Научная статья на тему 'The Fourth Vector of Vladimir Putin (Russia’s Foreign Policy – Any Changes?)'

The Fourth Vector of Vladimir Putin (Russia’s Foreign Policy – Any Changes?) Текст научной статьи по специальности «Социальная и экономическая география»

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Текст научной работы на тему «The Fourth Vector of Vladimir Putin (Russia’s Foreign Policy – Any Changes?)»

Dmitri Trenin,

Director, Moscow Carnegie Center

THE FOURTH VECTOR OF VLADIMIR PUTIN

(Russia's Foreign Policy - Any Changes?)

Since the year 2000 Russia's foreign policy has had many vectors, in a sense that its vector has changed more than once. At the very beginning of Putin's first presidency its main course was the establishment of firm allied relations with the United States and integration with the European Union within the framework of what was then called the "European choice" of Russia. A symbol of that period was Putin's support of the United States after the terrorist acts on September 11, 2001, and the most eloquent expression - his speech at the German Bundestag in October of that year. Then, in the mid-2000s Moscow turned away from the political "orbit" of the West, having become opposed to Washington on the principal questions of international politics and the world order. The most vivid embodiment of that period was the five-day Russian-Georgian war of 2008, and the most eloquent "literary" monument - Putin's speech in Munich in February 2007. The third period - "Medvedev's" in form, but Putin's in essence - was the pressing of the "reset button" of Russian-American relations, and the order of the Kremlin to establish "modernization partnerships" with the most advanced countries.

These changes in Russian foreign policy do not always coincide with presidential terms of office, yet, there is certain connection. It can be said that after Putin's return to the post of president, Moscow's course in international affairs is again modified. Naturally, the main reason is not the change of the country's leader. Vladimir Putin continued to remain the "first person" of the state determining the vector of its foreign policy during Medvedev's presidency. The "Libyan episode" was not the latter's improvisation: the sanction to abstain at the UN Security Council during the voting procedure was definitely given by Putin. The principally new factors are now a considerable change of the domestic situation in Russia and the continuing fundamental changes of the external medium in which Russia's policy is implemented.

Domestic Conditions

During the two decades after the overthrow of Communist power in the country essential changes have taken place in Russian society. Certain sections of the population (about one-third of it) have reached a material and cultural level allowing them to take an active part in public life. As a result, the authoritarian rule has suffered certain erosion. The more or less satisfied consumers began to turn into "angry" city dwellers. At the end of 2011 - beginning of 2012 their discontent took a vivid form of mass manifestations in the streets of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other big cities.

The powers that be described this movement as a result of the subversive activities of the West, and above all the United States. Vladimir Putin directly accused the U.S. Department of State of financing these protest movements. Thus, the authorities were striving to present the opposition as the "fifth column" of the West doing everything to weaken Russia, and themselves as the national

patriotically-minded force defending the independence and integrity of the country. When Putin declared himself winner of the presidential election in the evening of March 4, 2012, his words sounded like a triumphant report of victory over the external enemy and his domestic accomplices.

The first steps of the newly-elected head of state were aimed at bringing to naught the potential sources of influence of the outer world on the domestic situation. A law was hastily adopted demanding that the Russian non-governmental organizations receiving financial grants from abroad be registered as foreign agents. Moscow also demanded that the American Agency on international development aid (USAID) stop its activity on the territory of Russia. The Russian authorities withdrew from such an agreement with the United States as the program of joint reduction of the nuclear threat in which the U.S.A. was the donor and Russia the recipient of aid. Simultaneously, in its domestic policy the Kremlin laid an emphasis on overtly conservative premises, but not on an imitation of pluralism as it used to do.

During the presidential election campaign of 2012 in the United States the Russian theme was not mentioned practically at all, except a gibberish statement of the republican candidate Mitt Romney about Russia as the "No 1 geopolitical opponent." Nevertheless, at the end of the year, while abolishing the "Jackson-Vanik amendment," the U.S. Congress adopted the notorious Magnitsky act, which introduced sanctions against the Russian officials accused of violations of human rights. In reply, the Russian government adopted the law forbidding the adoption of Russian children by American parents. Public opinion in the United States has unfolded a broad campaign against the Kremlin policy, and anti-Americanism has openly become one of the pillars of official patriotism.

