CC BY
16
of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, concludes Bagrat Seiranyan.
Author of the abstract - Valentina Schensnovich
2017.04.008. ANDREI FEDORCHENKO. FROM GENERATION TO GENERATION: PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION OF POWER IN ARABIAN MONARCHIES // "Ezhegodnik IMI" Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 2015, № 1. P. 165-179.
Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, UAE, monarchy, succession of power.
Andrei Fedorchenko,
Dr.Sc. (Economics), Professor, the Middle East Studies Center,
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
There are absolute monarchies in three Arabian countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar), in Kuwait and Bahrain there is dualistic constitutional monarchy, in the UAE usually reckoned in constitutional monarchies there is a peculiar symbiosis of republic form of government and an absolute monarchy writes the author.
Arabian monarchies (excluding Bahrain) still stay out of Arab "thaw." Authorities of these countries could preserve political and social stability based on combination of three factors. First, export revenues of hydrocarbons gave an opportunity to eliminate real and potential social protest hotbeds. Secondly, the regimes supported friendly relations with conservative religious sectors and leaders of tribal clans. Thirdly, national security was guaranteed for all Western countries primarily the USA.
In spite of risen opposition sentiments monarchs could retain support by popular majority of these countries. At the same time under apparent tranquility there are concealed, recently intensified internal and social contradictions, economic problems. For more or less effective response to challenges of the Arab spring Arabian monarchs will have to carry internal modernization in one form or another. Despite partial modernization of political systems in member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) during its existence this process is slow and has multispeed nature.
There is a burning issue of supreme power shift in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) which is concentrated in hands of 80-90 years old children of founder of the state and in Qatar and Oman it required search of successors for supreme rulers. Spiritless and incoherent modernization doesn't transform political elite.
Saudi state was initially built as an absolute theocratic monarchy. It's based on Salafi interpretation of Quranic creed -Wahhabism. In the system of public agencies distribution of authority is exercised between two centres of power- political and religious elite. Saudi dynasty represented by more than 5 thousand members of royal family, controls armed forces and security services, foreign policy system, economy. Religious sphere, ideology, proceeding refer to area of activity of Wahhabism founder descendant Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab- the Al ash-Sheikh and adherent to it theologists-Ulemas groups. At the same time leading role of the king in this system is obvious: as a head of the state he bears a title of the Malik (King) and Imam (spiritual leader) and inherited from the KSA founder title of "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques."
Reforms which took place in the early 90s involved constitution of framework legislation and introduction of new participants to policy making process. In Saudi Arabia reformation didn't bring any pivotal changes into traditional division of responsibilities between two centres of force -
political and religious elite. Development of the third pole of national policy so called educated class (representatives of universities, journalists, specialists in the field of technology and engineering) goes slowly and is controlled by the royal family. Partial modernization doesn't transform political elite itself.
In general Saudi society has never been monolithic. Controversies in the royal family gained momentum after death of the founder of the state king Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud in 1953. The total number of his descendants, who could inthrone, surpassed 300 people. The founder on the Kingdom left devise for his sons in which there was a principle of devolution from one son to another.
Internal conflicts affecting the interest of the ruling dynasty follow next lines: Saudis - are extrasystemic opposition in the name of radical Wahhabis, liberals (their views are shared with some members of the ruling family) - conservatives, Sunni authorities of the country - Shia community. Presence of opposition forces caused the need to strengthen reform efforts of the Saudi authorities especially after the beginning of the Arab spring. Transformation of political elite is aimed at retaining of existing succession system.
In Saudi Arabia along with Oman transition of supreme power and generational change in the ruling elite are critical issues. Late changes in succession in the Kingdom were advanced by aggravation of internal contradictions in the country, insecurity of the KSA foreign policy position, declining years and poor health of the king and successor to the throne. Existing system of succession "from brother to brother" leads to ageing of the pretenders to the throne. Generation of 80-90 years old children of founder of the state has to take care of strengthening of stability in the KSA, ensuring continuity of administration and demise of the crown in particular by change in practice of shift of supreme power, creating conditions for transition of power from the second to the third (having growing ambitions) generation of Saudi dynasty ruling from the beginning of the XX century.
On 30 March 2014 citizens of Saudi Arabia adjured - oath of loyalty to newly-appointed "by successor of successor to the Crown" prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz who in such a manner got the second place in the line of Saudi throne succession retaining post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.
