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standards, and Islam itself as the factor determining the form of the political self-organization of peoples.
While realizing the danger of radical trends of political Islam for the social and political stability of the republics of the North Caucasus and the national security of the entire Russian Federation, it would not be correct, nevertheless, to speak of the total Islamization or fundamentalization of the North Caucasus. Likewise it would be wrong to extrapolate the situation of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran or the influence of Islam on the political life of such countries as Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, etc. on to the Muslim republics of the former USSR.
An analysis of the real state of affairs shows that in many cases the revival of interest in traditional Islam, as well as the Wahhabi and other trends of Islamic fundamentalism bears a formal character. One could agree with those experts and scholars who maintain that religious fundamentalism often serves as a substitute for ideology and mythology of ethno-national, cultural, confessional or other self-identification.
"Vlast," Moscow, 2013, No 4, pp. 79-83.
T. Chabiyeva,
Political analyst
RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OF YOUNG PEOPLE
AND THE WAHHABI TREND IN INGUSHETIA
The processes of re-Islamization exert a serious influence on the socio-political situation in the North Caucasus. The radical Islamist trends which have tried to proclaim themselves a public and political force right after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. are playing a special role. In the 1990s adherents to the Wahhabi trend emerged on the Russian political scene, which immediately began to fight for
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domination among Muslims and opposed the official authorities. Then came a legislative ban on their activity and the Wahhabi trend went underground. Following this, political influence of traditional Islam in Russia has increased.
In experts' views, the Wahhabi trend and its adherents took the niche in the social and spiritual life of Muslims in the North Caucasus, which was not occupied by traditional Islam. The view is current that the Wahhabi trend became so widespread in the North Caucasian region, particularly in the Republic of Ingushetia, due to the absence of the active resistance on the part of the authorities and clergy. However, the real reasons for this phenomenon are much deeper. The spreading of Islamic radicalism has largely been due to the high level of unemployment (along with the high birthrate and high population density). In the first decade of this century the army of the unemployed in the republic grew by 3,500 people annually. Among other factors are the increasing social differentiation of the population and continuing interethnic tension. In the conditions of contradictory social problems the role of religion has grown considerably. The motive of social injustice proved the initial ideological point of departure which explains the popularity of and demand for Wahhabi political views.
The ranks of extremists are constantly replenished by young men from the marginal sections of society. But in recent years young students and institute graduates have joined their ranks. There are widely-known cases of young people telling their relatives and friends about their going to take exams, but in reality they join the terrorist underground in Ingushetia itself, or leave for training centers in other Muslim countries.
The spreading of Wahhabi ideas in Ingushetia reached its peak in 1993-1994, the years often referred to as "religious renaissance." In
1997, the Wahhabi Muslims organized a study and training center in the mountains of Ingushetia where they taught Arabic and fundamentalist Islam to local residents free of charge. Simultaneously, instructors from Arab countries taught them methods of armed combat. When the authorities learned about the camp it was immediately closed, but the institution of "parallel Islam" through which part of Russian traditional Muslims began to interact closely with representatives of the Arab world has become stronger and more influential in the region. There were several channels of Wahhabi ideas' penetration in Ingushetia. Among them Muslim education received by Ingush young men in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait. Then there was the "chain reaction" of the Wahhabi trend spreading in Dagestan and Chechnya. At the initial stage there were many Arab lecturers and instructors at the Ingush Islamic Institute and their lectures and lessons were of a fundamentalist character.
In the neighbouring republics of Chechnya and Dagestan the Wahhabi trend took its radical form at the very beginning. But in Ingushetia it coexisted with "traditional" Islam. The activity of the "Ingush Wahhabis" manifested itself in the late 1990s. On July 30,
1998, a conference of the republican clergy and public took place in the republican capital which declared that "the Wahhabi trend opposes traditional Sufi Islam and that the Wahhabi ideas are alien to modern Ingush society and its century-long traditions and customs." On August 2 the republican leadership, mosque imams and religious authorities decided to ban the Wahhabi trend officially.
