CC BY
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Back to Islam? "Women's Problem" in Pages of Tajikistan's Press (1930-1940 and 2000 - 2010)]. Dushanbe, 2014, Donish, p. 340.
5. E. Kisriyev. Arabskiye revolyutsii v globaliziruyuchemsya mire i "novy Islam." [Arab Revolutions in the Globalized World and "New Islam."] Moscow, 2012, URSS, pp. 104-110.
6. M. Mchedlova. Sovremenniye parametry vozvrashcheniya religii: rakursy porblemy [Modern Parameters of Return to Religion: Aspects of the Problem]. Moscow 2012. Bulletin of Institute of Sociology, No 1 (107), pp. 11-21.
7. Latest History of Ismailites. Continuity and Changes in Muslim Community. Moscow, 2013, Natalis, 480 pp.
8. J. Habermas. Against the Militant Atheism. The Post-secular Society - What Is It? About the New European Order. - Russky zhurnal, 23.07.2008. URL.: http://www.russ.ru/pole/Protiv-voinstvuyushchegoateizma
9. J. L. Esposito. Retreat from the Secular Path. - Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement. 2003 - N.Y. Syracuse University Press. P. xiii-xxxiii.
10. R. Rinaldo. Women and Piety Movements. 2010. - The New Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion. Ch. 26 N.Y.: Wiley-Blackwell.
"Vlast," Moscow, 2014, No 9, pp. 162-167
Elena Ionova,
Ph. D. (Hist.), Institute of World Economy
& International Relations RAS
DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN UZBEKISTAN
The political situation in Uzbekistan is becoming more tense due to a number of factors. It is characterized, among other things, by the growing political and intra-clan struggle prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as the stepping up of separatist sentiments in the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakia. Apart from that, Tashkent is faced with a difficult choice of foreign political priorities due to the growing confrontation between its man partners in the international arena - Russia and the United States.
Despite the fact that after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the republic still has a considerable production potential, its leadership has been unable to overcome serious economic problems so far. Due to a shortage of resources the government cannot rehabilitate many
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enterprises ruined during the past decades. At the same time foreign companies have a very cautious attitude to investing in the Uzbek economy because of the unreliable bank and financial systems of the country. As a result, despite a considerable manpower potential, Uzbekistan's economy is unable to provide enough jobs to a considerable number of the able-bodied population. Hence, the low living standards of the overwhelming mass of people and a high level of labor migration, mainly to Russia. According to the data of the World Bank for 2013, Uzbekistan held 126th place among 190 countries in the GDP per capita level.1 The Karakalpak Autonomous Republic is the country's poorest region; it was part of Uzbekistan since 1936.2
The republic occupies one-third of Uzbekistan's territory and its population is 1,500,000 (the total population of Uzbekistan is 29 million). More than 85 percent of Karakalpakia's territory is taken by deserts, one of them - Aralkum - has formed on the bottom of the dried Aral Sea. The republic is situated in a zone of an ecological catastrophe and the living standards of its population are considerably lower than in the rest of Uzbekistan, and its social problems are especially acute. A shortage of water is felt almost always there, and many districts have no water, gas and electricity supply.
In early June this year an appeal of a little-known political movement called "Alga Karakalpakstan" ("Forward, Karakalpakstan!") appeared in the Internet, which called for secession of the autonomous republic from Uzbekistan. The appeal of the new movement pointed to numerous violations of human rights committed by the ruling regime of Uzbekistan and it did not exclude a possibility of the republic joining Russia, which was described as "a guarantor of stability and sovereignty." (It should be noted that Karakalpakia has no common border with Russia).
It seems that in the conditions of the growing Russian-Ukrainian crisis harping on the question of the Karakalpakian autonomy joining Russia can seriously worsen relations between Moscow and Tashkent. In this connection, it cannot be excluded that the rumors and talks on the subject have a definitely provocative character. The Tashkent authorities received this with a tint of mistrust and assessed the report about the emergence of a new movement as an attempt of certain outside forces to destabilize the situation in Uzbekistan. Commenting on the situation the official site of the Uzbek special services UzMetronom emphasized that "the traditional champions of democracy like to develop it wherever there are rich deposits of oil and gas." (There are both in Ustyrt Plateau in Karakalpakia).3
Most experts do not consider the threat of separatism in Karakalpakia real, all the more so since the future of this autonomous republic is largely connected with the development of oil and gas deposits, which can improve its economic situation. Nevertheless, they do not exclude the possibility of stepping up the struggle for the secession of the autonomy after the change of power in Tashkent.
