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35can not be combined with each other to create RSC and RFC.
Currently, all countries have accumulated a large number of quite powerful various weapons - tanks, IFVs, guns and howitzers, various means of intelligence and communication. But the efficiency of their use is quite low due to the inability to combine them into a single complex for various purposes. It requires a deep modernization to bring them to modern requirements for weapons, which will allow you to create RFC and RFC that can perform any combat tasks.
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EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECONNAISSANCE AND FIRE COMPLEX
Ongarov Ye.,
master's student, national defense University named after the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
- Elbasy (Nur-Sultan) Ulakov Ye.
master's degree, teacher, national defense University named after the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Elbasy (Nur-Sultan)
ABSTRACT
In order to improve the efficiency of the operation of reconnaissance and fire complexes, the process of choosing the most optimal structure that meets the requirements for the range and accuracy of fire damage, the effectiveness of the munition on the target remains always relevant. This paper presents a variant of the methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of the intelligence and fire complex, taking into account the relationship of all subsystems of the complex. The results of the study can be used to justify the creation of a domestic reconnaissance-fire (reconnaissance-strike) system.
Keywords: reconnaissance and fire complex, reconnaissance and strike complex, unified information space, unmanned aerial vehicle, effectiveness of the reconnaissance and fire complex.
Modern military conflicts are characterized by: a wide spatial scope with simultaneous impact on the enemy on land, sea, in the aerospace and information spaces;
transience, increased maneuverability and reduced deployment time of groups of troops;
increase the efficiency of command and control of troops and weapons by automating control;
complex use of means of armed struggle (high-precision weapons, robotic systems, weapons built on new principles) [1].
In such conditions, it is obvious that the success of the operation largely depends on achieving superiority over the enemy in the management of their troops and
weapons, intelligence and defeat of objects and groups of enemy troops.
Historical experience shows that the emergence of new and improvement of existing types of weapons affects the tactics of warfare and operational art. In [2], [3], the concepts of the method and form of combat use of Rocket troops and artillery, as well as the main directions of their development, are given.
The main method of combat use of Rocket troops and artillery in the short and long term is considered maneuver-fire actions. This method provides for maneuvering formations, strikes and fire, dispersed placement of formations in compliance with the anti-fire maneuver mode after each fire task, as well as the use of
Autonomous combat groups based on self-propelled artillery guns.
In modern conditions, due to the insufficient number of forces and means, the main thing is the sequential order of fire destruction of the enemy. However, when applying the first and subsequent massive fire strikes, as well as to defeat small groups of troops, as a rule, the simultaneous order of fire destruction of the enemy by rocket troops and artillery will be applied. Simultaneous order of fire destruction of the enemy involves synchronous fire impact on all or most of the critical objects in the composition of groups (combat and support systems) of the enemy, subject to defeat to achieve the required operational and tactical effect. The practical implementation of such a procedure should provide a high degree of opening enemy subsystem intelligence reconnaissance onewho complex of Rocket troops and artillery, as well as reliable monitoring of moving targets and, of course, combat-ready subsystem of forces and means of destruction of the reconnaissance-fire complex of Rocket troops and artillery. A combination of sequential and simultaneous order of fire destruction can occur in certain conditions when it is impossible to organize simultaneous impact on groups of troops (combat and support systems), critical enemy objects.
The predominance of maneuverable methods of action of troops and an increase in the share of unscheduled tasks in the near future will lead to a change in the priorities of forms of General fire damage with the nomination of systematic fire impact as the main one. Systematic fire impact is the actions of the enemy's forces and means of fire destruction on duty to immediately defeat newly discovered important and dangerous enemy objects. The basis of the forms of destruction by fire will be reconnaissance and firing actions of the units, the essence of which is far in advance of fire and defeat the enemy by joint efforts of involved groups exploration, destruction and security from different kinds and types of troops [3].
Thus, one of the ways to improve the combat effectiveness of weapons is to combine existing and
Fig. 1. the Simplest structural model of the "intelligence-defeat" cycle
promising means of reconnaissance and fire destruction into reconnaissance-shock and reconnaissance-fire systems (complexes).
