Научная статья на тему 'About three conceptualizations in pro-animals philosophy'

About three conceptualizations in pro-animals philosophy Текст научной статьи по специальности «Философия, этика, религиоведение»

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Ключевые слова
ВЕЛЬФАРИЗМ ЗИНГЕРА / ЭТИКА ЖИВОТНЫХ / ПРАВА ЖИВОТНЫХ ПО РЕГАНУ / ФИЛОСОФИЯ ПРАВ ЖИВОТНЫХ ФРАНЦИОНЭ / УТИЛИТАРИЗМ / ЖИВОТНЫЕ / SINGER'S WELFARISM / ANIMALS ETHICS / TOM REGAN'S ANIMALS RIGHTS / FRANCIONE'S PHILOSOPHY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS / DEONTOLOGY / CONSEQUENTIALISM / UTILITARIANISM / ANIMALS

Аннотация научной статьи по философии, этике, религиоведению, автор научной работы — Turowski Tomasz

When in the early 70s of the twentieth Century it became clear that the credo animal is not a thing, it’s not sufficient, it gave rise to a different perspective on pro-animal issues. Peter Singer’s publications, especially Animal Liberation showed animals as a philosophical and theoretical problems, and above all far from cheap sentimentality, which we were usually accompanied by in our attitude towards our smaller brothers. Until the early 80s welfarism position ( animal welfare ) represented by Singer seemed to be the only valid one, but the work of Tom Regan, including his magnum opus, T he Case for Animal Rights shown us that animals have rights ( animal rights ), including the basic right to live as well. 90s highlighted a new approach to the theoretical grounding of animal rights. Mainly, Gary Francione’s philosophy of rights made the welfare paradigm collapsed. It only deepened the unreconciled dispute between reformers and abolitionists. For many years, there has been a ceaseless struggle between supporters of animal welfare, and lawyers, which appropriated the philosophy of animals and although that argument forever changed the way they are treated, it also left a void theory, which I intend to fill in this article. Is it possible to reconcile the trends, mentioned above? Is welfarism actually a matter of obsolete? Is it possible to reconcile the consequentialism with the deontology in the philosophy of animals? And finally, is it possible to have another solution in a discussion about the philosophy of animals?

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Текст научной работы на тему «About three conceptualizations in pro-animals philosophy»

ФИЛОСОФИЯ КУЛЬТУРЫ

О трех концепциях в философии о животных

Томаш Туровский

В статье представлен обзор трех исторических концептуали-заций проблемы отношения к животным. Когда в начале 70-х годов XX в. стало ясным, что выражение «животное не есть вещь» является недостаточным для дискурса о них, появилась точка зрения, позволяющая более широко охватить проблему. Работы Питера Зингера, прежде всего «Animal Liberation» показали проблему животных как философскую и теоретическую, и далекий от сентиментализма. Подход Зингера, вель-фаристический (animal welfare), считался общепринятым по 80-е годы. Потом работы Тома Регана (точнее его фундаментальный труд «The Case for Animal Rights») показали, что животные имеют права (animal rights), включая основное - право на жизнь. 90-е годы показали новый способ подхода к теоретическому укоренению прав животных. Философия прав Гари Франционэ привела к отходу от вельфаристической парадигмы. Это привело к спору между лагерями реформаторов и аболиционистов.

Многие годы идет спор между сторонниками благополучия животных и юристами, который подчинил себе философию животных. Вопрос в том, можно ли примирить представленные направления? Действительно ли вельфаризм это дело прошлого? И на конец: возможен ли третий пут в дискуссии о философии животных?

Ключевые слова: Вельфаризм Зингера, этика животных, права животных по Регану, философия прав животных Франционэ, утилитаризм, животные.

About three conceptualizations in pro-animals philosophy

Tomasz Turowski

When in the early 70s of the twentieth Century it became clear that the credo animal is not a thing, it's not sufficient, it gave rise to a different perspective on pro-animal issues.

Peter Singer's publications, especially Animal Liberation showed animals as a philosophical and theoretical problems, and

above all - far from cheap sentimentality, which we were usually accompanied by in our attitude towards our smaller brothers. Until the early 80s welfarism position (animal welfare) represented by Singer seemed to be the only valid one, but the work of Tom Regan, including his magnum opus, The Case for Animal Rights shown us that animals have rights (animal rights), including the basic right to live as well. 90s highlighted a new approach to the theoretical grounding of animal rights. Mainly, Gaiy Francione's philosophy of rights made the welfare paradigm collapsed. It only deepened the unreconciled dispute between reformers and abolitionists.