These steps of Moscow, as well as police reprisals against Russian opposition leaders, a severe sentence passed on the members of the Pussy Riot group who have staged a "punk-prayer" in the main Russian Orthodox Cathedral of Christ the Savior, and also checks and inspections at the offices of German political foundations in this country have led to a marked intensification of criticism of Russian domestic policy in the European Union countries. For their part, the Russian authorities have declared for the first time since 1991 that they do not fully share modern European values, including those concerning human rights, and will follow their own orientations.

Thus, one may draw the following conclusions:

First, Russian domestic policy and its reflection in the public opinion of America and Europe have "intruded" for the first time during the post-Soviet period into the sphere of Russia's relations with the United States and the European Union.

Secondly, this "intrusion" tends to turn into a partial "occupation" of bilateral relations by domestic subjects.

Thirdly, Russian official patriotism is now openly formed on the basis of anti-Americanism.

Fourthly, differences between Russia and the European Union have acquired not only a situational and political, but also an essential and value-laden character.

External Conditions

The world crisis of 2008-2009 was not only the deepest one since the time of the Great depression. It laid bare the profound moral vices of modern capitalism and essential drawbacks in the system of state management in the most advanced western democracies. Postcrisis progress in the United States was very slow, and in the European

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Union countries the crisis took the form of protracted recession. The debt problems of a number of countries have questioned not only the integrity of the euro zone, but the very existence of the common European currency. In the conditions of the crisis the social problems have become much deeper and more painful in a number of European countries. The state debt and budget deficit in the United States have reached such dimensions that they are now a serious brake in the implementation of Washington's foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the results of the American foreign-policy course in the early 21 century are far from impressive. Iraq has plunged into chaos after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, and Afghanistan is facing a specter of civil war on the threshold of such withdrawal. Iran continues its nuclear program, despite the western sanctions and Israeli subversive acts. North Korea carries on missile and nuclear tests and threatens with war. Finally, the "Arab spring," which the White House supported after some hesitation, has apparently beaten a track to power for Islamists, who are far from wishing to pursue a foreign-policy course loyal to Washington. Bashar Asad's regime in Syria, which used to be quite friendly to the United States, is still in power. Against this background China's economic growth continues, although at a slower pace, nevertheless, the country proclaims and pursues its national interests still more firmly. The Asia-Pacific region becomes the main area not only of world trade, but also world politics.

The conclusions made in Moscow could be summed up as follows:

First, the multipolar world, which has been talked of so much since the mid-1990s, is becoming a reality.

Secondly, the epoch of the unrestrained domination of the West in the international arena is coming to an end. The West has lost its

moral authority and cannot serve as a model for Russia. In general, democracy does not guarantee a high quality of state management.

Thirdly, American foreign policy has become cost-based and ineffective. Washington has overstrained itself in the international arena, its strategy is now more destructive than constructive, and is often unrealistic.

Hence, the foreign-policy independence of Russia should also be moral political independence. "Eyes front to the West" in the matter of values has become obsolete. Moscow should and will go its own way.

Economic Conditions

The foreign economic situation has also changed against this background. The price of oil, which dropped sharply in the heat of the global crisis, has now stabilized at the level of $110 - 115 per barrel of North Sea "Brent" oil. After that there has not been any further increase, and the economic recession in Europe and a slow growth of the U.S. economy, along with a reduction of growth rates in China, threaten with a new drop of the price of oil. Meanwhile, the budget liabilities of the Russian government can be fulfilled only along with the preservation of the current price of oil. Besides, an energy revolution has taken place in the United States after the beginning of the industrial development of shale gas, which has changed the world economic situation. It has opened the prospect of achieving energy independence by 2030, and has also caused a change in the structure of gas trade. Combined with the measures adopted by certain countries of the European Union after the "gas wars" of 2006 and 2009, these measures have resulted in noticeable reduction of Europe's dependence on Russian gas, and stability with regard to breakdowns in its supplies has grown.

