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Политические проблемы международных отношений, глобального
и регионального развития
Л. Саваста
Террористы или герои? К вопросу об определении понятия «терроризм»
в государственном и международном праве
В статье показано, какие шаги должно предпринять государство против терроризма, каковы права государства и как оно может действовать (право на самооборону, в каких случаях оно может быть расширено за пределы границ государства, пропорциональность применения силы). В первой части статьи дано определение терроризма и тех законов, которые могут быть отменены при совершении террористической атаки. Далее автор указывает, каким образом в данной ситуации может применяться международное право. Это объяснение дается с использованием двух примеров: борьбы Турции против Рабочей партии Курдистана (РПК) и иракских курдских сил самообороны (Пешмерга) в Ираке против ИГИЛ (ISIS)1. Основное внимание в данных разделах статьи уделяется тому, как международное право, а точнее говоря, международные органы, действуют с использованием двойных стандартов, в зависимости от того, какое государство находится под угрозой. По мнению автора, действия международных организаций противоречивы, а законы неточны, потому что «стандарта поведения» в данном случае даже не существует из-за того, что международные органы пока не в состоянии дать определение понятия «терроризм». Ключевые слова: борьба с терроризмом, самооборона, применение силы, Рабочая партия Курдистана (РПК), иракские курды, международное право, Турция.
1 Организация запрещена на территории Российской Федерации.
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L. Savasta P5 &
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Terrorists or Heroes? J
On the definition § t
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of the concept of 'terrorism' g
in public and international law
Terrorism has always been present in modern world as a method for acquiring something specific (land, recognition, power, natural resources) from the sovran state where it is located. There have been different forms of terrorism but the one we know right now is called 'modern terrorism', and it operates through mass killings caused by bombs (suicide bombers mainly) and fighting actions (almost war actions). The latest attacks in the western world and the ongoing war on terrorism carry one name: ISIS.
But before ISIS erupted there have been many others, which were promoting different ideologies in various countries. The main countries that have been or still are under threat are: Israel, Turkey, USA, Afghanistan, Iraq and Russia. Almost all of them have now ties also with the war on terror and have been plagued by terroristic actions made by Dae'sh in the last 4/5 years. But two out of these have a particular connection: Turkey and Iraq; this is due by the presence of an ethnic group which is playing and have played a particular role in these states: Kurds.
This name is very well known worldwide right now for their armed forces which are fighting and making withdraw the Caliphate fighters: the Peshmerga, in Iraqi Kurdistan. But many of us could remember this ethnic group also if we go back to the 80s and 90s in Turkey, when the PKK (the terroristic Kurdish group) was starting its campaign for recognition of itself as ethnic minority in the country, using a sort of 'terroristic deterrence'.
The focus of this article is on how Turkey behaved in its fight against PKK and how the international bodies and laws have been applied in this case, and how instead the Iraqi Kurds are fighting ISIS terroristic group and how in this case international actors and forces are displayed and how they are moving on the ground. Doing this we could see that international law is still unclear on the topic and how this can be described using different shadows which make a set of very strong different colors when we look on the real actions. And also which are the systems and the steps that a state under terror attack has to take.
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lil The right to self-defense in international law
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When a state is under threat by a terroristic group, what it can and should o e^o do? A topic which is very common (unfortunately) in our present times, but g| is particularly curious in all this matter against terrorism is the right to self-defense and I think is a good point from where we can start talking about counter terrorism [2, p. 19-21]. = As noted, Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 cited the inherent
right to self-defense in the specific context of international terrorism. One involves ascertaining whether an action constitutes an 'armed attack', for under Article 51 the right to defend oneself surfaces only in the face of such attack. It is arguable that certain operations that do not involve physical force, such as a computer network attack, might be a use of force, but not an armed attack. It is therefore the scale and the effects of the act that are determinative in assessing whether an armed attack is taking place such that a right to respond in self-defense vests. Despite the gaps, however, it would appear that the level of violence necessary to rise to the level of an armed attack is markedly low [ibid.].
This can be the case of PKK, which was/is considered a terroristic group, even if they have always claimed that their actions were against a status of annihilated minority. It is also recognized from many different international bodies (governative and non governative) that the behavior from the Turkish part towards the Kurdish minority has never followed the human rights and or the law of proportionality in the use of force (even if this point is quite dark too). However, customary international law imposes certain requirements on self defense. The principle of necessity requires that the resort to force occur only when no other reasonable options remain to frustrate continuation of the armed attack [ibid.].
