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УДК 316.776.33 Т. И. Грибанова
доцент кафедры грамматики и истории английского языка факультета ФАЯ МГЛУ; e-maiL: [email protected]
ХЕДЖИРУЮЩИЕ СРЕДСТВА В АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ: ИСТОРИЯ, ПОДХОДЫ И КЛАССИФИКАЦИИ
Данная статья посвящена хеджированию, одному из наиболее противоречивых явлений в современной лингвистике. При наличии общего взгляда на хеджирование как способа смягчения или усиления коммуникативной интенции говорящего, не существует единого понимания того, что представляет собой этот процесс и какие языковые средства используются для его реализации. Статья представляет собой обзор исследований, посвященных изучению данной проблематики и современных подходов к классификации хеджирующих средств.
Ключевые слова: хедж; хеджирующие средства; интенсификация; компенсационные тактики.
T. I. Gribanova
Associate Professor, Grammar and History of English, English Language Department, MSLU; e-mail: [email protected]
HEDGES IN ENGLISH: HISTORY, APPROACHES AND CLASSIFICATIONS
The present articLe discusses hedging, a controversiaL though pragmaticaLLy valuable linguistic phenomenon. Hedges are genera^y understood as means of either attenuating or reinforcing the communicative message. Linguists provide different definitions of what hedges are, thus appLying different LabeLs to the same mitigators. The articLe is aimed at presenting a survey of approaches to research on hedges in modern linguistics, as weU as most accepted ways to classify them.
Key words: hedge; means of hedging; reinforcement; mitigation.
It is common knowledge that while talking we mainly exchange information with our interlocutors. This is one of the main purposes of human communication. At least, this is a traditional view of it. In fact, now it is proved that in the process of interaction we do not only exchange facts and information but also convey interpersonal messages which can be expressed by different grammatical means including hedges.
What do we call a hedge in our everyday life? It is a means of protection or defense which can be formed of shrubs or low-growing trees
which form a fence or boundary serving as a barrier. Applying this term to linguistics we may say that we use our words and phrases just like these shrubs and trees as a kind of protection. But in this case the impact is rather psychological rather than physical.
The notion of "hedge" evolved through the history of linguistic research. Undoubtedly, hedges had appeared straight after people learned to talk, however they became the object of linguistic research only in the second half of the 20th century.
Analyses of the process known as hedging first appeared only in the 1960s. It was explored in different areas: logic, semantics, philosophy and later in pragmatics. Taking this into account, it is necessary to say that in each of these fields, the term "hedging" is defined differently. Today the hedge is mainly viewed as a concept of pragmatics.
U. Weinreich (1966), a Polish-American linguist, dealt in his article "On the Semantic Structure of English" with "metalinguistic operators" (163) which a bit later would be defined as "hedges" by other linguists. He argued that "for every language "metalinguistic operators" such as (in) English true, real, so-called, strictly speaking, and (in) German eigentlich, and the most powerful extrapolator of all - like - function as instructions for the loose or strict interpretation of designata" (1966: 163).
The term "hedge" first appeared in 1972 when it was introduced by G. Lakoff (1972), a famous American cognitive linguist. His studies later became the starting point for many analyses of the topic. In his article "Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts" Lakoff analyzed the usage of hedges and tried to throw some light on their theoretical significance. He believes that hedges are words or expressions which are used to "make things fuzzier or less fuzzy" (1972: 195). He says, "For me, some of the most interesting questions are raised by the study of words whose meaning implicitly involves fuzziness - words whose job it is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy. I will refer to such words as 'hedges'. (1972: 195). He regarded hedges as lexical items which cannot exist out of context. So, according to Lakoff, context is very important in assigning hedges their meaning. He focused mainly on the pragmatics rather than on the semantic aspects of hedges. The communicative value of the use of hedges did not interest him, as he was mainly concerned with the logical properties of phrases such as sort of, kind of, rather, and largely (1972). He believed that hedges were used to attenuate the
meaning of a given expression (1), or, on the contrary, could reinforce its class membership (2). For example,1
(1) John is sort of smart.
That is technically a bookcase.
(2) He is very, very smart.
I really love you.
In his research Lakoff touches upon only one aspect of hedges -propositional hedging, capable of affecting the truth value of the proposition. He also gives quite an illustrative example of hedges modifying the degree of the category of membership (1972: 460):
a) A robin is sort of a bird. [false, no questions it's a bird]
b) A chicken is sort of a bird. [true, or very close to true]
c) A penguin is sort of a bird. [true, or close to true]
d) A bat is sort of a bird. [false, or very close to false]
e) A cow is sort of a bird. [false]
G. Lakoff's follower L. A. Zadeh (1972) continued investigating hedges in written and oral speech from the point of view of their semantics and logic. In his article "Fuzzy-Set - Theoretic Interpretation of Linguistic Hedges" (1972) he proves that hedges are contextually dependent and cannot exist out of context.
