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Международный научный журнал «СИМВОЛ НАУКИ»_№4/2015_ISSN 2410-700X
ФИЛОСОФСКИЕ НАУКИ
UDC 165
Korban Inna Viktorovna, engineer of a computer center of the Faculty of Humanities Education Samara Technical University Samara, RF E-mail: [email protected]
CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A COGNITIVE STRATEGY
Abstract
The subject of this article is related to the problem of knowledge, specific to radical constructivism. Despite the controversial nature of the designated positions, they always appear in the various branches of modern science.
Keywords
radical constructivism, epistemology, knowledge, cognition
Radical constructivism in epistemology is one of the most original and at the same time, the discussion flows. Basic epistemological position of radical constructivism paradigm states that knowledge as such is in the minds of people, and the thinking subjects cannot act in any other way than to construct it based on their own experience. Accordingly, the possibility of scientific knowledge of external reality of radical constructivism is completely rejected. Any science, any knowledge - contextually and is a product of experience. Knowledge is a cognitive practice, in each situation must be analyzed, who have studied, what, when and why.
One of the reasons for the rapid growth and popularity of radical constructivism is the crisis of the fundamentalist paradigm in epistemology. The fundamental division of "consciousness" and "peace" has led to increased skepticism because of the inability to reconstruct the actual process of learning that was the cause of the need to develop new approaches to the problems of ontology and epistemology.
The origins of this view refer to the ancient skepticism with its position that all of the ideas and knowledge of the subject somehow gets out of the experience, which includes feeling, thinking, activities, etc. Therefore, the thesis holds Xenophanes that even if someone will be able to describe exactly what the world really is, he (she) still will not be able to ascertain whether it is "true" description, as required access to the world that does not include our expert knowledge about it.
One of the founders of constructivist epistemology is E. von Glasersfeld. In his works, a scientist criticizes primarily those of the provisions of the theory of knowledge, which always seemed natural and inevitable:
a) that fully structured world exists independently of the knowing subject;
b) that the subject has the task to identify what constitutes a "real" world and what is its structure.
According Glasersfeld, «These assumptions inevitably lead to a paradox. Whatever a human subject perceives
or conceives is necessarily the result of that human subject's ways and means of perceiving and conceiving. There is no way of comparing the results of these activities with what might exist independently, because the only access to the presumed "reality" would be through yet another act of perceiving and conceiving.» [1, p. 2]. And since there are no procedures for the resolution of this paradox, representatives of radical constructivism produce "decisive shift in perspective". In the center of the [now] is not the problem of justifying the knowledge, actually is the study of the process (biological, neurophysiological, psychological) of creating constructs that are «ultimate reality", which can deal of human cognition.
Radical constructivism is based on the fact that people in their processes of thinking and perception not only reflects the world around us, how it works. Radical constructivism intuitively based on the assumption that "any cognitive events occur in the experimental world of a goal-oriented consciousness", thus:
- construct - then purposefully distinguish;
- construction produces a coherent, relative peace;
- construction is an infinite recursive process;
- fashions the people and the constructed world they constitute procedural unity.
Radicality of radical constructivism is, according to Glasersfeld, lies in the fact that "One of the central points
Международный научный журнал «СИМВОЛ НАУКИ»
№4/2015
ISSN 2410-700X
of the theory is precisely that this kind of "truth," can never be claimed for the knowledge (or any piece of it) that human reason produces. One of the central points of the theory is precisely that this kind of "truth," can never be claimed for the knowledge (or any piece of it) that human reason produces."[2, p. 1]
As suggested Glasersfeld, «The trouble is that throughout the occidental history of ideas and right down to our own days, two requisites have been considered fundamental in any epistemological discussion of knowledge. The first of these requisites demands that whatever we would like to call "true knowledge" has to be independent of the knowing subject. The second requisite is that knowledge is to be taken seriously only if it claims to represent a world of "things-in-themselves" in a more or less veridical fashion. In other words, it is tacitly taken for granted that a fully structured and nowable world "exists" and that it is the business of the cognizing human subject to discover what that structure is.» [2. p. 3].
In the paradigm of radical constructivism all knowledge, the whole experience is entirely dependent on the subject. Although in principle the possibility of the existence of some objective reality constructivists allowed, yet the admissibility of this is completely useless for the subj ect in the process of constructing their own reality. Question objective reflection of reality, thus, radical constructivism is removed or does not occur at all. And only available subject real world - one that he constructs in the learning process. In the works Glasersfeld problems of cognition gets a fundamentally different interpretation: knowledge appears not as a model of ontological reality, as close to the ideal, but rather as a way of action.
This point of view allows for a qualitative shift from attempts to describe the objective reality to the functional efficiency received knowledge (this position is also developed in pragmatism, operationalism). The goal of any knowledge therefore is to ensure to build such a model of the real world that would most logically organize cash and experience to provide the optimum solution of practical problems. In support of its position Glasersfeld repeatedly refers to the postulate of Piaget's adaptive function of knowledge: "For Piaget (as for Vico), knowledge is not and can never be a "representation" of the real world. Instead it is the collection of conceptual structures that turn out to be adapted or, as I would say, viable within the knowing subject's range of experience." [1, p. 6].
