination in dominated environments quite often express fears for their own existence, even when objective demographic, political, or cultural conditions would normally not lead to such conclusions. This ‘reaction of concern’ comes from the exaggerated feeling of danger and leads to ‘extreme actions in response to rather moderate dangers’ (D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, p. 383)...11 In Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, the social status of the Armenians in the enclave was higher than that of the Azeris inside and outside the territory (see: A. Yamskov, “Ethnic Conflict in Transcaucasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,” Theory and Society, Vol. 20, No. 5, 1991, pp. 631-660).”12
In January 2003, Armenian President Robert Kocharian made a remark about “the ethnic incompatibility of the Azerbaijani and Armenian people” during his election campaign. He implied longstanding enmity between the two peoples. This statement was condemned by Secretary-General of the Council of Europe Walter Schwimmer, who stressed that “recalling the dark pages of European history will never be a good electoral strategy.”13 On the other hand, warmonger rhetoric and bellicose statements are frequently heard in Azerbaijan.
But were Turks and Armenians “ethnically incompatible” in the 18th, 16th, or 15th centuries? History proves they were not. Here are a few examples. A medieval Armenian chronicler, Kirakos Gandzaketsi, wrote about the leadership of one of the first Turkic Seljuk sultans of the 11th century, Melik Shah, who freed the Armenian priesthood from having to pay taxes, that “he tamed the universe, not by violence, but through love and peace.”14 Shah Ismail Hatai, leader of the Turkic tribe kizilbash and founder of the Safavids dynasty, which ruled over Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and Iran in
8 See: The Girard Reader, ed. by James Williams, Crossroad, New York, 2000.
9 See: V.N. Redekop, From Violence to Blessing. How an Understanding of Deep-Rooted Conflict Can Open Paths to Reconciliation, Novalis, Ottawa, 2002.
10 V. Tishkov, op. cit.
11 Ibidem.
12 Ibidem.
13 Council of Europe Press Information, 30 January, 2003.
14 K. Gandzaketsi, Istoria Armenii, Moscow, 1991, p. 89.
the 16th-18th centuries, gave Armenian traders exclusive rights over silk. There is a popular folk epic poem in Azerbaijan entitled “Asli ve Kerim” about the love between a Turkic man and an Armenian woman. Sayat Nova, a famous Armenian poet, wrote also in the Turkic language.15
Nowadays, it is futile to present these or other facts to the public in either country, since scholars competing in writing the history of “the most ancient tribes” in the Caucasus, as well as “the most brutal and wild ones,” and emotions hurt by the conflict and losses inflicted overshadow the scientific discourses. Ideology sustains and exacerbates ethnic animosity and the notion of supremacy of one ethnic group over another. People acquired the phenomenon of “selective memory,” when one violent act committed by the opposite side becomes an object of hatred, while one’s own deed is overlooked. Events which contradict the common perception are moved to a “blind spot” in the collective memory.
In his book Black Garden, Tom de Waal presented many examples of friendly interactions between the ethnic groups before and during the conflict.16 He concludes that the two nations lived in harmony before the conflict, which was launched by group of nationalists (many of them from the diaspora, who never lived in Nagorno-Karabakh) and further orchestrated by outside powers. “Blood-and-soil” nationalism, the creator of «hate narratives» is a modern phenomenon. De Waal further points out that the conflict cannot be considered only in the framework of political or socioeconomic problems. History and identity, or rather misguided and dangerous ideas of history and identity, played a more important role. He writes: “The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict makes sense only if we acknowledge that hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis were driven to act by passionately held ideas about history, identity, and rights.”17
Stuart Kaufman draws a similar conclusion. Neither economic problems (the Armenians rejected a package of economic benefits offered by the Soviet authorities at the beginning of the conflict) nor insecurity (the U.S.S.R. was a stable country) caused the violence and subsequent war. “Prejudice, fear, and a hostile myth-symbol complex can create a contest for dominance and an interethnic security dilemma.”18 The Armenian ethnic identity with the highlight on its ancient history and myths of genocide collided with the Azerbaijani one focused on its territory and statehood. “What made the situation so fiendishly hard to manage was not the existence of ethnic minorities, or even the tragic history of the two groups, but the way the historical myths and hostile attitudes led them to insist on mutually exclusive political goals.”19
Armenian and Azerbaijani Perceptions of the Conflict
In this chapter I will illustrate how the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians perceive the history of Nagorno-Karabakh and the past events. I present a table with two versions supported by various research studies and findings from both sides.20
15 A number of examples can be drawn from Azerbaijani historian Suleyman Mamedov’s PhD dissertation “Friendship between the Azerbaijani and Armenian People” written in 1985. A year earlier, in 1984, Armenian writer Zori Balayan wrote a notorious book called “Hearth” replete with anti-Turkic sentiments. The author is regarded in Azerbaijan as the main propagator of the Armenian nationalist movement in Karabakh. Ironically, Balayan as a surname has a Turkic origin: “Bala”—son.
