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R. SULEIMANOV, K. KHIKMETOV. THE ROLE OF THE 'KURDISH FACTOR' IN THE COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY ON JULY 15, 2016 // The article is written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World".
Keywords: Turkey, coup d'etat, parliamentary elections, Justice and Development party, People's Democratic party, Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK), Turkish Kurdistan, anti-terrorist operation, Turkish armed forces.
R. Suleimanov,
fourth-grade student, World Policy department, Moscow State University; A. Khikmetov,
second-grade post-graduate student, World Policy department, Moscow State University
Abstract. There was a military coup attempt in Turkey on the night of July 16, 2016. According to official data, 240 people were killed, and 2,200 were wounded during the disturbances. Quite a few factors pointed to the possibility of a coup in the country, the main one being the growing tension and instability during the past several months preceding the event (major terrorist acts in Ankara and Istanbul serve as an example).
This article shows the role of the Kurdish factor as one of the key reasons for the coup attempt. It also describes in detail the current situation in the region of Turkish Kurdistan, where bitter fighting resumed in July 2015.
On the night of July 16, 2016, a coup attempt took place in Turkey organized by military officers. It is a generally recognized fact that the ruling Justice and Development party during its reign since 2002 has succeeded to lower the role of the Turkish army in the country to a great extent. However, the military operations developing on the territory of Turkish Kurdistan from the summer of 2015 (after the ruling party lost its parliamentary
majority necessary for the formation of government at the elections to parliament on June 7) have shown that the military elite has gradually returned its former influence in the country, and the coup attempt was its consequence and confirmation. The investigation of the developments carried on by the Turkish authorities has given a clearer picture of the "Kurdish factor" playing a major role in them.
Background
On June 7, 2015, elections to parliament took place in Turkey at which the Justice and Development part lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002, having gained 40.87 percent of votes (258 seats in parliament). The People's Democratic Party supporting the rights of the Kurds won 13.12 percent of votes (80 seats in parliament). Now the representatives of the Justice and Development party had to come to agreement with other parties in parliament in order to form a coalition. Otherwise, new elections should have been held.
From the very beginning it was clear that a coalition could not have been formed largely due to the unwillingness of the ruling party leaders, and President Erdogan personally. Realizing this, the Justice and Development party, with a view to reducing the number of potential voters for the People's Democratic party, provoked an armed conflict in the volatile region of Turkish Kurdistan. On July 20, 2015, a terrorist act was committed in the town of Suruc in the south-west of Turkey, in which 32 people were killed and 104 injured. Responsibility for this act was laid on the Islamic state. Two days later two policemen were murdered near Suruc. Responsibility for this was initially taken by the PKK (banned and branded as terrorist in Turkey) and declared as the act of retaliation for the explosion in Suruc, but in several hours the PKK representatives announced that they were not to blame. On July 25 Turkish planes bombarded several
targets on the territory of Iraq. Officially the bombing attacks were made on the Islamic state positions, but in actual fact all air strikes were aimed at the positions of the Kurds living in Iraq and their military units.1 At the same time the Turkish authorities began a massive anti-terrorist operation in Turkish Kurdistan. Due to this, representatives of the PKK declared that it was absolutely impossible to observe the truce, which existed in the region of Turkish Kurdistan since 2013. (The truce was proclaimed in order to unite efforts in the fight against the Islamic state. That was how another relatively peaceful period in the history of the "Kurdish problem" has ended, and real military operations began with the use of heavy artillery and aviation, which continue to this day.
As a result of the unfolding conflict hundreds of thousands of the population of the Turkish Kurdistan had to leave their homes, and hundreds of peaceful citizens, soldiers and policemen were killed.2
The Military Gain More Influence
From the very start of military operations in Turkey the role of the army began to grow. As is known, during the stay of the Justice and Development party in power the army's role has been reduced considerably, which was shown by the referendum of September 12, 2010, which abolished the role of military tribunals and lifted legal immunity of the participants in the military coup on September 12, 1980. Several months prior to the conflict in Turkish Kurdistan, from the summer of 2015, the Turkish military received certain concessions and privileges. For example, on June 7, 2016, the Council of Ministers of the country adopted a special law concerning servicemen. According to it, criminal proceedings against all military men could only be started on approval of the Minister of Defense.
The Turkish leadership rendered all-round support to the military. Most Turkish mass media which are under complete
control of the country's authorities due to the present-day legislation3 have been lauding the military, calling them "heroes and defenders of the nation from the terrorist threat." President Erdogan himself has time and again stated that the military should receive everything they need for "successful struggle against the PKK terrorists." However, several days later, after the abortive coup, it was announced that many of those who had been proclaimed "true patriots of the Turkish nation" turned out to be "traitors."
