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13ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ
HASSAN ROHANI AND HIS CHALLENGES
J. C. G. Kouma
© 2018 (Cameroon)
Abstarct. This article is a contribution to the analysis of the challenges of Iran's foreign policy under the Hassan Rohani era and particularly the economic, nuclear and hegemonic issues. It is therefore more precisely his ambition to decipher the motives underlying the measures taken by the Rohani administration, which are part of the continuity and rupture of those taken by the Ahmadinejad administration, but stand out only by their magnitude. To weigh the for and against, Iran's foreign policy has been very dynamic since the accession to the presidency of Hassan Rohani on June 14, 2013. Nobody do not need to be an expert in foreign policy of this country to see that the paradigms of yesterday serving as sacred (violence and extremism), have experienced a gradual evolution. Iran has managed to secure external conditions favorable to the country's internal development. Obviously, these changes are not nearly as significant because of their dynamics and new phenomena imposed by the international environment. Socio-economic development, the conquest of regional leadership and, above all, security are fundamental and most important areas of attention for Iran's foreign policy in the Rohani era. After having decoded the contemporary international oil scene and the Islamic dimension in the foreign policies of Iran and Cameroon, which is necessary to put into perspective the innovations brought by Hassan Rohani, this article highlights the renewed interest between the two countries, all involved in global oil geopolitics. It is within these three concepts that Iran's international position and vital interests are emerging. Despite the Rohani administration's stated intention to break with what had been done previously, the impact is no less uncertain. Nevertheless, much of the positive effects of the Rohani administration would still be ahead.
Key words: Hassan Rohani-foreign policy-regional integration-power-development-security-Middle and Near-East-Cameroon.
The election of Hassan Rohani, considered a "moderate"(the moderation advocated by Rohani is realized and his unifying speech allows Sunnis and Shiites to live and work together ) or rather centrist president, essentially reflects a change in the operational paradigm in Iran's foreign policy. In this Islamic Republic, foreign policy issues seem to be issues of internal politics. Iran, like Cameroon, is a strategic country coveted by major oil-consuming powers. It must be emphasized that oil is and will remain for a long time the main source of energy consumed in the world. As such, it will remain a major economic, political and strategic issue. Between Cameroon and Iran, therefore, new challenges seem to be linked to oil and the growing insecurity of their respective regions. Indeed, the failure to resolve the nuclear dispute with the international community of Iran facing debilitating economic sanctions that were crippling the economy [32].
DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA OF ROHANI Iran's violent and extremist policies have created economic problems in the country as a result of sanctions imposed by the western powers and their Israeli and Arab allies. The economy has suffered a violent shock as a result of these sanctions. The decline in oil exports (which corresponds to nearly 80% of goods exports), combined with the difficulties of repatriating the rest of the world's currencies to Iran, caused a collapse in the black market's exchange rate. So, the dollar that was trading to 10,000 rials in december 2010 has appreciated to reach a historic record of 42,000 rials in december 2012. It has depreciated slightly thereafter and stood at 36,000 rials in june 2013[5]. An american reading chart made Iran a theocratic regime to be classified in the category of "rogue states" (Clinton Administration) as well as "the axis of evil" (Bush Junior Administration) or "states of concern". (Obama Administration)[3]. This situation further highlighted Hassan Rohani's stubbornness in implementing his country's openness to the international scene. In the context of those challenges, Rohani puts forward a compelling argument for change. He even appeared to enjoy the support of Khamenei (the Guide which limits the power of the President of the Republic as a true Head of State, the Constitution gives it a very great authority over all institutions ), who argued that the time had come for Iran to exercise heroic flexibilty in foreign policy [32]. To this end, improving the economy and integrating Iran into the community of nations has a major challenge [26]. This "developmentalist" agenda of Rohani has thus found a first political translation with the signing of the interim agreement of Geneva on November 24, 2013 [33]. Rebulding the iranian economy is Rohani's priority. He pointed to the scale of this ambition in the World Economic Forum in february 2014, proclaiming that" [32]. The first priority of President Rohani was therefore marked by a formal commitment to the promotion of national development put forward in his major statements on the one hand, and on the other hand resided in his determination to solve the nuclear problem to lead to a lifting of unilateral US and European sanctions that undermine the country's economic development. Its willingness to transform Iran into a real emerging country through the implementation of the Geneva Interim Agreement, as of january 20, 2014, has been gradually implemented. Indeed, despite the partial and limited lifting of sanctions, there is at least a clear improvement in the country's national economy. The International Monetary Fubd(IMF) expected the iranian economy to expand
by 2.2 percent in 2015, a significant improvement after two years of recession in 2012 and 2013 [32]. However, financial sanctions remain in place despite a gradual thaw of $ 7 billion worth of iranian assets [3].