Later a new term hedged performative was introduced by B. Fraser (1975). The term was applied to combinations of different modal verbs with certain verbs such as apologize, request, promise. These structures were considered a means of in softening the illocutionary force of the utterance.
e.g. I must request that you sit down
I should apologize for running over your cat.
I can promise I will never again smoke grass.
A few years later the focus in researching hedges shifted to their pragmatics. Trying to shed some light on the notion of hedges from the point of view of politeness P. Brown and S. C. Levinson (1978) first introduced the term "face threatening acts"2 and developed strategies of
1 The examples are obtained from B. Fraser's scientific research "Pragmatic competence: the use of hedging" (2010: 17) , they represent the BNC, texts, papers, everyday conversations, etc.
2 Term "face" - Goffman (1955: 338).
positive politeness, in other words strategies that are intended to avoid giving offense by highlighting friendliness. Hedges became part of their methods intended to "save face", due to their ability to soften and reinforce a particular expression.
In the early 80s the investigation in hedging continued. Prince, Bosk & Frader (1982) conducted research among doctors working in a pediatric intensive care unit. As a result, they divided all hedges into two groups: "approximators" and "shields" according to the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition.
Hubler (1983) in his book "Understatements and Hedges in English" compared such notions as "hedges" and "understatement".
Caffi (1999, 2007) looked into mitigation - lessening the intensity or force of something unpleasant or attenuation of unfortunate effects on the hearer (Fraser, 1980) and introduces his own division of mitigating mechanisms. There are three of them: bushes, hedges and shields.
Since the 1980s linguists have been very much interested in the properties of the individual hedges and begun to explore the use of hedges within different areas and genres such as political talk and scientific discourse research articles, language learners' speech, courtroom discourse, medical discourse, mathematics, etc. The use of hedges will depend on the genre to a large extent.
Linguists of all times provided a large number of definitions which are sometimes controversial. That is why sometimes it is quite difficult to understand the process of hedging.
As it was mentioned earlier, the term "hedge" in linguistics was introduced by G. Lakoff who defined these phenomena as expressions to make things "fuzzier or less fuzzy" (1972: 195). That was the first definition of hedges in linguistics. Lakoff's approach later was criticized by various linguists. For example, Lewin (1998) believed that Lakoff (1972) viewed hedges as a definite range of utterances which can be added to lexical and grammatical devices to distort the truth of the utterance. Lewin argues that "natural language concepts have vague boundaries and fuzzy edges... and consequently, natural language sentences will very often be neither true, nor false, but rather true to a certain extent and false to a certain extent" (Lewin 1998: 90).
Numerous dictionaries provide the following definitions of hedging and, hence, hedges:
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (1987: 488) defines the term "hedge" as something that "gives protection" while the verb "to hedge" as a means which is used to "to refuse to answer directly";
Collins English Online Dictionary (1997: 365) claims that "to hedge" is "to evade decision or action, especially by making noncommittal statements" while the noun "hedge" is defined as "a cautious or evasive statement";
The Dictionary of Stylistics (Wales, 1989) defines the process of "hedging" as "qualification and toning-down of utterances and statements in order to reduce the riskiness of what one says" (215). This dictionary mainly refers to the semantic origin of "hedging" and regards it as a part of the speech act theory.
It is also worth mentioning that today's hedges are regarded in a slightly different way from whom they used to be treated even a century ago. Though many linguists including Lakoff (1972), Prince, Frader, Bosk (1982) focus on both the reinforcement and attenuation aspects of hedges, it is worth mentioning that now reinforcement as a function of hedging is often laid aside. In the sentences below the words certainly or extremely are not considered as instances of hedging and have their own sphere of usage being generally called "intensifiers".
e.g. I certainly do insist that you sit down. He is extremely tall.
The reason for this is probably the fact that hedges are capable of reducing the force of a statement while intensifiers, on the contrary, tend to increase it. Wright and Hosman (1983) studied the interactive effects of intensifiers and hedges in speech and came to conclusion that hedges have an influence on perceptions of attractiveness and credibility, but intensifiers do not. This is, probably, the main difference between these two notions.
It is also very important to bear in mind the fact that not all expressions such as sort of, I think, in a way and all others should be always regarded as hedges in any sentence. It often happens that they are employed in their literal meaning. B. Fraser (2010) gives examples to clarify this difference:
e.g. I will be coming in a few minutes. I think that politics is sleazy. Can you see the deer over here?
I appreciate that kind of help.
Blair and I were able to talk in a way that reduced ambiguity.