For many years, there has been a ceaseless struggle between supporters of animal welfare, and lawyers, which appropriated the philosophy of animals and although that argument forever changed the way they are treated, it also left a void theory, which I intend to fill in this article. Is it possible to reconcile the trends, mentioned above? Is welfarism actually a matter of obsolete? Is it possible to reconcile the consequentialism with the deontology in the philosophy of animals? And finally, is it possible to have another solution in a discussion about the philosophy of animals?

Keywords: Singer's welfarism, animals ethics, Tom Regan's animals rights, Francione's philosophy of animal rights, deontology, consequentialism, utilitarianism, animals.

A few years ago, dealing with theoretical (therefore-ethical and philosophical) aspect of animal rights was considered as eccentricities and a sign of cheap sentimentality in human relation to these creatures, so-called our smaller brothers. Being vegetarian or vegan was taken by demonstration of new fashion, but only temporary fashion possibly connected with some subculture. Nowadays, this situation is changing diametrically: we got papers, books about animals philosophy (and of course other publications); conferences and scientific symposia about idea of animal rights. All of this proves that pro-animals philosophy now is not only fashion and is not attention case of activists for animals organizations. Currently, we have got a climate which can essentially discuss the grounding of animals rights philosophy.

The problem which I try to resolve in this paper is relatively new, but deriving from some tradition of thinking about ethics and animals. Especially in Anglo-Saxons countries this problem was and still is widely discussed. First of all, in this article I want to organize discussion; second of all — and the most important — I

want to point out the possibility of appearing the third way of this, so very lively and sometimes too much antagonized, debate on moral-law status of animals. I want to present this problem in a form of essay that releases me from responsibility of scientific objectivism which is often confused with earnestness. I reliably describe and explain three philosophical currents in this contemporary, lively and antagonizing debate about relevant animals and their rights. I describe this problem and hermeneutical interprets and admit that third position, so-called new welfarism, is only a touch in this paper. It is just the beginning which I should develop (not in this article) in another paper. Issues which are discussed in this place I called pro-animals, what means that it belongs to methodological issues of pro-animals philosophy.

Consequentialist conceptions which are connected with basic category - category of interests, we should confront with deonto-logical justification of rights and ask a question: is there such a common feature to provide consensus across a party line? As we know the difference between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism is contemporarily known as the difference between teleology and deontology. Supporters of act utilitarianism do not acknowledge the main function of law and there is no problem for this option not to take care about the law. Different situation is for deontologist or rule utilitarianism supporter.

Next problem with pro-animals philosophy is that: each of these options come from different anthropological conception so this leads to different point of view in issuing the relation: human animals — non-human animals. At the end, whether emphasizing what is common to move to the third way in the pro-animal debate? Is the so-called new welfarism can aspire to the title of the third position?

I have no doubt that we couldn't discuss about animal rights

without universal recognition of human rights. In connection with this, animal rights take some rules which are the fundamental elements of the human rights. Two very important declarations: United States Declaration of Independence and post-revolutionary French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen set the people equality, freedom and rights like the fundamental meaning of laws and morals. Nevertheless, none of these declarations didn't lead to the real equality and freedom. Obviously, even the American Declaration did not bring total equality, because it excluded the black slaves, treated as instrumentum vocale.

I think, that French document is important, because was significant for Jeremy Bentham who directly referred to this document in his famous book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, where he took the credo of new utilitarian philosophy and — the most important — motto of the whole animals movement: "The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withheld from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason for a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else, is that what should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is, beyond comparison, a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not. Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they sufferr? [1, p. 311]. For Bentham human being and animals in moral sense are the same creatures because they have interest to avoid the suffer, avoid the pain. Interest is the first moral category of Bentham's utilitarian philosophy. What does it mean interest? Why this term is so important? The answer is: this term is main term of classical utilitarianism, because only beings which are able to suffer are morally important. They can suffer and we should do everything to change this situation, because pain is always wrong. This results from nature: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do... By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government" [1, pp. 1-2]. So measure of our actions is felicific calculus which lead us to protect all beings which are able to feel. In this context every being is equal. It is worth mentioning that similar resolves were offered by Henry Sidgwick in his opus magnum The Methods of Ethics, complemented by author category of be-

nevolence. Next was Henry Salt, who identified with utilitarian resolve for animal rights and proposed vegetarianism like way of life. Salt was the first thinker who opposed vivisection. Of course important was influence of Darwin's theory of evolution, because that change our point of view on relation homo sapiens and other animals. But problem is that, this intuitions was forgotten for almost hundred years until the 70s of XX century.