A reconnaissance and fire complex (ROC) is a set of intelligence, control, and fire destruction tools designed to perform a specific task on a real (close to real) time scale with high efficiency (required damage). At its core, the functional combination of means (subsystems) of reconnaissance, destruction, and fire control is acceptable in any (regular or temporarily created) artillery formation. However, questions arise as to what tactical and technical characteristics the listed elements (subsystems) and complexes (contours) should have in General; what are the ways to determine the installations for firing and how to fire at the target are most preferable, what will be the consumption rates of projectiles for hitting various targets?
These questions can only be answered by evaluating the effectiveness of fire damage and analyzing the impact of each of the subsystems on the effectiveness of fire damage.
The main tasks of the reconnaissance and fire complex are:
generalization and analysis of situation data; distribution of objects (goals) of the enemy between the means of destruction;
preparation and application of goals; planning for sequential destruction of targets in the absence of the necessary number of weapons of destruction;
generalization and analysis of the results of hitting targets[4].
The intelligence and fire complex consists of subsystems of intelligence (information support), combat control and fire destruction, the elements of which closely interact with each other during a single cycle of "intelligence-defeat". The effectiveness of the intelligence and fire complex depends on the result of the functioning of each of its subsystems.
An analysis of the experience of using the Russian Federation's Aerospace forces in the Syrian Arab Republic shows that for successful combat operations, complete, operational and reliable information about the enemy is a prerequisite.
Intelligence, as a type of operational (combat) support for the operation, is organized and conducted constantly, in any conditions of the situation in peacetime and wartime in order to exclude the surprise of enemy actions and timely provide the command with complete and reliable intelligence information necessary for the effective use of troops (forces), fire and electronic weapons. The integrated use of all means (bodies, types) of operational and tactical intelligence (including artillery) will allow to realize the combat potential of Missile forces and artillery formations in full, since the effectiveness of their use in operations directly depends on the quality of the organization and conduct of intelligence, as well as the capabilities of its forces and means to obtain the necessary intelligence.
Artillery reconnaissance is traditionally conducted by optical, sound, radar, and radio-technical intelligence units. In addition, the tasks of artillery reconnaissance are performed by the crews of reconnaissance and correction helicopters, units of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVS).
The UAV as part of the reconnaissance and fire complex should provide the ability to monitor the results of missile strikes, target targeting, and correct artillery fire during firing. To implement this requirement:
the time spent by the detected object in the UAV's visibility zone should be at least 10 minutes (if necessary) ;
the time spent on the "reconnaissance - defeat" cycle should be less than the time spent by the target at the location of its detection (1-4 minutes);
intelligence data on targets (objects) should be provided in a short time;
The UAV should provide the ability to highlight targets when firing high-precision ammunition [5].
Options for using UAVS as part of interspecific reconnaissance and strike complexes and reconnaissance and fire complexes are given in the works [6], [7], [8], where their advantages over manned aviation and priority areas of development are revealed.
Intelligence tasks for opening enemy objects designated for fire destruction of Rocket troops and artillery can be performed by the forces and means of intelligence of the senior chief, as well as intelligence of interacting formations and neighbors. Consequently, in order to obtain the most complete intelligence information about these objects, there is an urgent need to organize interaction, i.e., to coordinate the efforts of various, heterogeneous and multi-departmental forces and means of intelligence [9].
Until recently, the control system created in the artillery was focused on the preparation and conduct of large-scale wars, including long-term ones, and did not fully correspond to the tasks and capabilities of the troops. The analysis of factors affecting the effective-
ness of command and control, the experience of exercises and combat operations in various conflicts, and the results of modeling the functioning of control bodies showed that the average time for processing information in the artillery control system exceeds the required time by two times or more [10].
However, today there are conditions for automating most of these processes, improving the accuracy of computational work and reducing the time required for their implementation. This led to a qualitative change in the artillery. Increased maneuverability and rate of fire of artillery systems. Fire units were able to operate according to the maneuver-fire scheme, which includes: taking the main firing position and preparing for firing, firing with maximum rate of fire for 1-2 minutes, leaving the firing position (performing an anti-fire maneuver), and taking a temporary firing position. The total time of the battery's stay in the firing position from the moment of the first shot to its abandonment did not exceed 3-5 minutes [11].