On March 1, 2016, the "Anadolu" News agency circulated an article highly praising General Adem Huduti, who was later arrested as one of the active rebels.4
Five thousand servicemen of the Turkish special forces had to be redeployed to Ankara. However, the population of the locality of their former deployment, together with the local police, prevented the operation by blocking the airport5 An important role was planned for six F-16 fighter-planes which were supposed to bomb administrative buildings in Ankara. 6
The military, who captured the TRT TV-studio on the night of July 16, publicly announced the true aims of the coup. It became clear from their statement that one of the reasons for the coup was the desire to stop the military hostilities in Turkish Kurdistan. It was said, among other things, that "the basic rights and freedoms in the country are in jeopardy..., our country is under an autocratic regime based on fear., today innocent people lose their life for nothing." 7 In this way the military and representatives of the security forces taking part in the operations in the southeast of Turkey expressed their desire to end the war in the country, come out as "saviors of the nation," and raise their prestige among the Turkish population.
The Coup Attempt as a Possibility
for Peaceful Settlement of the Kurdish Problem
After the abortive coup a new opportunity has emerged to resolve the Kurdish problem peacefully, return to : and cease military hostilities. Immediately after the coup of July 16, the cochairman of the People's Democratic party Selahattin Demirtas said the following: "The emerging opportunities should be regarded positively. It is now quite clear that our society, which has been divided by great polarization for a very long time, has now become a single whole."8
But the Turkish leadership has taken a course aimed at pursuing a harsh policy toward the Kurdish population and all people of Turkey, which shows that the Turkish establishment is now dominated by the hawks. After the events of July 15 and up to this day, more than one hundred mass media of the opposition have been closed down. Out of 106 cochairmen of municipal councils, who are members of the Democratic Regions party, thirty-nine have been arrested.9 In Kurdistan cochairmen of 24 municipal councils have been removed from their posts, and dozens of local officials have been arrested. To date twenty Kurdish radio and TV companies have been closed down on the order of the Turkish authorities, and dozens of local officials have been fired and thrown into prison. On September 2, 2016, Turkey's Prime Minister Binali Yildirim announced that "from July 24 of last year onwards the country has been waging the fight against terrorism according to new rules." 10 Two days later he said that about 14,000 teachers would be fired on suspicion of ties with the PKK. 11 According to the data by November 24, 2016, about 5,530 Kurdish political and civic leaders were arrested during the past year. 12
Moreover, representatives of the Turkish authorities today accuse the deputies of the People's Democratic party of maintaining ties with the "Hizmet" movement and personally with Fethullah Gulen, who is regarded in Turkey as the
ringleader of the failed coup. The Turkish mass media actively spread rumors and information about the movement's direct participation in the coup in 1980. 13 In turn, President Erdogan, in one of his public speeches in 2012, invited Fethullah Gulen to return to Turkey from the United States where he lived in exile for 13 years while being on the wanted list. 14 As is known, the Justice and Development party has played a considerable role in the assimilation policy of Kurds by sponsoring the "Hizmet" movement (schools, lyceums, universities), which was granted carte blanche on the territory of Turkish Kurdistan.
It should be noted that three months before the events of July 15, the newspaper "Hurriyet" in its April 6 issue published a statement of the former military prosecutor Ahmet Zeki in which he warned the authorities and Turkish public of the forthcoming coup. 15
Some people asserted that under the guise of fighting anti-government rebels an open struggle against the democratic forces was going on. Besides, there were quite a few important persons among government officials and those in the Justice and Development party who were well aware of the preparations for the coup. And President Erdogan also knew about it. But he did nothing to nip them in the bud. He was solely concerned of strengthening his personal power.16
More and more facts come to light showing that Erdogan knew about the revolt, and the events on the night of July 16 could be viewed as beneficial for the powers that be, because the failed coup gave a free hand to the Justice and Development party in its campaign against the opposition: mass arrests of journalists, university teachers and scholars, closing down of newspapers, magazines, radio and TV channels, and civil societies continue to this day.17 Actually, it is the massive struggle against the opposition forces in Turkey. By November 2016 nine deputies to parliament from the People's Democratic Party, including its leader Selahattin Demirtas, were arrested.
The leader of the Republican People's party Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who has previously supported the ruling Justice and Development party, but later became disappointed in its activity, commented on the present-day policy of the Turkish authorities by saying that the real coup was going on in Turkey now. TV channels, newspapers and magazines are c and journalists and writers are thrown into prison.18
The Justice and Development Party Is Toughening
Its Policy Towards the Kurds
On September 4, 2016, the Prime minister of Turkey Binali Yildirim announced that right after the events of July 15, the Turkish government disbanded the PKK cells in Hakkari province which had been active there during the past thirty years. 19 However, statements issued by the People's Defense Forces (the armed wing of the PKK) disprove this. According to their information, in special operations they have carried out, fifteen members of the Turkish gendarmerie were killed and twenty-five wounded.20 From August 30 until September 10, 2016, as a result of land and air operations ninety-nine men and officers of the Turkish army were killed.