In February 1975 in New York a book was published that started revolution. Title of this book was Animal Liberation and this was the first which treated pro-animals philosophy seriously and started the Animal Welfare Movement. Author, Peter Singer offered development of utilitarianism, new version of this moral methods called by himself preference utilitarianism. If in classical utilitarianism right action are defined as those that maximize pleasure and minimize pain, this new form of utilitarianism in contemporary philosophy promote actions that fulfill the interests (preferences) of those beings involved. For Singer preferences utilitarianism focus two important things: interest and speciesism (type of human supremacism). First is contemporary modification of Bentham's intuition, second is Richard Ryder's term creatively developed by Peter Singer. For author of Animal Liberation speciesism is the same way of thinking like racism and sexism, therefore to be a homo sapiens member is not morally important. For Singer interest appertains to this beings which are able to feel.

After the great success of Animal Liberation, many organization rose to protect animals and their welfare or rights. When everybody was sure that Singer wrote all about pro-animals philosophy and no one could do more in this ethical way of thinking, in 1983 on University of California, Berkeley Tom Regan published his opus vitae The Case for Animal Rights. This book was a critical response to Singer's ethics, because Regan defended not only interest, but first of all rights. In his book Regan distinguished three fundamental notions: subject-of-a-life, inherent value and the right to be treated with respect that includes the right not to be harmed.

Regan's publications unleashed war between animal rights and animal welfare supporters. This battle rages on, but meanwhile a new publications appeared about pro-animals philosophy, which tried to order the discussion. I must mention Bernard Rollin, David DeGrazie, Steven Wise, or Robert Garner, but first of all Gary Francione, whose publications are frequently quoted.

This lawyer in the 90s published several important and influential books and papers relating to animal rights, particularly about difference between animal rights and animal welfare. Francione totally rejects animal welfare's point of view. The most important works of Francione: Animals, Property, and the Law (1995), Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement (1996), or Animal As Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation (2008).

Between the main currents in contemporary debate, two approaches shaped to this problem: consequentialist and deontolo-gists. As we know, these two traditions of ethical thinking cannot be reconciled, but problem which is interesting for me, could be presented in this metaethical field.

When Singer published Animal Liberation, this "liberation" primarily meant reinvented older system, which treated animals like things, and of course lower beings. That hopes connected with rising Animal Liberation Movement was based on proposition of changing this status quo cruel to animals, therefore main goal was reformist. As this term welfare means reform and improvement, change situation, striving for maximum, minimize suffering, change the condition of breeding etc. The main objection from animal rights supporters to welfarists is this that time for small steps is gone, welfare is not enough. Instead the small steps, for animal rights supporters we must change everything completely. For Regan, or Francione animal liberation is based on radical abolition, not only slow reform of status quo.

Welfarists, first of all Singer, are utilitarists, so they are con-sequentialists. Every utilitarianism is consequentialism, but not every consequentialism is utilitarianism. In utilitarian theories decision-making processes must be rational, that means the principle of utility is strongly connected with the principle of reason. If we believe that utilitarianism is a version of consequential-ism, which states that the consequences of any action are the only standard of right and wrong. Unlike other forms of consequentialism, such as egoism, utilitarianism considers all interests equally. Utilitarianism is such a philosophical and ethical system which is based on actions, but this actions which are based on effects. So we must do everything to increasing result, good consequences of our acts. In utilitarianism action first step is to consider things to be evaluated from the point of view of ethics (deeds, actions, codes, institutions, laws, etc.) and the effects

(depending on whether they are right or not, and what benefit they bring, eg. Welfare).

I must add that consequentialism does not preclude general rules, but transposes the point of view in this debate to main question: is in human (inside human being) some permanent structures which are important from moral point of view? And another one: are some actions always wrong for human like a whole? In Singer's opinion not. There are no permanent structures, which are typical for our species. Singer similarly to utilitarian and consequentialist does not believe in existence of necessary laws important for ethical resolve. That what counts in this proposition is to multiply the good consequences. And there is the main difference between utilitarianism and deontologists theory: in deontologists general rules defined goals; in conse-quentialism the goals defined the rules. As we read in Singer's Practical Ethics: "The deontologists - those who think that ethics is a system of rules - can rescue their position by finding more complicated and more specific rules that do not conflict with each other, or by ranking the rules in some hierarchical structure to resolve conflicts between them. Moreover, there is a longstanding approach to ethics that is quite untouched by the complexities that make simple rules difficult to apply. This is the consequentialist view. Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals. They assess actions by the extent to which they further these goals. The best-known, though not the only, consequentialist theory is utilitarianism. The classical utilitarian regards an action as right if it produces as much or more of an increase in the happiness of all affected by it than any alternative action, and wrong if it does not" [4, p. 3].

