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DOI: https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2019.5.19
UDC 327(55):623.454 LBC 66.4(5Ирн),303
Submitted: 08.04.2019 Accepted: 26.08.2019
IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AS A WHOLE AND FOR PAKISTAN
Muhammad Naveed Ul Hasan Shah
University of Peshawar, Peshawar, Pakistan
Rab Nawaz
Quaid e Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan
Muhammad Irfan Mahsud
University of Peshawar, Peshawar, Pakistan
Abstract. Introduction. No doubt that the Iran-USA nuclear deal of 2015 got fame in the international politics. Some countries were in favor of such a deal and some were against this development. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has more concerns over the Iran nuclear deal, it feels that after the deal Iran will become a regional power and will increase its military and political power which will disturb the regional security and stability. As the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) itself provokes the creation of such conditions, thus their influence in the Middle East will be affected. Analysis. The article analyzes the concerns of Israel, implications for Turkey, the question why deal is beneficial for Pakistan, economic concerns of Saudi Arabia, implications for Persian Gulf and 2 Middle East, economic implications for Turkey, economic opportunities for Pakistan. After the nuclear deal, Iran cn becomes a regional power and increases its political and economic influence in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf. The world says that Iran cannot get nuclear weapons after the deal because it has no such a capacity. However, according to some findings from the documents of the deal Iran is not blocked to become a nuclear power % and the deal legitimizes the nuclear program. So, on the other hand after the Iran nuclear deal the regional political and economic environment is totally favorable to Iran. On the other hand, scholars believe that the United States ^ of America (USA) operate in terms of diplomatic competition. From the economic standpoint, the deal will be 5 favorable for Iran. Thus, some countries have objections related to the deal, while others express a positive attitude g towards it. Results. Pakistan will be able to generate economic opportunities from Iran, especially with the help of Iran-Pakistan-India Gas pipeline project (IPI project). Consequences of the deal will be beneficial for the regional 2 economic development of the Middle East and South Asia respectively. ^ Key words: Iran, USA, Nuclear deal, P5+1, Greater Middle East, Pak-Iran, Middle East.
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g Citation. Muhammad Naveed Ul Hasan Shah, Rab Nawaz, Muhammad Irfan Mahsud. Iran Nuclear Deal: Its •S Political and Economic Implications for the Region as a Whole and for Pakistan. Vestnik Volgogradskogo ^ gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya 4. Istoriya. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [Science Journal of Volgograd State University. History. Area Studies. International Relations], 2019, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 259-267. ^ DOI: https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2019.5.19
! УДК 327(55):623.454 S ББК 66.4(5Ирн),303
Дата поступления статьи: 08.04.2019 Дата принятия статьи: 26.08.2019
ЯДЕРНАЯ СДЕЛКА ИРАНА: ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ ДЛЯ РЕГИОНА В ЦЕЛОМ И ДЛЯ ПАКИСТАНА
Мухаммед Навид Уль Хасан Шах
Университет Пешавара, г. Пешавар, Пакистан
©
Раб Наваз
Университет Каида и Азама, г. Исламабад, Пакистан
Мухаммед Ирфан Махсуд
Университет Пешавара, г. Пешавар, Пакистан
Аннотация. Введение. Ядерная сделка между Ираном и США в 2015 г получила широкую известность в международной политике. Некоторые страны отнеслись к его заключению положительно, другие же были против такого развития событий. Королевство Саудовская Аравия (КСА) наиболее обеспокоено этой ситуацией, его правительство считает, что после этой сделки Иран станет региональной державой и увеличит свою военную и политическую мощь, а это, в свою очередь, затронет региональную безопасность и стабильность. Поскольку Королевство Саудовская Аравия само провоцирует создание таких условий, это коснется его влияния на Ближнем Востоке. Анализ. В статье анализируются проблемы Израиля, экономические проблемы Саудовской Аравии, экономические последствия заключения соглашения для Турции, Персидского залива и Ближнего Востока, экономические возможности для Пакистана. После заключения сделки Иран становится региональной державой и усиливает свое политическое и экономическое влияние, особенно в Персидском заливе. Мировое сообщество считает, что Иран не может получить ядерное оружие после соглашения, потому что у него нет таких прав, но из документов следует, что государство не будет ограничено в стремлении стать ядерной державой и сделка узаконивает ядерную программу. Таким образом, с одной стороны, после подписания соглашения региональная политическая и экономическая среда становится полностью благоприятна для Ирана. С другой стороны, ученые считают, что США действуют в соответствии с принципами дипломатической конкуренции. С экономической точки зрения сделка выгодна для Ирана. Таким образом, ряд стран имеют возражения, связанные с заключением соглашения, в то время как другие выражают к ней положительное отношение. Результаты. Пакистан будет в состоянии генерировать экономические возможности из Ирана, особенно с помощью проекта Иран-Пакистан-Индийский газопровод (1Р1). Последствия сделки будут выгодны для регионального экономического развития Ближнего Востока и Южной Азии.
