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Damir Mukhetdinov,
Ph.D. (Political sciences), First deputy chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Russian Federation, member of the Council for interaction with religious associations under the President of the Russian Federation RUSSIAN MUSLIMS: CALL FOR CONCEPTUALIZATION AND CONTEXTUALIZATION
"I wouldn't spend a drop of ink on these notes, if I doubted even for a minute the brilliant future of my Motherland and its Muslim community. I believe that sooner or later Russian Muslims reared by their country will stand at the head of intellectual progress and civilization of the rest of the Muslim ummah. Civilization born in the Orient has gradually been moving to the west until now, but at present it seems to have started to move east, and along its way the Russians and Russian Muslims will be its best guides. "I.B. Gasprinsky. Russian Muslims (essence of jadidism)".
In one of the few articles devoted to the phenomenon of Russian Muslims our outstanding thinker Ismail-bei Gasprinsky noted that the Muslim population felt only an outward, formal connection with the Russian Empire. This connection is confined to duties and selfless service. But this is not enough. In his view, it is necessary that "these outward, official connections should acquire a deeper ethical character, should strengthen and become livelier not only due to its political
necessity, but also realization of its historic significance and usefulness. Russian Muslims should become convinced of the fact that Providence, hiving connected their destinies with the destinies of great Russia, opened before them broad vistas on the way to civilization, enlightenment and progress."
This thought was formulated by Gasprinsky in 1881. This view of his put forward a more important question, namely: "What do Russian Muslims have what other Muslims do not have?"
Foreign-policy and ideological challenges force us to put forward the question as to what Russian Muslims really are. What is this ethno-confessional reality? What are its specific features? What can it give the world? What place in Russian social and political life does it take? How can it preserve its traditions and continuity? What threats does it face? And lastly: How important is it for the future of our Motherland - the Russian Federation?
In this article I use the words "Russian Muslims," which is more correct than "Russian Islam." The point is that Islam cannot be Russian, Arab, Tatar or Turkish. There is one, uniform Islam, inasmuch as it is the universal message given by Allah to all peoples. However, it is true that getting to a certain socio-cultural ground Islam adapts to it and gives original sprouts, as it were. But in this case we deal not with a special Islam, but with a special practice of Islam, or a special Muslim culture. We should not talk of "Russian Islam," but we can talk of the existence of "Russian Muslims as a conglomerate of Muslim cultures on the territory of the Russian Federation.
Muslim cultures of Russia have certain specific feature of their own, which are connected with national history. I pay enough attention to the concept of Russian Muslims, that is, ideological construction, which would allow us to single out basic specific features of Russian Muslims and reveal their place in the context of modern socio-political,
philosophical and civilizational trends. In this lies the contextualization of this phenomenon. The concept of Russian Muslims is an answer to the question as to how these Muslims can survive in the present conditions without losing their identity. Inasmuch as contextualization has pride of place in this article, much attention is devoted to close geopolitical and ideological topics.
The article consists of seven parts. In the first I analyze the demographic situation in modern Russia and give certain forecasts for future decades. There is a tendency of the growing role of Islam in Russian social life, which can lead to a crisis in Russian identity and its transformation.
In the second part I analyze the geopolitical and ideological context. I show how the world moves away from the unipolar model towards a multipolar one. The Eurasian area can become one of these poles with the core in the form of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin elite is guided by the proto-ideology of a neo-Eurasian type, whose components are protection of traditional values, traditional multiculturalism and moderate conservatism. These trends open broad opportunities to Russian Muslims.
In the third part I turn to the problem of correlation of Islam and ethnicity. I show that the Koran does not say anything about the need to renounce one's own ethnicity, or that ethnicity is of no importance. The spiritual road is only possible in the mainstream of ethnicity.
In the fourth part I turn to Russian Muslims as a social phenomenon and show that such formula is quite legitimate. I give as an example a brief analysis of Tatar Muslim culture.