I always admired the fact that a person who was relatively comfortable in life would be willing to help the less fortunate.
In other words, it is crucial to tell free word expressions used in their direct meaning from cases of hedging which is based on context and the situation where they are employed.
The complexity of the notion and the variety of approaches to its study bring about a number of hedges classifications.
Prince, Bosk and Frader (1982) classify hedges into two main groups: approximators and shields.
In this classification approximators reflect G.Lakoff's (1972) definition of hedges as words and expressions making the propositional context fuzzy and affecting the truth conditions of a given proposition. However, for Prince and al. (1982) this devision seems to general to cover all the instances of hedging. They elaborate on the following subtypes of the linguistic phenomenon in question: approximators then fall into adaptors and rounders, while shields can be either plausibility or attribution.
Adaptors are preferred when the speaker talks about less representative members of a category. Typical examples of adaptors are "sort of", "kind of", "somewhat", "a little bit", etc.
e.g. He also has a somewhat low interior larynx. She noticed that he was a little bit blue.
I wasn't really aware of who he was, he was just a kind of mate.
Rounders, on the contrary, are used quite frequently when we talk about measurements whose reference to a precise term is not relevant. To rounders belong "almost", "about", "approximately", "something between".
e.g. His weight was approximately 3.2 kilograms.
The baby's blood pressure was something between forty and fifty. Done in a sympathetic way, a loft conversion can blend in almost anywhere.
A gamma spectrometer cannot be used because a hole about 5 cm in diameter is required for the probe.
As for shields, they, unlike approximators, do not affect the truth conditions of a proposition. They can be of two types. Plausibility shields are used when the speaker expresses different degrees of uncertainty as
in phrases "I believe, perhaps", "I think, probably", "as far as I can tell you", etc.
e.g. I think we can just slow him down to a little over maintenance.
As far as I can tell you, you do not have anything to lose by taking this path.
Now I believe things are starting to change.
Attribution shields are used when everything the speaker says is acquired via information received from other people that one cannot adequately substantiate. For example,
e.g. He was not very ill, according to her estimates.
There was no reason to worry, as far as anyone knew.
Prince and al. (1982) believe that shields affect the degree ofthe speaker's commitment, the speaker being hedged, while due to approximators we hedge the proposition itself.
Later on Prince and al.'s classification (1982) was often criticized. Other linguists (Skelton, 1988) claimed that this distinction of hedges into approximators and shields could be applied only to theoretical part but they believed it has nothing to do with authentic language use. Thus, Skelton (1988) believes that approximators could easily function as shields. As an example he uses a phrase "It's made of something like rock". He claims that "something like" here is an approximator as it makes the context fuzzier. But if we use "I suspect" in the same context, it will be regarded as a shield. On the whole, shields are more frequent in speech and can extend over more than one sentence.
Hubler (1983) suggests another classification which is in some respects similar to Prince, Frader and Rask's (1982). He divides words and expressions into two main groups: hedges and understatements. He argues that they both express a lack of determination and at the same time points out that there are two kinds of indetermination: phrastic and neustic. The former deals with the propositional content of the sentence, while the latter pertains to the validity of the proposition made by the speaker. So, in other words, understatements deal with phrastic indetermination and hedges are expressions of neustic indetermination, thus the sentence "It's a bit cold in here" will be described as an understatement while "It is cold in Alaska, I suppose" will definitely be a hedge. (Markhanner & Schroder: 1997). Comparing Hubler's classification (1983) with the classification given by
Prince, Frader &Rask (1982) we may conclude that their approximators were used as Hubler's understatements while shields as hedges. So two these opinions overlap and have a lot of common features.
F. Salager-Meyer (1995), a famous French linguist who has published several articles on linguistic, rhetorical and discourse analysis, draws taxonomy of hedges including word classes which can be used as hedging devices. They are as follows (1995):
1) Shields: can, could, may, might, would, to appear, to seem, probably, to suggest.
2) Approximators of degree, quantity, frequency and time: approximately, roughly, about, often, occasionally, etc.
3) Hedges expressing authors 'personal doubt and direct involvement: I believe, to our knowledge, it is our view that ...
4) Emotionally-charged intensifiers: extremely difficult/interesting, of particular importance, unexpectedly, surprisingly, etc.
5) Compound hedges: could be suggested, would seem likely, would seem somewhat.
Salagan-Meyer's theory (1995) not only classified hedges into several groups, she aso tried to analyze the frequency of their occurrence and distribution in different genres. Her findings suggest that case reports and research papers contain fewer hedges than editorials and reviews where the passive voice as one of hedging devices is more frequent.
