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disappear in the post-Soviet period, but are restored by the new generation of imams. Thus, conformist and unitarist rules are more inherent in imams-" specialists," and the spirit of opposition and ideological pluralism is inherent in imams-"neophytes." The essence of this opposition, which has latent forms as previously, is the same, that is, the unwillingness to recognize unquestionably the authority of the Spiritual Board in religious-legal questions and its administrative prerogatives as the controlling body.
At the same time the results of the examination make it possible to suppose that the real public role and authority of the imams-"neophytes" will depend on the specific conditions in which a greater part of the Muslim activists was formed during the perestroika and post-perestroika periods. So far the socialization of Russian imams is greatly determined by the formation model of imams-"specialists."
Author of the abstract - Elena Dmitrieva
2019.02.005. KSENIYA GRIGOREVA. THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS IN BASHKORTOSTAN? AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF S. HUNTINGTON'S THESIS // "Vlast," Moscow, 2018, Vol. 26, № 7, P. 190-197.
Keywords: S. Huntington, Clash of civilizations, bashkortostan, orthodox, muslims, political orientations, values, religious radicalism.
Kseniya GRIGOREVA,
PhD(Sociology), Research Associate, Institute of Sociology, FCTAS RAS
S. Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations is verified by the materials of an empirical research conducted in the Republic of Bashkortostan. The author refuted the thesis about the incompatibility of the values of Muslim and Orthodox Slavic
civilizations, based on the results of the study. The thesis on the rallying of civilizations is verified by data on the attitude of the local population to visitors of different civilizational affiliation.
In his famous theory of the clash of civilizations, S. Huntington put forward the statement that the boundaries separating humanity and the prevailing sources of conflict will be determined by culture in the near future, and not by ideology and economy [Huntington 1994: 33]. Moreover, it is religion that will play a key role in the confrontation of cultures. According to S. Huntington, it is religion that divides people more than anything else.
Religious differences, according to S. Huntington, entail disagreements on a wide range of political issues, including interaction of citizens and the state, the importance of political freedoms, human rights. Following the theory of the clash of civilizations, the conflict occurs on two levels. It takes place between countries belonging to different civilizations at the macro level (Western, Islamic, Confucian, etc.), while the micro level is represented by a clash of groups living within the borders of one national state.
The theory of S. Huntington was repeatedly criticized, it was tried to be tested empirically. As a rule, these studies were aimed at confirming or refuting the thesis about the prevalence of armed conflicts between countries belonging to different civilizations. The obtained results showed its fallacy in the absolute majority of cases.
Despite repeated empirical refutation of the theory of the clash of civilizations, it has not lost its popularity yet. The argument cited quite often for verifying the theses of S. Huntington based on the analysis of data for the 1990s (this period accounts for most of these empirical studies) is not sufficiently correct. One of the main ideas of the political scientist was that inter-civilization conflicts would dominate in the future, some time after the end of the Cold War, which meant that the studies conducted immediately after its completion would not be
able to detect the predicted changes. The author believes that nowadays, after 25 years after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, such arguments no longer work: S. Huntington's predictions, if they are correct, must be reflected in reality.
The author of the article attempts to test the theory of the clash of civilizations on the materials of empirical study conducted in the Republic of Bashkortostan in 2017. Bashkortostan, a region with a complex ethno-confessional composition, fully meets the description of the territory along which the intercivilizational fault passes. Here Turkic and Slavic peoples adjoin, between which historically the struggle was waged, as S. Huntington emphasizes. Using the categorization proposed by S. Huntington, the author classifies the Tatars and Bashkirs, professing Islam, to Islamic civilization, and the Russians, professing Orthodoxy, to Orthodox Slavic.
The initial hypothesis of K. Grigorieva was the assumption that representatives of these civilizations have different views on the relationship between the individual and the state, the state and religious institutions; they are committed to the values of freedom, equality, and the rule of law in varying degrees. In addition, the researcher verifies the statement of S. Huntington that support for religious radicalism is spreading, especially among young people, people with a high level of education and representatives of the middle class. Finally, the author verifies the thesis about the "consolidation of civilizations" (the syndrome of "fraternal groups"), using data on the attitude of the local population towards visitors belonging to different civilizations.
The empirical base of the study is based on the materials of a mass survey conducted in Bashkortostan in July 2017 on a quota area sampling representing the population of the republic. The sample included 14 cities and 15 rural areas representing 6 geo-economic zones of the Republic: Central, Western, southern, North-Western, North-Eastern and Ural. Quotas were set for gender, age, education and nationality (Bashkirs, Tatars, Russians). A total of 1035 respondents were interviewed.