In the fifth part I examine the concept of Russian Muslims and show that this concept can be part of a general neo-Eurasian trend proclaimed by the Kremlin elite; besides, I emphasize a special
conceptual closeness of Eurasian traditions and single out their basic features.
In the sixth part I briefly analyze the main challenges facing Russian Muslims, and pay special attention to the globalization process and the diktat of European ultraliberal values.
Finally, in the seventh part I sum up the results and pose the question about the role which Islam should play in Russian identity taking shape at present.
The solutions which I offer in this article are preliminary. As the title of the article says, this is a call for conceptualization and contextualization so any remarks and suggestions are welcome.
1. Demographic Context
Demography is the main factor of survival and historical viability of society.
In the last decades of the 20th century a demographic crisis and a sharp drop in the number of born Europeans were observed, which was one of the reasons for turning to mass immigration, including from Muslim countries. Low birthrate combined with a comparatively low mortality leads to gradual ageing and extinction of the white population, which will actually mean an inevitable transformation of the ethno-confessional structure of Europe and the growing role of the Muslim factor. The reasons for the demographic decline are many and varied, but the main one is the changes in the view on the family and childbirth, which are definitely based on the economic causes. The cult of the mini-family, solitary existence (the "Stockholm model"), economic emancipation of women, feminism and libertarianism, loss of religiousness, mass use of contraceptives, legalization of abortions, etc. all this leads to a demographic crisis, which causes an identity crisis due to immigration policy connected with economic considerations.
A no less complex situation is in Russia. In 1925 the summary birthrate was 6.8, whereas in 1990 it dropped to 1.2. Now the figure is 1.7, whereas it should be 2.1 for simple population reproduction.. The low birthrate in Russia, almost similar to that in Europe and the United States, is combined with high mortality rate, which is similar to that in Tropical Africa. To boot, Russia holds one of the leading places in the world in the number of abortions, although this index has been two times lower in the past decade. Low birthrate, high mortality rate and a great number of abortions have given rise to the phenomenon known in demographic literature as the "Russian cross," that is, sizable depopulation. In the period between 1992 and 2005, the natural decrease of the population in Russia amounted to 11.2 million, that is, almost one million a year. In recent years this figure has diminished, but it is expected that birthrate will soon lag behind mortality rate. According to forecasts, by 2030 the natural decline of the population will be about 11 million.
The most probable future of Russia is examined in an authoritative report of the UN "Russia Facing Demographic Challenges" (2008).
With the preservation of the present demographic tendencies by 2050 the population of Russia will drop to 116 million; the country will move from 9th to 14th place in the world rating: it will take place below Ethiopia, Congo, the Philippines and Mexico. The age structure will also change considerably: by 2025 the able-bodied population will lose 14 million people, there will be five million more pensioners. During that period there will be 822 unemployable persons per each thousand of those working.
According to recent statistics, the depopulation processes have the strongest effect on ethnic Russians, who are the backbone of Russian nationhood. Certain experts believe that the expected
depopulation by 2025 will touch 85-90 percent of Russians, which will result in a decrease of their share to 60-70 percent; there is also a forecast, according to which the share of Russians in the country will amount to 46.5 percent. Supposedly, it will be accompanied by low birthrate precisely among the Russian population, which will mean an essential change of the ethno-confessional structure. We see already now how the image of Moscow is changing, and in the future these processes will go on more rapidly; suffice it to say that at the moment one-third of all births in Moscow is among migrants.
And so, let us sum up the above-mentioned tendencies.
First, during the past two decades mass depopulation has been taking place in Russia, which was due to low birthrate and high death rate.
Secondly, it affects the Russian people most of all.
Thirdly, depopulation will continue, which may lead to the further curtailment of the population and a change of its ethno-confessional structure (with a reduction of the share of Russians).
