Shamil Kashaf,
Post-graduate student at the chair of political management, Russian Academy of National Economy and Government Service under the President of the Russian Federation INTERACTION OF THE STATE AND MUSLIM RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REALITY FACING CHALLENGES TO RUSSIA'S IDENTITY
Looking into the essence of turning points in human history one can notice that it demonstrates more and more precedents of dramatic struggle for collective entities and social relations connected with them. Quite a few of them reach a degree when, using the language of Plato, "all are at war with all in social life and in private life, and each is at war with himself."
A serious struggle is unfolding in the globalized world for the resource of religious convictions, which seem to have left the international political scene, and for the use of theological arguments in political discussions. Cases of turning to religiousness in the West show not so much its return as its use for legitimation of political power. In the view of some experts, theology is reviving as the initial point for radical politics. Experts also describe new constellations in ideology and politics of post-secular society. Globalization compels the national state, which is losing many of its characteristic features, to open the door to cooperation with religious associations. Globalization poses powerful challenges to many societies organized as states, which create bifurcational processes for entire countries and nations. Being a new "megatrend" touching on all spheres of society's life, and also the identity of groups and individuals, globalization finds itself in opposition to the desire to preserve the
identity of all - people, religions, states and civilizations. Religion reacts to this by more actively playing the role of a subject of politics, and in the epoch of globalization and the crisis of state institutions, religion and the church succeed in articulating more convincingly moral impulses and solidarity intuition.
Religion possessing a political function is able to influence the formation of worldviews of people, including persons adopting political decisions and through this to change political behavior and political culture.
Influencing the elaboration and adoption of political decisions religion realizes its political subjectness. Experts also point to its ability to influence state (political) ideology. Thus, entering the structure of a political system and eliminating the traditional forms of political solidarities religion plays a practical role in the political process. Although supreme religious figures - Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Russian Federation sheikh mufti Ravil Gainutdin emphasize their non-involvement in public politics, there has been a conservative-traditionalist turn in Russian politics, which coincided with the political discourse of Eurasian conservatism and the readiness of the Russian Orthodox Church to be not only an element of tradition in the life of modern Russia, but also the active ideological center producing conservative ideology and even political decisions, and with the Eurasian initiatives of the Spiritual Board of Muslims bearing an obvious political context. All this evidently characterize the new state of interaction of the state, ruling elites and religious organizations, and participation of religious associations in creating social and political reality in the country.
Spectacular changes have taken place among the subjects of the building of the nation. Many parties have moved away from the
"frontline" of nation-building. As to the intelligentsia, it has split into two and formed two elite fragments. The first - functional - is oriented to "intellectual backing of practical actions undertaken by the political elites, to predicting the consequences of this action, its legitimation (or deligitimation), etc.," and the second - reflective, whose representatives are not oriented to direct practical action with a definite result, but is free to experiment in the entire cultural area.
There is no hope that Russian business will be able to generate moral values on which the political nation could be based. First, the oligarchic structures are now separated from their people, and secondly, they have been warned against participation in domestic political activity, especially at the federal level, so strictly that it would take much time before they could recover from those "preventive measures."
Certain experts attach a place of importance to the Russian Orthodox Church, this social actor with a very high rating of trust among participants in Russian nation-building.
The Russian Orthodox Church regards itself a mouthpiece of the aspirations of millions of Russian and an influential organization with political positions in society, and it claims greater intensity of close ties with the sacral and national realm. The ideological surrounding of Ravil Gainutdin is also ready to claim the role of an equal subject of the formation of national-state identity.
We should be ready to refer religious organizations and different confessions to the second - after the state - element in the institutional hierarchy of the political system of society.
Today, when the correlation of modernization and tradition has changed and the victory of innovation over tradition is not considered an important feature of modernization, on the contrary, it became clear that it needs support on tradition, inasmuch as traditional symbols and
forms of leadership can become a vitally important part of the value system on which modernization is based, the principles of "non-catching-up" modernization and development on the basis of their own identity, their own culture and traditions and customs formulated by non-western countries do not seem archaic, as it has always been presented by liberal interpretation.
It is believed that most modern crises have become possible when the "epoch of ideals was replaced by the epoch of interests," with the coming of the neoliberal project of globalization implemented, primarily by the United States under the guise of multicultural declarations. Samuel Huntington, who proclaimed America becoming the world and the world becoming America, connected the result of the choice of identity by Americans themselves not only with the destiny of their nation, but with the destiny of the entire world. This is an open hint on the potential of influence of the world hegemon moving (or completely destroying in case of opposition) other cultural nuclei of national identity of state and civilizational communities, unwelcome from the point of view of philosophical concepts and political interests of the United States.
The aggressive promotion of values of one culture in line with the dominant political orientations and to the detriment of values of another culture, neglect by some states of the interests of other states violate the balance of cultural and civilizational diversity as the very foundation of the existence of states and nations in the world community.
