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RELIGIOUS SPHERE: "MINSK SPLIT" INSTEAD OF "MINSK DIALOGUE"
Natalia Vasilevich Summary
In 2018, the long-standing dream of the Belarusian authorities to make Minsk a center of religious reconciliation failed. In October, at its meeting in Minsk, the Holy Synod, the governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church, decided to break the Eucharistic unity with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which became known as "Minsk split".
The events surrounding the creation of the new Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the fact that the Patriarchates of Constantinople gave it the Tomos of Autocephal actualized the discussions on the possibility for Belarusian Orthodox Church to obtain the same independence from the Moscow Patriarchate in the future. Belarusian churches also took an active part in the public debate on the adoption of a new law on domestic violence, speaking mainly against such a law.
Trends:
• Control over the religious sphere takes place through legislative and bureaucratic mechanisms;
• Discussions on autocephaly are expanding in the Belarusian Orthodox Church and in society, but they are not intensive;
• In the socio-political sphere, the churches adhere to a conservative line.
Legislation and institutions
In October 2018, Belarus passed the procedure of a periodic report in the UN Human Rights Committee. In its concluding observations1, the Committee drew attention to the "excessive restrictions on the exercise of freedom of religion" that exist in Belarus, among which the following were mentioned, first, the requirement of compulsory registration of religious communities, second, the facts of refusal of such registration for a number of religious communities, and third, the need for foreign citizens to obtain a special permit to participate in religious activities on
«Заключительные замечания по пятому периодическому докладу Беларуси (CCPR/C/BLR/5).» Комитет по правам человека Организации объединённых наций, 22 Nov. 2018, http://undocs.org/ru/ CCPR/C/BLR/CO/5.
the territory of the Republic of Belarus (item 45). According to the Committee, for Belarus in order to fulfil its obligations assumed by its participation in one of the main international human rights instruments, the Covenant on civil and political rights, the requirement of compulsory state registration must be abolished (item 46).
Although the Belarusian authorities did not abolish the requirement of compulsory state registration of religious organizations, at the end of the year they abolished criminal liability for activities without such registration — amendments were made to the Criminal Code, and the controvercial article 193.1 was deleted. Nevertheless, instead of criminal liability administrative liability was introduced for such activities (art. 23.88, the Code of Administrative Offences), which provides punishment in the form of a fine.
On the one hand, the abolition of article 193.1 can be seen as a step towards the requirements of international organizations and human rights defenders. But this article was not fully applied: state bodies were limited to issuing warnings and demands to stop the activities of unregistered religious organizations under the threat of its application. On the other hand, the weakening of responsibility for such activities may contribute to the fact that the administrative article, which can be held liable even in pre-trial order, will be applied more widely, creating great financial problems for the leaders and members of unregistered religious organizations.
There are religious communities in Belarus that do not want to register because of the peculiarities of their religion. But the registration procedure itself is quite complicated, refusals by registration authorities can be completely opaque. Autonomous communities that are not part of an already registered religious association or a community of a new religious direction for Belarus face particular difficulties in registering. Most often, the authorities refer to the rejection on one or another basis of the proposed legal address. It is also noted that there is a position of local authorities against the registration of new religious communities.
In 2018 the most examplary was the case of pastor V. Novakovski (Pentecostal Church "Thy will be done"), who
made a number of unsuccessful attempts to register his Church, as well as the situation of communities of the religious direction "Jehovah's Witnesses", about ten ofwhich are deprived of state registration.2
Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church and the Belarusian Church
In April, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko addressed the Ecumenical Patriarch with a request to provide autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This request was not the first one, the negotiations of the Ukrainian authorities with Constantinople have been held unsuccessfully since 2008.
In October, the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate revoked the decision dated 1686 on the transfer of the Kyiv Metropolitanate to the Moscow Church, and also recognized the canonical status of the bishops of the alternative jurisdictions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), sending them, and also to the Bishops of the UOC (MP) an invitation to participate in the unification Cathedral of the new Ukrainian Church, which was to receive autocephaly from Constantinople. The jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine was declared invalid.