Both of them — utilitarianism and deontology are currents, with roots in British empiricism, and their value is attitude to measurable, observability and possibility projected example: by analysis situation, etc. and — this is for someone big value — utilitarianism is very simple. Utilitarianism is ambitious because this method try to change the whole world by maximizing these which are desired and trying to avoid suffering from the world. The main attribute in utilitarian methods is trusted in science, which expands our knowledge about visible world and appeals for modification of moral rules. So many utilitarian philosophers are interested in medicine development and dealing in bioethics.

Deontologist don't trust in current knowledge in common sense about morals phenomenon, which could be resolved only

by goals and effects. For deontologists exist some situations, in which we must take care about the rules based on permanent structure of acting. In short, deontology doesn't believe in consequences, but rather in duties and obligations. Singer's wrote about this: "The consequences of an action vary according to the circumstances in which it is performed. Hence, a utilitarian can never properly be accused of a lack of realism, or of a rigid adherence to ideals in defiance of practical experience. The utilitarian will judge lying as bad in some circumstances and good in others, depending on its consequences" [4, p. 3].

Initially, Singer follows on the Bentham's way of thinking, and was the first who's disagreed with exclusion of animals from moral community. This exclusion was based on conviction that animals aren't rational, don't communicate with verbal form, and — according to Cartesian tradition — cannot feel anything, therefore cannot suffer. For Bentham the condition sine qua non takes care of whatever is able to feel. This is connected with the nervous system. It's obvious that not only humans have this system and for Bentham it's implicated new relation between human and animal. This new relation must be based on humanitarian treatment, and in practice that means we shouldn't give animals unnecessary suffering.

Author of Animal Liberation assumed that moral status belongs to this individuals who are able to feel pain, experienced desired states or not, but important is that according to Singer law (including natural law) doesn't decide about moral value. Peter Singer accepted utilitarian vison of ethics, but he denied classical (Bentham and Mill) version of utilitarianism. For him, we shouldn't care about pleasure, hedonistic account, because important is interest and preference. This new version of utilitarianism is called by Singer preference utilitarianism, and the main difference between this and old version is that, classical utilitarianism, in which right actions are defined as those that maximize pleasure and minimize pain, preference utilitarianism entails promoting actions that fulfill the interests (preferences) of those beings involved.

The main thesis is that: taking interests and considered from ethical point of view we must take care about all beings, regardless of some species membership. Interest have only these beings which are able to feel. "The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any

meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare" [4, p. 57].

Obviously, that interests could be different, as different, as different are beings able to feel, but interest is interest and must be consider like interest. For Singer we must go out to beyond partial point of view, beyond egoistic point of view. And if we consider interest as interest we have seen that isn't important who is a subject of this interest. Representative of the black race or white, male or female, and intelligence or not aren't important as well as, moral character or rationality. Rationality, consciousness, intelligence, race, sex — all of this from utilitarianism point of view isn't important. Singer's proposition is called the principle of equal consideration of interests. Singer wrote about this: "The principle of equal consideration of interests acts like a pair of scales, weighing interests impartially. True scales favour the side where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests; but they take no account of whose interests they are weighing" [4, p. 22].

Problem is when interests of some group are not considered. When we arbitrarily recognize members of this group like lower creatures. It has been in the case of black slaves, women and nowadays this group represents animals. If principle of equal consideration of interests has to be universal and neutral, membership of species is not morally relevant. Singer argues, if we considered pain, that this what is important, is only ability to experience pain.

Problem with Singer's principle is we must consider not only

ability to pain, but also killing. In this moment we must take seriously another moral status of beings, and answer question: what does it mean a person, and who is a person? What does it mean moral status of a person? As we know in moral philosophy and in the philosophy of law only personal being, personal ens has special meaning and from conception of person depending how we can resolve ethical or law problem. Singer's definition of person was taken from John Locke's philosophy, which in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding he emphasized, that personal beings are only these beings able to recognize own I, therefore self-conscious. For Locke person means: "thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it-

self as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this everyone is to himself that which he calls self not being considered, in this case, whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances" [3, p. 318].