Ensuring interaction with interspecific intelligence tools and creating a single information field can significantly improve the effectiveness of the Missile forces and artillery control subsystem, since the capabilities of regular artillery intelligence tools alone are not enough for this. A multi-level control system, control points, communication facilities, and control automation tools are being created to control Missile troops and artillery. The control system, based on both horizontal and vertical integration of intelligence means of the Association (connection), allows you to more effectively use their combat capabilities, increase the reliability of intelligence information. In addition, their inclusion in the General system of command and control and integration with subsystems of weapons provides operational and tactical intelligence required activity and dedication to obtain data for planning the use of dissimilar weapons[12], [13].
It is known that with the same number of weapons, the choice of one or another organizational structure can affect the effectiveness of the use of artillery. Thus the result will be influenced by the following factors: the time of the opening of the object, the time of defeat, the number of weapons (guns), firing rate, area of lesion, size of targets, etc. Examples of calculations to determine the impact of the organizational structure of artillery units on the effectiveness of their fire are given in [14].
In [13], [15] presents the fundamentals of evaluation of efficiency of fire defeat the enemy Missile troops and artillery, reflected a systematic description of the process destruction by fire of Missile troops and artillery in the operations of the operational units, bases of construction of system of indicators and criteria, models and methods of evaluation of efficiency of fire defeat of the opponent.
The definition of indicators and criteria of efficiency of the reconnaissance-fire complex will allow to establish objectively the best variant of its construction with the influence of the main factors in the situation to perform reconnaissance and firing tasks. As a tool for
determining specific values of indicators and performance criteria, a method for evaluating the effectiveness of the intelligence and fire complex is proposed.
Mathematical dependences of models for the functioning of a reconnaissance and fire complex are presented below, where exponential dependences of probability theory and Queuing apparatus are applied, taking into account a number of factors that affect the performance of tasks under the conditions under consideration.
The essence of the functioning of the reconnaissance-fire complex consists of the following:
a) are formed and analyzed source data, namely: insights from assessment of the enemy; elements of design (decision) of the commander; the tasks and the order of destruction by fire; the planning results of exploration; availability and condition of forces and means of reconnaissance, destruction and asuv, the size of the task of the reconnaissance-fire complex and their execution time; the main factors of physical-geographical conditions;
b) the capabilities of the intelligence system are evaluated. As parameters that characterize the capabilities of intelligence tools, the depth of exploration (Dr), the accuracy of determining the coordinates of objects (Er), and the timeliness of intelligence data (RSV) are considered. If these parameters meet the requirements for the means of destruction, the transition to the next point of the methodology is carried out.
C) the search and detection capabilities of the intelligence system are determined:
1) the probability of opening objects for the I-th class in the J-th intelligence tool is calculated for the K-th time interval (stage under study) - R_VSK program IJ (t)K. Values for calculating the R_VSK program IJ (t)to the complexes of intelligence tools are applied mathematical dependencies. Describing the model of functioning of these tools for opening (detection, recognition, determination of coordinates) of enemy objects.
These mathematical dependencies are obtained and refined in relation to the conditions under consideration, taking into account losses in the forces and means of intelligence as a result of enemy counteraction.:
PBCK = 1 — ((l — P(BCK)OnT) X (l — P(BCK)P^KP0n) x ■■■x
(1 - P(BCK)_/)) (1)
Pbck - probability of opening objects with the entire complex of intelligence system tools;
P(bck)oot - - - ••• - P(bck); - probability of opening objects of each complex of intelligence tools included in the intelligence system.
However, in the conditions under consideration, it is important to determine not just the probability of opening an object by one or another means of intelligence, but taking into account the requirements for the timely intelligence of weapons of destruction. Then the formula for determining the probability of opening an object by an intelligence tool, taking into account the
timeliness of receiving intelligence information, will have the following form:
PBCKÎyXn = PbckV'(0 X PcbÎ;
(2)
PCBi/ - probability of timely intelligence information about a class i-th object from the j-th intelligence tool.
2) the mathematical expectation of the number of objects of the i-th class is calculated (M[NBCKj]fc), opened by the intelligence subsystem for the k-th time interval (the stage under study).
