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CHURCHES IN BELARUS:
OLD PROBLEMS AND NEW LEADERS
Natallia Vasilevich Summary
In 2013, the religious field in Belarus was significantly controlled by the state, which was characterized not only by minor ‘clean-ups’ of Protestants, but the Orthodox and Catholic Churches also suffered some blows, although they tried to control conflict situations. Pro-life values (family, demography, abortions) prevailed on the social agenda of the churches and this caused both unification and protest potential, which, nevertheless, was used too little.
The confrontation in the administration of the Orthodox Church in Belarus regarding the change of the patriarchal exarch was intensified by interference of the state authority, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by the Moscow center, which finally made a single-handed decision and appointed a new Metropolitan of Minsk - an ordinary Russian hierarch without any relations to Belarus.
The arrest of the Roman Catholic priest Uladzislau Lazar by the secret services threatened the established balance between the Belarusian authorities and the Catholic Church and created prerequisites for reformatting their relations in the context of significant staffing changes in the Vatican.
Trends:
• State authorities tend to avoid open confrontation with the Protestant churches, and build communication with them in line with the regulations;
• Churches present themselves in the public sphere around pro-life themes, of which uniting and protest potential remain unrealised;
• Internal controversies in the administration of the BOC and influence of Moscow centre in it are increasing;
• Staff changes on the highest level of the Roman Catholic Church do not improve its relations with the Belarusian authorities.
General update
The number of religious organizations gradually increased during the year, without drastic leaps. According to the official information1 the total number of registered religious *
Information of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs on the ehtnic and confessional situation in the Republic of Belarus and cooperation in the compatriots abroad in 2013, see: http://www.belams21. by/ru/nashi_novosti?id=391774.
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organizations in Belarus reached 3,280 religious communities as of January 1, 2014, of which 1,615 were of the Belarusian Orthodox Church (49.24%), 488 — of the Roman Catholic Church (14.88%), 907 — of the Protestant parishes (27.65%), 520 (15.85%) being of Pentecostals and 287 (8.75%) — of Baptists.
In the summer 2013, a number of mass events in different denominations took place. The number of their participants can give information about activities of believers of different denominations. According to the information of the Interior Ministry 85,000 people participated in the celebration of the 1025th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus with the highest hierarchs of local Orthodox churches. The 400th anniversary celebration of the Budslah icon, attended by papal legate Cardinal Tauran, was visited by around 40,000 people.2 The regional congress of Jehovah’s Witnesses attracted around 10,000 people at the stadium Tractor.3 Despite its situational character, this data has informative potential in the light of the absence of official statistics on the number of believers of each denomination because mass surveys of state and independent agencies differ significantly depending on methodology. Nevertheless, their conclusions are quite similar: those who refer to themselves as Orthodox are the most numerous but the least active, Catholics are significantly less numerous with a medium level of activity, and the not so numerous Protestants are active both religiously and socially.4
Legislation and institutions:
A decade of partnership with the Orthodox Church
On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of signing an agreement between Belarus and the Belarusian Orthodox Church a number of events was held to summarize the results of cooperation. Legal
2
3
4
Information of BelTA information agency.
See: http://news.tut.by/society/361081.htmi.
See more: Vasilevich N. Belorusskaya pravoslavnaya tserkov v teni gosudarstva [Belarusian Orthodox Church in the shadow of the state] // Pro et Contra, 2013, 5(60): 80—96; Vasilevich N. Churches and the State: Ten years after the law On religion // Belarusian Yearbook 2012. Minsk, 2013.
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agreements of this kind were enabled by the amendment to the law On freedom of conscience in 2002, according to which “the state can establish relations with religious associations by signing agreements according to the civil legislation of the Republic of Belarus”.5 This type of agreements have been concluded only with religious associations of the Orthodox Church — the Belarusian Exarchate and single eparchies. Firstly, the Roman Catholic Church has no national religious association, which hinders signing agreements on the national level. Secondly, it yearns to conclude an agreement of a higher level and based on another mechanism-international law. This very form of concordat is traditional for the Roman Catholic Church, but in the Belarusian context, despite numerous statements during the last 6 years, it seems non-realizable.
