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balloon burst due to significant punctures and started to lose its original splendor. The idol of adepts' dream perishes in various countries. They suffer and, probably, cry, although not so loudly as fanatics in North Korea mourn over death of Kim Jong-il. It seems that they do it not less sincerely. It is possible to hope that it will become a process with sobering effect on them and will lead to spiritual self-cleaning, which will let comprehend that the present global civilizational subject is not a decorated figure of Goliath holding "big baton", but the unity of diversity of sovereign state and civil subjects covering inter-ethnic and inter-racial, inter-personal, language and spiritual spheres of civilizations' life. The problem of governance of contemporary trends of global development, of putting them in order and directing in the positive creative channel resembles a shaping and developing chorus of the orchestra, where each instrument with its specificity performs its melody, which merges with all other instruments and lets forming an actual harmony of heroic symphony of global self-governance of the countries and peoples of the contemporary world.
"The article was submitted by the author for publication in the bulletin "Russia and the Muslim World". It is the sequel of the author's article "Reanimation of Racism: Sources and Variations" published in the bulletin N11 of 2011.
A. Glukhova,
Political analyst (Voronezh State University) ARABIC REVOLUTIONS AS A FACTOR OF INFLUENCE ON INTERNAL RUSSIAN POLICY
Spring in 2011 suddenly was marked by the events, which were not foreseen even by well versed political analysts. Some countries of the North Africa from Tunis to Libya turned out to be rapidly
destabilized by a wave of people's protests against the ruling political regimes with actual inherited-dynastic character, despite republican (presidential) system of governance. The ordinary democratic wave, in words of S. Huntington, with the speed of political tsunami covered the Islamic world putting a number of uneasy problems before analysts. The first of them is as follows: how to incorporate these events in logic of the third wave of democratic transit starting in the middle of the 1970s? Do we confront the fourth democratic wave or sub-wave within the framework of the united transformation process? Or is this unexpected wave of its own Arabic origin and its own unique nature? The last question corresponds to the version expressed by specialists (primarily, by S. Huntington) yet in the beginning of 1990s about the failure of the democratic process to overcome Islamic bastions for reason of full lack of convergence of valuable foundations of Islamic and western civilizations. Nevertheless, the demonstrators on the square Takhrir in Cairo, like in other capital's squares of Arabic states, raised demands of freedom of speech, meetings, justice in distribution of incomes, political representation et., which may be evaluated as democratic demands. In other words, the democratic winds reached the boundaries of the Islamic world as well.
The following question is quite logical: what are the reasons of these processes? To all appearance, we see a complex of reasons, which conditioned a cumulative effect being pernicious for authoritarian rulers of this region.
A special attention should be paid to the institutional context of developing processes, exactly the character of the political regime. The situation in the discussed countries more often than in others is defined as "decaying semi-authoritarian regime" by American researchers. In the beginning of the 2000s they included in this group of countries Egypt and Azerbaijan (the prognoses for the latter mention analogous
events in the near future). The mere fact of being in power for the period of 30-40 years and firm intention to give it to the successors testifies to the limitless self-confidence of the ruling leaders, which together with the unbelievable personal enrichment led to the explosion of people's dissatisfaction.
At the same time, side by side with the political factor, there exist also other remote causes of emerged macro-conflicts, for instance, economic factors. For the last half of century, particularly for the last two-three decades, the Arabs endured the on-going crisis, which exists today. There are multi-planned causes of this crisis: war against Israel, increasing influence of religious extremists, rising social injustice, particularly against background of corruption of many power structures and their intention to suppress a different trend of thought, as well as the growing gap between the rich and the poor. The tempos of economic development of most of 22 member-countries of the League of Arabic States significantly slowed and turned out to be the lowest on the planet. Actually, one third of the population in the Arabic East is illiterate and almost the same part of it lives having daily income of $ 2. The backwardness of the Arabic world is especially evident against the background of economic successes of East and South-East Asia, which started from almost equal positions but left Arabs far behind. And this situation occurred, despite the fact that the Near East possesses almost two thirds of the energy-bearers' resources, while the self-cost of extraction of the black gold is actually by an order of magnitude greater than, for instance, in Russia.