The above-said tendencies combine with a number of other tendencies, which allow us to speak of the growing role of the Muslim factor. I have in mind the immigration problem and regional specific features of demography.
One of the important premises of the "Concept of demographic policy of the Russian Federation up to 2025" is that the state regards the drawing of migrants as a major task in accordance with the requirement of the demographic and socio-economic development and with due account of the need for their social adaptation and integration. At present Russia is the world's second in the absolute volume of immigration, after the United States. During the past two decades it has been possible to adjust somewhat the dynamics of the decline of the population. According to official data, during the period between 1992
and 2010 almost eight and a half million immigrants arrived in this country, but unofficial statistics gave other, more realistic figures -15-18 million, that is, 10.5-12.7 percent of the population. It should be taken into account that high immigration leads to an essential transformation of social reality. According to the data for 2012, 91 percent of the entire migration surplus is accounted for the CIS countries; 63.5 percent of them - representatives of the Islamic republics (Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, partly Kazakhstan). This proportion will be preserved in the future, although on the whole a certain reduction of immigration is expected. One of the challenges facing Russia is integration of immigrants, especially those who have come here to stay permanently.
Another factor showing the growing role of Islam is connected with regional specificities of demography. The least favorable region in terms of demography is the Central Federal region, whereas the North Caucasian region is the most favorable one. From 2000 until 2012 its birthrate increased by 1.7 times. Experts note that the decline of the population is observed in regions with predominantly Russian population. Among demographic leaders are national republics with a low share of the Russian population, and also Tyumen region and Moscow where population surplus can be explained by immigration and high living standards. Baby-boom is expected in North Caucasian republics in the 2020s. Thus, we observe a situation in Russia similar to that in Europe, namely, Islamic people are distinguished by higher and more stable indices of birthrate, as well as by younger age structure. Connection between religious affiliation and summary birthrate coefficient is a well-known demographic fact.
Mass depopulation, decrease of the share of Russians, ageing of the population, immigration flows, and demographic growth of Muslim
peoples show that in the coming years the role of Islam in Russian social and spiritual life will increase. How great will these changes of the ethno-confessional structure be? It is difficult to give a definite answer. We do not have exact data about the numerical strength of the Muslim population. According to the 2002 population census, the number of the traditionally Muslim people of Russia was about 14.5 million, that is, about ten percent of the country's population. But there are more realistic figures - 18 to 20 million, or 14-15 percent. On the basis of these figures we could assess, somehow, the future of Russian Muslims. By 2030 the number of Muslims will grow by three percent. I believe that taking into account immigration and depopulation of Russian citizens, the share of Muslims in Russia will reach 20 to 22 percent by 2030.
Thus, some 10-15 years later one of five inhabitants of Russia will be Muslim, and in Moscow this figure will be bigger.
These data require thorough conceptualization. I am sure that in several decades we shall have to deal with a new social reality in which the role of the Muslim factor will be much greater. I think that there can be a crisis of Russian identity, or at least its evolutionary transformation. It would be a grave mistake to ignore the existing tendencies and try to push Islam to periphery, thus giving an incentive to chauvinism and islamophobia. It would be much wiser to try to correct a policy and public opinion in accordance with the existing trends and thus contribute to an evolutionary and less painful change of social reality. In Russia this process will be simpler and less painful than in Europe where there are more talks of the crisis of identity. It is connected with the fact that Russian multiculturalism is more natural and has a longer history.
2. Geopolitical and Ideological Aspect
After the end of the Cold war the world has become unipolar, which has been reflected in the economic and value hegemony of the West headed by the United States. But in the early 1990s a slight trend toward multipolarity began to be observed. It became more pronounced at the beginning of this century. In 2001 the abbreviation BRIC was introduced, which was changed into BRICS in 2011 and included several economically promising countries. At present the BRICS population comprises 43 percent of the world population, and its GDP volume is 20 percent of the world's volume. There is no doubt that by 2050 the BRICS countries will dominate economically. However, there is no clear idea about their geopolitical perspective. It is presumed that a big scope of the BRICS countries' economies will enable them to transform economic growth into political influence. At present the BRICS bloc positions itself as an alternative to the western development model. Each country of the bloc has a unique political system and its geopolitical interests in the region. A uniform political platform for them in the spirit of the western concept of "liberal democracy" and "human rights" seems hardly probable, it is more possible that each country will form its own political agenda relying, on the one hand, on European tradition, and on the other, on their own civilizational specificities.