Since then the mass media have been publishing numerous articles and features denouncing Wahhabi ideology. The actions of all religious organizations were placed under control of the republican authorities. The law-enforcement agencies were instructed to expel persons without Russian citizenship and who were engaged in "illegal
religious activity in the Wahhabi spirit" from the republic and cancel the licenses for educational work of those organizations which were financed from abroad. These measures were supported by the public.
Religion in Post-Soviet Societies
The Dagestani authorities, jointly with the Muslim spiritual leaders, have also begun a broad campaign to eradicate radical Islam in their republic, and within a short space of time have restored control over the situation in the religious sphere. On September 16, 1999, it was announced at a session of Dagestani parliament that "all Wahhabi trends were banned on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan, and all adherents of Wahhabi ideas were placed on the same footing as extremists and terrorists and outlawed." Persons suspected of adhering to Wahhabi trends were put on register by law-enforcement agencies, and suspicious communities (jamaats) were closed. Similar measures have also been taken in other republics of the North Caucasus.
In North Ossetia there are twenty-four Muslim communities at present. Besides, according to statistical data by 2010, 28,300 Ingush and 16,100 Kumyks live in Ossetia. In recent years many Chechens have moved to Mozdok district, and now 2,200 people of that nationality live there. In the view of the Ossetian leadership, there are no grounds for the activities of the adherens of Wahhabi trends in North Ossetia.
In 2002, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted the federal law "On Opposing Extremist Activity." But despite all attempts of the authorities to restrict Wahhabi activities, it is too early now to speak of stopping Wahhabi propaganda altogether.
At the initial stage adherents of Wahhabi trends preached at mosques where adherents of tariqat (followers of Sufi) offered their prayers. When contradictions between them took an acute form
radically-minded young people were driven out from these mosques. Later, Wahhabi believers began to open their own mosques. The authorities continue to work on establishing control over mosques. Sermons there are often attended by representatives of the federal security service and representatives of the muftiate.
Apart from lectures and sermons read by representatives of the Wahhabi trend, among the sources of radical ideas in the republics of the North Caucasus are books and numerous pamphlets published by members of the Wahhabi movement. Inasmuch as this movement is supra-national, it is striving to spread its views among as many people as possible, and, consequently, literature containing propaganda of radical views is published in the language understood by all, that is, in Russian. This was the case of the North Caucasus during the period between the early 1990s and the autumn of 1999. But in Ingushetia religious literature of extremist nature began to be distributed in big circulations in the early 2000s.
The basis of the confrontation between Caucasian young people and the older generation is their position on Islam. Part of young people is bent to radical Islam or "pure Islam" of the Wahhabi trend and is against "traditional Islam."
Fundamentalism in Islam is manifested in its radical-conservative political essence. The ideas of fundamentalism in the North Caucasian region were actively implemented in accordance with the situation there and under different slogans. For instance, in Chechnya this idea boiled down to the independence of the republic, and in Dagestan the idea was to create an Islamic state. In Ingushetia this movement had no clear-cut political essence.
In 1998 the Coordination Council of Muslims of the North Caucasus was set up. From that time on the muftis of the republics in the South of Russia decided to join efforts to oppose the spreading radical
religious currents. However, the measures adopted against the Wahhabi elements only hampered their activity and forced them to go underground, but they changed their tactic in influencing rank-and-file believers.
Today the number of adherents and supporters of the Wahhabi trend cannot be ascertained exactly. According to various estimates, there are from 20,000 to 100,000 active Wahhabi members in Dagestan. In Ingushetia their number is several hundred, and in Chechnya about a thousand.
The negative attitude to the Wahhabi trend in Ingushetia has intensified due to mass murders of Muslim religious leaders, who enjoyed popularity among local inhabitants.