16 See: T. de Waal, Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, New York University Press, New York, 2003.
17 Ibid., p. 272.
18 S. Kaufman, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
19 Ibid., p. 206.
20 I will omit numerous references below; interpretations can be drawn from many Azerbaijani and Armenian websites on the Internet, in official statements and books.
ARMENIAN VERSION AZERBAIJANI VERSION
| Ancient History of Karabakh |
Karabakh or Artsakh was a part of Great Armenia and the Armenians have long lived in that territory. Greater Armenia embraced a large portion of the Caucasus, Turkey, and Iran. Karabakh was part of Caucasian Albania from the very beginning of its existence, i.e. from the 4th century BC to the 8th century AD.
| Medieval History of Karabakh |
Throughout the Middle Ages, Armenians lived in Karabakh and formed several small feudal melicates (principalities). Caucasian Albanians had no presence in Karabakh. The Armenians of Karabakh fought against Arabs and Turkic Seljuks and managed to preserve semiindependence. Karabakh was populated and ruled by Caucasian Albanians who were gradually Armenianized after the Arabic conquest in the 7th century AD. This process was accelerated after the subordination of the Albanian Catholicasate to the Armenian Echmiadzin in 1836.
| Establishment of the Karabakh Khanate |
A certain Panah Ali was able to capture the main fortresses of Karabakh and proclaim himself Khan. Then his son Ibrahim took advantage of the continuous strife among the Armenian meliks and gr adually subdued the whole of Karabakh. The Karabakh Khanate was founded in 1747 as an independent khanate, the founder of which was Azerbaijani Turk Panah Ali khan from the clan of Javanshir (1693-1761).
Russian Conquest of the Southern Caucasus, including Karabakh (As a result of the Russian-Persian wars at the beginning of the 19th century Azerbaijan was divided between Russia and Iran, and Russia took control over the Southern Caucasus)
The settlement of the Armenians has no major implications for the demographic composition of Karabakh. As for the Azerbaijani Turks, they are relatively new settlers in the Caucasus (after the 13th c.). They appeared in Nagorno-Karabakh only in the last third of the eighteenth century and never constituted more than 3 to 4 percent of the population, right up to the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 1921. The ethnic classification “Azerbaijanis” did not appear until the 1930s. Prior to this, they were referred to as “Caucasian Tatars” or “Turks” in Russian sources. The Azerbaijanis believe that all the problems and tragedies that have befallen them started with the Russian conquest. The Russian tsar ordered for Armenians from Iran and the Ottoman Empire to be settled in the Caucasian and Azerbaijani lands in particular. This policy was reflected in the letters of a renowned Russian diplomat and poet Alexander Griboyedov. In accordance with the Russian census at the beginning of the 20th century, Azerbaijanis constituted 43% of the population of Erevan—the Armenian capital. The Armenians installed a memorial in NK in 1978, celebrating the 150th anniversary of their settlement there. A relevant inscription on the memorial was destroyed at the beginning of the conflict.