C. Swee and H. Tan (2002) elaborate on their own analysis of the types of hedges based mostly on Salagan-Meyer's theory. According to their linguistic investigation all hedges can be grouped into1: adverbials (a), epistemic verbs such as suggest, seem, appear (b), modal verbs (may, can, would, etc.)(c), cognition Verbs like believe, suppose, think, surmise (d), hypothetical constructions (if-clauses + adjectives, adverbs, nouns expressing modality) (e), anticipatory it- clause and there is/aref):
e.g. a) The length of the metal bar was approximately 22 cm.
Generally, girls are more eloquent speakers compared to boys.
His views on the matter were quite well received.
C. Swee and H. Tan comment (2002) on the position of these hedges in the sentence. They say that some adverbials may be placed after the verb
1 The examples are given in Chan Swee and Heng-Helen's article available on the site www.melta.org.my/ET/2002/wp09.htm
(approximately), whereas others usually modify an adjective or even the whole idea expressed in the sentence (for example, the adverb generally).
e.g. b) The graph suggests that there was a dip in the sale of Proton Saga cars between the months of January to March. It seems that the football team manager will be replaced soon. The new regulations appear to safeguard the interests of women, but they do not.
e.g. c) Gases may be changed into liquids.
It would be inappropriate to discuss the matter with your colleagues.
According to C. Swee and H. Tan modal verbs have different usage and hence differently express the strength of the claim made by the speaker. This is quite obvious because they all carry out different functions in speech.
e.g. d) I believe that we need to further explore the causes behind child abuse.
I surmise that there is a need for a more intensive English language programmes.
I think it is not a sound method for increasing productivity.
e.g. e) If we agree on the report, then it can be handed up now.
Unless we attend to it now, we will not get the target results. The machine could possibly be repaired for RM500. e.g. f) It is likely that the experiment will stretch on for another hour.
There is a tendency to underdeclare the amount of taxes to be paid. With English becoming more important, it is probable that more students will take the subject seriously.
Crompton (1997) suggests another typology dividing hedges into the following types:
- copulas other than be (e.g. The result appears to be that... );
- lexical verbs (e.g. The result suggests that.);
- modal verbs (e.g. The result might be that.);
- probability adverbs (e.g. The result possibly is that.);
- probability adjectives (e.g. It is possible that the result.); (Crompton 1997: 280).
Thus, we can conclude that the linguistic phenomenon of hedging is a controversial but most interesting linguistic issue, contributing to investigating the processes of mitigation, face saving and effective interaction at large.
REFERENCES
Brown, P. and Levinson, S. Politeness. Some Universals in Language Usage.
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1987. Caffi C. On mitigation. Journal of pragmatics. 1999. No 31. P. 881-909. Caffi C. Mitigation. Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2007.
Chan Swee Heng and Helen Tan. Making claims and the use of hedges. 2009.
Universiti Putra Malaysia. URL : www.melta.org.my/ET/2002/wp09.htm Crompton P. Hedging in Academic writing: Some theoretical problems. English
for Specific Purposes. 1997. Vol. 16, No. 4. P. 271-287. Fraser B. Pragmatic competence: The case of hedging // Studies in Pragmatics 9. New approaches to hedging / ed. by G. Kaltenbock, W. Mihatsch, S. Schneider. 2010. P. 15-34.
Hübler A. Understatements and Hedges in English. Amsterdam : John Benjamins, 1983. 192 p.
Lakoff G. Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts, Papers from the Eighth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. 1972. P. 183-228. Reprinted in: Journal of Philosophical Logic. 1973. 2:4. P. 458-508.
Lewin B. A. Hedging: Form and function in scientific research. - 1998. Prince E., Bosk C. and Frader J. On Hedging in Physician-Physician Discourse // di Pietro, J. (ed.): Linguistics and the Professions. Norwood / New Jersey : Ablex, 1982. P. 83-97. Salager-Meyer F. Hedges and textual communicative function in medical English
written discourse. English for Specific Purposes. 1994. 13(2). P. 149-171. Skelton J. The care and maintenance of hedges // ELT Journal. 1988.Vol. 42(1). P. 37-43.
Wales K. A dictionary of stylistics. Pearson Education, 2001. 429 p. Weinreich U. On the Semantic Structure of English // Greenberg J. H. (ed.): Universals of Language. Second Ed. Cambridge / Mass. : MIT Press, 1966. P. 142-217.
Wright J. W. & Hosman L. A. Language style and sex bias in the courtroom: The effects of male and female use of hedges and intensifiers on impression formation. Southern Speech Communication Journal. 1983. Vol. 48. P. 137-152. Zadeh L. A. Fuzzy-Set - Theoretic Interpretation of Linguistic Hedges // Journal of Cybernetics. 1972. Vol. 2(3). P. 4-34.