Ключевые слова: Иран, США, Ядерная сделка, Р5+1, Большой Ближний Восток, Пак-Иран, Средний Восток.
Цитирование. Мухаммед Навид Уль Хасан Шах, Раб Наваз, Мухаммед Ирфан Махсуд. Ядерная сделка Ирана: политические и экономические последствия для региона в целом и для Пакистана // Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. -2019. - Т. 24, №№ 5. - С. 259-267. - (На англ. яз.). - DOI: https://doi.org/10.15688/^и4.2019.5.19
Introduction. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a nuclear deal which got distinction since it marked. This deal was done between Iran and P5+1 on July 14, 2015 which got acclaim on the planet [8, p. 47]. Further this understanding was additionally viewed as a positive advance by the UN Security Council. Iran alongside Russia, China, UK, France and Germany is still following and satisfying the understanding, however the US has declared to stop the understanding since May 8, 2018 [9, p. 125]. In such circumstances the US is no more part of JCPOA, and Iran alongside different partners of the understanding are as yet dedicated to pursue this arrangement. JCPOA was an understanding and researchers considered it as a Nuclear Deal for harmonizing the entire world. We will examine the political and economic implications of this nuclear deal in the surrounding regions of Iran.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is somehow a little bit hopeful that Iran will not get nuclear weapons, but more concerned about Iranian influence and its increasing political role in the region which will decrease the Saudi's role and importance in the region. The main goal of the article is to find out what are the implications of the Iran-US nuclear deal in the surroundings of Iran. Especially its impacts on near east countries. For this purpose the descriptive method has been applied while using primary and secondary sources.
After the Iran nuclear deal, Iran is becoming a regional power and increasing its political and economic influence in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf. It is certain that the deal is going to reshape the interaction between states in the region and policies among them. The deal is less important for the United States than Middle Eastern states. Iran will never cheat the world and make nuclear like North Korea. The United
States policy is to support its allies in the Middle East to strengthen the regional security and stability. The Palestinian issue is also important for the region and Iran is the only country that supports both politically and militarily. Obama says that it is a historic opportunity for the United States and not a historic mistake. The world says that Iran cannot get nuclear weapons after the deal but the deal is not blocking Iran to become a nuclear power and the deal legitimizes the nuclear program. And the deal is between Iran and P5+1 and no regional country was present in the deal, which is directly affected by the nuclear program.
Most analysts say that the nuclear deal will reduce the risks of proliferation and discourage the potential to build weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East region. It was also a military option against Iran on the table for Israel to take, and the ratification of the agreement by the United Nations Security Council makes this an enviable option. The deal will change the relations between Iran and Turkey [19, p. 105]. Iran and Turkey have political completion in the region. Turkey is also trying to create its influence in the Middle East region and in the Muslim world. But Iran is competitive in terms of political influence in the region. This convergence will contribute to increase economic cooperation between the two countries and reduce tension in the region. The problematic relations between both Iran and Saudi Arabia are not favorable for Pakistan and the whole region. So after the Iran nuclear deal the regional political and economic environment is totally favorable to Iran. India is going to invest billions of US dollars in Chabahar port that is a potential threat to Pakistan both economically and politically [30, p. 80].
Concerns of Saudi Arabia. King Salman of Saudi Arabia expressed concern about the lifting of sanctions. No doubt it is an exceptional deal and it will bring some usual end results [22, p. 390]. Nawaf Obaid (Managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment project in Riyadh) said that "first and foremost is obviously terrorism Al Qaeda. Number two is the Iranian factor; the Iranian nuclear program is less a priority than the existing environment of government of Iran" [1, p. 69]. Iran nuclear program will disturb the balance of power in the Gulf and the Middle East whole region.
