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Mikhail Vinogradov,
President of the "St. Petersburg Policy" Foundation
A LOOK BEYOND THE OUTSKIRTS
(Foreign Policy as Seen
by the Russian Elite Farther Than
at Their Departments)
During the twenty years of the existence of new Russia its position in the world has radically changed. The level of its integration in the world economic, political, cultural, scientific and sport context has grown considerably. The speed of its movement in this direction was much greater than the average world rates of globalization. The geography of foreign countries is now studied in Russia not as something like, say, astronomy, a science far removed from everyday requirements.
Pictures of the Outer World
Russia's foreign policy has also changed seriously. Our country was drawn more deeply in the activity of the world markets, its traditional partnership relations with other states became more versatile, it tackled more actively the practical problems of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapon and the unification of ecological standards, and the number of countries opened for Russian citizens without entry visas became greater.
Naturally, quantity has not always meant quality. Greater openness was accompanied with a certain growth of self-isolation. Suffice it to watch and hear TV news bulletins to see that public interest in the world processes is very low.
The reasons for this state of affairs are quite understandable. They lie in the depolitization of public opinion for many long years, and also in the loss of the former superpower status of the country. In these conditions society and the elites kept aloof from assessments of foreign policy and they became rather indifferent to it.
Discussions of foreign political realities within the elites are now rare and far between.
However, despite this it should be admitted that some subjects and ideas of international realities do exist for Russia and are discussed here. For instance, in certain border regions people voice their views unequivocally on vital issues. The inhabitants of Sakhalin region, for instance, are firmly against the transfer of Kurile Islands to Japan. Or representatives of the local elites in the north-western regions of Russia take part in joint meetings with their counterparts in Finland and Arctic states discussing problems facing the entire Arctic region.
The ideological situation in the South of Russia is quite tense. The elites of the North Caucasian republics harp on the premise that unfriendly acts toward Russia are due to the activity of radical Islamists, and schemes of the United States and Israel, for some reason or other. And the dangers coming from radical Islam are in the center of public attention.
Representatives of big business are not inclined to public discussions of foreign policy. True, Oleg Deripaska, a tycoon in many industrial spheres, is an exception. At the Baikal Economic Forum in September of 2011, he put forward the idea of a "turn to the East," which envisaged reorientation of the economy of the Eastern part of
Russia beyond the Ural Mountains to China. However, the Moscow authorities were not too enthusiastic with regard to this idea because they saw a pro-Chinese bias in it.
Change of Generations and the Risk of Failure
Foreign policy is for the present Russian elite a field to be dealt with by professional diplomats. If business or commercial interests are not directly connected with a concrete country or a sphere of international relations, representatives of the elite deal with some or other problems of this sort sporadically, depending on concrete situation. In any case, a "west-oriented" approach dominates, proceeding from the premise that it is Western Europe and the United States that determine the course of events in politics and economics, and the alternative centers of force, like China or the Islamic world, are taken for something less understandable and hence potentially more dangerous.
The main result of the elite's participation in international activity is the establishment of economic interaction or exchange of experience and study of modern technologies (including managerial ones). Public discussions of possible priorities of Russia's foreign policy in the foreseeable future (advancement to the Arctic, arbitration in international conflicts, etc.) do not meet with noticeable response in society. Public interest in the future role of the country in the international scene is relatively low.
Such situation is quite stable and is not threatened by anything. Nevertheless, one can talk of certain challenges to be faced by Russian diplomacy. First of all, it is greater demand for the service functions of the state. This subject is discussed ever more frequently in the context of domestic policy, but soon it will be placed on the agenda in international relations. Will it be possible to reorient foreign policy
from serving the interests of the state to lobbying the interests of concrete economic and political players? True, it may take place only when the elites and part of society have rational ideas about their own interests in this sphere.
Another challenge is connected with the generation change. Foreign policy is now dealt with by the post-Soviet generation of politicians and diplomats whose views took shape in the period of the international isolation of the U.S.S.R. Their psychological traumas caused by the loss of the superpower status have not been overcome completely. However, the age groups best adapted to foreign realities are gradually coming to the fore. Many representatives of these groups have already succeeded in gaining enough business experience, are more open to communication and best oriented to ultimate results. Naturally, there is a possibility of generation conflicts, although it is not inevitable.
Finally, serious rethinking of Russia's place in the world is possible in case of noticeable failures in the international arena, provided they are viewed and felt as such not only by the elite, but also public opinion.
Expert Reconstruction of Ideas of the Russian Establishment Concerning the Rules of the Game in Foreign Policy and Optimal Aims of Russian Diplomacy
"Picture of the World" / Timely subject on the agenda
1. Exchange of signals. It proceeds from the premise that the country's belief in its strength, consistency, and moral grounds of its position is the most effective way of adapting foreign policy to the
existing rules of the game: the more confident one looks, the greater respect one enjoys; weakness should not be displayed.
2. "Besieged Fortress". It presents a bipolar picture of the world, depicting reality of the 1970s.
3. "Let's Exchange". It regards foreign policy as a set of short-term measures aimed at compelling to mutual concessions and not oriented to reaching strategic aims and interests.
4. "Atmosphere Decides Everything". It largely resembles the model of "Change as the Aim in Itself". However, it presupposes another sequence of actions with an emphasis on making unilateral concessions in exchange for creating a comfortable atmosphere facilitating concessions on major issues in reply.
5. "No politics - only business". It envisages interpretation of any developments in foreign policy on the basis of business interests. It is oriented to interpreting earlier events rather than modeling "optimal" manner of behavior. In formulating aims emphasis is laid on pragmatic tasks (softening of visa regime, legalization of capital, creation of comfortable conditions for Russian investors).