In such a manner long-term supremacy of Sudairi family was for a time replaced by promotion of the Sudairi dynasty representatives as well executives of so called third generation. It was estimated that if Mukrin would become the monarch the place of the descendant could be occupied by eldest son of Abdallah prince Mutib. The king Abdallah in order to maintain stability postponed for a time transfer of power to princes-grandsons (the third generation of successors). This reflects typical for the Kingdom "medial approach" renunciation of radical shifts in public administration. Demise of the king Abdallah 23 January 2015 lead to changes in the balance of power in the Saudi administration but not in the system of succession. On 23 January 2015 Salman bin Abdulaziz took the throne and reshuffled the upper echelons of government of the KSA. In accordance with direction of Salman predecessor the heir to the throne became prince Mukrin. In defiance of experts suggestions the place of the descendant (substitute of the descendant) occupied not the eldest son of the demised monarch prince Mutib, but Prince Muhammad bin Nayef. This way quiet succession took place in the Kingdom. Bin Nayef is nephew to Mukrin and comes from the Sudeiri clan. Many people today call him the most influential person in the KSA after the king. Thereby the Sudeiri clan again moves to the fore. Two out of the three power-wielding agencies turned out to be under their control. Muhammad bin Nayef is considered to be a reformer and a relative liberal. It is entirely possible that he will be the first Saudi monarch with Western education.
In the foreign policy area staff appointments can result in positive changes in the KSA policy in regard to Iran, Iraq and Syria.
Sheik Mohammed Al Thani is deemed to be the founder of modern Qatar who united disparate nomadic tribes of the peninsula in 1868 and created unified state.
In 1995 in the result of coup d'etat son of emir Caliph Sheik Mohammed Al Thani came into office who realized fractional democratization of the system of public administration. Qatar as an absolute monarchy is characterized by underdevelopment of parliamentary institutions and opposition. Specificity of executive power resides in that ruling dynasty Al Thani preserves family monopoly on key positions. The role of emir is traditionally great and government stays just an executive body under monarch who has decisive influence over executive and legislative power.
Power of emir passes to a successor, as a rule, to the eldest son. Sometimes there is the Higher family council of Al Thani family a few closest family members form part of it for setting current issues or selection of the heir to the throne. Even quasi-parliament in the country lacks. There is only Advisory council, 25 members of which are appointed by emir. His functions are-to give guidance which is not binding. According to experts it's nothing more than sinecure to place top and influential persons from emir's team. All members of government including prime-minister and his deputies are appointed by decrees of emir or Prince Royal (prince bears a title "deputy of the ruler" person who replaces the head of the government in his absence).
In projecting generation change in leadership elite of Qatar peculiar tradition of this country should be taken into account. From the date of independence declaration (1971) a ruler change came round in the result of bloodless palace revolutions.
Generation change in Qatar in 2013 happened peacefully. At a private session at the end of May 2013 members of the Higher family council of ruling dynasty Al Thani entitled to vote in solving a question of power derivation came to a decision that before the end of the year Hamad should give the emir seat to his son - royal prince Tamim who held office of emir deputy (being
right-hand man in the country). Prince Tamim became the youngest ruler of the conservative regime furthermore Wahabee on the Arabian Peninsula. It sent a message for replacement of elderly leaders in other monarchies of the Persian Gulf primarily in Saudi Arabia.
In the area of foreign policy Qatar will probably continue to support jihadis in Syria and other Arab countries however forms of it will become more disguised and its volume will diminish.
Its contemporary name Qatar got in 1970 when in the result of palace revolution sultan Qaboos bin Said came to power. He stays in power at the present time. He owns full authority of legislative and executive power. In the short term a question of succession and generation change in the monarchy will become a central one for the country. The complication for forecasting assumption of power by one or another person is related to the fact that 73-year-old Qaboos is childless and unmarried and at the same time doesn't call the name of the successor to the throne.
An important problem of succession of power in the country was considerably solved by fundamental law of Sultanate Oman in 1996. According to the fundamental law Oman is an independent Arab Islamic state, form of rule of which is an absolute monarchy. For first time ever in the country in this law there was enshrined a principle and procedure of shift in power. In compliance of the article 5 the power is passed by male line to direct descendants of Seyyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan. If within three days after the day when the throne became vacant the Council of the ruling family doesn't take a decision over a successor, the Defense council created by decree of Qaboos in 1996 is empowered to endorse a candidate designated by being in power up to that moment sultan in his message to the Council of the ruling family. This document is prepared beforehand. The name of Crown Prince will be probably called after death of the present monarch.