At the moment, the following documents regulate relations between the church and the state: 1) Program of developing the religious sphere, national relations and cooperation with the compatriots abroadfor 2011—20156 agreed with the only religious organization—the Belarusian Orthodox Church; 2) Framework agreement on cooperation between Belarus and the BOC with priorities set in “public morals, education, culture and creative activities, health, social welfare, charity, support for the family, maternity and childhood, spiritual guidance of the imprisoned, educational, social and psychological work with the military, environmental protection”; 3) agreements and programs with state bodies and organizations that do not have a unified structure and are formulated in the form of “declaration of purposes” or a calendar plan of events, or give the sides certain rights; 4) regional programs and agreements; 5) special statutes or instructions that regulate cooperation:
• Instruction on the procedure of work of the priests of the Belarusian Orthodox Church in correctional institutions, medical and preventive treatments facilities, investigatory isolation wards of the criminal and penal system of the Interior Ministry (2007);
5 Art. 8 of the law Onfreedom ofconscience and religios organizations № 2054-XII.
6 http://www.belarus21.by/dflles/000343_178124_Programma razvitija_
etnokonfess otrasli 20112015 gg.doc
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• Regulations of the order, conditions, contents and forms of cooperation of educational institutions with religious organizations in the issues of moral education (2011);
• Methodical recommendations on organization of cooperation of educational institutions with the Belarusian Orthodox Church (2011).
According to the Regulations (2011), the Ministry of Education concludes agreements on cooperation only with those national religious associations which have agreements on cooperation with the Republic of Belarus in compliance with the civil law, and the only organization of this kind is the BOC. As for the Roman Catholic Church in Belarus, it, firstly, has no national religious association, secondly, it did not signed any agreement on cooperation with the Republic of Belarus, thirdly, the form of such an agreement is concordat, which is not a civil, but an interstate document. Opening a Catholic class in Homiel secondary school № 34 for the school year 2014—2015 failed despite its previous announcement because the respective organs had to explain why it is not possible to cooperate with any religious organization, except the BOC. 7
The new version of the law On social welfare active of January 1, 2013 introduced the common form of cooperation between non-profit organizations (including religious ones) and the government — the state-guaranteed social order. It stipulates financing of social services of non-profit organizations from local budgets, which potentially could provide budgetary financing for churches to implement their social programs. Nevertheless, religious organizations failed to compete in the pilot tender on nursing services put out by local executive and administrative bodies and centres of social welfare as unable to provide the required level of service. The mechanism of the government order for social services is applied in cooperation with the House of Mercy (Minsk) and its rehabilitation centre Eleos.
The management of the religious sphere in regions was transferred from independent departments on religious and national affairs to structural units within chief directorates on
Information of the Commissioner, 2013.
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ideological work, culture and youth affairs of regional executive councils and Minsk city council. Independent departments on religious and national affairs remained only in Brest and Viciebsk regional executive councils.
Points of tension: registration, places of worship, fingerprinting, death penalty, abortions.
Confrontation with non-registered organizations continues, and is connected both with article 193-1 of the Criminal Code criticized by human rights activists and with issues beyond it. The initiated criminal case against the Catholic Shchadrou who organized a shelter for the homeless in the village of Aliaksandrahka, Scucyn district was closed after he registered a private social organization Pavier u stable (‘Believe in yourself). A wave of persecution rose against non-registered Baptist communities in Homiel that gather in private homes for services. First, after the KGB-initiated search on April 14, leaders of the communities Yashchanka and Shchadrenka were sentenced to a fine under article 23.34 part 1 of the Administrative code “Organization and participation in a non-sanctioned mass event”. On December 22, the police conducted another spot check and drew up a report under the same article.8
There was another attempt to put pressure on the New Life church related to its exploitation of the building at Kavaliova Street 72, confrontation around which had lasted for 10 years and which seemed to have been resolved in late 2012.9 The case was renewed for a short time, long enough for the pastor to land in an intensive therapy ward with a stroke, as a result of a long-term confrontation, when on June 13, the marshal of the Economic Court once again demanded that the church vacate the building. The next day the news arrived that the plaintiff — the Directorate of Housing-asked the court to stop the eviction. It is not clear if the decision is final.