The results of the study refute the hypothesis of fundamental differences in the political orientations of representatives of Islamic and Orthodox Slavic civilization. On the contrary, the latter show complete solidarity on issues of common goals that could unite Russian society, and whether a citizen should rely on his own strength or wait for help from the state, and whether the ROC and the DUM should influence political decision-making.
Representatives of both groups believe that ensuring law and order in the country, the welfare of the people and justice in society are key goals that can unite Russian society. This shows that the values of the rule of law, equality and justice are shared not only by representatives of Western civilization, but also by representatives of Islamic and Orthodox-Slavic civilizations and are not a source of contradictions, despite S. Huntington's assertion.
The respondents of both groups demonstrate unanimity on the issue of the relationship between the citizen and the state as well. The overwhelming majority of respondents believe that the state should take care of the welfare of its citizens.
The issue of the admissibility of the influence of religious institutions (ROC and DUM) on government decision-making is not a subject of disagreement between representatives of Islamic and Orthodox Slavic civilization, too. Approximately equal proportions of respondents from both groups believe that religious institutions should (not) influence policy decisions. Moreover, the results show that neither the Orthodox nor the Muslims are inclined to show favoritism in relation to "their" religious organizations.
As for value orientations, representatives of the two civilizations also demonstrate not differences, but similarities. The respondents from both groups consider the most important to have a good family; to live well, in prosperity; to have an interesting job. The author emphasizes that it would be a considerable exaggeration to speak about the support of religious
radicalism both by representatives of Islamic and representatives of Orthodox Slavic civilization.
Only 3.3% of Muslims and 6.7% of Orthodox are positively assess the activities of those who are ready to defend the purity of the religious faith with arms in their hands. Moreover, contrary to the statement of S. Huntington, the share of young people who hold this position does not exceed the same share in older age groups. The level of education also does not have a significant impact on the attitude towards the activities of religious radicals. The statement that they are supported by highly educated people does not find empirical evidence. The financial position of the respondents also does not affect the support of religious radicalism. Representatives of the middle class approve of those who are ready to defend the purity of faith with weapons, not more often than representatives of the lower and upper classes (5.1% against 4.7% and 5.7% respectively).
The author also notes that the data obtained did not confirm the thesis of "consolidation of civilizations," according to which residents of other countries and regions are perceived as "their" if they belong to the same civilization. The study showed that residents of Bashkortostan (both Muslims and Orthodox) have approximately the same attitude to all visitors, regardless of their "civilizational" affiliation. About half of all respondents (both Muslims and Orthodox) support restrictive measures against visitors. It should be noted that the level of support for these measures remains at the same level or even slightly increases, if we are talking about "civilizationally close" visitors.
In conclusion, K. Grigorieva argues that the study conducted in the Republic of Bashkortostan in 2017, once again did not provide empirical confirmation of S. Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations. The obtained data refuted the thesis about the incompatibility of political and value orientations of representatives of Islamic and Orthodox-Slavic civilizations. The statement about the spread of support for religious radicalism, especially among young people, people with a high level of
education, and representatives of the middle class, was not confirmed either. There was no confirmation of the provision of "Rallying civilizations." The results of the study demonstrated the complete absence of favoritism from both Muslims and Orthodox Christians in relation to "civilizationally clos" visitors from other regions of the Russian Federation.
Author of the abstract - Valentina Schensnovich
2019.02.006. TATYANA SENYUSHKINA. ISLAMIC FACTOR IN THE CONFESSIONAL SPACE OF THE CRIMEA // Nacionalnaya bezopasnost i strategicheskoe planirovanie. 4 Mezhdunarodnaya nauchaya konferenciya "Tavricheskaya perspektiva". 25 let MPA SNG aktualnye problemy i perspektivy evrazijskoj integracii. St.Petersburg, 2017, P. 175-182.
Keywords: Islam, Crimea, reunification of the Crimea with Russia, nontraditional Islamic trends, fight against religious extremism.
Tatyana Senyushkina,
DSc(Politics), Professor,
Tauric Academy of Crimean Federal University, Simferopol, the Republic of Crimea
The article examines processes going on in the Muslim community of the Crimea, beginning from the historic stage connected with the emergence of Islam in the region. Special attention is devoted to Islam in the Crimea in the period between 1991 and 2014, when the Crimea was reunited with Russia on the basis of a referendum. The new model of relations between the state and Islamic religious organizations is analyzed, which took shape in the Crimea in 2014-2016 in the conditions of the integration of the Crimean Muslim community in the Russian socio-cultural and legal area.