Interpretation of knowledge as a process that is functionally inseparable actions leading to the abandonment of any ontology: Such a philosophy deontologizatsiya necessarily entails ideological pluralism, many different versions of reality equal; epistemology without ontology - the principled position of representatives of radical constructivism.
These provisions have been criticized repeatedly for the inadmissibility philosophical generalizations regarding the findings in the framework of natural knowledge, or the risk of degeneration in solipsism. But, despite the abundance of criticism, modern science, and art, retain lostoyanstvo appeals to the provisions of radical constructivism.
Radical Constructivism - it's a good methodological basis for the construction of the building of modern science. Together with other anti-realistic directions (pragmatism, instrumentalism, operationalism), constructivism takes a position that presupposes the inseparability of the observer and the observed, the relativity and subjectivity of any scientific knowledge.
Constructivist discourse includes a number of specific concepts of an interdisciplinary nature, developing natural science model of the knower of the body (which include cybernetics of living systems, the study of the nervous system and brain, the theory of perception, neuropsychiatric processes, etc.). Discourse of radical constructivism is one of the most striking examples of interdisciplinary knowledge.
References:
1. Glasersfeld E., von Aspects of Radical Constructivism // Published as: Aspectos del constructivismo radical (Aspects of radical constructivism), in M. Pakman (ed.), Construcciones de la experiencia humana. - Barcelona, Spain: Gedisa Editorial, 1996. - P. 23-49.
2. 1Glasersfeld E., von "An Exposition of Constructivism: Why Some Like it Radical" / In: R. B. Davis, C. A. Maher and N. Noddings (Eds.), Monographs of the Journal for Research in Mathematics Education. - Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 1990. - P. 3.
© I. V. Korban, 2015
Международный научный журнал «СИМВОЛ НАУКИ»_№4/2015_ISSN 2410-700X
УДК 16
Абрарова Зинира Фоатовна
Канд.филос.наук, доцент БашГУ, г.Уфа, РФ E-mail: [email protected]
ВИЗУАЛИЗИРОВАННЫЙ ОБРАЗ КАК СРЕДСТВО КРЕАТИВНОГО МЫШЛЕНИЯ В
НАУЧНОМ ПОЗНАНИИ
Аннотация
В статье ставится задача уяснения особенностей применения визуализированных образов в процессах научного творчества, выявления эвристического потенциала образных форм представления знания.
Ключевые слова
Визуализированный образ, креативное мышление, когнитивная деятельность, научное познание.
Наука - специализированная когнитивная деятельность по производству нового научного знания[1]. Ценность ученого и научного коллектива определяется, прежде всего, тем вкладом, который вносится ими в массив существующего знания. Поэтому основным приоритетом научно-познавательной деятельности является научное творчество, направленное на получение новой истины. Новизна, наряду с полезностью и истинностью, считается главной ценностью научного познания. Но как ее добиться?
Механизм получения нового знания остается одной из важнейших проблем эпистемологии. В современной философии науки существуют общие рекомендации по организации творческой деятельности. Считается, что для ее успешности важно соблюдение пяти условий:
1) четко сформулированная проблема;
2) профессионализм, т.е. обладание запасом накопленных в изучаемой сфере знаний и навыками исследовательской деятельности;
3) способность к переструктурированию, перекомбинации имеющихся элементов существующего знания;
4) релевантность, т.е. способность к отбору значимых, перспективных фактов;
5) когнитивная смелость, т.е. способность к принятию нестандартных, рискованных решений[2].
Подход к научному творчеству как к сугубо рациональной деятельности не позволяет выяснить
процесс зарождения нового знания. Если бы творчество было бы возможно лишь на рациональной основе, то можно было бы, уловив его алгоритм, создать компьютерную программу, и из имеющихся знаний и фактов выводить новое знание. Пытаясь понять суть математического творчества, А. Пуанкаре пишет: «Оно заключается не в создании новых комбинаций с помощью уже известных математических объектов. Это может сделать мало ли кто; но число комбинаций, которые можно найти этим путем, было бы бесконечно, и даже самое большое их число не представляло бы ровно никакого интереса. Творчество состоит как раз в том, чтобы не создавать бесполезных комбинаций, строить такие, которые оказываются полезными; а их ничтожно меньшинство. Творить - это отличать, выбирать»[3].
Но что значит «отличать», «выбирать»? Задав сам себе этот вопрос, Пуанкаре приходит к ответу, что это, главным образом, внерациональный, бессознательный процесс. Ссылаясь на мнения других математиков и на собственный опыт творчества, он пишет, что его «поражает этот характер внезапного прозренья, с несомненностью свидетельствующий о долгой бессознательной работе; роль этой бессознательной работы в процессе математического творчества кажется мне неоспоримой; следы ее можно было бы найти и в других случаях, где она является менее очевидной»[4]. Доказывая невозможность сведения математического творчества к логическим алгоритмам, Пуанкаре высмеивает возможность создания логики открытия. В таком случае, пишет он, ученого можно было бы заменить логической машиной, подобной легендарной машине в чикагском мясокомбинате, в которую вкладывают живых свиней, а на выходе получают окорока и сосиски[5].
Французский математик историк науки Ж. Адамар, исследуя особенности творчества Пуанкаре и других ученых (в частности, Эйнштейна) приходит к выводу, что вначале ученый, основываясь на собранных данных, пытается представить себе проблему в целом, что приводит к необходимости ее визуализации. Если