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ARMENIAN VERSION AZERBAIJANI VERSION
Karabakh in 1918-1920 (After the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 three new republics—Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia—emerged in the Southern Caucasus)
Nagorno-Karabakh fought for its unification with Armenia and in 1919 the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh signed an agreement with the Azerbaijani authorities in which the parties agreed that the question of Nagorno-Karabakh must be resolved at the Paris Peace Conference. The Armenians temporarily agreed to subordination to the Azerbaijani authorities until the Paris Conference. Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan in 1918-1920, and the Armenians launched a war trying to capture it as well as other Azerbaijani regions. In 1919, the National Assembly of Nagorno-Karabakh recognized the supreme power of Azerbaijan. On 12 January, 1920, at the Paris Peace Conference, the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers de-facto recognized Azerbaijan's independence.
| The March 1918 Event |
Armenians were under threat in Baku and any killing occurred due to mutual offensives. In March 1918, Armenian nationalist groups killed thousands of Azerbaijanis in Baku and other regions of Azerbaijan under the banner of Bolshevism.
| Nagorno-Karabakh and the League of Nations |
The League of Nations refused to recognize Azerbaijan because of its territorial claims to the Armenian-populated Eastern Caucasus, including in particular Nagorny Karabakh, as well as the lack of efficient state control over its supposed territory and inability to legitimize the borders of this territory. In April 1920, Azerbaijan was captured by the Soviet Red Army. By the time the Azerbaijanis submitted an application to the League of Nations in November 1920, Azerbaijan had ceased to exist as an independent entity. The League of Nations also refused to recognize Armenia as a state with distinct borders and rejected its application in December 1920 (in November, Armenia was also conquered by the Red Army).
Question of Nagorno-Karabakh after the Sovietization of the Caucasus in 1921-1923
After the arrival of communism in the Southern Caucasus in 1921, Stalin gave Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. This decision was designed to appease Turkey and its leader Ataturk, as well. Azerbaijan also obtained Nakhichevan. The 5 July, 1921 decision “to retain” (and definitely not “to transfer”) Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan was not made by Stalin himself, but rather by a collegial body, the Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Communist Party, which was made up of only two Azerbaijanis, sever al Armenians, and representatives of other nationalities. At the same time, a big chunk of Azerbaijani lands— namely Zangezur—was transferred to Armenia.
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| Nagorno-Karabakh during the Soviet Period |
Nagorno-Karabakh suffered from discrimination throughout the Soviet period and its population shrank, while the Azerbaijani population rose. The economic situation in Nagorno-Karabakh was better than the Azerbaijani average. While Armenians had autonomy in Azerbaijan, thousands of Azerbaijanis in Armenia (in Zangezur in particular) had no status at all.
| Beginning of the Conflict in 1988 |
The Armenians began peaceful demonstrations and petitioned Moscow on the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The Azerbaijanis responded with violence. Two young Azerbaijanis, killed on 24 February, 1988, were the first victims of the conflict. The Armenians were well prepared and armed before the start of the conflict.
| Sumgayit |
Violence in Sumgayit was the response of the Azerbaijanis to the Armenian petition and displayed the Azerbaijanis' attitude toward the Armenians. After the Sumgayit event, the Armenians felt themselves liberated from the rule of the Azerbaijanis. It was grass-roots violence caused by the influx of Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia. At the same time, several days before the events, several Armenian and other television stations had already arrived in Azerbaijan in order to report on the “forthcoming” pogroms, whereas many well-to-do Armenian families residing in Sumgayit had left the city well in advance of the events. The three-time convicted felon Armenian Eduard Grigorian murdered five Armenians in Sumgayit.
| Exodus of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Populations |
About 300,000 Armenians were expelled from Azerbaijan in 1988-1991. The expulsion was accompanied by murders in Baku and Ganja. About 200,000 Azerbaijanis were expelled from Armenia. The expulsion was accompanied by murders in Gugark and other settlements.
| Armenian Earthquakes in 1988 |
The Armenians do not recall an accident with a plane carrying the Azerbaijani rescue team. Instead they claim that the Azerbaijanis tried to take advantage of the situation created in the aftermath of the earthquakes. Azerbaijan sent a rescue team, and the plane carrying the team crashed near Erevan. Armenian navigators intentionally misguided the plane crew.
| Operation “Ring” |
In April 1991, special Azerbaijani and Soviet police detachment forces began the so-called Ring operation and ousted Armenian armed bands terrorized the local Azerbaijani population and made raids within Azerbaijan, in which
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Armenians from Chaykend and other villages on Azerbaijani territory. 54 people were killed. In response, the law-enforcement agencies carried out a special operation to gain control in Chaykend and other adjacent districts.
Dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and Nagorno-Karabakh
Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum in 1991 and declared its independence. This region had the right to secession in accordance with the Soviet law of March 1991 on the procedure of secession of Soviet republics, which stipulated that if a Soviet republic is to secede from Moscow, its autonomous republics and regions may choose to secede from that republic. The referendum was illegal, as the conditions involved armed conflict and the absence of the Azerbaijani population of NK. Azerbaijan attained independence after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and Azerbaijan has never used the procedure contained in the Soviet law of March 1991 on secession of Soviet Republics. Therefore, reference to that law is irrelevant. The U.N. Security Council in its relevant resolutions reconfirmed the sovereignty of Azerbaijan over NK.
| Armed Hostilities in 1992-1993 |
The Armenians were forced to create a buffer/security zone to secure its population from the Azerbaijani armed forces. The Armenians began ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh and then in seven regions outside Nagorno-Karabakh, taking advantage of the internal instability in Azerbaijan.
| Fall of Shusha |
Shusha was a strategically important city from where Azerbaijani armed forces bombed the surrounding areas and towns. While Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders negotiated a peaceful solution in Tehran under the auspices of the Iranian president, Armenian armed forces stormed Shusha and captured it.
| Fall of Khojaly |
The Khojaly event was a conspiracy by the Azerbaijani opposition to overthrow Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutallibov (1990-1992). The Armenians left a corridor to allow the Azerbaijani population to flee from Khojaly. In support of their argument, the Armenians quote former Azerbaijani president Mutallibov: “The shooting of Khojaly was obviously organized by someone to take control in Azerbaijan.” It was genocide committed in order to intimidate the Azerbaijanis. They quote the executive director of Human Rights Watch, who stated in her letter to Armenian Foreign Minister: “We place direct responsibility for the civilian deaths on the Karabakh Armenian forces. Indeed, neither our report nor that of Memorial includes any evidence to support the argument that Azerbaijani forces obstructed the flight of, or fired on Azeri civilians.”
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ARMENIAN VERSION AZERBAIJANI VERSION
| Armenian Terrorism |
Acts committed by individual Armenians should not be linked to the Armenian government. The Azerbaijanis also exploded gas pipelines in Georgia that supplied Armenia. In 1988-1995, Armenian terrorists committed a number of acts in Azerbaijan, particularly in the mass public transport network, resulting in the death or injury of 2,000 people. Armenia supported terrorism at the state level.
| Use of Mercenaries |
Azerbaijan invited Afghan mujahedeen to fight against the Armenians. Armenia used Armenian terrorists from the Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria in particular.
| Russian Support and Involvement |
Armenia won the military campaigns in 1992-1993 because its forces were well trained and united. Russia supplied Armenia heavily with arms and ammunitions and supported it politically. In 1997, Russian mP Lev Rokhlin revealed that one billion dollars worth of Russian arms had been transferred to Armenia.
| Blockade |
Azerbaijan imposed a blockade on Armenia. Armenia has limited access to global routes and suffers economically from it. Armenia blockaded Azerbaijan's enclave Nakhichevan. Armenia has access through Iran and Georgia.
| Destruction of Cultural Heritage |
The Azerbaijanis destroyed Armenian cemeteries and churches on its territory, these include an old Armenian cemetery in Julfa, Nakhchyvan. The Armenians destroyed and pillaged numerous Azerbaijani museums, mosques, and cemeteries on the occupied territories.
| Armenian Settlement in Occupied Regions |
New Armenian settlers in NK are refugees from Azerbaijan. Armenia is conducting a policy of mass settlement in occupied Azerbaijani territories in order to change the demographic situation in the region.
As we see, the two sides have opposite perspectives on the past events. There were few attempts to bring both sides together and try to find middle version. Some international NGOs have been holding psychological training sessions that allow the parties to express their anger and emotions and then explore common denominations.21
21 For information on nongovernmental initiatives, see: A. Hasanov, A. Ishkanian, “Bridging Divides: Civil Society Peacebuilding Initiatives,” in: The Limits of Leadership: Elites and Societies in the Nagorny Karabakh Peace Process, ed. by L. Broers, Accord, Issue 17, 2005.
