CC BY
9
CHURCHES AFTER THE ELECTIONS AND BEFORE THE CHOICE
Natallia Vasilevich
Summary
The religious sphere in 2011 was influenced by the presidential elections of 19 December 2010 and repressions in civil and political spheres afterwards. On the one hand, both at the higher level of the senior hierarchy and among believers began a certain resuscitation. On the other hand, it was not systematic, flaring up and abating. Nevertheless, this resuscitation was observed both in in-church issues and social events. Besides the traditional agenda (church-state relations, religious education at school, demography, family, abortions, donations for religious buildings and social projects), new issues arose: current political events after the elections and the followed repressions, and the death penalty. The adoption of the new law on reproduction technologies made topical questions of bioethics. These dominated the religious discourse. The church communities gained a more important position. The economic crisis of spring-summer 2011 hit churches as well.
Trends:
• The religious sphere continues experiencing oppression, certain religious organizations and foreign citizens are being persecuted;
• Christian communities tend to show less loyalty to the Belarusian regime;
• Religious organizations speak more actively on social and political issues, voicing an alternative to the authorities' position and reacting to persecution;
• Inside the churches civil society is growing stronger;
• Relations between the state authority and the Catholic community "freeze".
General situation
According to information by the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs1 the number of religious organizations has not changed significantly: 3210 communities have been registered (48 more than in 2010). There is a significant difference across regions: the number of communities in the west is several times larger than that in the east (Brest - 739; Minsk - 667; Viciebsk - 533; Hrodna - 468; Homiel — 383; Mahiliou - 278). This imbalance is traditional and historically motivated. Until 1939 Western Belarus was a part of Poland and through
http://www.belarus21.by/ru/main_menu/religion/sotr/relig_sit
that retained religious infrastructure and higher level of religiosity of the population. In Eastern Belarus they were significantly destroyed in times of severe persecution in the 1920 — 30s.
There have still been no definite criteria applied to establish the number of adherents of each denomination or associated with religious organizations. The calculations are based on social polls and the number of registered religious organizations. In 2011 the Institute for Sociology of the Academy of Sciences held an inquiry but its results were available only in the press: "true" believers make up 20% of the population, of which the Orthodox constitute 57.3%, Catholics - 34.5%, Protestants - 3.1%2.
The confessional structure by the number of parishes is the following: the Belarusian Orthodox Church — 1567 (48.8%), Christians of Evangelical Faith — 512 (15.9%), the Roman Catholic Church — 479 (14.9%), Seventh-Day Adventists — 73 (2.3%), Judaism — 53 (1.7%), Old Believers — 33 (1%), Lutheranism — 27 (0.8%), Islam — 25 (0.8%). But neither source provides sufficient information on religious affiliation of Belarusians, the degree of their bond with denominations and the consequence of the latter in society.
Churches: elections, choice and crisis
The presidential elections of 2010 came as a shock for the whole society and affected the Church dislodging its relations with the state from the traditional paradigm of gestures of reverence and loyalty. Despite greetings to A. Lukashenko from the head of the Russian Orthodox Church3, from emigrant Protestant Mikhail Morgulis4, and unusual support from the American citizen rabbi Abraham Benenson5 on behalf of Jews, local representatives of religious organizations, except for some predictable figures, were quite reserved in their reaction or even outraged. The widely publicized picture of popular support came in contrast with letters of sympathy for protesters in the official newspaper of the Belarusian Exarchate Carkounaje slova (Ecclesiastical word)6, reserved greetings from religious leaders, letters to the Patriarch form the Orthodox
2 http://news.tut.by/society/279195.html
3 http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1347158.html.
4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature = player_embedded&v = 9w9ayZFNwmQ.
5 http://nn.by/?c = ar&i = 59597.
6 http://churchby.info/bel/654/
believers bewildered by his position7. Apart from this the article by a Roman Catholic priest Zmrocnaje Rastvo (Gloomy Christmas)8 deserves attention, an appeal of Catholic believers on the situation in the country9, and later the appeal of Metropolitan Kondrusevich on the social and political situation in the country which he called "complicated"10. The homily by Sergey Khomich, Bishop of the United Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith11, and appeal of Seraphim, Bishop of Babrujsk to judges supporting opposition activists12 are other examples.