Fourteen Kurdish guerillas lost their homes as a result of bombardment, one drone was brought down, and one tank and three helicopters were destroyed. 21
Parallel with this, from August 30 to September 2, 2016, eighty-six Turkish soldiers were killed and fifty-eight soldiers wounded. 22
According to the data of the People's Self-defense Headquarters, there were 1,199 armed clashes between the Kurdish fighters and the Turkish army in the period between July 24, 2015, and July 23, 2016. As a result of military hostilities 2,982 men and officers were killed and 1,146 men and officers wounded. Guerilla losses are estimated at 435 men. 23
The command of the People's Self-defense Forces (the PKK armed wing) has informed that in the military operations in Turkish Kurdistan 1,736 soldiers of the Turkish army and policemen were killed and four tanks and 120 armored vehicles were destroyed from August to October 2016. The Kurdish guerillas lost 214 men during the same period. 24
The Chairman of the People's Republican People's party Kemal Kilicdaroglu, commenting on the latest losses of the Turkish army, stated that "it is the political leadership of the country that is responsible for the death of so many of our children. It is they who must explain where our country is heading to." 25
The Workers' Party of Kurdistan has changed its tactic with a view to protecting the life of peaceful citizens. Now its operations are mainly directed to the key positions of the Turkish armed forces and it cautions Kurdish young men against taking part in any military actions. The main armed clashes are now taking place in mountains, where the Turkish army suffers serious losses. However, in the period from July 15 to 19, 2016, the Kurdish fighters did not take part in any clashes with the government forces.
On August 20, 2016, the Union of Communities of Kurdistan distributed the following information: "Recently, quite a few states, international and Turkish organizations, as well as organizations of Southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan asked the Kurdistan Workers' Party to resume negotiations with the Turkish authorities. After their request we deemed it necessary to present our view to the world public.
We propose the following steps for a solution of the Kurdish problem. The ruling Justice and Development party should show good will in its desire to resolve it and take the necessary steps for their implementation. The party should organize and hold a meeting with our leader Abdullah Ocalan, with Turkish parliamentarians taking part. If all conditions for negotiations are created and representatives of all political forces
of Turkey (including parties outside its parliament), representatives of civil organizations and religious groups - those who support movements for democracy and freedom are drawn in this process, we guarantee agreement with all necessary actions on our part and full responsibility for the due procedure of negotiations. 26
The Invisible Hand of Ocalan
Right after the abortive coup the Kurdish population began to worry over the fate of its permanent leader Abdullah Ocalan who, incidentally, predicted the possibility of a coup in 2014 already. In the past four-five months preceding the abortive coup he repeatedly stated that if the Kurdish problem was not solved peacefully, the country might face a coup.
On September 5, 2016, fifty Kurdish politicians went on hunger strike and demanded that the Turkish authorities arrange their meeting with Ocalan. On September 11, 2016, there was a meeting of Abdullah Ocalan with his younger brother Mehmet. Through him he gave the following message: "My incarceration continues but I have no health problems. Several of my colleagues are also here and we continue to work on our project. If the state is prepared to talk about it, we could reach an agreement within six months. First of all, it should be stated that we are not to blame for violating the peace process. The Kurdish problem is a very difficult one. It has not been solved during the past twenty years. Neither had it been solved during 150 or 200 years. Thirty people die every day. If the government were honest, there would not have been so many deaths. All people with conscience should realize this. If the government is ready for negotiations, it should send its representatives here. We have worked out the necessary proposals and we shall be able to settle the problem within six months. The war makes people blind. There can be no winner in this war, which lasts for forty years already. And it can continue for another eighty years. This must
not happen. There should be no more blood and tears. The Kurdish problem cannot be solved unilaterally by the biggest party in the country. If the state had realized this, the war would not have lasted for such a long time, and the problem would have been settled." 27
The cochairman of the People's Democratic Party Selahattin Demirtas, speaking about the meeting of Ocalan with his younger brother and addressing the Turkish leadership, said the following: "Both the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Turkish leadership should have understood a long time ago that the Kurdish problem could not be resolved by military means and methods. We adhere to the same positions which we outlined in our election program on June 7, 2015. And we are quite sincere in it. If we have the slightest opportunity for a dialogue, we are sure to use it as fully as possible." 28
In conclusion we would like to note that the Kurdish problem is one of the key issues for the entire state. The abortive coup of July 15, 2016, and the subsequent toughening of the policy pursued by the Turkish leadership, have evidently exacerbated the situation in Kurdistan and revealed quite a few problems of modern Turkey which have been in the offing for a long time.
As is known, the Justice and Development party is forced to enter into allied relations with the ultranationalist organization "Ergenikon" in opposition to the "Hizmet" movement. It can be expected that having smashed the coup supporters the Justice and Development party will enter into a conflict with "Ergenikon." Mention should also be made of the ultranationalistic politician Dogu Perincek, leader of the Turkish Vatan Party, who positions himself as an enemy of all supporters of Erdogan and Gulen. And all of them come out against the Kurdish movement.
The ruling Justice and Development party is unable to take an independent and effective decision for solving the Kurdish problem. It enters into alliance with chauvinistic organizations,
such as the Nationalist Movement party and "Ergenekon," which can hardly help resolve the Kurdish problem.
In the past several months, especially after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, the Kurdish problem has become ever more pressing. And the harsh measures taken by the country's leadership only aggravate the situation around Turkish Kurdistan.
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The author describes the changes in political life of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the first decade of the 21st century, showing the status of the government and society in the transition from traditional to modern. For half a decade of this century there have been major political changes in the Arab