The glaring need for faster economic development in Rohani faces certain obstacles, including the prevention of any international opening in the absence of a profound reform of financial or banking structures, especially the weight of an elite corrupt economy, as evidenced by the riots of january 2018. This year, the revolt mobilized deep Iran and its people have resisted an openness they do not control and that risks losing them the power and the culture of the Islamic Republic. Thus, although the economic challenges faced by Rohani are enormous, in particular the uncertainty hanging over the actual lifting of sanctions, the latter has at least made the choice of liberalizing the economy and implementing strategies to improve the competitiveness of enterprises. In 2014, as the iranian market starts timidly, french manufacturers are still waiting for a banking solution and Asian builders are strengthening their presence. For example, Chinese vehicle sales would have jumped 288% in the first quarter of 2014 for low volumes [6]. In the Rohani era, it is important to look at the state of the iranian economy and the prospects available to the country in terms of economic policy.
REGIONAL POLICY OF ROHANI
The Middle East is one of the most volatile regions in the world. At the heart of the tensions that mark this region, is the syrian crisis, entered since march 2018 in a new paroxysmal phase of use of chemical weapons. Beyond the horror of the indefatigable sequence of these attacks in syrian territory, it is necessary to note at least that the latter has become the place of confrontation of multiple and contradictory visions, of declared or concealed strategic stakes, but also of identity, social, cultural and religious beliefs and convictions, strong and antagonistic. This state of violence has the particularity of being exported out of the homes that unfolds. Far from reducing the Middle East to a field of confrontation between the imperialist powers, it should be emphasized that some of its constituent countries are progressively asserting themselves as full-fledged actors of globalization. In addition, contrary to a simplistic vision that would reduce this region to a universe welded around the islamic common denominator, it constitutes more than a coveted space because of its economic and strategic attractiveness which has brought out numerous tensions between the states and exacerbated existing religious (Sunni / Shiite) or political (Iran / Saudi Arabia) divides. The renewal of Iran's regional policy that took place after the election of Hassan Rohani, in the form of a revision of the fields of action, can largely be linked to the constraints placed on the states by a new international environment and so to the will of this country to meet the challenges that are posed to it. From then on, the security challenges that Iran faces would stem from the profitability of its geopolitical and geostrategic position that is trying to get the country out of its isolation and integrate it into the international community. Iran's foreign policy is thus part of international relations of a community type with neighboring countries. In other words, these relations involve a major principle of solidarity, regional interdependence and cooperation within a group of states that constitutes a particular entity [24]. Rohani reached out in an effort to rebuild trust in the region. He said: "we are going to re-open trade with all of our neighbors. Our neighbors are our priority" [32]. It goes without saying that, as a sovereign state, Iran does have a part of its "outward-looking" national political activity, whose aim is the control of the international environment, the reinforcement of its influence and its international respectability as well as the maximization of its national interests. It seeks to consolidate and safeguard the Islamic foundations of the regime and extend its authority over the entire muslim world, so that no other country should claim to lead [2].
The Iranian regional policy is undeniably between islamist commitment and hegemonic inclination. According to Rohani, "reconsidering foreign policy does not mean changing the principles but changing the methods"[11]. Iran's projection across the Middle East has been fueled by a set of referential ideas and politico-strategic considerations that could be the explanatory vectors of its activism. These "strong ideas" and prescriptions thus determined Iran's political choices and objectives in the region, as well as structured the strategies effectively implemented. According to foreign minister Zarif: "we extend our hand in friendship and Islam to our neighbors, assuring them that they can count on a reliable partner" [32]. Overall, Iran's regional policy appears to be fundamentally based on at least three key ideas, including: Shiite clergy whose members of the same clerical family are often settled in different countries (Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, etc.). They constitute transnational networks that the iranian power can effectively activate and use for its benefit. On the other hand, it is the Guardians of the Revolution, the militia on which the regime relies, whose mission among other things is to export the revolution (creation of the armed wing of Hezbollah in Lebanon or the formation of some Shia militias in Iraq). Thirdly, oil revenues provide Iran with considerable financial means which allow him to support the political movements that are close to him in the countries of the region [28].