The reasons for these changes might be twofold: interest for presidential candidates with open religious affiliations and growing general dissatisfaction in society. However, loyalty for the authorities did not reduce drastically, in a number of cases the Church dissociated itself from politics (e. g. the Red Church priest Uladzimir Zavalniuk called the parish not to organize any meetings in the church)13.
The elections swang the pendulum but by the summer its movement abated. The financial crisis made economic issues more pressing. The crisis was most felt in communities with construction or renovation work underway. Financial aid from the parish and business entities reduced. Only parishes with foreign financing or foreign-economic activities remained unscathed.
It is generally believed that social turmoils and economic crisis stimulate religious feelings in people. But neither the post-election situation nor the dramatic impoverishment created crowds in churches: lines to exchange offices and household appliances shops, to say nothing of lines of cars on the state borders showed where more likely places for worshipping.
Legislation and institutes
Freedom of religion. Pavel Sevyarynets (Orthodox) was denied visits several times despite the agreements with the BOC and Internal
7 http://churchby.info/bel/652.
8 http://churchby.info/bel/656.
9 http://churchby.info/bel/672.
10 http://catholic.by/2/home/news/belarus/hierarchs/109046-kandrusiewicz. html.
11 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v = OWvZlE1k6Vk&feature = player_ embedded.
12 http://churchby.info/bel/783/
13 http://churchby.info/bel/792/
regulations. The journalist Andrey Pachobut (Roman Catholic) was also denied a visit of a priest for several months. Restrictions apply not only to political, but ordinary prisoners, too. The law stipulates "a visit of a priest" if the body executing the criminal procedure allows it14. In a bulk of cases these bodies deny the requests or creates obstacles.
After the explosion on 11 April a new round of obligatory fingerprinting was launched. A lot of believers, mostly Orthodox, refused to undergo the needed procedure. In July 2011 priest Igor Prilepsky was fined for refusal to give fingerprints15. This issue was raised at the eparchial assembly of Minsk Eparchy of the BOC16.
Amended laws changed the procedure of mass events and the churches felt it, especially during holidays or pilgrimages. On Palm Sunday and at Easter in Minsk and other places people were allowed into churchyards only after examination of personal belongings, sometimes using metal detectors. During the mass pilgrimage in Budslau the territory was surrounded with metal frames, pilgrims had to submit their belongings for inspection, even umbrellas were banned17. This stirred dissatisfaction and even protests among believers. The group led by Fr. Viachaslau Barok protested against the overdone security measures by staying outside the rails and praying18.
Fr. Barok became the target of a new type of persecution, namely, from the Department of Financial Investigation, as an organizer of pilgrimages. On the ground of an anonymous letter the department initiated an investigation of his "financial activities". Late 2011 new cases took place of visa denial for Catholic priests19, which is a sensitive spot for the Roman Catholic Church and which the Belarusian authorities manipulate.
One more tension point is Article 193-1 of the Criminal Code stipulating liability for acting on behalf of an unregistered
Internal regulations of the temporary detention centers of the interior, approved by the Decree of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus 20.10.2003 № 234; Internal regulations of remand centers of the penitentiary system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of
Belarus, approved by Decree of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the
Republic of Belarus 13.01.2004 № 3 http://churchby.info/rus/720/ http://churchby.info/bel/837/
http://www.catholic.by/2/home/announcements/109185-budslau.html.
http://churchby.info/bel/news/2011/07/10-1/
http://churchby.info/bel/821/
organization. Over 2011 the Prosecutor's Office issued several warnings for a number of protestant and other communities. For example, in April it affected the leader and four activists of the International Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (ICCECB)20. Within the campaign Prava na vieru (Right for Faith) was launched a signature drive to abolish this article21. A similar campaign to amend the law On freedom of conscience and religious organizations in 2007 collected over 50 thousand signatures, but without any results.
Education. For the last several years the issue of participation in education has been very topical for religious organizations. Previous agreements between the BOC and the Ministry of Education contemplated wider cooperation in this sphere, though it was not that active. Nevertheless, a number of educational establishments provided some optional courses on the Orthodox culture and spiritual issues. Access to schools was for both the Orthodox and Catholic Churches one of the main targets of "lobbying". The Education Code adopted in 2011 and the subsequent Regulations on the procedure, conditions, content and forms of cooperation of educational establishments with religious organizations in upbringing students22 significantly reduced chances of their participation in education reducing the cooperation to the sphere of upbringing (talks, excursions, organization of holidays, etc). This normative act prohibits missionary work, distribution of literature, audio-, video- and other materials of religious content (except for approved in the syllabuses), services, religious rites, rituals and ceremonies, placing religious symbols and property and others. In the Italian "crucifix case" brought before the European Court of Human Rights about crucifixes displayed in classrooms of state schools many hierarchs, including the Belarusian ones, criticized the Court for its first decision. But when the Belarusian law threatened to introduce even stricter regulations on religious symbols, they kept silent or even commented favourably.