One of the factors destabilizing the domestic political situation in Uzbekistan is the corruption scandal connected with the family of President Islam Karimov, namely, with his elder daughter Gulnara. The point is that profitable sectors of the Uzbek economy have been under her control and control of persons close to her, and incomes from these sectors have been transferred abroad with the help of "illegal" schemes, in which foreign companies took part. As a result, according to the data of the Council of national security of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the country's economy has lost about $2 billion.
After these facts have become known and law cases have been started in Switzerland, France and Sweden on money laundering by Gulnara Karimova, the Council of national security has initiated the
arrest of her businesses and accounts. 4 According to information, she either has been placed under house arrest, or fled abroad.
The main blow has been dealt at the surrounding of the President's daughter. In 2013, her business partner and cousin A. Abdullayev, who owned large business in Ferghana Valley, including a big oil refinery, was also arrested. In June - July this year, other persons close to Gulnara Karimova, including her boyfriend, singer R. Madumarov, were arrested and sentenced to prison terms. According to certain information, the law-enforcement agencies of Uzbekistan have brought to justice about 200 people connected with the financial machinations of the daughter of the President of Uzbekistan.5
It is indicative that in contrast to European legal practices, Uzbek justice does not consider the daughter of the President a witness or accused, the entire blame is laid on people close to her. Thus, in the view of numerous observers, the anti-corruption campaign unfolded in Uzbekistan has largely been aimed at diverting the attention of foreign investors and European law-enforcement agencies from the family of the President of Uzbekistan.
Some experts maintain that Islam Karimov should complete the process of protection of his capital and the family before September of this year, when the election campaign begins in the country. By the presidential elections in March 2015, Islam Karimov should be clear from all suspicions and accusations that he covers the criminal cases of his children or contributes to corruption in the higher echelons of power.6 In the view of other observers, the Uzbek authorities have acquired a good opportunity to make a reshuffle in these echelons and distract public attention from more serious problems in Uzbek society.7
It is known that in December 2014 there should be parliamentary elections and on March 22, 2015, presidential elections in Uzbekistan. Islam Karimov, who is now 76, has been standing at the head of the
republic since 1991. He was reelected in 2000 and 2007, however, the question of his taking pert in the elections of 2015 is still open. Observers do not exclude the fact that the President is looking for a successor at present and examines different variants of transfer of power to him. This is shown, if indirectly, by certain amendments in the Constitution of the republic initiated by Karimov, which envisage reduction of some powers of the President and their transfer to the prime minister and parliament
The amendments to the Constitution proposed by Karimov this year envisage the preservation of foreign and defense policy, as well as the special services under jurisdiction of the President. The economy and social sphere will be transferred under full control of the head of the cabinet of ministers. Parliament will control the activity of the cabinet and the executive power bodies.8
In the view of A. Knyazev, an expert on Central Asian affairs, the role of political parties may noticeably grow along with the greater role of parliament in Uzbekistan. He maintains that inasmuch as political parties in Uzbekistan are not parties of the "leader type," that is, they have not been created to support any concrete political figure, the country has a chance to form a real parliamentary multiparty system. At present there is a number of parties most of which are oriented to the existing power. Among them the People's democratic party of Uzbekistan, the Social-democratic party, Liberal-democratic party, Democratic party, and the Public association "Ecological movement."
Participation of opposition movements in elections has been rendered difficult by the fact that most of their leaders have emigrated. Among them are M. Salikh, the leader of the first officially registered opposition party "Freedom" ("Erk"), who is now in Turkey as political emigrant; B. Choriyev, the founder of the social movement
"Bardamlik," who is now living in the United States, from where he directs acts of civil disobedience; human rights activist M. Tajibayeva, who created the "Civil Society" movement and is now trying to consolidate forces for opposing the existing authorities from France.9
In the view of analysts, in these conditions the leaders of clans -Samarkand, Tashkent, Ferghana, Khorezm and Karakalpak - will come to the fore. The Tashkent and Samarkand clans have the strongest positions. The most influential representative of the latter is the incumbent premier Sh. Mirziyaev, who has held this post since February 2003. The Tashkent clan is represented by the first deputy premier and minister of finance R. Azimov, who is in charge of the financial-economic sphere and is of pro-Western orientation. Among the possible claimants of presidency is the head of the National security service R. Inoyatov, who is one of the most influential persons in the republic at present. Just as Islam Karimov, he positions himself as a post-clan politician.