Transposing the standard to terrorism, the question is whether law enforcement operations are likely to be sufficient to forestall continuation of the armed attack, such operations may be undertaken by the victim State, the State where the terrorists are based, or, for that matter, any other State. The proportionality principle simply requires that the response in self defense be no more than necessary to defeat the armed attack and remove the threat of reasonably foreseeable future attacks. As to the size of the attack, it would be absurd to suggest that there must be an equivalency of force between the armed attack and self defense [ibid.]. Requiring equivalency of nature is equally inappropriate, at first glance, a standard of proportionality vis a vis the harm caused (or possible) to the victim might seem more reasonable.
But such a standard ignores the fact that international law grants States the right to self defense in order that they not be rendered helpless in the face
of an attack. Finally, there have been suggestions that self defense operations
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are disproportionate if they cause more collateral damage and incidental injury than the civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects originally 02° suffered by the victim State (case of Kurds in Turkey). § ^
Claims of this nature confuse the self defense proportionality requirement I ^ of the jus ad bellum with the proportionality principle contained in the law ^ governing how force may be applied once a state of armed conflict exists (jus o in bello). Restated in the context of terrorism, the proportionality standard allows only that degree of force necessary to fend off a terrorist attack and protect oneself from a future continuation thereof. But the force necessary to achieve this purpose may far exceed that employed in the attack; terrorists often operate in loose networks from dispersed locations, receiving logistic support in ways intended to mask its nature. The most responsive balance between these two interests lies in permitting a use of defensive force in advance of an attack if the potential victim must immediately act to defend itself in a meaningful way and if the potential aggressor has irrevocably committed itself to attack [2, p. 22-25].
The approach reflects the reality of combat, in which pauses are the norm, not the exception, and treating a series of actions as a unitary whole makes particular sense in the context of terrorism. Terrorist campaigns generally consist of a series of actions that occur periodically over extended periods of time, by this interpretation, it is not the imminency of an isolated action that is relevant, but rather the relationship between a series of attacks. It is apparent, therefore, that the international community does not view the applicability of a criminal law enforcement regime as precluding a response in self defense to an armed attack by terrorists [ibid.]. Necessity requires an absence of reasonable alternatives to the defensive use of force, in this context, then, the State may only act against the terrorists if classic law enforcement reasonably appears unlikely to net those expected to conduct further attacks before they do so.
How and when a state can conduct cross border counter terrorist operations
While it is appropriate to extend self defense to acts committed by non State actors, and though the availability of criminal law enforcement responses does not preclude doing so, since non State actors possess no territory as a matter of international law (they may in fact), can the victim State enter another State's territory in order to conduct self defense operations?
The State in which the terrorists are located has a right of territorial integrity, this well established customary international law right creates corresponding duties in other States. For instance, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits
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the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. The State o^o victimized by terrorism has a right to self defense. No one would dispute that c^i a State forfeits a degree of its right to territorial integrity when it commits | ^ acts that vest the right to self defense in another State, at least to the extent & s necessary for self defense to be meaningful [2, p. 27-35]. Should a State be ¡5 unable or unwilling to comply with this obligation, the victim State is then
§ permitted to enter the territory of the State where the terrorists are located c for the limited purpose of conducting self defense operations against them? Of course, all requirements of self defense must be met. There must be an ongoing armed attack (or armed campaign), no reasonable alternative to the penetration of State as territory for the purpose of using force against the terrorists can exist, and the force used has to be limited to that necessary to accomplish the defensive objectives [ibid.].
Once those objectives are attained (the terms 'State A' and 'State B' will be used for this explanation), State B must immediately withdraw because at that point there is no right of self defense to justify its violation of State A's territorial integrity. Finally, State A may not interfere with the self defense operations, as State B is simply exercising a right under international law. For example, the international community was unsupportive as Turkey mounted regular incursions into Northern Iraq against Kurdish terrorists throughout the 1990s, the opposition arguably was driven by factors other than the legal acceptability of crossing into Iraq [ibid.]. At the time there was de minimus concern over violation of Iraq's territorial integrity, as Iraqi forces and government officials were already excluded from the area due to their suppression of the Kurds.