Iran, although isolated diplomatically for many years, now considers itself a true regional power thanks to its transnational politico-military networks in the Middle East, emphasizing hard and soft power [19]. In a Foreign Affairs article of may 2014, which outlines Iran's foreign policy priorities, it is mentioned that Iran is a regional power because of its strategic importance in a region plagued by political instability and terrorism. He is an important player in several countries of the region, like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Yemen. A major player thanks to its political opportunism and historical-geopolitical oscillations, which allowed it to increase and perpetuate a real presence and influence outside its own borders. In Iraq, Iran finances, organizes and coordinates the actions of Hashd Al-Shaabi, popular mobilization units composed for a large part of Shiite militias and has concluded military transactions expressed to 10 billion dollars [1]. In the same vein, it stepped up his support for Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria by crushing a popular insurgency hijacked by Islamist terrorists. Regarding the regional strategy of Iran, the syrian crisis is one of the reserved areas of the Guide, because of the strategic nature of this
alliance: Syria was, before the military invasion of Iraq by the United States in march 2003, the only Arab ally in the Islamic Republic [3]. Iranian hard power rivals its Saudi neighbor, who is yet better armed, over the july 2014 Houthi uprising against the Hadi movement in Yemen. These illustrations testify to the fact that the Middle and Near East, commonplace, suddenly became the scene of deadly conflicts, the space of rivalries, requiring external intervention and whose configuration of the balance of power takes into account the hegemonic aims state actors like Iran ( since 1979, Iranian-Iranian tensions have crystallized around the holy sites and the pilgrimage, culminating in the deadly clashes between police and Iranian pilgrims on Friday, 31 July 1987, which left more than 400 dead) and Saudi Arabia, which is also considered a regional power at the political, economic and ideological levels. It is symbolically the seat of Islam, because of the presence on its soil of the holy places (Mecca and Medina). It plays a leading role in the Arab-Muslim world, through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League. It is considered a world economic power because it holds a quarter of the world's oil reserves. It proves to be unavoidable for Westerners, especially when it comes to stemming the influence of Iran in the region [4]. Nevertheless, Iran is making many efforts to maintain the dialogue[35] in the Middle East, it is a triple optic to make its way, to nourish its current ascent and to pose as a "responsible" and "conciliatory" power. It is also a question for this Middle Eastern regional power to reduce the mistrust and criticism that its behavior is already provoking on the international scene. Rohani and Zarif quicky understook a charm offensive the region, visiting neighbors, discussing friendship, and presenting Iran as the region's elder stateman[32]. It is true that some analysts believe that Rohani has no control over the regional politics of his country and that it is the Guardians of the Revolution who lead the military and diplomatic policy of Iran in the Middle East, and not the politics of Rohani [27].
INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF ROHANI
Iran nuclear ambitions and the question of a clandestine nuclear weapons program have been at the heart of the dispute between Iran and the international community. The struggles of international sanctions used by the United Nations, the United States of America and the international community, are of great importance to the iranian economic, given their reliance on oil export revenue [24]. The Islamic Republic of Iran thus cultivates international ambitions that go far beyond its international environment. Speaking to the Asia Society and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, on 27 September 2013, President Rohani said that: « Iran has actual and potential capabilities for enhancing its role in the world arena. Iran's millennial culture and civilization, its exceptional Iranian state continuity rooted in millennial, its distinguished geopolitics, the characteristics that foster Iran's social stability in the midst of a region in turmoil as well as the pool of its well-educated youth, all in all, enable us to confidently look to the future and aspire to assume the major role in the global level that our people deserve; a role that no actor in global politics can ever ignore » [21]. It wants to be a global player with an active presence on all continents, while fighting for the transformation of the international order currently in place. Rohani's policy is above all a break with the bellicose rhetoric of Ahmadinejad, his predecessor and advocates the abandonment of the policy of permanent confrontation with the West. During the reign of the latter, the Islamic State has increased its security policy inside, against the Arabs, Kurds, Baluchi whom he accused of being financed by the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf and the Westerners but also against his opposition from the Green Movement whose links with the United States and Europ [17] he denounced. It was suspected that the United States would support this movement under the