A possibility of destabilization of the domestic political situation can be the main factor due to which Islam Karimov, who has become the trusted national leader, may stay at the head of the country despite his venerable age. Although, according to the present Constitution of Uzbekistan, one person has no right to hold the post of president more than twice in succession, it may be possible to use the precedent of 2007, when the first term of Karimov's presidency, due to a change in the Constitution, was "slashed to zero" (at that time amendments were adopted which prolonged the presidential term of office from five to seven years). In December 2010 more amendments were made to the republican Constitution according to which the presidential term of office was again reduced to five years. Experts believe that the very fact of this change of the Constitution may give Islam Karimov the reason for taking part in the elections, just as was the case of 2007. It cannot be
excluded that the unlimited term of office of President I. Karimov may be introduced, on the example of Kazakhstan.
Growing tension between the elites against the backdrop of the low living standards of the population, and the exacerbation of social problems create the ground for the strengthening of protest sentiments, which is, as is known, a factor used by the United States for creating centers of instability. It is indicative that according to the rating of stability in Central Asian countries published in the U.S. journal "Foreign Policy," it is precisely Uzbekistan, which used to be regarded as the regional leader in the sphere of national security, that experts referred to a group of states with a very high degree of threat of destabilization. Uzbekistan holds 48th place in this respect, being ahead of Tajikistan (55th place), Kyrgyzstan (58th place), Turkmenistan (78th place) and Kazakhstan (11th place).10
In these conditions Tashkent is trying to do everything possible in order to get support of the three main forces whose influence determines the geopolitical situation in Central Asia - Russia, China and the United States. Tashkent's foreign policy has long become more pro-Western than that of other Central Asian countries. In this connection it was no surprise that Uzbekistan suspended its membership of CSTO, which was followed by the opening of the NATO mission in Tashkent in May 2014. The Pentagon duly assessed the consent of the republican authorities to make this step and did not reduce assistance to Uzbekistan in the sphere of security protection, as it had been done with regard to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. While doing this, American business is in no hurry to invest in the Uzbek economy. According to the data of the economic adviser of the USAID organization, American companies have invested more than $10 billion in Azerbaijan, over $16 billion in Kazakhstan, whereas only $500 million in Uzbekistan.11 In these conditions Tashkent cannot
ignore the importance of its relations with Russia, which is a big economic partner of Uzbekistan to date. The Russian Federation intends to broaden its economic presence in the republic. In mid-January 2014 a plan of measures was endorsed at a meeting of the intergovernmental Uzbek-Russian committee on the implementation of the Program of economic cooperation for 2013-2017.
In trade turnover the Russian Federation holds first place among the trade partners of Uzbekistan: its share in the republic's foreign trade amounted to 30 percent in 2013, or about $7 billion. There are 902 enterprises with Russian financing functioning in the republic, and 489 enterprises with Uzbek capital working on Russian territory. The total volume of direct Russian investments in the Uzbek economy in 2008-2013 exceeded $6 billion.12 The positions of Russian companies in the oil-and-gas branch, which is becoming the key industry in the republic (Uzbekistan holds third place in gas extraction in the CIS, coming next to Russia and Turkmenistan, and eighth place in the world).
The Russian "Gazprom" Company is developing three gas deposits in the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic. The "Lukoil" Company, which has invested more than $1 billion in the implementation of two agreements on products sharing is one of the major investors in Uzbekistan. The company's investment program for the next five years amounts to $5 billion. "Lukoil" is actively working on gas deposits, taking part in geological prospecting in Khauzak, Shady, Kungrad and Kandym, where about 18.5 billion cubic meters of gas have been extracted. Apart from that, "Lukoil" is part of a consortium of investors which is engaged in seismic work on the territory of the Aral block.
It should be borne in mind that the labor migrants from Uzbekistan working in Russia are making a great financial contribution
to the Uzbek economy. Uzbek people are the leaders among the labor migrants from the CIS countries, as far as their personal money transfers back home are concerned: in 2013 alone they transferred to Uzbekistan from Russia about $7.9 billion.
Nevertheless, as the Ukrainian crisis has shown, the degree of economic interaction with Russia is no guarantee from destabilization of the situation in the CIS countries, in which certain forces in the United States and other states are interested. In these conditions close interaction of the Russian Federation with the People's Republic of China, which has growing interests of its own in Central Asia and, in essence, the division of the spheres of influence between Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia, becomes a factor of opposition to Washington's attempts to create seats of instability in the region. One of the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis was the turning of China into a major geopolitical ally of Russia in Central Asia.