Rather, criticism most likely derived from irritation over interference with the relief and no fly operations in Northern Iraq and concern over a track record of human rights abuses against the Kurds during Turkish military operations conducted in Southeastern Turkey [ibid.]. We could say that Turkey, historically, has always wanted to go back in time (and even with some actions nowadays) till 'the Ottoman Empire'. Or at least if they are accused of entering without any political reason in another state (as they are doing now in the Iraqi territory) they always find the excuse of 'historical duty'.
Basically, the adequacy of a request to the State in which terrorists are located, as well as the sufficiency of the response thereto, must be assessed contextually. There are various circumstances in which it is unquestionable that one State can enter the territory of another to conduct defensive counter terrorist operations. An option is upon invitation, though any such operation would have to comply with the relevant provisions of human rights and humanitarian law, as well as any conditions imposed by the host State [ibid.].
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of the State such that its attacks can be deemed those of the State itself.
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the penetration of the attacker's territory is whether cross border operations § ^
More problematic is the situation in which the terrorist group acts on behalf f the State such that its attacks can be deemed those of the State itself. As in traditional armed attacks by a State actor, the sole question regarding
are necessary, proportional and in response to an armed attack. To the extent the State could be attacked in self defense, so too can the terrorist group that ^ actually executed the armed attack.
The question of armed attack, its proportionality and imminency
A community consensus now appears to exist that armed attacks may be conducted by terrorist organizations, at the same time, such attacks constitute violations of international and domestic criminal law. To amount to an armed attack, the scale and effects must be significant, although in a series of related attacks significance is a cumulative calculation [2, p. 27-35].
This is a somewhat ambiguous standard, but factors such as the nature and capabilities of the organization conducting the attack, the extent of human injury and physical damage caused, the relation of the attack to previous attacks and the method and means used to conduct it bear on the appraisal. The relative success of any law enforcement efforts will affect the extent to which resort to armed force is necessary. Similarly, if self defense operations involve crossing into another State's territory, that State must be unable or unwilling to prevent the terrorists from continuing to threaten the victim State [ibid.].
Self defense operations against terrorists and States involved in terrorism are limited to the nature, targets, level of violence and location required to defeat an ongoing attack or, if that attack has ended, prevent any further reasonably foreseeable attacks. That said, those who act in self defense should be sensitive to the other face of proportionality, its jus in bello face [ibid.].
It is permissible to cross into the territory of another State to conduct defensive counter terrorist operations when that State has granted consent to do so or when it is unable or unwilling to effectively prevent terrorist activities on its soil. Operations may only be conducted against the terrorists and their assets; however, if the host State forcibly interferes with them, then that State may have committed an armed attack against the force carrying out the counter terrorist actions. The shadowy world of international terrorism simply does not lend itself to immediate access to credible information [ibid.]. By the standard imposed in the international law, States would almost never have sufficient evidence to mount a timely and decisive response to a terrorist act.
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lil PKK in Turkey: just terrorism?
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s^i One of our country of focus in this article is Turkey, which experienced a form of modern terrorism before the 1970s. It is argued that the causes of 1970s terrorism go back to the 1950s when Turkey, with a newly pE introduced multi-party system, began to integrate itself into the global § economic system. It is claimed that this unhealthy economic integration, along with high inflation in the 1950s, caused rising levels of socioeconomic grievances, that invited a coup d'état on March the 12th 1971 [5, p. 9-42]. During the 1970s, there were mainly two fronts in Turkey, on one side were the leftist organizations such as People's Liberation Party / Front (THKP/C) and Turkish People's Liberation Army (THKO), which were involved in some terrorist activities, namely killing, usurpation, robbery, and kidnapping. On the other side there were the rightist organizations such as Turkish Revenge Brigade (TIT) and other extreme nationalist organizations, which were determined to protect the nation from leftist assault [ibid.].
It could be argued that even though the Turks have a strong tradition of governing a state, the rulers of the Turkish Republic might have perceived that their new state was vulnerable to these confrontations and social discontents. Consequently, Turkish officials might have recognized that the best response to terrorism and any kind of quasi-terrorist movement should be harsh suppression. Moreover, as Crenshaw argues, if the state's regime is perceived as politically vulnerable, any terrorist organization could see this situation as an opportunity to use their acts to challenge the government this sense; hence, the PKK decision makers might have perceived that the Turkish state, which had been struggling with mainly leftist terrorist organizations for a while, was vulnerable to terrorism [ibid.].