(M[^BCKi]fc = KU^c^^)
(3)
3) the achieved degree of opening of objects is determined, taking into account its combat potential and functionality NWr
flOCT
^OCT _ Z"=iZ"=i^PBCK0'(r)XPHECTi7
ULi^i
(4)
P,
HECTij
probability of non-aging of intelligence data by the time of opening fire (probability of timely opening fire);
4) the mathematical expectation of the number of fire tasks for hitting objects of the i-th class opened by the intelligence subsystem for the k-th time interval is calculated (the stage under study) - M[N03Jfc;
5) the mathematical expectation of the value of reducing the enemy's combat potential by fire of weapons of destruction for the k-th time interval (the stage under study) - W^oct.
d) the required amount of reduction in the enemy's combat potential is Determined ^.Tp and the required value of the degree of opening of the object WBTpK.
e) the values of the performance indicators of the intelligence subsystem are determined in accordance with the studied variants of its construction Pnpl' '3np2).
d) determine the indicators of effectiveness of the subsystem of exploration in accordance with the studied variants of its construction
g) Updating the planning results of exploration, the distribution of forces and means of intelligence, and, given the combat capabilities of the means of destruction, according to the maximum value of criterion of efficiency (U) is determined by the best option of construction and operation of the reconnaissance-fire complex under these conditions.
e) based on the results of the effective functioning of the intelligence and fire complex, the issues of organizing the interaction of forces and means of intelligence are clarified, and proposals for allocating additional (redistributing existing) forces and means of intelligence are justified.
The structure of the methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of the intelligence and fire complex is shown in figure 2.
Assessment of die capabilities of the reconnaissance and fire complex
> r
Calculation of key indicators a Determination of the capabilities of the reconnaissance and fire complex for search, detection, efficiency of information delivery, control and destruction
- by reach ,H,p; - the precision of the coordinates Ep; - by task completion dates T (cp). Calculating the probability of opening and destroying objects i-th class j-th means of reconnaissance and fire complex (PBCK U№)
r
j PbckOCT) = Pbck^CO x PCBij
1
Requirements for exploration i
- by reach flp(Tp); - the précision of the coordinates Ep(Tp); - for the timeliness T(rp). n WNwxth = £ WiPBCKÎ7<T) f=i
i
i ,,,/locT Hr=i Nj AjPBCKij(T) x Phecto' r " If., M,
Assessment of compliance of private indicators with intelligence requirements MP.) — flp(mp)\ Sx => < Epj < Ep{mp)\ ^ yes Tj < T(mp) no I
M[N03i]k = Xi 1=1
I
/V[M^00£] = Ai(t)9 x [1 - = Pco,
i r I
Exclusion from the list of possible attracted exploration funds Tl Mr(AocT)k = x M[W00i]k ¡=1
□T
Assessms nt of the functioning of the reconnaissance and fire complex
it-> 1
Clarification results planning - The definition of performance indicators (3npl,3np2) Determination of the required value of the enemy's combat potential W™p h required value of the opponent's autopsy degree W™PI(
Definition of RFC performance crite- rj.,1/ _max q 11 _max q ridU —sec Jnplu ~SEG •3np2
1
The best option for building and operating a reconnaissance and fire complex
Fig. 2. structure of the methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of the intelligence and fire complex
Thus, the proposed methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of the intelligence and fire complex allows you to:
1) determine the composition of the reconnaissance and fire complex capable of performing tasks to defeat the object in accordance with the requirements;
2) establish the capabilities of the reconnaissance and fire complex to open and defeat various enemy objects, taking into account the timeliness of the functional capabilities of the controls;
3) establish and evaluate the effectiveness of the reconnaissance and fire complex, as well as their share (contribution) in the overall system of destruction;
4) to assess the quality of functioning of reconnaissance-fire complex in close relationship with the probable reach the damage target enemy with a fire attack, taking into account the losses in manpower and equipment, as well as opposition from the enemy in a given situation;
5) develop sound recommendations on the appropriate procedure for creating and deploying a reconnaissance and fire complex, proposals for organizing interaction between management bodies, means of reconnaissance and fire destruction.
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