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24наук (ФОНы). Институт общественных наук в вузах должен был выполнять функцию внедрения пролетарской идеологии в сознание студентов.
5) Обязательность в борьбе за законность опираться на помощь народной массы.
В.И. Ленин видел успех борьбы с правонарушениями в активности широких масс трудящихся, в повышении их роли во всех областях экономической, политической и культурной жизни. В докладе на II Всероссийском съезде политпросветов, касаясь борьбы с волокитой, бюрократизмом и взяточничеством, В.И. Ленин учил, что «обеспечить успех в этой борьбе, завершить ее можно только если сама народная масса поможет»6
В. И. Ленин сформулировал и обосновал те принципиальные положения, которые являлись основой советского права. Он всегда исходил из трактовки права как возведенной в закон воли господствующего класса, содержание которой определяется классовыми материальными условиями и интересами, оформленными в виде системы норм, правил, установленных или санкционированных
государственной властью. Исходя из марксистско-ленинского определения права в условиях диктатуры пролетариата, оно должно было применять к правоотношениям революционное правосознание, а не старые буржуазные понятия.
СПИСОК ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ:
1. Р.А. Руденко | В.И. Ленин о социалистической законности (Ы1р://ульянов-ле-нин.рф/leninizm/4_Rudenko_Lenin_o_sotsialistiches koy_zakonnosti_1.php) дата посещения - 06.04.2019
2. Научная электронная библиотека «Кибер-ленинка» (https://cyberleninka.ru/) «В. И. Ленин о законах и законности» (Шрз://суЬег1етпка.ги/а111с1е/у/у-1-1етп-о-7акопаЬ-1-7акоппо8Й-к-138-1е%и-8о^пуа^геМетуа) дата посещения - 04.04.2019
3. Академия наук СССР, институт государства и права «В.И. Ленин о социалистическом государстве и праве» Издательство «Наука», Москва 1969
AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE XX CENTURY ABOUT CENTRAL ASIAN REVOLT OF 1916.
Koizhigitova Zh.
Master student, faculty of history, archeology and ethnology Al-Farabi Kazakh National University
Abstract
The article considers the Central Asian revolt of 1916 and its study in American historiography in XX century. The aim of the article is to identify the main causes, directions and methods used by American scientists in studying revolt of 1916 in Central Asia. The study is aimed determining the approaches of American scientists in explaining the causes of revolt of 1916, revealing the scale of the revolt and their consequences. Authors Edward D. Sokol, Maurice Dobb, Richard Pierce and others have defined possibilities of further studying of a revolt of 1916 in a historical science. Article was based on a wide range of written sources, books, and other written archival sources, articles and collections of works. Researcher considers views and opinions developed in the works of American scientists. In addition, the author used comparative-historical method, as well as general methods of scientific knowledge: analysis and synthesis.
Keywords: revolt, 1916 year, Central Asia, historiography, mobilized, tax, cotton, peasants.
Introduction
August 1, 1914 year Russia entered to the First World War. The war laid a heavy burden on the people. Under the guise of helping the families of the mobilized, the Kazakhs were forced to work on the farms of the recruited Russian settlers. Also, the needs of the war required a large number of livestock, food, transport, money, which led to mass requisition of livestock and fodder among the population. Incredibly increased taxes. A military tax was introduced. Since the beginning of the war, taxes have increased by 3-4 times, and in some cases 15 times.
During the war years, 300 thousand pounds of meat, thousands of pounds of fish, 70 thousand heads of horses, about 13 thousand camels, about 14 thousand yurts, as well as more than 40 thousand pounds of cotton, thousand pounds of cotton oil, soap were exported from the Turkestan region. The value of livestock and
livestock products, exported only from Semirechie in the first year of the war, amounted to 34 million rubles [Kozybaev, 2008].
The revolt of 1916 was the first signal of the ensuing catastrophe and the last expression of the tsarist policy towards minorities. The revolt tested the strength of contacts and the symbiosis of different cultures and peoples in the tsarist empire, demonstrated protest against the "white man", as well as Muslims against the infidels. At the same time, different cultures (nomadic and sedentary) reacted differently to the encroachment on their freedoms and existence[Sokol,1954].
According to Edward Sokol conquest of the region by Russia do not meet any resistance from the international community.
Economical and political causes of the revolt.
6[В.И. Ленин. Полн. собр. соч., т. 44, стр. 171.].
Professor Sokol describes in detail the economic situation, in his book, that preceded the revolt, and separately - the cotton industry. He pays special attention to the cotton industry. Thanks to the King of Cotton, trade between Russia and Central Asia grew 10 times during the period of conquest - in the decade between 1857-1867. This was facilitated by the American Civil War in the early 1880s, which caused a sharp rise in cotton prices (soaring 4 times from 1859 to 1865), and the introduction of the seed of American cotton in Turkestan by Governor-General Kaufman. The construction of the Trans-Caspian railway reduced the cost of transporting cotton and linked the economy of Turkestan with the tsarist empire[Sokol,1954].