The PKK was established by Abdullah Ocalan in November 1978, in Lice, near Diyarbakir with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state on the base of Marxist-Leninist ideology. On August 15, 1984,69 the PKK began its violent career in Turkey with raids on two towns, Eruh in Siirt and Semdinli in Hakkari.
In evaluating Turkish countermeasures to the PKK's tactics, two observations should be noted, first, Turkey perceived the PKK's cause as a security problem, not a political one, since the PKK was advocating secession. The countermeasures were, therefore, militarily focused; hence, the PKK exploited these countermeasures in favor of its cause to accumulate more recruits and to further alienate the Kurds from the Turkish state. Second, as Andrew Mango argues, 'terrorism can corrupt the state.' Under these conditions, some security forces might have been trapped by this aspect of terrorism-corruption [ibid.].
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Generally, from the PKK's point of view, there has been a logical, & historical flow illustrating their struggle. First, when the PKK was founded, ^f ^ its aim was to create an independent socialist, Marxist-Leninist Kurdish state 02° in territory which could be created by gaining lands from Turkey, Syria, Iran, § ^ and Iraq. Then, Ocalan announced that he was in favor of keeping Turkey's I ^ borders intact, and that he sought democratic solutions within the framework ^ of Turkish state. On the other hand, it should be considered that even o if the PKK's separatist argument has been transformed into a political one which focuses on Turkish-Kurdish differences, their new expression does not present a solid defined objective but it supports the idea of a federalist system in Turkey. In this case, an ethnically based federal state was physically impossible to pursue, due to the reason that moving two ethic masses from one side to another of the country was resulting a madly program (the Kurds might have to leave the western part of the country, and the non-Kurds, mainly Turks, the eastern part). Furthermore, Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, defines Turkish nationalism precisely as common values which connect people living within Turkish borders and based on culture and history, rather than on ethnicity [5, p. 9-42].
Turkey has responded to the PKK's unilateral so-called ceasefire declarations with a no-negotiation approach, since the Turkish government would have been hard pressed, before its domestic audience, to defend a decision to negotiate with a terrorist organization. Moreover, Turkish government officials have been emphasizing the state's right to self-defense, where the state is the only power which has right to use violence over the people living in its territory. During these years, Turkey has actively pursued acculturation of the Kurds, and on the other hand it is crucial to understanding the PKK's dynamics to remember that not all the members of the PKK were Turkish citizens [ibid.]. As a countermeasure and a normalization tool, the Turkish authorities tried to pass some laws to ease terrorists' return into society.
For this cause, the Turkish National Assembly has passed some laws to mitigate the more negative effects of terrorism.
'Why have Turkish national counter terrorism strategies not put an end to PKK terrorism in thirty years?' To find explanations, the PKK's tactics and the responses by the Turkish officials were discussed. During first time frame, in which the PKK was founded, this terrorist organization used endogenous people and the Turkish state's affiliates to foment unrest among the local people. In addition, the PKK used cruel and forcible tactics to increase the cost of entrance into the organization and to deny exit from it [ibid.].
During the second time frame, the PKK managed to attract the international audience attention to its cause, from which got support as a result.
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gil In the third time frame, as the PKK tried to present itself as a political party rather than a terrorist group, trying to explain the drastic situation of Kurds s^i in Turkey, of course pressures from some Western European countries were
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& s This is why today, after ISIS erupted in the Middle East bringing all
this chaos that we can see in the region, this group of insurgent from PKK came back into action. Seeing the positive results, the political, economic and territorial achievements made by their 'Iraqi cousin', Turkish Kurds moved from the sand the memories and the desires of independence and recognition. All this without seeing clearly that the situation in Iraq is completely different, confronted with the Turkish one, and they can't think to make the same steps that Iraqi Kurds are making. Moreover, we have to remember that Turkey will never respond to PKK attacks with soft power, because when the states perceive that their most crucial interests are under threat, namely security, then response to terrorism will be more severe. So even though the terrorist organization perpetrated terrorism for the sake of political ends, it would be hard to convince these parties to play political games in the same arena [ibid.].