What concerns places of worship of the Orthodox and Catholic churches, according to the information of the
8
9
http://forb.by/node/398
See: Vasilevich, Churches and the State, op. cit.
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Commissioner, provision with them is 92 and 98% respectively. Meanwhile, only half of submitted applications for endorsement of locations for constructing religious buildings (22 of 49) were approved.10 11 The reasons for denials are the following: unfinished construction of other buildings and violation of the order of documents submission. In this situation religious communities of the BOC arbitrarily occupy ground areas and construct religious buildings (for example, in Zarecca of Kamianiecki district and Ploscava of Pinsk district, both in Brest region). Although administrative bodies express their discontent with this course of affairs, they treat the Orthodox communities relatively mildly.
The topicality of the fingerprinting issue has lessened11; nevertheless there are still cases when Orthodox priests are sentenced to fines for refusing to undergo the procedure12.
Whereas the public interest in the issue of death penalty has decreased, the question became topical again at the round table of the Council of Europe Religion and death penalty in Minsk on June 21, when Metropolitan Filaret backed abolition of the death penalty.13 Being of relatively little topicality at that moment, this statement drew a wide response in democratic circles but did not turn into a conflict point in relations with the state authorities.
The promotion of family values and campaigns against abortions in the context of both demographic and moral crises remains a source of conflicts. Pro-life values became a uniting discourse for Christian churches in 2013. Moreover, being put on the agenda, this topic has protest potential and the churches might “take to the streets” and work together with civic forces. After the city administration cancelled the national march For
10 Information of the Commissioner, 2013.
11 Vasilevich N. Daktiloskopirovaniye i Tserkov: kontury soprotivleniya [Fingerprinting and the Church: contours of resistance] // [Electronic ressours] Mode of access: http://nmnby.eu/news/express/4863.html.
12 Prilepskiy B. Fr. Obiazatelnaya daktiloskopicheskaya regisratsiya: itogi [Compulsory fingerprinting registration: results] // [Electronic ressours] Mode of access: http://churchby.info/bel/906/
13 Metropolitan of Minsk Filaret (Vakhromeev). The welcoming speech for the participants of the round table “Religion and death penalty”; see http://church.by/ru/node/1085.
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the life, for the family, for the children scheduled for September 21 and organized by the Christian churches and non-governmental organizations of Belarus, the common pro-life movement revealed discrepancies. Firstly, from the outset, the protest component was diligently levelled and confrontation with the authorities was avoided, which did not prevent the latter from banning the march. Cooperation between the churches, despite value and strategic grounding, turned out feeble, which was revealed by the ban.14 And finally, instead of cooperating with political and civic forces, the churches distanced themselves from the BChD petition for amendments to the Belarusian legislation to restrict induced abortions. The churches and pro-life organizations associated with them spoke out, on the one side, for a more radical position—no half-measures, only an outright ban on abortions, on the other hand, their position was less radical in means — they avoided any protest tone in their statements.15
Belarusian Orthodox Church:
the end of the Metropolitan Filaret epoch
For the administration of the BOC, the whole year 2013 was filled with confrontations caused by preparations for the potential replacement of the patriarchal exarch to Belarus, which, nevertheless, happened unexpectedly and with no influence from internal ‘parties’. The decision on the succession of the BOC head was fully concentrated in the hands of the Moscow center, which formally complied with the staffing procedure of the ROC Statute, according to which the Metropolitan of Minsk, Patriarchal Exarch of all Belarus, unlike other bishops of the Belarusian exarchate, is appointed by the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church without nomination from the local Belarusian Synod. Nevertheless, there remained informal means of lobbying a desired candidate given some leverage was still
14 http://www.pro-life.by/analyst/demograficheskaia-dinamika-v-rb/ pervy-j-obshhenatsional-ny-j-marsh-v-zashhitu-zhizni-i-sem-i-opy-t-rekonstruktsii/
15 http://www.pro-life.by/life-protection/ofitsial-noe-zayavlenie-dvizheniya-prolajf-belarus/
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available. But neither the administration of the BOC nor the top administration of Belarus managed to find this leverage, and the Synod of the ROC made a single-handed decision, avoiding open confrontation because of the forced dismissal of the reputable hierarch, and using the formal cause — the statute application for resignation filed by Metropolitan Filaret in 2010 — and sugaring the pill with honorable titles.