Human life and family values. The law On reproduction technologies and guaranteed rights of citizens in their application
http://svabodavery.org/2011/09/prokuratura-vynesla-oficialnoe-predu-
prezhdenie-rukovoditelyu-i-aktivistam-nezaregistrirovannoj-religioznoj-
obshhiny-v-gomele/; http://svabodavery.org/2011/09/miliciya-grozit-bap-
tistam-tyuremnymi-srokami/
http://svabodavery.org.
http://churchby.info/rus/723/
stirred even greater attention and criticism from the Churches. The main criticism was against the provisions of the law on IVF technology, donorship of gametes, surrogate motherhood, the possibility of experiments on embryos, and embryo reduction. Social frameworks of the RCC and the ROC pay a lot of attention to these issues. Both the Orthodox and the Catholics organize public events, concerts, and conferences to promote family values, premarital continence and sexual morality in general. The law was criticized not only for its content but also for the fact that it was devised without consulting religious organizations.
The Orthodox Church had the bill examined for morality and the press secretary of Minsk Eparchy meant, "the bill stands in sharp contradiction with the view of the Orthodox Church and its teachings"23. A spontaneous movement among the Orthodox produced appeals to the state bodies with demands to review the bill provisions, a number was conferences was held. Unfortunately, this criticism did not transform into any official statement. Under the pressure from the Orthodox certain amendments were made regarding probable experiments with embryos. But these amendments were of rather skin-deep character. The BOC voiced certain suggestions only when the law was practically adopted24.
As for the Catholic Church, in the name of Metropolitan Kondrusevich it publicized a statement "Regarding the law on reproductive technologies adopted by the House of Representatives of the National Assembly" in which the hierarch expressed his serious concern about the fact that the "bill was devised without consulting religious organizations"25. Nevertheless, neither the Orthodox nor the Catholics managed to start discussions and influence the content of the law, despite all statements.
When the Orthodox fight for the right of embryos in the framework of "family values", the Catholic documents refer to this issue as "protecting human rights". The protection of life since the moment of conception is no less important than the issue of death penalty. When in 2011 Dmitry Konovalov and Vladislav Kovalyov charged with the explosion in Minsk metro on 11 April 2011 were sentenced to death, it raised issues of the young men's afterlife and death penalty in general. The Catholic senior hierarchs publicly
http://churchby.info/bel/news/2011/05/01-2/
http://churchby.info/rus/756/
http://catholic.by/2/libr/speaches/108809-kandrusiewicz.html.
protested against the death penalty and called to pardon the convicts26. The Belarusian Orthodox Church entrusted the comments to its press service. No calls for pardon and abolition of the death penalty were issued, moreover, it was stressed that the Church should not "demand the abolition of death penalty" or intervene with "the terms of reference of the judicial and executive branch". Nevertheless, the press service expressed doubts about the reasonability of this measure27. The authorities paid no attention to the voice of the Church in this case, either.
Conclusion
Firstly, we should expect that churches become more active in social and political life, but not because of senior hierarchs' work but due to activities of religious communities.
Secondly, all churches will experience pressure as the authorities will try to win back loyalty and force to protect interests of the ruling elite both inside and outside the country. It is less likely that the pressure will come in the form of bargaining over the "stale goods", such as concordat in the case if the RCC.
Thirdly, the increased pressure might lead to more radical moods in society as well as to reduction of political activities. But the protest mood will develop independently.
Fourthly, the Belarusian Orthodox Church might face administrative changes caused by restructuring, which might also influence the social and political stance. But most likely that it will be an internal affair.
Fifthly, the upcoming parliamentary elections will stimulate religious communities as well.
http://catholic.by/2/libr/interview/110860-kandrusiewicz.html.
http://www.church.by/resource/Dir0301/Dir0302/2011/Page3998.htmlboth.