Moscow has properly assessed Beijing's support of its position on Ukraine. Alliance with Russia is quite important for China not only for the realization of its economic interests. Beijing relies on Moscow's support in the Asia-Pacific region, where tension is growing. Experts note China's concern over the new military policy of Japan, particularly, its statement on the possibility to use its armed forces outside the country's boundaries, and also emphasize the legitimate character of joint military exercises carried on by Russia and China in this connection.
Evidently, Beijing will act in Central Asia proceeding from its own interests, which now lie mostly in the economic sphere. It is the known fact that Chinese influence on the regional economy is growing rapidly. Uzbekistan is no exception in this respect. Already now the volume of Chinese investments in the Uzbek economy considerably exceed that of Russian investments: in 2012 Beijing and Tashkent
signed a package of documents envisaging the implementation of thirty investment projects to a total sum of over $5.3 billion, and in 2013 agreements were signed on drawing $7.7 billion from China, including bank credits to a sum of $6.1 billion, direct investments of Chinese companies amounting to $1.3 billion, and state grants reaching $0.3 billion.13
China is the second biggest trade partner of Uzbekistan (trade turnover of the two countries comprised $5.3 billion in 2013). The trans-Asian gas pipeline Turkmenistan - Uzbekistan - Kazakhstan -China passes trough the territory of the republic (the third section of this pipeline was commissioned in June 2014). Negotiations are underway on building the fourth section which will make China the main importer of Uzbek gas: it is planned that with the commissioning of this section of the pipeline the supply of Uzbek gas to China will grow to 25 billion cubic meters a year (at present China and Russia import about the same volume of Uzbek gas - about 10 billion cubic meters each).
Apart from that, Uzbekistan comes second after Kazakhstan in exporting uranium to China. According to the latest agreements signed with the Guangdong nuclear-energy company of China, the latter plans to purchase low-enriched uranium in Uzbekistan to a sum of $800 million.14
Thus, neither Russia nor China which have serious economic interests in Uzbekistan, are interested in a destabilization of the domestic political situation in that country. As to the United States, its relations with Uzbekistan will be determined by the degree of loyalty and manageability of those who will come to power in Tashkent.
Notes
http://uzbekistan.polpred.com/?ns=4
Prior to that Karakalpakia was part of Kyrgyz and Kazakh republics, as well as the RSFSR. In December 1990 a Declaration on state sovereignty was signed at the republican Supreme Soviet, which envisaged complete independence on the basis of the results of an all-republican referendum. However, in 1993 President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan succeeded in persuading the local political elite to sign an interstate treaty for a term of twenty years on Karakalpakia entering the Republic of Uzbekistan. The document contained a clause proclaiming the right of the autonomy to secede from Uzbekistan through referendum. At present one-third of the republican population is Karakalpaks, one-third - Uzbeks, and one-third - other nationalities (Kazakhs, Russians, Ukrainians, Koreans). http://lenta. ru/articles/ 2014/06/10/karakalpakstan http://lenta.ru/articles/2014/06/10/karakalpakstan http://www.news-asia.ru/view/6514
http://www.zamondosh.com/2014/07/16-terra-group-prime-media-gamma.html http://www.zamondosh.com/2014/07/16-terra-group-prime-media-gamma.htm http://www.news-asia.ru/view/uz/6761
http://total/kz/politics/2014/03/18/president_uzbekistana_predlozhil...
http://www/fergananews.com/articles/8038
Ibid.
http ://www. 12news/2014/07/21
http://www.zamondosh.com/2014/07/16-politicheskaya-situatsiya-v-uzbekistane.html
http ://mfa.uz/ru/press/new/2014/05/1909/
http://noviyvek.uz/novosti/kitay-k-2022-g-zakupit-v-uzbekistane-uran-na-800-mln.html
"Rossiya i noviye gosudarstva Evrazii: ezhekvartalny zhurnal IMEMO RAN," Moscow, 2014, III (XXIV), pp. 92-99
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Boris Volhonsky,
Ph. D. (Hist.), Russian Institute of Strategic Studies HYDRORESOURCES AS A FACTOR OF GEOPOLITICS IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
"Water wars" have recently become one of the main subjects in political literature. In the view of many analysts, water will be the main cause for interstate conflicts this century, just as oil and gas were the pretexts for wars in the 20th century.