pretext of respect for human rights, democratization or to counter the military nuclear program. Westerners have used this pretext to impose barbaric sanctions and their goal is to install a pro-American [14] regime in power. This vision of the Islamic Republic as a "different" or even "evil" state, with which it is not possible to dialogue, is likely to reinforce the real intentions of the great powers. US Administrator James A. Lyons states that "Iran is a major threat. We must put at the disposal of the opposition to the regime Iranian all the necessary material support. The goal must be the change of the Iranian regime"[17]. It is therefore clear that the Iranian nuclear power creates the animosity of the United States, international sanctions and the fragility of its position on the international scene. To resolve the nuclear crisis and begin bilateral talks with the United States, Rohani defended diplomatic action and the principle of flexibility. Rohani's foreign policy is marked by a relative realism and has enabled to take important steps towards dialogue with the world, to pursue the policy of relaxation and increase its regional and international cooperation. The implementation of the interim agreement of Geneva of november 24, 2013 constitutes a decisive test for the opening diplomacy of Rohani [27]. This agreement signed between the seven negotiating countries (Iran, the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany and the United Kingdom) provides that the Islamic Republic agrees to limit its nuclear program, suspected by Washington and its allies to have military aims, in exchange for a reduction of economic sanctions. In the same vein, the july 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on nuclear power made it possible to reintegrate Iran into the concert of nations. It was a crossroads in the wake of the decision by the United States to withdraw from that agreement, the United Nations official for political matters told the 15-nation organ today.
Rohani, after having obtained the authorization of the Guide, thus relied on the new regional policy of Obama marked by a realistic management of the regional crises and a prudence with the use of the force to settle political questions. This Iran-US reconciliation was built on converging geopolitical interests in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, especially in the face of the threat of Sunni jihadist groups. In this regard, he states: "If Mr. Obama and I were to meet again, we would both look to the future, its prospects and our hopes for the future. We need a starting point. I think it's the nuclear issue"[37]. However, since Donald Trump's ruling in 2017 and Republicans classic skepticism of Iran's willingness to assert its regional power, feed a relative uncertainty about the long-term effects of openness, consent and risky, company by Rohani. As a candidate, Trump described the JCPOA as
"disaster" and "the worst deal ever negotiated", which could lead to a "nuclear holocaust" and adding that it would "dismantle" it [26] and the withdrawal of United States on this nuclear agreement in 2018 is an obvious illsutration. For the Iranian conservatives, this american decision weakens Rohani who made the mistake of binding internal affairs of the country to this agreement. Moreover, Rohani is criticized (in December 2016, a huge majority of the US senate renewed for a period of ten years the sanctions related to the nonrespect of human rights, the support of Iran to groups considered as terrorists in the United States and its program ballistic missiles) by the Khamenei Guide for having so far not generated a concrete lifting of Western sanctions [19]. Indeed, anti-Americanism remains one of the main ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic, which reinforces its base within the movements like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad or the Lebanese Hezbollah. For the Khamenei Guide: "we will not be negociated with the US on domestic, regional and armamentary arms the Islamic Republic of Iran "[12]. Rohani says he wants to discuss with Europeans, Chinese and Russians to see if they can guarantee Iran's interests after the withdrawal of the United States from the Iranian nuclear deal [13].
Some powers like France have recognized the importance and the weight of the Islamic Republic in the region and have invited Iran to participate in the efforts of the international community to find lasting solutions to the syrian crisis. It must be recognized that the inability of the international community to find solutions in the region has made Iran a key player in the Middle East, while exacerbating its rivalry with the Saudi Wahhabi monarchy(dismissed from discussions to end six years of war in Syria in December 2016 in Russia). President Rohani's effort to rewrite Iran's foreign policy and its contribution to the internationalization of the country [32]. The British authorities also stepped up their help to Rohani by providing reform assistance to three banks, Persian International Bank, Bank Meli Iran (BMI) and Sepah Bank [26]. Rohani's civil approach to the international community was to welcomed by some international investors. India signed a Memorandum of understanding with Iran on the Chabahar Port project in May 2015, despite United States warming against making deals with Iran in hoste. President Rohani is aware that it is reliant on major restructuring of Iran's foreign policy and its international isolation [32].