Singer took this proposition seriously and went from descriptive to normative conception of person, emphasized: "the main point is that this indirect ground does provide a reason for taking the killing of a person, under certain conditions, more seriously than the killing of a non-personal being. If a being is incapable of conceiving of itself as existing over time, we need not take into account the possibility of it worrying about the prospect of its future existence being cut short. It can't worry about this, for it has no conception of its own future" [4, pp. 91-92].

Singer is sure that we cannot claim that all life has the same value. Conclusions are as followed, although interest in avoiding the suffering has equal weight for all able to feel, the weight of interest to reserve life is different for human and for animal.

In this point animal rights supporters disagree, because they thought they defined welfarism as very important, and coherent, right to live question is for them wrong and in practice disappointing. Old colleagues - Singer and Tom Regan's paths diverged. First of all welfarism is a form of consequentialism. Like all forms of consequentialism, welfarism is based on the premise that actions, policies or rules should be evaluated on the basis of their consequences. Therefore welfarists urged vegetarianism, but Regan et consortes veganism. For Regan, author The Case for Animal Rights, another option, than veganism is connected with exploitation of animals and divested animals right to live and of course right to be not harmed.

Tom Regan is a radical and abolitionist and claim that animal rights are connected with appertained eligibility, this make sense only if we accepted human rights. For Regan if we consider human rights as binding (people have no doubt with this), we must accept animal rights. Nowadays: "animal rights are more than a philosophical idea; it is also part of the name of a burgeoning social justice movement, the animal rights movement" [5, p. xiv].

Human rights obtained from 1948 rose against discrimination of sex or race. According to Regan, if we stopped only at human rights we would be still discriminating. At this point Regan agreed with Singer's speciesism theory.

People have various rights. Except right to live, we have right to freedom, right to vote, right to education, right to equal disposition and distribution of goods. Animals do not need right to vote and others, but right to live and not to be trapped of course, according to Regan. It results from justice, because we must expand rule of justice beyond our species. According to the author of The Case for Animal Rights if you do not tell on the side of the philosophy of animal rights that this is the same, we are on the side of discrimination, whether these are people or institutions.

In The Case for Animal Rights Regan criticizes consequential-ism, welfarism and establishs a new language based on a new terms to mean humans and animals. Instead of telling human and animal, according to his moral-laws discourse, we should talk about subjects-of-a-life, which defined humans and animals. "The basic moral right to respectful treatment places strict limits on how subjects-of-a-life may be treated. Individuals who possess this right are never to be treated as if they exist as resources for others; in particular, harms intentionally done to any one subject cannot be justified by aggregating benefits derived by others. In this respect, my position is anti-utilitarian, a theory in the Kantian, not the Millian, tradition" [5, p. xvii].

Subjects-of-a-life are individuals which refer to world, are beings in the world, besides they have desires and feelings, beliefs, aspirations, therefore it is important to them what happens to them, avoiding pain strive to fulfill desires. Furthermore, universality basic moral eligibility, which are important to subjects-of-a-life result from nature, not from conferment. This is one of the main difference between welfarism and abolitionist philosophy of the law.

For subject-of-a-life, life is some entireness, identity which allows to distinguish subjects-of-a-life from other subjects. According to Regan subjects-of-a-life are not only biological beings, but first of all they have own biography. Then to these subjects we rate not only human, but many animals. Of course the question is: which ones? In Regan's opinion each difference between us and animals we can draws only by pencil, because these differences will be changing along with development of science and knowledge about animals. On early 80s when Regan wrote his

main book, he thought that subject-of-a-life may be each mammal over one year of life. Currently for science subjects-of-a-life are all vertebrates, also line of division is fluent and thin.

Task of pro-animus philosophy of Regan's is building coherent theory of animal rights, which will be not based on factors mainly for utilitarianism, where morality is assumed on a pain, suffering and psycho-mental states of subject. Principle of utility isn't important in the Regan's philosophy of rights. For Regan we must expanding range of our duties to everybody, for every beings which are subjects-of-a-life. Both of them are important — human and animal.

At the beginning, Regan's theory seems like Singer's. Both of them tried to answer question how did this happen, that in tradition animals were defined like beings beyond of moral community. And both of them have similar answer: because in western tradition of thinking, started in ancient Roman theory of law, laws are only for this creatures who are able to understand what does it mean law? Of course in tradition such beings were only humans. But the dangerous of this thinking is that if we ask about that every human is able to understand what law is? The answer must be negative. Infants, persons mentally ill, mentally retarded does not understanding the law, but we do not claim they haven't got human rights. Therefore, why only animals have not rights? Singer and Regan give us the answer: because we are speciesism. We are used to anthropocentrically tradition which is based on philosophical and religion beliefs. The difference between Singer and Regan is that, the first one tries to resolve problem and proposed principle of equal consideration of interests based on impartiality, the second one tries to build theory based on objectivity of rights, free from subjectivity.