The kingdom is more concerned about the Iran nuclear deal, they feel that after the deal Iran
will become a regional power and will increase its military and political power which will disturb regional security and stability. The kingdom welcomed the deal and said that "if there are good intentions, this agreement could represent the first step towards reaching a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear program" [14, p. 15]. They are a little bit hopeful that Iran will not get nuclear weapons, but more concerned about the Iranian influence and its increasing political role in the region which will decrease the kingdom's role and importance in the region. Western powers accept Iran's sphere of influence. The regional balance of power is shifting towards an Iran-led order.
The competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran will increase in the region. The protection of Shia's in the region, in particular and in the world as a whole was the policy of Iran. And Iran supported them to take military and political control where possible [13, p. 200]. Iran supports the state sponsor of terrorism in different countries. Iran supports Shia's in different countries to get their interests, such as Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Bahrain, and to weaken the local government [12, p. 233]. Saudi Arabia hopes that Iran will violate the agreement because of Iranian behavior in the region. It is important for Iran to sustain the agreement than the American led States would not be able to form an anti-Iran policy. The removal of sanctions will enhance Iran's influence both economically and politically. Iran should keep good relations with Pakistan to normalize the relation and create an equilibrium between Saudi and Iran's relations with Pakistan.
Saudi Arabia is satisfied with the assurance that Iran will not get nuclear weapons, but the question for the kingdom is the political price at which this has been achieved. The P5+1 have swapped political negotiation all paper. And it was said that the "snapbacks" in place are not effective enough to deter Iran from pursuing its objectives and regional activities. Many people in Saudi Arabia are skeptical about the case. Some see it as a "down payment to Iran", where there is much to rely on the goodwill of Iran to work for peace in the region, but commitments do not exist, it should be done. It is said that Saudi Arabia has used its reservations about the agreement to justify the arsenal of the US military [16, p. 7].
Saudi Arabia also did not contribute to the case, and its silence on the playing status of the
material appears. Despite all countries, it is Islamic, but the antithesis of the Theological School is both in the head and registered and fight against proxy wars in the region against the other. The agreement could lead to a new conflict between the two states. The US sources insist on the separation of the nuclear issue and regional issues, but the internal conflict in Syria, Iraq and Yemen could become the hostage of the agreement with Iran. In other words, led by the United States, it will deter countries to pursue the interests of the opposition in Iran to politics, fearing that in response Iran will evade its obligations under the agreement and the renewal of the activity is prohibited in the nuclear field.
Implications for the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The Middle Eastern politics is driven by two factors: the first is the political interests of regimes / monarchies, and the second is sectarian /ideological tussle. Both factors are present and constant despite the others. After the Iran nuclear deal, Iran is becoming a regional power and increasing its political and economic influence in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf [2, p. 56].
The Iran nuclear deal will change suddenly not only the international but also regional dynamics. The deal provoked a mixed reaction, alarms, shock and anger on the part of regional countries. It is certain that the deal is going to reshape the interaction between states in the region and policies among them. The deal is less important for the United States than it is to Middle Eastern states. The election of president Rohani clearly shows that the removal of economic sanctions is more important for the further progress of the nuclear program. Iran will never cheat the world and make nuclear like North Korea.
Iran will support the Bahraini protesters to overcome the status quo. The policy of the United States is to support its allies in the Middle East to strengthen regional security and stability. They have a policy of controlling Iran by allies so as not to disturb the regional strategic environment. Zarif (Iran's foreign minister) said after a question that if you recognize Israel, the Palestine issue would be resolved, "you see, that's a sovereign decision that Iran would make but it will have no consequence in the Middle East. If the Palestinian is happy with the solution, then nobody outside Palestine could prevent that from taking place.
The problem for the past 60 years is that the Palestinians have not been happy. The Palestinian has not been satisfied and they have every right not to be satisfied, because their most basic rights continue to be violated and people are to address those rights" [4, p. 10].