The economic growth of the BRICS countries is an earnest of the future multipolarity. Theorists of the multipolar world single out the most probable zones: western civilization, Eurasian civilization, Islamic civilization, Latin American civilization, Indian civilization, Pacific civilization, and African civilization.
It should be noted that the future regional division will be formed not only on the economic basis. Economics, and in particular the growth of the BRICS countries, is only a necessary prerequisite for
political, cultural, ideological and worldview demarcation. Theorists of multipolarity operate with the concept of "civilization," which presupposes special type of economic management and unique culture, social organization, and worldview clichés. In essence, the point is an important notional transfer from the thesis of "universal values," under which western values are meant formed within the framework of western tradition, to the thesis about specific features of each political and cultural oekumene.
On numerous examples we can see that mechanical transfer of western political institutions and value paradigms to other societies is fraught with social upheavals and great political problems.
Western values only seem simple and understandable, but in reality they are vague and indefinite. In what respect are Islamic ideas about "human rights" worse than European ideas? Why is European liberalism "liberal" toward any people, except Muslims, and in general except religious people? Why does "liberalization" mean pushing religiousness to periphery? The truth is that even modern western models are not consistent in everything.
It is interesting that the coming of the age of civilizational pluralism is felt and predicted by western ideologists themselves. It is important to note that along with the emergence of political realities and their perception of them their positions are gradually changing. Two cases in point are Francis Fukuyama and Zbigniew Brzezinski.
And so what the modern geopolitical context looks like. Evidently, we observe the growth of the economic might of the BRICS countries accompanied with broad civilizational identity of individual regions. We are now on the threshold of civilizational pluralism, which is recognized by leading western political analysts. The major task facing the local civilizational poles is to define one's own place in the world order taking shape and the formation of the timely agenda
making it possible to map out ways for further progress with due account of cultural specifics.
If we turn to the ideological context we shall see that our political elite accepts these challenges, and this is why our country has taken a course recently aimed at the formation of an independent civilizational pole, which is connected with the integration process in the Eurasian area. It is said in the Constitution of the Russian Federation that our state does not have ideology, and this is why the course taken should be viewed as a general geopolitical and socioeconomic orientation. This is not ideology, but a set of concepts and trends. I would characterize this course as "proto-ideology." It has most fully been expressed in articles by President Putin and in a number of his speeches, especially the one in Valdai in 2013.
I shall try to sum up the essence of this new "proto-ideology."
It can be characterized in the most general form as neo-Eurasianism on the basis of classical Eurasianism of the 1920s - 1930s. It is not a concrete detailed and consistent theory, but a number of concepts united by the assertion that in the formation of Russian identity a great role had been played by Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples. Westernizers were oriented to Europe, Slavophiles were oriented to Slav peoples, nationalists to Russian originality and byzantism, whereas Eurasianists proposed to look towards the East and deepen interaction with Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples. The union of the Russian, Turkic and Finno-Ugric people living in the vast Eurasian area has formed, in the view of Eurasianists, a unique pattern of Eurasian civilization. Eurasianists advocated the independence of Russian/Eurasian civilization, civilizational pluralism and multiformity, as well as the leading role of Orthodox Christianity in the spiritual life of peoples, although other Eurasian traditions (Islam,
Buddhism, Tengriism, etc.) were regarded close to Orthodox Christianity, as potential Orthodox Christianity.