Attempts have been made in the past to combine the diverging views. Several years ago, the British Embassies in Armenia and Azerbaijan sponsored two websites where Azerbaijani and Armenian experts offered their visions of the history of the conflict and their proposal for economic interaction. In January 2006, the London-based Conciliation Resources’ Accord Program (again a British initiative), with the combined efforts of four other organizations, issued a publication entitled The Limits of Leadership: Elites and Societies in the Nagorny Karabakh Peace Process,22 which represents the ideas and perspectives of the two sides in the conflict and of international experts.
Thus far, the historians and experts from both sides continue launching offensives on each other. Azerbaijan is full of military rhetoric promoting the use of force for liberating the occupied territories. Armenia and its strong diaspora continue to employ ideology to undermine Azerbaijan’s ethnicity and statehood.
Overcoming Hatred with the Right Peacebuilding Formula
Mediators and experts believe that 2006 represented a good opportunity for conflict settlement since there were no elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan. This fact itself merely acknowledges that, when one is trying to achieve a peace deal, it is easier to deal with leaders rather than with two countries’ societies that have been poisoned with hatred. Efforts to reach out to civil society in Armenia and Azerbaijan are limited and have not yet been successful. Interestingly, no significant attempt has been made to engage historians and scholars—those who actually write the history of the countries and the conflict.
The geopolitical agendas and interests of the regional powers also play a great role in the conflict resolution process. OSCE mediators (France, Russia, and the U.S.) are basically working on a combination of two approaches—phased and packaged resolutions centered on the future status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. And here geopolitics and international perceptions matter.
The OSCE mediators themselves recently suggested that it would be better to put off the status question until later and begin by resolving the other issues—the return of refugees, the opening up of communications, etc. International organizations—the Council of Europe and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly—proposed autonomy formulas in their relevant reports, referring to European experiences.
But the West, as a whole, tends to recommend self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh through a referendum in exchange for the return of the occupied Azerbaijani territories outside NK to Baku’s control. The Western experts mentioned above, such as de Waal and Charles King, support this idea, although they are in favor of a “step-by-step” approach to conflict settlement.
The West supports eventual self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh, while rejecting any separatist aspirations in other parts of the former U.S.S.R.—Transdniestria in Moldova and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. Is it an accident that many Western experts sympathize with the Christian populations in Darfur, Nagorno-Karabakh, but rebuff the Turkic Cypriots? Kosovo with its mixed Christian-Muslim Albanians is a special case which entails a non-religious dimension in the view of the Western media. However, any standard newspaper article in the West describes the Arme-nia-Azerbaijani conflict as between Muslim-populated Azerbaijan and the Christian Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. The West itself suffers from the misperception that conflicts, such as that over Nagorno-Karabakh, have religious connotations. That situation only adds to the grievances in Azerbaijan and in some other countries, where the population suspects the impartiality of the Western experts and media. (But this article is not about a civilizational Christian-Muslim stand-off.)
22 Online version at: [http://www.c-r.org/accord/nk/accord17/index.shtml].
Certainly the following question arises: if such extreme hatred is embedded in the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies, wouldn’t separation be the easiest and best solution? History proves the opposite—only cooperative formulae aimed at interaction can ensure a durable peace, no matter how painfully this process may advance. Europe, after two bloody wars, settled its territorial disputes based on an autonomy formula that was strengthened by the umbrella of a political and economic union. New EU members, Rumania and Hungary, were also required to resolve their disputes within established borders based on local self-governance. One of the most brutal post-Cold War conflicts in Europe, the Bosnia question was settled on the basis of preserving the state’s multiethnic structure. Despite the problems and still bitter recollections, Bosnia is gradually recovering.
The separation of Nagorno-Karabakh will legitimize the result of the military achievements. What is more, it has a corrupt moral aspect, and that formula will imply the possibility of settling this and other disputes by military means in the future. Moreover, it will not ensure security for the Azerbaijani refugees from Shusha and other settlements within Nagorno-Karabakh. But preservation of NK in Azerbaijan with broad autonomy will force Azerbaijan to provide safety for its Armenian population in order, in turn, to provide security for the Karabakhi Azerbaijanis under the local authority of the Karabakhi Armenians.