At the meeting of the Synod on December 25 a new exarch was appointed—an ordinary hierarch, Razan Matropolitan Pavel (Ponomarev), citizen of the Russian Federation, with no ties to the Belarusian church elites or Belarus in general. This appointment demonstrated a few points. Firstly, the status of the BOC within the Moscow Patriarchate was marked as ‘provincial’ and ‘secondary’. Secondly, it demonstrated mistrust of the local church elites. Thirdly, it ignored the role of President Lukashenka in church issues who, in summer, expressed his readiness to reformat the Orthodox Church in Belarus. Well, the initiative of reformatting was intercepted by the Moscow center.
The Roman Catholic Church: the new Pope
For the Roman Catholic Church the year 2013 was marked by the resignation of the relatively conservative Pope Benedict XVI and election of the new Pope — Cardinal Bergoglio from Argentina, who adopted the name Francis. The new Pope, which became popular in the media, launched a renewal of the Church and made a number of staff and structural changes in the curia. One of the dismissed functionaries was Mr. Bertone, Cardinal Secretary of State, responsible for diplomatic and intergovernmental relations in the Vatican. His visit to Belarus in 2008 marked the start of the so-called ‘turn to the Catholic Church’. Secondly, a number of staff changes took place in Belarus: in spring, Viciebsk bishop Uladzislau Blin resigned, on November 29 three new young bishops were appointed: Aleh Butkevich (Viciebsk doicese), Yury Kasabutski (Auxiliary Bishop of Minsk — Mahiliou) and Iosif Staneuski, which reduced the ‘Polish party’ in the RCC administration, which is experiencing a cutback of priests of the Polish nationality as a
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result of pressure from the state authorities: in 2013, only 135 out of 449 Catholic priests were Poles (146 in 2012).
Thirdly, a considerable conflicting moment was the ‘espionage case’ against priest Uladzislau Lazar, the causes and circumstances of which are still unclear. From their side, the administration of the Roman Catholic Church agreed to publicize his arrest only after the public protests.
As a result, we can speak about the end of the era of promises and relatively friendly air between the state and the Catholic Church that started in 2008, and the inevitability of reformatting bilateral relations.
Conclusion
Single conflict situations with the Orthodox and Catholic Churches did not cause confrontation with the state authority and, on the whole, did not lead to a crisis in relations. Nevertheless, the staff renewal that both major denominations underwent can potentially cause changes both on the church and state-church level. In the second half of next year the authorities might make some populist steps, due to the upcoming election campaign, for retaining control over religious communities. A good moment for that might be the Orthodox-Catholic forum due in Minsk in early June.
The key social and political topics are sure to be demography and abortions; another attempt of consolidation might be made around this agenda. The change in the administration of the BOC is likely to result in staff and structural reforms after the Russian model and develop toward greater centralization. This might lead to decentralization, which could develop from discontent with the new policy, and cause instability. The relations with the Roman Catholic Church will be based on attempts to exploit its foreign-policy and national potential, the ‘espionage case’ might remain a conflicting point. Protestant churches might seize the chance of ‘visa vacations’ during the Ice Hockey World Championship to organize visits for their foreign partners.