The form of neo-Eurasianism, which has become widespread among our political elite, preserves many tenets of classical Eurasianists. Citing one of the predecessors of Eurasianists, philosopher Konstantin Leontyev, President Putin asserts that Russia "has always developed as a 'blossoming complex,' as a 'state-civilization,' and "it is from the model of state-civilization that the specific features of our state structure originate. It has always been striving to take into account the national and religious specific features of some and other territories, ensuring multiformity in unity. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions are an inalienable part of identity and historical heritage of Russia in the present life of its citizens."
Just as classical Eurasianists, President Putin favors civilizational pluralism and multipolarity of the world. Putin says that the unipolar world does not need sovereign states, it needs vassals. Historically, it is renunciation of one's own image, of the multiformity of the world.
The meaning of integration in the Eurasian area is to contribute to the creation of one of civilizational poles, while preserving cultural wealth and diversity. The 21st century promises to be an age of great changes, and an epoch of the formation of big geopolitical, financial-economic, cultural, civilizational and military-political continents. This is why our absolute priority is close integration with neighbors. The future Eurasian economic union of which we have been talking recently, is also a project of preservation of identity of peoples, historical Eurasian area in the new century and in the new world. Eurasian integration is a good chance for the entire post-Soviet area to become an independent center of global development, but not a periphery for Europe or Asia. This integration will be built on the principle of diversity. It will be an association in which each member
will preserve its image, originality, and its political subjectness. We shall consistently implement this project along with our partners and we believe that it will be our joint contribution to the preservation of diversity and stability of world development.
In contrast to classical Eurasianists, Putin does not give priority to Orthodox Christianity, but acts within the framework of the idea about the four religions traditional for Russian civilization (Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism). Orthodox Christianity will continue to play the leading role in the spiritual life of Russian citizens, but it will not play the exceptional and privileged role. The President of Russia sees his country's prospects in deeper interconfessional and intercultural actions, in peaceful coexistence, Eurasian spiritual traditions and cultures formed by them.
Another important thesis of Putin is connected with the sphere of morality and religiousness. His criticism is aimed not at religious traditions, but at the degenerated sphere of morality, post-modernist relativization of morality, at the ousting of religiousness from society's life. Putin notes that many Euro-Atlantic countries have actually taken the road of renunciation of their roots, including Christian values forming the basis of western civilization. Ethical foundations and traditional identity: national, cultural, religious, or even gender are denied. People in many European countries are ashamed or afraid of speaking of their religious affiliation. This is a direct road to degradation and primitivization, and to a profound demographic and moral crisis.
Further on, Putin spoke in favor of traditional values contained in Christianity and other world religions.
There is a thesis in Putin's Eurasianism, which is no less important. Putin stands for the preservation of traditional values within the format of secular society which opens broad vistas to the existence
and activity of four traditional confessions. Such format of Russian / Eurasian civilization makes it possible to adhere to moral and spiritual principles in everyday life. This is conservatism, but not radical conservatism, not Wahhabi fundamentalism or Protestant sectarianism. This is moderate conservatism, which allows all to live in peace with representatives of other confessions and with secular people. It allows them to take part in public life, be members of democratic society and take part in elections. This is a unique combination of sound European democratism, technical progress, education and moral conservatism with equal rights of the four leading confessions and all cultures.
In analyzing the neo-Eurasian orientation of the Kremlin elite I examined, above all, the passage that Russia, along with its Eurasian partners, should create a separate civilizational pole in the multipolar world, and civilizational pluralism, which will make it possible to form its own agenda in the ideological sphere. At present we can observe the sprouts of this new ideology, which include antiglobalism, traditional multiculturalism, protection of traditional values, and moderate conservatism. In my view, this picture will satisfy Muslims. Russian Muslims can and must make their contribution to the development of Eurasian civilization and the formation of new identity.
(To be concluded in the next issue.)
This article was submitted by the author for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World".