The Iran-Russia reconciliation aims not only to strengthen its nuclear potential, but also to combat the American threat in the Middle East and to weaken the power of this shady neighbor, Saudi Arabia, which was not involved in the Moscow declaration of 20 December 2016 on Syria, which is a major diplomatic failure. Iran deploys intense diplomatic activity to Russia through: joint economic projects; cooperation in matters of regional security [20]. It is undeniable that the Islamic Republic has strongly moved closer to Russia, especially since 2015 in the syrian field, but it is a casual alliance, fragile, especially because precisely in Syria, and more generally in the Middle East, the goals of the two countries do not coincide [3]. Turkey and Iran have historically been and continue to be, rivals rather than close partners. While they may share certain economic and security interests, their interests are in many areas accross the Middle East. The two states have fundamentally different political identities and ideologies [15]. It is not a secret that in all periods of history, Tukey-Iran relations have always had an aspect of difficulty [23].
Diplomatic exchanges could be part of an understanding of the background reading of Rohani's actions in seeking political interest. For this purpose, to understand the diplomatic action of Iran as a State, we must seek to perceive the influences that have directed the course. It is therefore a question of "measuring the impact of deep forces on the behavior of international actors" [25]. For almost five years now, relations between Iran and foreign powers have been, at the diplomatic level, an upward trend because of their continuous densification. This intense diplomatic activity is crowned by the frequent exchanges of delegations of visits at the highest level which corroborate Iran's real commitment to international cooperation. Iran has been welcoming foreign dignitaries to Tehran in march 2014, the European Union (EU), foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton became the first EU official to visit Iran since 2008. In april 2015, the Australian foreign minister, Julie Bishop became the second western political leader to have visited Iran in a decade [32]. On the strength of the foregoing, the summit consultations were not the least significant and the most significant are those of President Rohani in Rome and Paris in January 2016, to renew political ties and turn the page.
With regard to cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly Cameroon, The post-independence years, however, are characterized by full emancipation of this country. The latter has managed to place this strategy in its policy of openness to some powers other than traditional, like Iran. Thus, the relations between Cameroon and Iran date from 1961, and without being frontal, the two countries presented two main axes with the logics and the essentially convergent interests: members of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OCI) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) [16]. Cameroon is the fifth largest oil exporter in Central Africa, and Iran is the only major oil country that has discovered more oil than it has produced for more than 20 years [18]. This means that the diplomatic-strategic space of the Near and Middle East is a subset of Cameroon's foreign policy.
The Cameroonian policy of Iran revolves around the economic-cultural pole (OPEC-OIC). But cooperation between the two countries remains timid and linked to hot military-security issues in the Near and Middle East. This situation responds to a global geopolitical constraint which is that of the rivalry, or even of the permanent Iranian-American conflict. This reality is expressed by the fact that the state develops bilateral relations with Iran is ipso facto in the camp of the enemies of the Western world. In such a constraining context, Cameroon is trying to promote a diplomacy of balance between the two camps. Thus, the Cameroonian policy of the Islamic Republic appears as a strategy to influence the United States, which are constantly interfering in its internal affairs. In a statement released by the US Embassy in Yaounde, US Ambassador to Cameroon Peter Henry Barlerin invited
president Paul Biya, to "think about his legacy and do like Nelson Mandela and George Washington, reflect on his legacy and how he wishes to be remembered in history books." [34] The exit of the representative of the administration of Trump in Cameroon provoked strong reactions from the Cameroonian government. On a radio channel, the Minister of Communication and spokesman of the government, Issa Tchiroma Bakary, wanted dry, indicating that the Cameroonian people is "sovereign", and is "not willing to accept any diktat that it either on the part of this or that power " [34].
The important changes in Cameroon's foreign policy relate to the modalities of its current rejection of integration into the Western bloc. Due to its strategic position in the Gulf of Guinea, the Western powers in strategic terms, want to use it as a shield against the Soviet and Islamic expansion in Central Africa. The all-inclusive cooperation of Cameroon seems to be a concern for the sustainability of the equilibrium relationship and the middle ground in the tumultuous relations between Iran, the Western world and its allies in the region. Nevertheless, diplomatic exchanges between the two countries could be part of the understanding of the background reading of the acts that the two actors pose in the search for political interest. As evidenced by the visit in May 2017, of an envoy of President Rohani in Yaounde, Mahdi Agha Jaafari, Director General of the Africa Department of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to him, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Cameroon are able to expand their cooperation in economy, technology, industry and the private sector"[10]. By the same token, an invitation was sent to the Cameroonian Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit Iran at a time when the Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to develop its relations and cooperation with Cameroon. This diplomatic exchange augurs a renewed interest in both countries and could lead to fruitful cooperation in the future.