The Palestinian issue is also important for the region and Iran is the only country who supports it both politically and militarily. The Strait of Hormuz is also important for regional politics and economy. Iran has deployed its missile on Strait to counter any threat. And Iran has an option to block the Strait of Hormuz in any problematic situation. The blockade of the Strait is more problematic for the Persian Gulf states because their oil and all other trades go through this route and they have no other option. So this is a threat to the Persian Gulf states.
Obama says that it is a historic opportunity for the United States and not a historic mistake. Iran's nuclear program ended the nuclear monopoly of Israel in the Middle East region. And some other regional states may follow Iran for nukes that pose a threat to Israel's security. Israel Prime Minister said that Rohani is a "wolf in sheep's clothing" [28, p. 1].
Why Israel distrust Iran. The world says that Iran cannot get nuclear weapons after the deal but the deal does not block Iran to become a nuclear power and the deal legitimizes the nuclear program. And the deal is between P5+1 and no regional country was present in the deal, which is directly affected by the nuclear program. And the deal is just to save the nuclear program and reactors which are very expensive. But American stance is that this deal will decrease the Iranian potential to build a bomb. It will reduce the risks of coverting the nuclear program with inspections and monitoring. It will stop the proliferation and Saudi and other country's path to proliferate nuclear technology. This deal will open the door of cooperation between Iran and the United States. Oil and gas supply will be better and region will be more stable and secure [23, p. 6]. Iran also has its eye on Israel because it is also a nuclear power in the region [24, p. 386-396].
Concerns of Israel. Most analysts say that the nuclear deal will reduce the risks of proliferation and will discourage the potential to build weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East region. Tamim Khallaf argues: "Both sides
are adamant supporters of establishing a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and have been vocal in their criticism of Israel's nuclear program and its non-adherence to the NPT. Now that an agreement on Iran's nuclear program has been reached, Israel's nuclear program should return center stage" [20, p. 6].
Supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei said on July 10, 2015 that "you heard 'Death to Israel' 'Death to US' you could hear it. The whole nation was shaken by these slogans. It was not only confined to Tehran. The whole of the nation, you could hear that was covered by this great movement. So we ask Almighty God to accept the prayers of the people of Iran", he also said on July 18, 2015 that "our policies regarding the arrogant United States government will not change... we don't have any negotiation or deal with the United States on different issues in the world or the region" [5, p. 9].
Israeli and western powers condemned this Iranian slogan and ideology. Iran supports Hezbollah and Hamas both politically and economically against Israel. The strong Iranian government and State will more strongly support these groups, which poses a threat to Israel's security and stability.
However, the counter-opinion by reaching the agreement and the E3 + 3 parts made Israel more secure by ensuring that Iran does not have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. It was also a military option against Iran on the table for Israel to take, and the ratification of the agreement by the United Nations Security Council makes this an enviable option. Participants discussed on this side for Israel on Iran and the agreement, noting that the result can have local consequences, the agreement may facilitate changes within the Israeli coalition government, with rumors of persistent talks to bring the Labor Party. Participants discussed the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's zero-sum policy toward Iran, suggesting the deal could force Israel to adopt a similar policy for Syria policy - focusing on the development of clear terms of engagement with Iran and strict compliance with these conditions.
The agreement may also push the Palestinian issue, which has overshadowed the Iranian nuclear negotiations in recent years, to the forefront of the regional agenda in Israel. Netanyahu even said: "The world has become a
more dangerous place because the most dangerous in the world system has taken an important step towards the realization of the most dangerous weapons in the world, this Israeli approach clearly suggests he will do everything possible to maintain the balance of power in the region in its own favor and the hostile atmosphere in the region will grow".
Implications for Turkey. Turkey's role may decrease and Iran's role in the region may increase. The deal will give Iran opportunities to increase its role in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon and other states. The cooperation will give opportunities to increase influence, which will automatically decrease the role of Turkey in regional politics [27, p. 83].
The deal will change the relations between Iran and Turkey. Both countries agreed to invest in trade and cooperate in business despite regional key issues such as Syria. Iran and Turkey have a political completion in the region. Both are at different poles in Syria. Turkey also tryes to create its influence in the Middle East region and in the Muslim world. But Iran is competitive in terms of political influence in the region.