On December 15, 2018, Kyiv hosted the unification Council of bishops of various Orthodox jurisdictions, mainly the former Kyiv Patriarchate and the UAOC, as well as only two bishops of the UOC (MP), and established a new Church — the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, elected a new head — Epiphany, Metropolitan of Kyiv, and on January 6, 2019, Tomos on autocephaly was received. Thus, there are two Church jurisdictions in Ukraine — the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), recognized by the canonical Patriarchate of Constantinople and whose status is still under consideration by other local Orthodox churches, and the Ukrainian Orthodox
«Беларусь: Приказ не регистрировать новые религиозные общины?» За свабоднае веравызнанне, 30 Jan. 2019, http://forb.by/node/687.
Church (Moscow Patriarchate), recognized as the only canonical Church in Ukraine by the Moscow Patriarchate and whose status is also under consideration by other local churches.
Thus, within Orthodoxy there are processes of self-determination of local Orthodox Churches in relation to Ukrainian Church jurisdictions, as well as along the line Constantinople—Moscow, which are in a conflict.
How does this relate to the situation in Belarus? Firstly, the abolition by Constantinople of the decision to transfer the Kyiv Metropolis, which included the lands of modern Belarus, to the Moscow Church in 1686 should theoretically concern the Belarusian Church, which could be included in the Kyiv Metropolis by such a decision and the canonical jurisdiction of Constantinople could be restored over it. However, this did not happen, and the Belarusian bishops did not receive any invitations from the Patriarchate of Constantinople to take part in the unifying Council. According to Tomos, the territory of the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is limited exclusively to the territory of the modern state of Ukraine and in no way extends to other territories of the former Kyiv Metropolis.
Thus, even with favorable Belarusian legislation, the OCU does not have the canonical right to open parishes or carry out any religious activity on the territory of the Republic of Belarus or outside Ukraine at all. This means that even those Belarusian parishes, bishops and clergymen who were in one way or another connected with the former UAOC and the Kyiv Patriarchate3 will either not be able to obtain canonical status within the OCU, or their status will be limited only to the territory of Ukraine.
Secondly, it creates an actual precedent when, in the presence of an appropriate political, social and internal Church order, the Patriarchate of Constantinople can restore its jurisdiction over the Orthodox Church of the country located on the territory of the Kyiv Metropolis, despite the current jurisdictional affiliation to the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as to regulate the canonical
The BAPC clergy consists of three in Belarus and five in the United States and Australia, the episcopate and the priesthood of the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (http://www.belapc.org/apiskapat-i-svatarstva). In Ukraine, there is also a priest of the former Kyiv Patriarchate, and now OCU, archpriest Sergei Gorbik.
status of this Church, regardless of the position of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Thirdly, the establishment of the OCU, in which the state authorities in Ukraine and President Poroshenko in particular took an active part, and the completion of this process in the form of obtaining Tomos about autocephaly, is an attractive precedent for the Belarusian authorities to create their own Church, independent from Moscow, but more dependent on the Belarusian state. Intensive discussions about autocephaly and the process of its acquisition to a certain extent actualized the discussion about the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Belarus and its greater independence from Moscow in society and in Church circles — both within the official Belarusian Orthodox Church and in alternative jurisdictions. However, this did not lead to the creation of a serious Pro-Autocephalous movement.
The Synod in Minsk
On 15 October in Minsk hosted a regular meeting of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, on the eve of which the Ecumenical Patriarchate made a decision to restore its canonical jurisdiction over the former Kyiv Metropolitanate and to deprive of such jurisdiction from the Moscow Patriarchate. This led to an escalation of relations between the two local Orthodox Churches, which resulted in the adoption of a decision on an extreme canonical measure — the unilateral termination of Eucharistic relations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.4 On the one hand, this phenomenon is not excluded in modern inter-Orthodox relations — the Patriarchate of Antioch exists in the rupture of such relations with the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. On the other hand, both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Patriarchate of Constantinople claim leadership in the Orthodox world, have parishes and diocesan structures abroad, which cooperated within the framework of Episcopal conferences,
«Журнал № 71 заседания Священного Синода от 15 октября 2018 года.» Русская Православная Церковь, 15 Oct. 2018, http://www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/5283687.html.
actively participate in Ecumenical dialogues, and as a result all cooperation was called into question.