The policy of identity, which should allow, apart from states, religious organizations and associations as a subject of state nationalities policy to take part in it, is an answer to the specific global challenge to national identity, which presupposes the presence of strategy and the value foundation of the development of a country.
The problem of the preservation and strengthening of one's identity is a crucial one for Muslim countries. This is shown, among other things, by the fact that the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hasan Rouhani began his speech at the 68th session of the UN General Assembly (September 17, 2013) with the words: "Our world is full of fear and hopes: fear of war and hostile regional and international relations, fear of deadly clashes between religious, tribal and national identities." Speaking of fear which society comes across, the President of Iran meant threats to many states which are weaker than the West.
His statement well corresponds to the discourse of President Putin of the Russian Federation, who two days later, at the 10th conference of the international club "Valdai" (September 19, 2013), also confirmed the importance to all countries of a search for new strategic approaches to the preservation of their identity, especially in view of numerous attempts to return to the unipolar model of the world, which undermines national sovereignty. Vladimir Putin said: "Such unipolar world does not need sovereign states, but it needs vassals."
Quite a few Euro-Atlantic states in their denial of ethical values and traditional identity - national, cultural, religious and gender, and values cherished by Christianity and other world religions - have come close to the boundary beyond which inevitably comes the loss of human dignity and profound demographic and moral crisis. Russia should avoid all this because in its model of a state-civilization is has always been striving to use flexible approaches to national and religious specifics of its population. As President Putin emphasized, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions are an inalienable part of the identity and historical heritage of the country and modern life of its citizens.
The combination of the Muslim component with other confessional identifications of Russia is quite natural, in our view. Our country is inhabited by the biggest number of Muslims among all European countries. President Putin has been the first to officially recognize that Russia is also a Muslim country. Speaking at a meeting of the Chechen parliament in December 2005, he stated that Russia had always been the most loyal and consistent defender of Islam. And he repeated this thesis at a gala meeting in Ufa in October 2013 devoted to the 225th anniversary of the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia. He said that "Islam is a bright element of the Russian cultural code." This position is reflected in the domestic and foreign policy of the country and can be seen in its bilateral relations with Muslim states, as well as its participation in the affairs of the Islamic Cooperation Organization where Russia has the status of observer.
It can be said that community of Russia and the Muslim world has been prompted not only by their cultural affinity, but also by the challenges from the West. In our view, the similar features in their reaction to the challenges of the western world will make it possible to come closer to understanding the specific features of the national identity of Muslim countries and Russia, which have today similar or identical positions on many aspects of their national and political identification.
Russia has always been able to understand and value the wisdom of the East and pragmatism of the West. It is actively searching partners for closer cooperation in the non-Western world on the basis of spiritual constants and adherence to traditional standards and values inherent in it from the past. Among them are responsibility of the individual to society and the state (along with his rights), and religious ideals (in contrast to aggressive secularism in Europe). It was not accidental that timely problems of responsible self-consciousness of followers
of Abrahamic religions in the present epoch, as well as the place and role of Russian Muslims in social reality of Russia and the Eurasian area being formed were included in the agenda of the 10th International Muslim forum "Mission of religion and responsibility of its followers before the challenges of our time" (December 10-12, 2014, Moscow).
As it was said by Ravil Gainutdin, Chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Russian Federation and Head of the Council of muftis of Russia, the identity of peoples and the historical Eurasian area correspond to the realities of Eurasian civilization, aspirations of Russian Muslims and the interests of the entire civil society. Further on he said that inasmuch as Eurasian integration is understood not only as an economic project, but also as a traditionalist one, it is possible -in the spirit of the early Eurasians - to talk of "the exodus to the East."
The Islamic leader of Russia advocates protection of traditional values, ethical standards and spiritual principles contained in canons of world religions; productive cultural exchange between people of different religions; harmonious combination of the way of life of modern man with religious practice, which is contained in the tradition of moderate Islam as "the medial path."
The Russian Muslims are part of the uniform Muslim ummah and at the same time citizens of the Russian Federation. Speaking of this, the leader of Russian Muslims mentions their historic mission as the active defender of general Russian and Eurasian traditional values. In this he sees healthy conservatism inherent in Russian Muslims.
Conservative motivations of Muslim clergymen combined with value, traditionalist and socio-political prospects of Eurasian integration are represented in a broader form in a number of public texts. In our view, they are addressed to the ruling elites as a symbolic sign of the
readiness of the actors of Russian Muslims to the construction, jointly with the state, of Eurasian integration.
Damir Mukhetdinov, deputy chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Russian Federation, in his article about Russian Muslims written specially for the opening of the International Muslim Forum called for adhering to moderate conservatism, inasmuch as it gives a wide scope to Muslims for activity in public life, enabling them to remain members of democratic society and take part in all election processes. Besides, moderate conservatism is a unique combination of sound European democratism, technical progress, education, and moral conservatism with the equal rights of the four leading confessions and small cultures.