Now it might be impossible to imagine peaceful coexistence between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians. But after the interethnic clashes in 1905-1920, the two ethnic groups lived peacefully under the Soviet regime. Armenian-Azerbaijani intermarriages were a widespread phenomenon. Of course, they were forced to live under authoritarian rule. However, nowadays, such structures as the EU can give better incentives.
If we take the separation formula as a way of settling ethnic problems, we will have homogenization of the states for several decades ahead. Can we imagine Europe built on ethnic lines? Then why should we recommend it for other parts of the world? After decolonization, the numerous newly-emerged states in Africa were not a solution to the problems; the creation of new ones will not be either. Still a myth is developing that the creation of new states will solve the problems that the people have been experiencing under the current state arrangements. Economic hardships and the lack of democracy and good governance definitely have an impact on ethnic tension, thus fragmenting the international community. But ethnic myths and prejudices stab at the heart of globalization.
The U.N. Secretary-General in his report “Agenda for Peace” of 1992 clearly stated: “[i]f every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.”23 In Karabakh we are dealing with an ethnic group which has already obtained independent international identity—the state of Armenia. And on many occasions the Armenian officials and separatists in NK acknowledge that the final goal is unification of Armenia and NK.
In mediating the Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict and while searching for best power sharing formula, international organizations and NGOs should redouble their efforts to reach out to civil societies (no matter how weak they tend to be in the Southern Caucasus), as well as to the media and academic circles. Kaufman suggests that peacebuilding programs must be aimed at eliminating stereotypes, prejudices, and ethnic-symbol-type propaganda. Unless these efforts are made a central part of the peace-making strategy, the strategy will not work.24
The diaspora, particularly in Western countries, continues to play a destructive and extremist role, instead of facilitating peace. The communities’ members should also be involved in the peacebuilding initiatives. Unfortunately, local politicians, particularly in Western countries, preoccupied with constituency support, only add tension to the conflict, appeasing the radical slogans of some diaspora organizations.
23 U.N. Secretary-General Report “Agenda for Peace,” 1992. U.N. Document A/47/277-S/24111, paragraph 17.
24 See: S. Kaufman, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
Once trust and interaction between the two nations begin, the final solution will come much easier. A step-by-step approach would promote the overcoming of ethnic hatred, the softening of myths, and the elimination of prejudices. The Azerbaijanis and Armenians, bound together in a regional framework, territorial borders, and a local administrative arrangement, will achieve peace sooner, rather than remaining divided and clashing over a piece of land. The solution lies in coexistence and cooperation both between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between the Karabakhi Armenians and the Karabakhi Azerbaijanis.
Fuad ALIEV
Post-graduate student at the Research Institute of Economic Reforms of the Ministry of Economic Development
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN AZERBAIJAN: THE PROCESS AND
ITS POLITICAL
A b s
The author analyzes the Islamic revival in the Republic of Azerbaijan, its specific characteristics, main actors, and potential trends; he also formulates possible responses from the government to the challenges of the times. He is convinced that the country can hypothetically use re-
IMPLICATIONS
r a c t
ligion to improve the social and economic context: today it has the unique chance of setting up a new model that combines secularism and revived Islam, since public perception of this concept has so far managed to escape the influence of radical ideologies.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Religious revival in practically all the Soviet successor states arose from the ruins of the official ideology of atheism and the communist system and gradually spread to all spheres of political, economic, social, and cultural life. The predominantly Muslim post-Soviet states supply the most graphic example of this revival: today many more people than before attend services and take part in other religious ceremonies in mosques; the media and the academic community are actively discussing the process and its possible results; and sociopolitical discussions of the subject are as vehement as ever.1
1 For more detail, see: F. Aliyev, “Crisis of Ethics under the Post-Communist Transition: Case of Political Economy of Azerbaijan,” in: Compendium of the Conference “Caspian Sea: Relations and CooperationMazandaran, Iran, October 2003.