Along with the further development of production of liquefied natural gas, this factor has had an adverse effect on the positions of "Gazprom" on the world market. In turn, the European Union has decided to start investigations of the activity of the Russian monopoly on the markets of certain EU member-states with a view to changing the rules of "Gazprom" business in Europe, particularly to revising the price formula of gas delivered through pipelines. "Gazprom" has now to work more actively to develop the Asian direction in an attempt to gain stronger positions on the markets of Japan, South Korea and China. The foreign economic position of Russia has changed after it joined the World Trade organization in August 2012. As a result of rather difficult negotiations lasting for nineteen years, the Russian side has gained considerable concessions from its partners, nevertheless, the effect of membership has become rather painful for a number of branches of the Russian economy, above all, agriculture. In these conditions one can talk of a certain temporary allergy to further integration in the world economy.

Foreign Policy in All Fields

The first international contacts of Vladimir Putin after his inauguration have shown a "renovated" outline of Russian foreign policy. On the inauguration day he received the heads of state of the CIS who attended the ceremony in Moscow, having thus emphasized the historic role of Russia as the center of the post-Soviet Eurasia. The first visit abroad by the new Russian President was to Minsk, the capital of Belarus, an ally of Russia. After that he visited Berlin and Paris, the main partners of Russia in the European Union. The European theme was continued several days later in St. Petersburg at the RF - EU summit. Further on President Putin continued to receive leaders of European countries, from Italy to Luxemburg.

After this, Vladimir Putin turned to Asia and went to Tashkent where he made a vain attempt to draw Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov to his integration plans. But soon Uzbekistan announced his withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The next stage of Putin's diplomacy was Beijing where he took part in the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In later months the Russian President visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Israel and Palestine territories, Turkey and India. The main diplomatic event of the year was the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Vladivostok, where the Russian President received the leaders of two dozen countries.

The multilateral meetings which have not been attended by Putin could clearly be seen against this backdrop. It was understood that the NATO meeting in Chicago would pass without Russian participation. However, Putin's refusal to attend the summit of the "Eight" at Camp David was utterly unexpected. Officially, it was explained by the need to work on the composition of the new Russian government, but unofficially, it was the reaction to Obama's absence at the APEC summit in Vladivostok. It showed that the Russian presence at such summit meetings was not an absolute priority for Putin. The only meeting he was interested in was a month later at the summit of the "Twenty" in Mexico.

The geography of Putin's visits and meetings demonstrates the priorities of Russian foreign policy. First, it is special attention to integration within the framework of the CIS, secondly, the greater role of relations with Asia, thirdly, lower interaction with the European Union, NATO, and other western institutions, and fourthly, maintenance of a certain distance in relations with the United States. These conclusions are bolstered up by an analysis of the Concept of the

foreign policy of the Russian Federation endorsed by President Putin in February 2013, and also by practical policy in each field mentioned.

The Eurasian Union

Vladimir Putin's article about the Eurasian Union, which appeared in October 2011, on the eve of parliamentary elections, became the first foreign-policy manifesto, as it were, of the new political cycle. The idea of the restoration of the unity of the postSoviet area in one form or another is rather popular among voters. In 2009 Putin decided to step up the creation of a Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, although at the time this act seemed to render more difficult Russia's entry in the WTO. Evidently, Putin has drawn a lesson from the world economic crisis, namely, that regional integration is more reliable than globalization. This line continues: the Uniform economic area of three countries began its existence in 2012, and it is planned to set up a full-fledged Eurasian economic union in 2015.

Speaking of the economic integration of the post-Soviet states it is necessary to have in mind several aspects. First, deep integration is only possible on a voluntary basis and preferably in the economic sphere. The political integration of Russia and newly-independent states above the coordination level of their political courses is unfeasible. Secondly, an expansion of the integration area beyond the bounds of the present "three Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Area is either unattainable or is fraught with serious losses. Just as Mikhail Gorbachev and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Vladimir Putin is of the opinion that without Ukraine the Russian center of force will not have a sufficient critical mass. However, for its part the Ukrainian elite apparently realizes well enough that close integration ties with Russia would mean its movement toward assimilation and gradual abolition of

the "Ukrainian project." Rapprochement with Moscow will inevitably provoke a political crisis and even a split of Ukraine.