Analysts assert that Russia's confrontation with western countries is not of a chance character. It shows, above all, that North Atlantic civilization is unwilling to recognize our country as an equal partner. For example, certain leaders of the Crimean Muslims have noticed that at the crucial moment of the history of the Crimean Tatar people connected with the Crimean plebiscite on joining Russia, they met with opposition from representatives of various sects, radical pseudo-Islamic movements, people with conflicting views and behavior in the Crimea, who were critical of and suspicious toward Russia. But most leaders of Muslim religious organizations, imams, representatives of Muslim public organizations and the mass media whom we approached maintain that the Crimea joining the Russian Federation strengthens the positions of the country's Muslim ummah. Returning to the subject of the International Muslim forum, we should mention the readiness of Russian and Eurasian Muslims for effective interaction with authorities of Russia. Authoritative Muslim (Sunna and Sh'ite) theologians, Eurasian scholars of Islam, high muftis of a number of European countries, who have not supported various sanctions adopted
by the United States and the European Union against Russia in 2014 due to its position on the Crimea, assessed numerous local and regional conflicts, and civil confrontations with the use of force as one of the major challenges of our epoch and a threat to mankind.
Within the framework of panel discussions at the forum and jointly with representatives of the Christian Orthodox, Judaist, Catholic and Protestant clergy, as well as Russian politicians and scholars, they discussed and reached agreement on a whole number of important positions. For instance, one of the summary documents of the forum admits that the existing challenges place humanity before serious trials, and to overcome them the countries of the historical Eurasian area should preserve their national, cultural and religious identity and strengthen the traditional system of values and institutions of national cohesion and solidarity.
Expressing the common opinion of the Forum delegates concerning the danger of the fundamental challenge of the "value and civilizational nature," the leader of Russian Muslims Ravil Gainutdin confirmed his view by the thesis of the need to wage ideological struggle with ultraliberalism which attacks traditional values.
Similar views were expressed by the chairman of the Committee on education of the State Duma of the Russian Federation V. Nikonov, head of the "Russian World" foundation, who pointed to the common moral ideals drawing Russia, Russians and the Islamic world closer together, and who are supporters of cultural diversity and opponents of managing people from one center, which regards itself to be the chosen subject to dictate its will to all mankind. V. Nikonov highly assessed the fact that not a single Islamic state joined the sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the European Union.
The forum was attended by more than 500 participants from 20 countries of the world (Europe, Southeast Asia and China). In the
opinion of Academician E. Primakov, former prime minister of Russia and diplomat under whose patronage the "Russia - Islamic World" group was set up in 2006, the forum was a major event and the subjects it discussed were quite important for the world community.
On the initiative of sheikh Muhammad Yusuf the forum set up the permanent working body for preparation of the International Muslim forum as a permanently functioning platform for discussion and legally independent organization. The inaugural meeting of the forum, on the proposal of its Iranian participants will take place in Qatar in 2015. (Qatar is the venue of the headquarters of the World Union of Muslim scholars). And the next, 11th meeting will be held in Istanbul also in 2015.
A new international platform for discussions with headquarters in Moscow, for which the head of the Spiritual Board of Russian Muslims Ravil Gainutdin hopes, will make it possible for the Russian authorities to tackle such important task as rendering assistance to the "geopolitical alliance along the Moscow - Ankara - Tehran axis," which may be formed with the participation of all sound-minded forces, those which will be able to use benefits for most Eurasian peoples from "turning Russia toward the East."
It should be said that with due account of a special position of religious identity in the Russian hierarchy of identities, all postSoviet regimes tried, to a certain degree, to use the ideological resource of religion.
The concept of "national identity" as a category of political practice and discourse becomes a useful instrument for Islamic leaders as agents of symbolic power. In the process of Russian national construction the political elites are often forced to turn to resource possibilities of religious institutions.
The proceedings of the 10th International Muslim forum demonstrated to its participants and observers a tangible impetus to stop and ponder over the close connection of national identity with the viability of the state and its "ability to answer the new challenges of history." Unfortunately, the nation begins to reflect upon these things when it is faced with a threat to its future, or when, as it was emphasized by the Russian religious and political philosopher N. Berdiayev, when catastrophes and turning points become especially acute, and also when certain moments of world history dispose to historical and philosophical reflection concerning the present.
In the view of representatives of the Islamic intellectual and religious circles, the Muslim world and Russia, as its organic part are living today through such dramatic turning moment, when the problem of searching for ways to preserve one's own national, cultural and religious identity and traditional social institutions takes an extremely acute form.
Russian Muslims present their answer to global challenges, which has nothing to do with radical Islamism, whose extremist forms are for all see. Less noticeable manifestations of this moderately conservative answer in the form of intellectual polemic and thoughts and feelings are all the more valuable.
Complying with the request of the Organizational Committee of the 10th International Muslim form, the author would like to express gratitude to the journals "Russia and the Moslem World," "Vlast" and "Kommunikologiya" for information support.
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This article was submitted by the author for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World".