A real cotton rush has set in the region - 60% of the total work force in Fergana, 80% of equipment, 80% of fuel worked for cotton. Total cotton production took up to 92% of the total production of the region. Russian ministers nursed ambitious plans for Central Asian cotton and discussed the possibility of turning the region into a monocultural one, leaving only cotton instead of rice and cereals, following the example of Egypt. The water system of the Amu Darya was compared with the system of Egypt. "Every pood of Turkestan wheat competes with Russian and Siberian wheat, every pood of Turkestan cotton competes with American cotton" - the words of the tsarist Minister of Agriculture Krivoshein. The idea of Turksib, the railway through which Russia would provide the region with Siberian wheat, belongs to him[Sokol, 1954]. So, cotton was in the first place and played really important role as one of the causes of revolt.
Consequently, the life of simple peasant has changed dramatically. On the one hand, guaranteed crop sales, tax incentives and the preservation of small farms in cotton production would have improved the position of the simple peasant. But the situation was much more difficult. Cotton prices varied greatly. The successful harvest in America brought down the prices for Turkestan cotton, especially if the yield there was low. The farmer had few tools for risk insurance - he received imported grain only in exchange for a certain amount of cotton. At the same time, the peasant had to borrow amounts from agents of cotton factories at huge interest rates (at least 4% per month) and as a pledge of his property. Debts, taxes, cotton speculation and the destruction of the local economy due to the influx of cheap Russian goods - all this led to the impoverishment of the peasant and the loss of his land.
At the same time, even with the loss of a part of the land, the peasant remained to work on his plot and the authorities even encouraged it, because the local "peasant is more industrious when working at home than on other people's plantations". With the loss of land, the peasant could not find another job in industry, like in Europe or Japan. The region remained the base of natural resources, and Russia did not locate industrial productions there, considering the colony as a market for its goods. At the same time, rich bai, who labored as agents of cotton factories, as well as at the first Cotton Exchange in Kokand, formed an alliance with the Russian authorities, and this was especially noticeable in cities such as Tashkent and Samarkand.
According to Richard Pierce, although cotton played the dominant role, sometimes other types of
crops were more important, as cereals like wheat, rice, rye, oats, barley, millet, sorghum etc[Pierce, 1960].
The seizure of land and water resources, as well as forests, in accordance with the Kaufman reforms, created barriers for the nomadic economy, making it impossible in many areas. The authorities offered tax exemptions to those nomads who agreed to go on a sedentary way. Although the transition to residency for the poor, left without the ability to roam, was the best way to stay afloat, he was resisted by the rich bai, whose income depended on nomadic animal husbandry. Squeezed between the Russian authorities and their own bays, the nomad moved to other pastures, but in winter his situation worsened. By 1913, the tsarist authorities had seized about 4.5 million hectares of the best land in Kyrgyzstan alone, and a class of landless proletariat had been formed, who had squatted on Russian settlers or their bays.
Political situation
The Tsarist Russian Central Asia was in fact a military-police state ruled by an all-powerful governor-general. The Turkestan governor had the most powers, compared with other governors in the empire (Poland, the Caucasus). He submitted to the military ministry, not the interior ministry (steppe regions, including the cities of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Uralsk, Turgai, and Semirechie, were governed by the Steppe Code, but were subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the exception of Semirechie). According to Lord Curzon, the Russian Central Asia was a large camp, in 1911 the number of soldiers reached 125,000, although the danger of a collision with the British had already disappeared. From 2 to 4 police officers, military officers were relied on each county. However, military ranks had few career opportunities in the region. The salary was low, and service in Turkestan was often viewed as a rehabilitation reference for the military, who lost the favor of the leadership. Corruption, intrigue and interference with local elections were common practice.
If the rich and wealthy locals were afraid of Russian forces, then ordinary people did not fully realize what the Russian army was like. Russian rule was considered accidental, temporary, unnecessary and problematic. The punishment for the Andijan revolt was severe, about 400 people were convicted and 18 were hanged. Andijan's lesson was remembered by the young General Kuropatkin, who led the suppression of the rebellion, and who in 18 years would deal with a rebellion on a much larger scale[Sokol,1954].
The revolt, as we know, began with the announcement of the mobilization of foreigners to the needs of the army during the First World War. But even before that, the Russian administration had raised taxes and requisition volumes (in the form of cattle, cotton, yurts) from local to the army. The region was filled with rumors about the activities of numerous Turkish agents leading subversive work among the Muslim population (Turkey fought on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary). How these rumors and messages were true is unknown. In one of the letters, the Governor-General of Turkestan writes that "the indigenous people are indifferent to the European war and the only danger comes from the mullahs who can agitate in an unfavorable way for us." Russia suffered heavy losses in the war, and it was decided to call on foreigners to work on defensive installations in the area of the active army.