For the Belarusian authorities, who constantly try to create an image of a place of reconciliation in Minsk and Belarus, including the religious sphere (we mention, for example, the long-standing idea to hold a meeting of the Pope and the Patriarch of Moscow in Belarus), such a decision to break the Eucharistic relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which journalists and analitics called the "Minsk split or schism", led to image losses. Although this event was actually related to Minsk and Belarus by accident, it was a coincidence in time.
Domestic violence act
In the area of public debate, the churches have once again taken a 'niche' position on the topic of traditional values and traditional family.
In 2018, the draft concept of the Law "On combating domestic violence"5 became the object of criticism, in which the main leader was the Roman Catholic Church in Belarus. In June, Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusevich addressed an open letter to President Lukashenko6, speaking "in defense of the institution of family, moral education of children and youth". Firstly, he noted the need to involve "representatives of traditional Belarusian religions who have been preaching fundamental family values for centuries" in the discussion of these issues. Secondly, he stressed the danger of harmful secular tendencies, first of all gender ideology leading to the destruction of the traditional family and propaganda of non-traditional sexual behavior, including advertising and positive display of
«Проект концепции закона "О противодействии домашнему насилию".» https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AaBR5j5F6QgY1luSffZ9 nonDYTuv0qH6/view.
"Арцыбюкуп Кандрусевiч прэзщэнту Беларуси Каталщю Касцёл гатовы прымаць удзел у абмеркаванш заканадаучых праектау." Catholoc.by, 21 June, 2018, https://catholic.by/3/news/belarus/8264-artsybiskup-kandrusevich-prezidentu-belarusi-katalitski-kastsjol-gatovy-prymats-udzel-u-abmerkavanni-zakanada-chykh-praekta
sodomy lifestyle, which means tolerance towards LGBTQ+ representatives for the "national interests" and "spiritual values of the Belarusian people". Thirdly, without denying the existence of the problem of domestic violence, Kondrusevich called for the protection of "conscientious parents" who have the right to "the slightest and harmless "punishment" of the child for his/ her safety, education and discipline."
Also a Coordination Council of the so called "Pro-family forces" was created, which included a number of public organizations and foundations somehow connected with religious organizations of various directions that began collecting signatures under the collective appeal against the adoption of the law in the proposed version7, which, according to the initiators of the action, "will contribute to interference in the personal, family sphere" and in fact "is a means of gradual dismantling of the institution of the family" through the "destruction of the hierarchical system of the family", which "creates conditions for free violation of the commandment" on the honor of parents and, the consequences would be "the actual recognition of gender equality ... recognition of various non-traditional genders, perversions."
As a result, the Ministry of Internal Affairs preferred not to adopt such a law, citing the fact that its decision is connected "with a high public response and the opinion of religious organizations." On the one hand, unlike the discussion on abortion and reproductive technologies, in the case of legislation on domestic violence in the Pro-Life movement and religious organizations, the legislative process was significantly influenced by their own interests. On the other hand, despite the existence of expert groups within the religious organizations that consider such a law appropriate (a number of Orthodox projects related to combating domestic violence and gender equality, in particular the Union of Sisterhoods of Belarus), in general, religious organizations in the public spectrum have occupied their traditional niche protecting the so-called "family and
«"Это ювенальная юстиция". Пролайферы Беларуси — против проекта закона МВД.» Katolik.life, 22 Aug. 2018, https://katolik.life/rus/ news/sotsium/item/3723-eto-yuvenalnaya-yustitsiya-prolajfery-belarusi-protiv-proekta-zakona-mvd.html.
traditional" values, and criticising gender equality and tolerance to LGBTQ+.
Conclusion
In the near future, the status of the Belarusian Orthodox Church will be updated: the Belarusian authorities, relying on certain forces and moods within the BOC, will try to weaken the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Moscow Patriarchate will seek not only to preserve but also to increase its influence — to compensate for the loss of parishes and structures in Ukraine.