The reason why Kurds decided to create this fighting group can be found in a description made by Amin Maalouf, a scholar who works on identity. According to him, «the single biggest contributor to identity-based violence is 'humiliation'.» When a group feels threatened, marginalized or humiliated, the identity that was nominal before becomes the dominant defining characteristic. 'Humiliation,' he argues, 'is the most reliable indicator of the rise of fanaticism.' The policy of restriction perpetuated by the Turkish government over Kurdish minority gave rise to this feeling and the willingness to fight for their freedom. Since these restraints were perceived as humiliation aimed at all Kurds, even though they do not believe in the cause of the PKK, they might have felt that they should support them as a reaction and a response [ibid.].
But they are heroes too
Iraqi Kurds are playing a great role not only in trying to restore the peace agreement between PKK and Turkish government, but from the moment that ISIS started its 'crusade' the first and those that took action in fighting them were the Kurds (peshmerga forces, men and women). In both Syria and Iraq they are facing mainly victories against the Caliphate. Those who have been quite abandoned by the international bodies are now there covering their shoulders, opening the path and guiding them in this fight. We talked previously about the PKK and Turkish Kurds, and the fact that are seen and recognized as terrorists in Turkey due to historical reasons, but here we face exactly the opposite. Kurds here are heroes, but even if are heroes and they
^ applied to Turkey to compromise with the so called terrorists [5, p. 9-42].
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are fighting the most terrible and dangerous terrorist group of nowadays, they & are treating differently. ^f ^
If we consider international law, they have full right in using heavy wea- 02° pons and in continuing the fights because the threat is inside their country and § ^ borders and moreover the terrorists are using weapons which are at a very ^ high level of mortal potentiality. ^
There is a growing body of international law which is directly relevant o to the fight against terrorism. International law provides the framework within which national counter-terrorism activities take place and which allows States to cooperate with each other effectively in preventing and combating terrorism. This framework includes instruments addressing specific aspects of counter-terrorism alongside other international instruments designed for international cooperation in criminal law, the protection of human rights or refugees or the establishment of the laws of war which provide the broader context within which counter - terrorism activities take place [4, p. 14-34].
The need to place actions to combat terrorism in the broader context is clear from the text of United Nations Security Council resolutions. In the Security Council resolution 1456 (2003) we can read: '6. States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law' [1, p. 2-4].
If we take in consideration The United Nations Charter, it sets down the purposes of the United Nations.
First chapter, article 1, 'The Purposes of the United Nations are: <...> 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.'
Why there is quite often a different behavior and different decisions regarding terrorism (who can be considered a terrorist, how to respond after a terror attack, when to respond)? This answer can be given directly from a document written by the UN regarding international law and counter terrorism. We can read «The General Assembly plays an important role in elaborating an international legal framework that promotes cooperation against terrorism and in encouraging governments to work more closely together in addressing this threat. In 1994, the General Assembly reaffirmed that terrorist acts are 'criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed.'» It was further declared that: 'Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke
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gil a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular o^o persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever s^i the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, | ^ religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them'. a! s It should be noted, however, that the General Assembly, despite years
¡5 of debate, has so far not been able to reach a consensus on a definition of ter-§ rorism because there is no consensus on a scope of application.» c So how to deal with it and how to consider a group a terroristic one? One
can based itself even on what is more convenient at the moment... But, the UN, seen the difficult situation and the unclear vision of it, has developed a Global Counter Terrorism Strategy: 'the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted in the form of a General Assembly resolution and an annexed Plan of Action, is a unique global instrument that aims to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism. This is the first time that all Member States have agreed to a common strategic approach to fight terrorism by resolving to take practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and combat it. It consists of four pillars.
1. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.
2. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism.
3. Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard.
4. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism [3, p. 2-24].
But which are the level and how these measures work? For this part the Security Council should enter in action, how? Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are different, those which are interesting for us are the following:
- to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction (i think this friction is already becoming more than this);
- to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken (in this point they still didn't reach an agreement regarding the threat made by ISIS);
- to take military action against an aggressor (military, not only humanitarian as they are pretty much doing now);
- to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression (this i think is implemented in a very high efficiency) [ibid.].
Now why they are not implementing all these points in the fight against ISIS directly on the side of Iraqi Kurds? I think we should focus only on one point: 'measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism
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and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard'; if they & would implement all of them, in particularly this one, they would directly ^f ^ recognized Iraqi Kurdistan as a state. But, giving them the right to self defen- 02° se, and recognizing Peshmerga Kurds as a force with all the rights and duties § ^ in this fight and actions against ISIS can be unconsciously as recognizing an I ^ already existent state, Iraqi Kurdistan. ^
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Conclusion
After an overview of how counter terrorism strategies and international law collaborate on the ground, or how they should work together, we can see that it is not an easy field. There are many 'grey' points which are not so clear for the main international bodies as the UN, and there are also some aspects which are covered by shadows.