Iran and Turkey will restore their relations. Turkey said that it is satisfied with the US-Iran deal. Turkish Prime Minister Ahnment Davutoglu said that "it is a target that Turkey has long sought to achieve and expert great efforts to reach. This convergence will contribute to increase economic cooperation between the two countries and reducing tension in the region" [10, p. 21].
Deal is beneficial for Pakistan. Saudi-Pak relations are also a hurdle between Pak-Iran relations, because Pakistan is tilted toward Saudi Arabia. Pakistan should balance its relations, and facing the sectarian issue at home Pakistan cannot afford hostile relations with its next neighbor [18, p. 184]. The problematic relations between both Iran and Saudi Arabia are not favorable for Pakistan and the whole region. Pakistan did not allow itself to be unfriendly to each of them. So after the Iran nuclear deal the regional political and economic environment is totally favorable to Iran. And Iran is going to become a regional power; this will create many issues for regional politics.
Pakistan is not too much affected politically by the Iran nuclear deal, but has many economic benefits like energy, oil and gas. The other issue on which Pakistan is concerned is the Chabahar
port near the Pakistani Gwadar port. India invests in the Chabahar port against Pakistan's economic motives. India basically shows her rivalry against Pakistan.
Economic concerns of Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is a major and important country of the Middle East region as well as the Persian Gulf and has been affected by the Iran nuclear deal. From an economic standpoint, this is supported, discussed and Saudi Arabia will not see a threat in Iran in the oil market. Saudi Arabia could offset the oil price drop in its budget based on national strategic reserves to a maximum of three to four years, while the reserves of Iran are much lower and the country depends on the oil price $ 135 per barrel to balance its budget [6, p. 15].
After the deal, the decline in oil prices continues for Saudi Arabia. Its oil economy is shrinking and getting too much loss by reducing oil prices. Iran is not too affected by reducing oil prices because it is still not producing oil in large quantity due to previous sanctions. One thing special after the deal is that Israel is going to purchase oil from Saudi Arabia first in history and both are going to start trading and bilateral relations. Lower oil prices does not only shrink the kingdom, domestic economy, but also affect its foreign aid and investment and its aid for foreign projects. The kingdom announced budget cuts in 2016 due to the GDP deficit up to 15 %. The subsidy on water, electricity and other products of petroleum will be cut on this year. The kingdom has its foreign ally to inform the media, organizations, personalities and institutions, all of which may face some decline in support.
But the IMF said that Saudi Arabia could go bankrupt in the next five years, if it does not change its economic policies and cut in support of foreign allies. Egypt's "Black Hole" economy is based on the kingdom, which provides aid for many years and decades. The kingdom has given billions of dollars to Egypt in terms of annual aid, but now due to the disturbed kingdom domestic economy this aid can go to cut. And it will damage the bilateral relations between the two countries.
Economic challenges and opportunities for the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The Persian Gulf is an important region of the Middle East. Most of the oil producing countries are present in the Persian Gulf. After the Iran nuclear deal they have some concerns about the nuclear
program. The Persian Gulf States have not such direct trade with Iran, but the Strait of Hormuz is important for these states. These states have no alternative route for trade. Strong Iran can block this route any time, which will be a great threat for economies of these states. These states have only trade or an oil economy.
Secondly, after the relief in sanctions on Iran due to the deal, Iran will start its large-scale oil trade with the world, then the trade volume of these states will automatically decrease. Because before the deal due to economic sanctions, Iranians were unable to export oil and gas to other countries.
Thirdly, Iran is increasing its economic power after the deal; strong Iran will more confidently help Iraq, Syria and Yemen to emerge from crises. This will be helpful for these countries to restart their economic activities and oil trade with the world.
The deal made Israel unhappy. As for Israel, Israel has no economic relations with the Middle East and has no direct impact of the Iran nuclear deal on the economy. But due to the Iran nuclear deal some Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia are going to start trading with Israel. For the first time in history Israel is going to purchase oil from Saudi Arabia. So the deal has positive effects on Israel in terms of economy. After the Turkey-Russia plane crisis, Turkey has also announced that it will purchase gas from Israel and they need Israel in the region to get their economic interests [29, p. 429].