Integration is viewed almost similarly by Uzbekistan. During the past twenty years the Uzbek authorities have formed their own idea about the role and place of their country in the region, and either Islam Karimov or his probable successors will hardly wish to become part of the Russian-Eurasian center of force. Of course, smaller and weaker countries of Central Asia - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - are another matter. Neither Bishkek nor Dushanbe can claim regional leadership, but they will strive for discretion. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the premature inclusion of these two states in integration will not only demand sizable contributions on the part of the Russian Federation, but will also considerably lower the general level and quality of the entire integration area.

The Asia-Pacific Region

Russia's turn toward Asia and the Pacific has just started. Yet, some people fear that the Vladivostok summit in September 2012 was the end of the turn, but not its beginning. The main threat to Russia's security is now determined by the fact that a part of Russia, which is the most depressive economically, actually borders on the most dynamically developing part of the world. To solve this problem it is necessary to find and realize an adequate development model of Pacific Russia.

Other, indirect, threats stem from the aggravating contradictions between the leading Asia-Pacific countries, primarily, between China and the United States, as well as between China and its neighbors -Japan, Vietnam and India. Russia should ably maneuver in these conditions in order to ensure its own interests and avoid being involved in disputes and conflicts of others. Today Moscow succeeds in

maneuvering at a tactical and operative level. Having gained participation in prestigious East Asian summits, Moscow deems it possible to limit its participation in the first one of them at the level of minister of foreign affairs. It is symbolic that his first foreign visit as the new leader of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping made to Moscow in March 2013. Chinese strategy is aimed at strengthening relations with Russia, which is a strategic rear and raw material base of China. However, there has been no strategy in reply so far.

"Economic" Relations with the European Union

The European Union remains the main trade partner of the Russian Federation. Their bilateral turnover amounts to over $400 billion, five times more than between Russia and China. The European Union claims over 50 percent of the volume of Russian foreign trade, whereas the share of its partners by the Customs Union accounts for less than seven percent. It was to be hoped that Russia's joining the World Trade Organization would give an incentive to trade and economic ties with the European Union. However, they have not been fully realized. Russia has to get used to the consequences of its entry into the WTO, and Europe in the present situation is concerned by the most acute crisis. As a result, the two partners confined their interaction to a narrow circle of practical, or even technical, tasks - visas, trade disputes, etc. The Russian negative attitude to the policy of the European Union, above all, Germany, was largely determined by the way the problems of the Cyprus debt were resolved in March 2013, as a result of which big Russian depositors of Cyprus banks lost their money. This step was publicly criticized by President Putin, premier Medvedev, and the mass media as anti-Russian.

As to international affairs, Russia has supported the military operation of France in Mali, but was at variance with the position of

Paris, London and Berlin on Syria. Moscow's position on Syria was in sharp contrast with its approach to Libya in 2011. The reason for this was not in the change of president in the Kremlin, but in the way NATO had carried out the Libyan operation. Moscow was outraged by the fact that the action sanctioned by the UN Security Council for the protection of peaceful citizens from reprisals on the part of the government troops was enlarged right up to the change of the ruling regime in Libya and the assassination of its head. It was with due account of the Libyan lesson that the position of Russia in the UN became much harder.

The questions of sanctions and the use of force in international relations, especially control over its use, have taken pride of place in Russia's position and actions in the UN. It is especially true of the situation in Syria. Moscow is not so much advocating the preservation of Bashar Asad in power as preventing foreign military intervention in Syria. Moscow is likewise against the possible coming to power of radical Islamists in Syria. Moscow declares its readiness to cooperate with the West on Syria, if the United States and its allies agree to act within the framework of the UN Charter and refuse from the idea of the forcible change of the regime in that country. However, the problem lies in the fact that by the spring of 2013 the potential of a political-diplomatic solution of the Syrian problem seemed to have been exhausted.