During the war on terrorism between Turkey and PKK the method which was applied (and which Turkey is applying nowadays too) was military focused, even though Turkish government said that they were focused on what is called 'non-military countermeasures'. This was not reflecting the reality that was going on because Turkey conducted several air and cross-border operations till northern Iraq when they were considering necessary (thing which is not accepted by the law regarding cross-border actions because the threat was inside the country and not outside). But Turkey was focused on the fact that they were recognizing the PKK as a security problem, and even when it declared a so called ceasefire, Turkey responded to it with a no-negotiation approach, the same that has always put on the ground from the beginning of the operations. In fact the behavior of Turkey has been from the beginning the one of 'no table for negotiation' and just pure deference has to be applied.
The fact that the PKK's tactics have acquired International attention to this case brought a sort of international knowledge of the problems that Kurds were facing in that country from the government of Ataturk, when he didn't recognize the existence of any minority in the country saying that anybody who were living inside Turkish borders were Turks. So they saw disappear their right of speaking a different language and to see on their documents signed their ethnicity from one moment to another, this of course brought them to rebellion, they have been humiliated and annihilated so this was one of the factors that brought to the creation of an armed group. Turkey never tried to follow the path of negotiation because they were against the process of starting talks with a terroristic group, and they have always emphasized the right to self-defense when some international bodies were questioning its conduct.
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gil Instead regarding the situation of Iraqi Kurds, which are fighting ISIS, o^o the story is quite different. There are too many international interests s^i on the ground which are not fixed yet. For example there is the situa-| * tion of Iraqi territories and borders, it is evident that it is a collapsed state and & 2 now we see two main actors which come from this country that are trying | to get back their own land and independence: Kurds and Iraqis. We have to understand that already before the rise of ISIS Iraqi Kurds had acquired the condition of 'semi-independent' republic, depending from the government of Baghdad under the economic part, which was about oil sell and prices. Regarding institutions and security it was already perfectly efficient by itself, of course the venue of ISIS took them a little bit unprepared, but they took actions strongly and aggressively quite fast.
But as we see, international bodies are not applying the laws in the same way as they should do. As i've reported in the last paragraph the main reason can be found by the fact that if they would apply all the help and the armed forces as described by their laws they would directly recognized Iraqi Kurdistan as a state. This can be understandable because it is not an easy step that one of redesigning the borders of a state and before this, to define this state as collapsed one. The main problem is that, once this fight will be close to the end and the Caliphate, hopefully, will be won, the Iraqi Kurds I think will ask for the recognition of their independence.
They're fighting and losing lives not only for their citizens, but for the entire world, they are pursuing a war which is not only something that can be considered a threat just inside their borders, so the western world and international bodies will have to recognize this sooner or later. Moreover they are proving to have a better preparation in terms of institutionalization and security of a 'country', the level of equality between men and women is one of the highest in all Middle East (after Israel). The economic conditions can guarantee a fully independence and Iraqi Kurdistan, under this matter and also as point of international and regional balance under the security matter, would be a 'golden' state.
I believe that soon one or more states, which are collaborating in this war on terrorism, or a state which is still not playing a determinant role but for geographical reasons will be soon take into consideration (Iran), should take a position regarding the situation of the so-called Iraqi state. This is evident that it doesn't exist anymore, and it is also evident that in a part of its ex territory, a new one is on its path. For this cause even the international community should take a step forward, applying some of those laws which are concerned for the safety, security and peace of a state; because Iraqi Kurdistan is not anymore a region and this just a blind cannot see.
References
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1. Security Council. Resolution 1456. Adopted on January 2003. vo ^ o
2. Schmitt M. Counter terrorism and the use of force in international law // Inter- ä™ national Law Studies. 2002. Vol. 79. Pp. 1-67. g Eb
3. UN, Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. Adopted in 2006. ^
4. UNODC, Frequently asked question on: International law aspect of countering >i terrorism. United Nation Office on Drugs and Crimes Vienna, 2009.
5. Zehni T. Turkey and PKK terrorism. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Cali- ^ fornia, 2008. P. 1-71.