Attempts on the life of spiritual leaders in Ingushetia are a natural continuation of Wahhabis' demands that imams and mullahs should be appointed only from among the fundamentalists. Such actions are a challenge to society and they enhance anti-Wahhabi sentiments in Ingushetia.
Since 2004 terrorist acts against representatives of the police and law-enforcement agencies have become more frequent. They are the main target of terrorists in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and eastern districts of Stavropol Territory.
In Ingushetia contradictions have been growing between fundamentalists and traditionalists, and both these currents are politicized and radicalized.
Those adhering to the Wahhabi trend in Ingushetia have strong and weak sides. Among the former is their powerful ideological potential which attracts whole groups of the population. These are the ideas of fraternity, a unified Sharia state, equality and justice. However, there is no clear-cut program. Social differences between the followers and opponents of the Wahhabi trend are sometimes due to the absence of experts in the Islamic law - fikh. The Wahhabi trend rejects the idea
of a dialogue with any traditional religious community, and this partly undermines its social basis.
One of the specific features of the fight against the Wahhabi trend in Ingushetia is cooperation between state power and the muftiate. The state bears the main responsibility for opposition to radicalism and initiates the necessary measures in this sphere. Ruslan Aushev, when he was the President of the Republic of Ingushetia, banned the Wahhabi trend. He recognized only traditional Islam on the republican territory. The influence of the state on the religious life of Ingush society is confirmed by the introduction of Sharia courts and lessons of "true" Islam in schools. It can be said that Islam in Ingushetia has become part of the system of state power and government bodies. Sometimes mullahs and imams give lectures to servicemen in the Ministry for the Interior on "traditional" and "non-traditional" Islam and their difference.
The death of the Chechen separatist leaders Abdulkhalim Saidulayev and Shamil Basayev, the destruction of the Kabardino-Balkarian underground in 2005 made it possible to believe that the armed Wahhabi resistance was suppressed. However, after the announcement by Doku Umarov about the creation of the "Imarat Kavkaz," local radical groupings in Ingushetia have become more active. The republic became a battleground between militants and government forces, and some people predicted it the fate of "another Chechnya." In 2007 armed clashes became more frequent, streets were patrolled by military vehicles, army and police units were deployed virtually in all districts of the republic. At that time the mass "anti-Wahhabi purges" were carried out in the republic. All this caused justified indignation of the population who were unable to lead a normal life. People accused the republican authorities of inability to cope with the situation, and they were afraid of the breaking out of military hostilities similar to those in Chechnya.
In the summer of 2009 the regime of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was lifted, but subversive and terrorist activity moved over to the neighboring republics - Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria.
In 2010 the authorities in Ingushetia were able to turn the tide for the better. Thus, Ingushetia, just as Dagestan and Chechnya, managed to rebuff the onslaught of Wahhabi elements.
Yet the Wahhabi movement still draws young people in Ingushetia to its ranks and destabilizes the situation in the republic. Terrorist acts do not stop and civilian population continues to suffer.
Although the control of the authorities and clergy over religious life restrains the spreading of the Wahhabi trend, the radicalization process of people, especially young men, continues in the present conditions, which should be changed, above all.
The authorities should act in the social sphere. They should end unemployment by creating new jobs and improve the population's living conditions. It is necessary to realize that religious persecutions have strengthened the positions of the Wahhabi elements which have gone underground. As experts, note, the present situation in Ingushetia is a principally new challenge to Russia. It requires new approaches and new decisions and solutions unlike those used in Chechnya.
In order to lead Ingushetia out of the present difficult situation, it is necessary to implement broad socio-economic transformations, organize constant dialogue between the younger and older generations, and carry on joint work by the republican authorities, clergy and civil society's bodies. It is necessary to give the young people a social perspective and foster knowledge about their people's history and culture in them.
"Etnopoliticheskaya situatsiya v Rossii i sopredelnykh gosudarstvakh v 2011,"Moscow, 2012, pp. 272-281.