"Sovereign Distancing" from the United States

In the first year after his return to the post of president Vladimir Putin was concerned with the problem of strengthening sovereignty of Russia with regard to the United States. The real reply to the Magnitsky law was not the act prohibiting adoption of Russian children in foreign countries, but the act prohibiting Russian government officials to keep

money abroad. Thus, two problems were tackled simultaneously: lowering vulnerability of representatives of Russian power with regard to foreign states, and, on the contrary, increasing intra-elite discipline and greater dependence of the Russian political elite on the powers that be in the Moscow Kremlin.

President Putin "took time out" in his relations with Washington. He seems to count on big western business rather than on governments or public opinion. In his view, the interests of the American business community can do more than agreements in the sphere of armaments.

In this connection President Putin instructed the government to raise Russia's positions in the Doing Business index of the World Bank by 100 points, thus moving it from 120th to 20th place. At the end of the first year of Putin's new presidency Russia has reached agreement with the western energy giants Exxon Mobile and BP. And in the World Bank rating it has moved upwards, to 112th place.

In the military-political sphere Moscow does not wish to display great initiatives in its relations with Washington. Despite anti-American rhetoric in the mass media and in public, Russia continues to comply with agreements signed with the United States and NATO concerning transit of cargoes needed by the U.S. and NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan. Moscow was preparing for Putin's meetings with Barack Obama at the summit of the "Eight" in Northern Ireland and at the meeting of the "Twenty" in St. Petersburg.

Rearmament of the Army and Navy

"The weakest goes to the wall." These words President Putin repeated over and over again several years ago. Russia began its military reform in 2008. In 2011 an announcement was made of a spectacular rearmament of the army at a cost of twenty trillion rubles

within the next ten years. Simultaneously, it was decided to reform the military industry and turn it into the driving force of new industrialization. Failure in negotiations with the United States and NATO on cooperation on the anti-missile defense in 2010 - 2011 induced Moscow to evolve a program of building the Russian antimissile defense aimed against the United States and NATO, and also to increase the potential of nuclear containment. Although according to the existing military doctrine adopted in 2010, a large-scale war against Russia is hardly possible, the United States and NATO are viewed as potential enemies at regional and local levels.

At the end of 2012 the Russian Navy carried out major exercises in the Mediterranean for the first time in twenty years, and in spring 2013 President Putin suddenly alerted the Black Sea Fleet for the first time.

Engaged as it is in the strengthening of its military might, Moscow is now more restrained in the prospects of arms control. The further reduction of strategic offensive weapons is linked with restrictions in the system of the American anti-missile defense system; control over non-strategic nuclear arms is placed depending on solution of precision weapons, and resumption of control over conventional arms is viewed on principally new foundation. The world without nuclear weapons is considered a dangerous illusion and movement toward it a risky business.

Conclusions and Prospects

The circle of persons taking part in the formation and implementation of Russian foreign policy has changed insignificantly, despite the change of presidents. Nevertheless, foreign-policy consensus, that is, accord of a greater part of society with government policy, has become a thing of the past. Political and ideological

stratification grows, various groups, government and private corporations, companies and clans offer their own, sometimes diametrically opposed variants of foreign-policy orientations. And this process will go on. Of course, foreign policy in major fields will continue to be determined, as before, by Vladimir Putin, and realized by the existing bureaucratic apparatus in the foreseeable future, but further on it will increasingly become a subject of acute struggle of interests and ideologies.

It is too early to make conclusions as to what Russian foreign policy will be during the third term of Putin's presidency. The conditions change rapidly and sometimes quite unpredictably. However, it is already possible to state that the geopolitical trends will be directed toward Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region. Russia will continue to distance itself from the United States and the European Union. And the fourth variant of Putin's foreign policy will, probably, essentially differ from the three preceding ones.

"Rossiya v globalnoi politike", vol. 11, special issue, 2013, Moscow.

Elvira Maiboroda,

Ph. D. (Philosophy), Institute of Socio-economic and Humanitarian Research, Southern Scientific Center of Russian Academy of Sciences WAYS AND METHODS OF DEPOLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA

Among the phenomena which have considerably influenced ethnopolitical processes in the North Caucasus it is necessary to single out those of depoliticization and repoliticization of ethnicity, which replaced each other throughout the entire post-Soviet period. A new

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