Peter Singer do not trust theory of law defined by nature of law, but Regan convinced to inherent value. For Regan animals have inherent value, because are subjects-of-a-life, and if we understand this, it must lead us to total abolition. "To be the sub-ject-of-a-life is to be an individual (...) that is, individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychological identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independent of their

utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests. Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value — inherent value — and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles" [5, p. 243]. Regan emphasized, that principle of inherent value is formal, and formally sounds: "we are to treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value" [5, p. 248].

So we understand, that value of subjects-of-a-life cannot be reduced to their interests, or quality of their exists. This subjects cannot be instrumental in the humans hands. Instrumentalization for Regan consists of not only recognizable value itself of subject.

For Regan this characterized Singer's ethics of animals. Regan is closed to Kantian deontology with formulations of the categorical imperative, tell us how to act in order to achieve a specific goals.

Further than Regan goes Gary Lawrence Francione. Author Animals, Property, and the Law tried to rejected whole welfarism. For Francione Singer allowed to treat animals instrumentally. Francione's proposition lead as to total abolitions by rejecting each form of utilitarianism. According to him we human as species suffer from moral schizophrenia, which is based on dispart our theoretical and practical acts to animals. Generally we know about cruelty to animals, but we tried not to think about it for example by eating meat or treat animals as our property. We likes ZOO, circus and other place of oppression. That's the problem. But Francione convinced us to reject treating animals as property. If we didn't do this we would be similar to slaveholders, which treated black men as property and nothing all.

For Gaiy Francione animals shouldn't be things, someone's property, like human cannot be means to our ends. Animals have the rights not to be used as property. Meanwhile almost in all country in legislation, animal are human property. Therefore Francione cannot agree with Singer's reformist philosophy, that's not enough. If Singer proposed vegetarianism, for Francione it is nothing special, because we must do everything to radical and total abolition. "The Abolitionist Approach regards veganism as a moral imperative. By this we mean that if animals matter morally, we are morally obligated to stop eating, wearing, and using them. That is, going vegan is not just an option for someone who agrees that animals matter morally; it is a fundamental moral obliga-

tion" [2, p. 72]. So far as Francione didn't go Singer, even Regan, because he accused all not a vegan about not giving justified exploitation of animals, because the abolitionist approach "is clear: if one is not a vegan, one is participating actively in animals exploitation. Since abolitionists reject all animal exploitation, even supposedly humane exploitation, abolitionists have no choice but to be principled and consistent vegans" [2, p. 73].

In his famous book Rain Without Thunder, Francione wrote about third position in our problem, so-called new welfarism. For him this is similar like Singer's welfarism, so it's wrong way in pro-animals philosophy. But I think that new welfarism is very interesting. Francione wrote about this like connection between animal rights and animal welfare, but for him it is full of hypocrisy. But for me this new welfarism will be the role of education. Because we must convince people to idea of pro-animal philosophy. Otherwise from time to time some people will be thinking about animal rights in this type: "Animal rights do not exist. Animal rights is a subterfuge for terrorist to disguise themselves as animal rights activists in order to undermine the social order. Animal rights is a conspiracy of extremists who intend to strip away our constitutional rights. Animal rights activists are a hate group and the animal rights issue is just a vehicle to disguise its character. Animal rights extremists prefer to see their children die rather than test animal to develop a medicine to save them" [6, p. 1]. This is problem with extremity. We must avoid each form of extremity in pro-animals philosophy.

Therefore, I think that rejection of new welfarism by Francione is an interesting proposition, because: first — supports animal rights, which agrees with the general idea of them; second — in my opinion this is very good educational thought: by small steps convinces the idea of pro-animal. Besides pointing to the characteristics common positions of animal welfare and animal rights rather than to antagonize and point out what divides.

Bibliography:

1. Bentham J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford, At The Calderon Press, 1879.

2. Francione G.L., Charlton A., Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach, Exempla Press, 2015.

3. Locke J., Essay Concerning Human Understanding, The Pennsylvania State University, 1999.

4. Singer P., Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

5. Regan T., The Case for Animal Rights, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 2004.

6. Williams R., Animal Rights, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013.

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