The decree on the mobilization of the foreign population was signed on June 25, the emperor ordered to call up to 250 thousand local residents of Central Asia at the age of 19-43 years. The age of recruits became a problem, since the local population did not have birth certificates, and the age was considered in lunar years and cycles. The local male population of the region was about 3.5 million people and 250 thousand were 8% of the total population (with the exception of the population of the Bukhara and Kokand khanates, to whom the order of mobilization was not applied). A certain number of workers should be left on the cotton fields. Therefore, Fergana received some exceptions, and the call from the Seven Rivers was greater[Sokol,1954].
The Kazakh intelligentsia, represented by Alash-Orda, was worried about the status of the Kazakh recruits and insisted that the Kazakhs become part of the Cossack detachments. In the majority, they took the side of the government and published in the newspapers appeals to people to accept the decree. From July 8, gangs began to form in the steppe, attacking their own aksakals, volosts and clerks.
The suppression of the revolt was cruel. Entire villages were shot, the suppression was accompanied by robbery and murder of civilians. In Przhevalsk alone, up to 700 Kyrgyz who were not participating in the revolt were killed. Kuropatkin wrote: "We must severely punish the Kirghiz, but also put an end to the lynching of the Russian population." People fled to China (it was remembered as Urkun - "outcome"), among them: Dungans, Kirghiz, Kazakhs. Russian troops tried to bring them back. Some rebels took Russian families with them as hostages and the bloodshed continued on both sides.
Turkish pan-Islamism completely failed its mission in Central Asia
The revolt was unexpected for the Russian authorities, wealthy local elites and religious leaders. If the Russian secret police on the eve of the revolt were too busy with the Jadids and pan-Islamists, the local elites did not have a common position - they either supported the rebels, because mobilization affected their commercial interests, or assured the Russian authorities of their loyalty, fearing reprisals. Mullahs hoped to restore their influence on believers and often exaggerated their role among the rebels. Poverty was the main driving force of the revolt, and judging by the number and status of the victims of the rebels, their fury had different targets. In Semirechie, the insurgents killed only 14 representatives of the Russian authorities and over 2,000 Russian colonists and Cossacks.
The number of victims from the Russian side, according to official data, was 3,709 people, including those killed and missing. Of these, only 97 soldiers and 24 officers died. Although Russia sacrificed more people to the revolt than during the conquest of all five regions of Turkestan, this is incomparable with the local victims, who made up about 270 thousand people. 20% of the population, 50% of horses, 39% of livestock, 55% of camels, 58% of sheep and goats were destroyed. Cultivated land was reduced by 163 thousand hec-tares[Sokol,1954].
By February 1, about 110,000 workers from the region were mobilized to the front. Some worked in
Central Asia itself on the railway and defense sites. Some were sent not only to the front, but also to Central Russia, Ukraine, etc.
At the end of the book, Sokol focuses on the interpretation of events in the Soviet Union. An eyewitness to the events, the Bolshevik Grigory Broydo put forward the version that the royal authorities intentionally contributed to the development of an revolt for their own purposes in order to seize more land. According to Turar Ryskulov, the Russian authorities wanted to have a bridgehead to attack Persia, China and Afghanistan. But this version was criticized by other researchers, one of whose arguments was the relatively small number of troops stationed in the region for these purposes. In the conditions of an acute shortage of soldiers and workers, it would be pointless to plot such a provocation.
Early Soviet historians generally viewed the revolt as progressive, although there was debate about whether it was a proletarian revolt or a national-religious movement. In a later period, soft assessments of Russian rule began to be heard, noting its civilizational role and technical progress. With the new characteristic of the Russian colonization of the movement, including the revolt of the Kazakh Khan Kenesary, they lost their "progressiveness" and became "reactionary", organized by the feudal bays and foreign agents[Til-let,1969].
The revolt was not synchronous, the nomads and the Sarts resisted separately from each other, and this enabled Kuropatkin to quickly move forces and suppress it at different stages.
To sum up, American historiography of the XX century has made a noticeable contribution to the process of studying the 1916 revolt in Central Asia. New scientific concepts and theories were put forward on the basis of a wide range of sources introduced into historical circulation. Nevertheless, many aspects of the revolt remain controversial, embroiled and need further development. Also, it is necessary to avoid politicized approaches, to abandon any confrontational arguments for proving the truth of only their position when using not entirely reliable facts.
REFERENCES:
1. Edward Dennis Sokol, The Revolt of Russian Central Asia, 1954.
2. James Bunyan, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918, Stanford University Press, California, 1934.
3. Kozybaev M.K., History of Kazakhstan. Part 3, 2008.
4. Kuzembaiuly A., Abil E., History of Kazakhstan., 2001
5. Lowell Tillet, The Great Friendship, Soviet Historians on the Non Russian Nationalities, 1969
6. Martha Olcott, Tha Kazakhs, 1987.
7. Maurice Dobb, Soviet Economic development since 1917, New York, 1948
8. Owen Lattimore, Chinese Turkistan
9. Richard A.Pierce. Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: a study in Colonial rule, University of Columbia, 1960.