The situational causes, including grave social problems occurred due to the world financial-economic crisis, primarily unemployment, which aggravated the position of not only the poorest strata of the population but also of the safe middle class - banks' employees, state officials etc. These hardships were particularly painfully met by the
youth, which instantly confronted disappearance of chances for professional carrier, rising mobility etc. Not accidentally, just the youth ("Face-book youth", by definition of some observers) became the main driving force of protest movements.
It should be said that the demographic factor, i.e. the growing share of young people in the social structure of the population attracted attention of researchers. The changes in the demographic balance of the population are regarded as a factor of not only internal but also international policy. The augmentation of one group gives rise to the political, economic and social pressure upon other groups and causes the counteraction. And what is more important, this circumstance engenders military pressure on the demographically less dynamic groups. For instance, for the 1970s, in Sri-Lanka the peak of Sinhalese nationalist mutiny and of Tamils uprising in the end of the 1980s coincided exactly with the years, when "the wave of the youth" including people from fifteen to twenty years exceeded the share of 20% in the total number of the group. Actually, all Sinhalese guerillas were less than 24 years old, and "Tigers of Tamil", as was reported, were unique in this kind, since they were supported in essence by an army of children comprising boys and girls at the age started from eleven years. The Tigers waged "the war of adolescents", as marked English magazine "Economist". In an analogous way conflicts and even wars marked by the gap between different ethnic groups were supported by a great difference in growth of the population. For the 1980s, Chechnya was one of the most densely populated territories of Russia, since the number of Chechens was increased by 26%. The high birth rate in the republic resulted in emergence of re-settlers and fighters. And not any exclusion represented the complicated and dramatic processes resulted in the inter-civilizations' wars in former Yugoslavia. They were marked by many causes and stating points.
However, it was quite probable that the most significant factor was the change of demographic situation in Kosovo. By the 1980s, about 50% of Albanians were young people at the age less than twenty years. The changed demographic balance led to the situation, when Albanians proclaimed the demand of raising the status of Kosovo to the status of Yugoslavian republic. The ethnic expansion of one group led to ethnic purges on the part of the other group. Thus, the changes in demographic balances and "peaks of the youth" in twenty and greater percent were "responsible" for inter-civilizations' conflicts in the end of the XX century.
The role of the moral factor seems to be also rather significant. The essential role was plaid by channel "Wiki-Leaks", which publicized the facts of corruption of the ruling circles, of huge riches accumulated by the ruling dynasties. This kind of information explosion shook the consciousness of millions of people. Together with economic problems caused by the global financial crisis the exposing publications made their contribution to formation of common dissatisfaction and mass protest mobilization.
At present, three main forces come forward to the proscenium of Arabic policy. First of all, it is the youth supported, as a rule, by secular opposition parties, as well as by the armed forces and Islamists, which by the level of influence in society and in case of actually free democratic elections are capable to collect not less than the third of votes, according to various estimates. The young educated people will never reconcile with the role of extras - mere observers of political processes, and they raise the demand of ensuring their actual participation in the political process and in the governance of the state. The particular ways of these revolutionary transformations will differ and to a great extension will depend on practical correlation of forces, the skill in bringing forward the slogans responding to the spirit of the
moment and the needs of people and the ability present convincing arguments, some specialists think. The Arabic world will never be the same as in the old days, and the tempos of reforms will only accumulate the force, considers Director of the Center for Partnership of Civilizations of the MSIIR(U) of the MFA of the RF V. Popov.
The identification of these events represents a significant problem. What was it: social revolutions, political revolutions, youth revolutions (by composition of participants) or subversive actions inspired from abroad in relation to legitimate governments? The publications in the national literature appeared soon after the analyzed events may contain also recent quite conspiratorial versions of them.