Economic implications for Turkey. Turkey has strong trade ties with Iran. Some analyst says that the deal will bring short term benefits for Turkish economy, but will harsh the Turkish strategic interests, because Iran will influence the region at Turkey's expense. Turkey may take opportunities of trade, energy resources at more suitable prices [26, p. 75]. "The nuclear deal with Iran is likely to re-energize the tired Turkish economy, but Ankara will only be able harness its potential long-term benefits if it can switch to a more flexible foreign policy. A coalition may be the only hope" [17, p. 14]. Turkey has an option to take this action after the deal with Iran. It will be better for both economies.Turkey will increase its trade volume with Iran. Iran is the 10th largest trade partner of the Turkey. All other countries have economic problems nowadays, but Iran is a strategic target for Turkey and it wants
to enhance its trade with Iran till 2023 at $ 500 billion. Due to sanctions most trade has been suspended, but now Turkey is increasing its trade and wants to increase it at $ 30 billion by the end of 2016, which will be double the trade of 2014. The second thing is the Iran deal was to meet energy needs. Iran is the second largest energy provider in Turkey after Russia. Iran gives 10 billion cubic meter gas to Turkey and also provides 30 % oil to Ankara. After the deal Turkey will get energy from Iran at lower prices as compared to the sanctions time and on a large scale. And secondly, Turkey will get more oil and energy from Iran and will be connected with Iran stronger.
The third thing is the end of shady business between both states. In the period of sanctions, the main trade and business were under the control of the Iranian revolutionary guard, and on the other hand, the banks and business of Turkey were subject to closer control. And in the sanctions time the Iranian Central Bank was unable to directly deal with Turkey's banks, so after the deal both sides will do business without any problems.
Economic opportunities for Pakistan are hidden in this deal. The deals offer some mutual benefits and cooperation to Pakistan. The delayed project of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline (IP) is the door to enter into cooperation in different fields. Pakistan can import rice, wheat and kinnu. The energy project of 1000 megawatt is also important for Pakistan. Iran is willing to install a 400,000-barrel-per-day refinery in Baluchistan. Pakistan can save on oil imports from Iran [25, p. 1175].
Iran will come back to the oil exporting market and Pakistan can get economic benefits from Iran. Oil prices can lunge down to $ 20 per barrel and it would be a positive shock. Relation with the US will be somehow normalized and with the European Union especially [15, p. 16]. Jawad Zarif visited Pakistan and met with the prime minister. He discussed with him mutual cooperation and trade after the deal and uplifting of sanctions.
Pakistan welcomed this deal. Zarif said that "Iran is fully prepared to support Pakistan in oil, gas, energy and transport sector. We will cooperate to deal with terrorism and peace process in Afghanistan". He also discussed the opening of interbank channels to facilitate foreign and mutual trade and investment [3, p. 307]. Iran
has agreed with Pakistan to open the border for trade in 2006. If Pakistan exports citrus and rice to Iran, then the prices will be high for producers and they will get more profit.
Iran has an agreement on food processing and infrastructure development and private sector partnership. Shahid Khaqan Aabbasi said, "Now, hopefully, as the sanctions are removed, it facilitates us to address our energy need and also meet the contractual obligation" [7, p. 2]. Iran has an agreement on 1000 megawatts of electricity and now after the visit of President Rohani it is increased to 3000 megawatts. Iran already provides 100M/W of electricity to the border areas of Pakistan. The Pakistan-Iran trade was $ 1.3 million in 2008 and $ 217 million in 20132014. Iran supported building of industries in border areas [21, p. 2]. Tariq Fatemi said, "An end to sanctions will open up new opportunities for Pakistan to enhance its commercial and economic ties with Iran. We have a long border, and we could have massive trade with that country should this issue of sanctions, no longer be hovering over us" [11, p. 6].
Conclusion. The Iran nuclear deal is a major change in the region and international politics as well. The regional countries have many implications of the Iran nuclear deal in positive or negative way. Some regional countries are positive about the deal and welcomed it. But some countries have concerns about the deal and call it a historic mistake by world powers. And they say that the deal legalizes the Iranian nuclear program and it is to secure the nuclear program. But some countries welcomed it and sayed that the deal is the victory of the diplomacy and peaceful struggle. And the deal will insure the regional stability and security and oblige Iran not to build nuclear weapons.