IRAN'S REGIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN OBSTACLE
Rohani has demonstrated his ability to make a more open line prevail in relations with western countries. Beyond this vision, it seems necessary to underline the complexity of the institutional architecture of the Islamic Republic [33]. The President is only one actor among others in the complex system of decision-making. Placed under the authority of the Guide, the economic openness towards the West wanted by Rohani is defined by the latter. The Guide has agreed to support the negotiations to lift sanctions and economic pressure on Iran, but it is doubtful that he wants to go beyond [31].
Although elaborated and implemented by Rohani, Iran's foreign policy has become a very useful tool to serve the aspirations of the country in terms of improving its economic position and promoting socio-economic development [8]. Although based on peaceful rhetoric, Iran's Islamic regime still seeks to maintain its character and spread its influence in the Islamic world. In August 2013, shortly after his appointment as Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif wrote that: « as a solid regional power in this era of intense transition in global politics, Iran stands in a unique position. Given its large landmass and unique geographic position along the east-west transit route, Iran, since antiquity, has enjoyed a preeminent position in its region and beyond. Any objective analysis of Iran's unique attributes within the larger context of its tumultuous region would reveal the country's significant potential for a prominent regional and global role. The Islamic Republic can actively contribute to the restoration of regional peace, security, and stability and play a catalytic role during this current transitional stage in international relations » [21]. As a result, the transformation of Rohani's long-awaited foreign policy seems to remain limited at the level of declarations. It certainly has elements of rupture compared to the Ahmadinejad era (2005-2013), but remains inscribed in line with the strategic objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979, foremost of which is the consolidation of power regional level.
As Samuel Huntington points out, "thepower of a state is therefore normally measured by the extent to which it has the resources it possesses relative to those owned by other states that it tries to influence" [9]. Iran is now at the global geopolitical center, since it can control major oil reserves in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. It is the key to Afghan, Iraqi and Syrian peace. Its strength lies in its creative power not in purely material terms. It is imperative for the other states to accept the reality of Iran's prominent role in the Middle East [32].
Although occasional and discrete cooperation is likely between the United States and Iran, the hypothesis of a return to the normal of their relationship does not appear on the agenda. Trump warns Iran in these terms: "never again threaten the United States or you will suffer consequences such as few in history have known before. We are no longer a country that supports your demented words of violence and death. Pay attention /"[7]. That an American president utters such threats to Iran was rare. A mutual indignation rose then. Rohani recognized by his soothing rhetoric, hardened the tone in these terms: "do not play with the tail of the lion, you will regret it" [30]. It is clear that Iran continues to see in the United States a power determined to overthrow or undermine its regime and restore a pro-American political order regionally. He also fears an american cultural surge perceived as contrary to the Islamic revolution and a threat to its durability. Bilateral relations remain tense and this latent geopolitical conflict between the two countries seems to acquire a strong emotional dimension.
Rohani thus presents himself as a president of rupture when it comes to diplomatic isolation and continuity in relation to the preservation of the supreme interests of the regime within the region. A historic agreement on the nuclear program in 2015, timid lifting of international economic sanctions in 2016, Iran is back on the international scene and faces a new page in its history. After decades of imprisonment, tragedy and resistance, the Islamic Republic will now face the immense challenges of a revival advocated by Rohani to hold the keys to internal issues (respond to the aspiration of change in politics and improve the living conditions of the populations), regional (facing the emergence of oil monarchies and jihadist networks) and international (becoming a respected player on the world stage). But, despite some successes, Iran's regional policy would meet two important limits. The first
would be geopolitical: Iran seems to have no real foreign allies who can bring help and assistance. The second limit would be economic: the country would not have financial resources comparable to Saudi Arabia or even the United Arab Emirates to carry out its external interventions and to finance the militias that are vested in Iraq, Syria and in Lebanon. With regard to Cameroon, its relations with the Islamic Republic are still relatively weak and are influenced by major global geopolitical groups and particularly the United States, which is a close ally of this country.
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