However, national experts, scholars of the Orient hold other, academic views and appraisals. In particular, V. Naumkin, the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS thinks that the events in Arabic countries almost by 100% have the social but not the religious implication. For instance, in Tunis the Islamist movement is very weak, and no religious impact was marked there. To his mind, it was the revolution of the youth characterized by the term "Face-book youth". Another matter is that the clergy and Islamic organizations might support this movement inter alia in their sermons. In Egypt "Muslim Brothers" took part in this movement. But neither the slogans pronounced by participants, nor the composition of the movement let make conclusion that Islamists plaid the key role in it. In Libya the events were connected with internal inter-tribal relations, with the loss of popularity of Qaddafi regime, leaving aside the social disease, such as unemployment, which deteriorated position of 30% of the population. At present, therefore the discussion on the Islamic threat is absolute unconstructive and unfruitful.
According to G. Mirsky, a senior researcher in the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the RAS, it was a real
social revolution, since the movement of great masses of people against the ruling regime was caused by their dissatisfaction with a great gap between the elite and society, corruption, arbitrary actions and rude behavior of the police, the lack of freedom of speech.
R. Silantyev, a scholar of Islam, the Deputy Chairman of the Expert Council for State Religious Expertise at the Ministry of Justice also considers that the events in Arabic countries were characterized by the mixed composition: Islamists may use the social protest of the people for their own aims, and it is not clear, what will be the outcome of it. According to E. Bazhanov, the Deputy Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the MFA of Russia, the opposition was nourished primarily by the aggravation in Muslim states of social evils: property stratification, corruption, poverty, unemployment and criminality. It was provoked as well by policy of the U.S. - assistance rendered to Israel, military invasion to Iraq and Afghanistan.
The experts by common consent expressed the view that Islamization of the region is possible but is not a sole option of development in the region. The experience of revolution in Iran in 1978 gave rise of the perception that any mass opposition movement in Muslim countries is possible only under the banner of fundamentalist Islam. And what is more, democratization of the state under these conditions is equal to Islamization. A recent justification of this tactic's rightness seemed to justify the results of general elections in Gaza, which showed the victory of fundamentalists of Hamas, said A. Umnov, senior researcher of IMEMO RAS.
However, these assertions ignore rather essential peculiarities of Shiite Muslims teaching dominant in Iran and Sunni trend dominant in almost all countries of the Arabic East. The Shiite fundamentalist clergy of Iran was able to unite under its leadership the people's movement against the existing power. In Sunni countries the clergy is
unable to do it not only due to certain local conditions but also in principle. At the same time, as thinks A. Umnov, the extremist wing of fundamentalists, becoming disillusioned in "parliamentarian" means of struggle, may again try "to waken the people" by terrorist acts. Other experts share this prognosis.
What do these processes mean for Russia?
In the end of February 2011, the president D. Medvedev at the meeting with members of the National Anti-terrorist Committee in Vladikavkaz supposed that the revolutions in Arabic countries would have "direct impact" on the situation in Russia but "this scenario would not work". The solution of the terrorist problem, according to the president, depends on the development of the North Caucasian region and "the maxim support of Russian Islam". Some days later, the prime-minister V. Putin at the press-conference in Brussels said that despite the reassuring theses that coming to power and growth of influence of radical groups in the countries of the North Africa was hardly probable, these events exited concern. First prime-minister of the Russian government I. Shuvalov at the press-conference "Russia and the World: in Search for Innovation Strategy" made the prognostication that Arabic countries would endure dismal life in future and would soon learn what happened after revolutions.
These views show that the Russian ruling elite attentively keeps an eye on the Arabic East and thinks about probable preventive measures to exclude in Russia something of the kind. The question is to what extent of adequacy and thorough evaluation the elites comprehend the reasons of political troubles in the North Africa and the Near East. At present, the evident attempts are seen to overestimate the role of Islamists in the events in the Near East, some experts point out. According to V. Naumkin, it would be a counter-productive meaning to
regard foreign Islamist circles to be responsible for what is going in the North Caucasus.