6. "Loving him for his love of me". Support of countries which take complimentary position toward Russia and properly appreciate Russian values (similar assessment of events of World War II, etc.).
7. "New times". The previous picture of the world is no more. Agreement should be sought with new actors. Among them are transnational corporations, opposition parties, and local regional leaders (China, Turkey, and others).
8. "Intracorporative public relations". The main task is to concentrate on satisfying public opinion with foreign policy results and create the feeling among Russian citizens that Russia plays an important role in the international arena.
Military Hostilities in Syria
1. Russia should demonstrate that it is an important player. This is why it should help Bashar Asad.
2. Solidarity with the enemies of the U.S.A. - Syria and Iran -under the slogan "Russia may be next".
3. Toughening the anti-American position with possibly exchanging it for concessions not connected with the situation in the Middle East.
4. Avoiding identification with Syria, giving western partners possibility to implement their own tactic and (in case of its success) using non-opposition of Moscow as an advantage in negotiations with the U.S.A. and West European countries.
5. Different variants are possible - from the need to preserve the market of arms for Russia to assumptions that total destabilization in the Middle East will boost the already high world prices of fuel and energy.
6. Syria takes a more "pro-Russian" position; besides Damascus and Moscow maintain prolonged historical ties and common economic interests.
7. There is no reason to interfere with processes which we cannot influence. Perhaps, failures of the West's policy toward Syria could lead to the weakening of western positions and strengthening of positions of other players.
8. Russia has a special position differing from that of other players, and the latter have to reckon with it.
Eurasian Union
1. The project of the Eurasian Union is our reply to attempts of expansion in the post-Soviet area. Russia's demonstration of the zone of its special interests is a sign of its strength.
2. The Eurasian Union should be given all-round support as it is a powerful military-strategic project; let Russia be its main sponsor. The CIS countries should realize who rules the roost.
3. The Eurasian Union is important not only as an instrument of psychological pressure to bear on foreign partners, but also as an instrument of containment of independent foreign-policy activity of post-Soviet countries. Russia should be the monopolist in the contacts of the U.S.A. with post-Soviet countries. This will ensure it the most advantageous positions in subsequent exchanges.
4. Although the ideas of searching for a new global international partner proved utopian for many CIS countries, Russia should not emphasize it and give the local elites the pretext for reviving the "younger brother" complex.
5. Restrained attitude to the importance of the problem on condition of Russia receiving preferences in the struggle for profitable assets in the post-Soviet area.
6. Support of countries in the post-Soviet area which adhere to integration rhetoric. Allies - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, "fellow-travelers" - Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan. Opponents - Georgia, Moldova, Baltic countries. High degree of uncertainty - Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan.
7. Emphasis on relations not with the present-day elites of the post-Soviet countries, but with the generation coming to replace them (especially in countries with the unresolved problem of succession of power, including those in Central Asia).
8. Bolster up expectations of the "New Soviet Union is on the horizon" type, without mentioning the fact that the line of horizon inevitably recedes as one approaches it.
Resetting with the U.S.A.
1. Resetting is not the apt term, because it presupposes recognition of previous errors by both sides. Requirement for resetting exists in the United States, whereas Russia may confine to playing up to this rhetoric, if America agrees to concessions.
2. Repetition of the policy of détente is rejected as it proved to be a trap for the U.S.S.R.
3. Attempting that both presidential candidates in the U.S.A. should emphasize the significance of relations with Russia in the course of their election campaign. It will have greater effect if "soft" democrats gain success.
4. To use resetting to the maximum for creating a favorable climate and trustful atmosphere in mutual relations ("it's easier to yield to friends").
5. It is necessary to find factors which will demilitarize the Russian-American agenda and ensure the appearance of a lobby for economic and political cooperation.
6. Agree to resetting in exchange for open concessions made by the United States, narrowing down rapprochement with the appearance of such excesses as the "Magnitsky list".
7. Dialogue is possible, but without thinking that the United States has controlling stake in international politics.
8. To lay emphasis on the military component of the Russian-American relations.
Relations with China
1. Cooperation with China gives Russia new advantages in its relations with other international partners.
2. This subject is often beyond the bounds of reflection.
3. To use BRICS for balancing NATO, to use SCO - for balancing BRICS, and the use OCST - for balancing SCO, etc.
4. To continue the present course envisaging a certain complimentary moves toward Beijing, which should not be accompanied with clear-cut political and economic obligations from both sides.
5. To search for spheres of economic cooperation with the PRC, but to be cautious and thrifty.
6. Cooperation within the framework of BRICS and SCO is a way to show that Russia is an influential player and partner.
7. To regard China as one of the potential leaders in international politics and economics in the near future, but without detriment to mutual relations with other partners (India, "Asiatic tigers").
8. To demonstrate pragmatism of Russia's policy in interaction with the "new world leaders", without drawing attention to concrete aspects (prices of fuel and energy, change of borders, etc.).
"Rossiya v globalnoi politike", Moscow, 2012, Vol. 10, No 3, May-June, pp. 22-33.
Boris Aksyumov,
D. Sc. (Phil.), Stavropol State University IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
The entire post-Soviet period of the development of the North Caucasus has been characterized by the growing turbulence of socioeconomic, ethnopolitical and cultural and civilization processes. This periodically changing turbulence is always at a sufficiently high level, and is determined by the functioning of the terrorist underground in the North Caucasus. In this connection the study of the ideological