Saudi Arabia hopes that Iran will violate the agreement because of Iranian behavior in the region. Iran should keep good relations with Pakistan to normalize the relations and create an equilibrium between the Saudi and Iran relations with Pakistan. In other words, led by the United States, it will deter countries to pursue the interests of the opposition in Iran to politics, fearing that in response Iran will evade its obligations under the agreement and the renewal of nuclear activities will be prohibited.
After the dealing Iran is increasing its economic, political and military powers and going
to become a regional major power. But Iran as a regional major and influential power is not acceptable to regional countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and some other powers. Israel and Saudi Arabia and other regional countries have serious concerns and have affects after the deal. Iran has been increasing its political, economic, and military power since the deal very speedily, and Iran also supports anti-Israel forces in the region such as Hezbollah and Hamas. These groups are the major threats to Israel and the Kingdom both. And after the dealing Iran will support these groups strongly. Besides, Iran supports Asad in Syria and the Houthis in Yemen, who are fighting against the interests of the Kingdom and Israel. Some other countries have their interests in this region game, such as Turkey. Iran should follow the deal in good faith and should not give any signal of threat to regional countries to avoid any conflict. Iran should build friendly relations with regional countries and avoid giving controversial statements against any country to avoid any tension, and this will help Iran to become an unopposed regional power.
The regional countries, especially the Kingdom and Israel should follow the deal and take it in a positive sense and try to build positive economic relations with Iran to enhance their power. The regional countries should increase their powers instead of countering Iran to insure their influence and role in the region and avoid any type of conflict with Iran, because this will help Iran to restart its nuclear program. The regional countries should try to oblige Iran not to build its nukes and follow the deal instead of investing in military and missile power. They should try to strongly build their economic power instead of an arm race. The deal will help Iran to become a regional power, and the US and world powers need Iran to settle the regional issues, because they feel that the Kingdom is not more effective to solve regional issues. They feel that Iran is necessary to settle the Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan issues. Pakistan as a country has many implications after the deal, but positive things are more than negated ones. The deal allows Pakistan to restart trade with Iran on a large scale. Pakistan has made a lot of agreements with Iran in different spheres during the visit of President Rohani, but Pakistan has more capacity and should fulfill its energy, oil and gas demands with the help
of Iran at low prices. Pakistan should complete its IP project to fulfill its gas demand. And Iran is the nearest country to make trade of kinnu and cotton. In general, the deal has its positive effects on regional and international politics.
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Information about the Authors
Dr Muhammad Naveed Ul Hasan Shah, PhD (Political Science), Assistant Professor (Pakistan Affairs), Cantonment Board College for Boys, Sarwar Road Lahore, 42, University of Peshawar, Old Jamrud Road, Qadir Abad, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, [email protected], https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7525-1769
Rab Nawaz, M.Phil Scholar (International Relations), Quaid e Azam University Islamabad, University Rd, Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory, Pakistan, [email protected], https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3196-7308 Dr Muhammad Irfan Mahsud, PhD (Political Science), University of Peshawar, Old Jamrud Road, Qadir Abad, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan; Assistant Professor in the Department of Basic Sciences and Humanities, CECOS University of Information and Technology, Peshawar, Sector F 5 Phase 6 Hayatabad, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, [email protected], https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4685-8013
Информация об авторах
Мухаммед Навид Уль Хасан Шах, PhD (политология), доцент, колледж-интернат для мальчиков, ул. Сарвар Роад Лахорэ, 42, Университет Пешавара, Олд Джамруд Роад, Кадир-Абад, г. Пешавар, Хайбер-Пахтунхва, Пакистан, [email protected], https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7525-1769 Раб Наваз, магистр (международные отношения), Университет Каида и Азама, Юниве-сити роад, г. Исламабад, Федеральная столичная территория, Пакистан, [email protected], https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3196-7308
Мухаммед Ирфан Махсуд, PhD (политология), Университет Пешавара, Олд Джамруд Роад, Кадир-Абад, г. Пешавар, Хайбер-Пахтунхва, Пакистан; доцент, кафедра фундаментальных и гуманитарных наук, CECOS Университет информационных технологий и новых наук, сектор F 5 фаза 6 Хайята-бад, г. Пешавар, Хайбер-Пахтунхва, Пакистан, [email protected], https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4685-8013