At the same time, in Russia there exist the structured factors, which gave rise to the protest wave, and the Russian authorities should take them into account. For instance, there are the same social reasons of dissatisfaction: poverty, enormous social stratification, the lack of valuable social guarantees, the dominant influence of bureaucracy, which deprives the youth of prospects to make carrier etc. And the corresponding moral factor is as follows: the enormous social injustice, the defiant lavishness exposed to other people, the impunity of criminal groups enjoying protection of law enforcement bodies etc. The mere fact that for the years of the financial crisis, despite the world trend, Russia became the leader in terms of the number of dollar billionaires speaks for itself.
Of particular significance are political reasons, for instance, stagnation of the ruling elite accompanied by the large scaled corruption and direct theft. For the last years, the tendency to blocking the channels of the ascending vertical mobility becomes more distinct, which demonstrates the urge of the ruling class towards the objective to "capsulize" political regime, to deny inflow of new young energetic people, who do not belong to the system, regarded A. Solovyev. The institutions of civil society, which in developed democratic countries come forward as a kind of insurance net in case of force-major circumstances, are very weak and are unable to play this role. Besides, the authorities regard them as rivals and create all possible obstacles for their activities.
However, nobody has yet liquidated the law of change in the political sphere, and 'the zero years" of stability are gradually replaced by the years of political dynamics nourished, inter alia, by the political campaigns of 2011 and 2012. The political mobilization of the Russian
youth, which may occur instantly, and the events in the Manezh square in Moscow in December 2011 had an impact on the Russian authorities, who were downright frightened just by the fact itself of a mass protest mobilization.
One should not forget that Muslims also live in Russia. Over 90% of Muslims are not well aware of what is going on in Arabic countries and do not intend to struggle against "the unfaithful", G. Mirsky regards. In the majority of the regions with Muslim population, primarily in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, Muslims maintain quite normal relations with Russians. And if they have some reasons for dissatisfaction, it does not mean that they are ready to arrange uprising against "Russian supremacy".
However, there exist a small but very vigorous stratum of Islamists not only in the North Caucasus, known as wahhabies, but also in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. For the last time it became evident that a number of religious representatives, having got education in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, came back and started to sermonize rather radical ideas. If Islamists gain a victory in Arabic countries and if the Arabic world is grabbed by the wave of Islamization, this situation will be presented by propaganda of Islamists as a defeat of the West and a triumph of Al-Qaida, which will give a push to development of Islamism in Russia.
It is needed to take into account the existence of solidarity of Muslims. Muslims in many parts of the world are upset by events in Palestine and express their indignation with the fact that the Holy Places are located within the territory of the Jewish state, feel wars keenly, when Muslim forces come forward, on the one side, and the western, American forces, on the other side. The united Muslim state -from Morocco to Indonesia - will never exist, but the feeling that it is necessary to be able to stand up for at least some part of Muslims will
disseminate wider. This is a significant problem particularly in case, if anti-Islamic nationalist feelings grow on the other side. The great rise of hostile attitude to Islam by Russians would be an ideal option for terrorists.
Thus, the impact of events in distant Arabic countries on the world and regional political processes is felt rather evidently. At present, the zone of political risk is much wider than the Arabic world, and Russia is not the exclusion.
"Vlast i obshchestvo: Vzaimodeystvie i conflicty". Voronezh, 2011, pp. 302-308.
M. Zinchenko, Political analyst (Pyatigorsk) DEPOLITICIZATION OF ISLAM AS THE BASIS OF STABILIZATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
One of the key factors capable seriously to destabilize the political process in the North Caucasus is Islamism, or political Islam, which emerged in the region during the past two decades and which has objective and subjective reasons, as well as internal and external political sources.
As we see it, the most effective struggle with radical Islamism, and hence, the stabilization of the ethnopolitical process in the North Caucasus can only be carried on within the framework of the strategy of the depoliticization of Islam. The conditions of depoliticization in the North Caucasus are as follows: first, to search for effective means to resolve the problems causing the politicization of Islam in its radical variant at the level of other social subsystems (economic, legal, religious, etc.); secondly, to alleviate the timeliness and high social significance of the problems causing the politicization of Islam in the