Violent upheaval in Oman at the present time is unlikely. According to experts there are no any overt or covert internal or international conflicts. During the reign of Qaboos two earlier existing splits: tension between possessing spiritual power Imam and secular power holder Sultan; rivalry among tribes traditionally living on the seaboard and representatives of tribes from inner districts of Oman. Rare on the number of participants, protests with economic claims took place in the country in 2011 which were mostly satisfied.
Against the backdrop of heated confessional conflicts in the Middle East sultanate can exemplify an effective solution to interfaith and intra-religious conflicts. The authorities in Oman adhering to liberal political approaches avoid arrises in questions of interfaith dialogue.
There is a reason to suppose, writes A. Fedorchenko, that the heir to the throne, there is no any credible information of whom. will continue sultan Qaboos foreign policy course based on flexibility, pragmatism and cautiousness. In practice it means noninterference in regional conflicts, commitment to create a system of collective security on the territory of the Persian Gulf, balancing between Saudi Arabia and Iran, disinterest in shifting the power balance in favor of one of those countries. Western-backed foreign policy orientation, strategic partnership with the USA will certainly stay the basis of Oman external policy under a new monarch.
Kuwait is a constitutional monarchy. Under the constitution Kuwait is an emirate. Emirs are chosen from a number of Mubarak Al-Sabah descendants. Throughout the year from the moment of enthronement every new emir appoints candidature of a heritor who should gain support of the majority of parliamentary deputies - National Assembly. In the absence of approval emir has to choose three candidates from Mubarak Al-Sabah descendants, one of who will be elected by parliament as the heir to the throne. Thus, power in Kuwait isn't demised
from father to a son. Ruling family participates in the heir to the throne designation who is approved by parliament.
In accordance with Kuwaiti tradition representatives of two branches of ruling family became emirs alternatively -Al-Jaberand Al-Salem. In the beginning of the XXI century this rule was infringed. Emerging role of parliament allowed him not to confirm the candidature of a successor to the throne Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah and propose Sabah IV Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah in place of new emir, representing Al-Jaber family. On 26 January 2006 77-year-old emir of Kuwait adjured to parliament. Parliament confirmed proposed by emir candidature of his blood brother Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah (that moment he was 69) on the post of successor to the Crown.
Representatives of Al-Sabah clan occupy many leading positions in government authorities of the country. Constitutionally emir appoints prime-minister and dismisses him. Upon the recommendation of prime-minister emir forms government comprised of not less than five members of ruling family as well prime-minister, Defense Secretary, Home Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Reinforcement of political role of parliament leads to attenuation of Al-Sabah ruling family institute. Claming its priority among branches of power structures, parliamentarians primarily opposition spokesmen permanently conflict with government. There is a demand for constitutional revision for creation of "genuinely parliamentary constitutional regime" formation of a cabinet on the basis of election. Practically this entails annihilation of tacit agreement functioning since 1961 whereby ruling family controls key posts in the government.
In response Al-Sabah family sets about strengthening their positions. After special elections to parliament in July 2013 quantity of ruling family representatives within new government increased apart from prime-minister there are six of them, notably they headed key ministries.
In recent years Kuwaiti authorities hold a line on systematic political reforming. However these changes don't concern current constitution since 1962 where it's stated a right of Al-Sabah family for power, and granted its social status.
Accession to power of a younger representative of ruling family will hardly lead to its refusal of their key powers and authority. At the same time emir's age (85 years) and the heir to the throne (76 years) makes Al-Sabah clan look for younger claimants to throne.
The UAE is a federative state. It consists of seven emirates each of which is an absolute monarchy and possesses full sovereignty in matters not related to the federation authorities. The UAE itself is included in a group of dualistic monarchies. High Council is a supreme body of the federation composed of regents of seven emirates. Members of High Council elect president of the UAE from its members for a five-year term suitable for subsequent, frequent reelection. Presidency of the UAE is in coincidence with emir's post of the capital emirate Abu Dhabi. As the emirate is an absolute monarchy, power in it is demised like in the entire state. Before 1966 in Abu Dhabi similar to Saudi Arabia it was decided to transfer power from brother to brother.
From the time of the state establishment in 1971 and to 2004 irreplaceable president of the UAE was a ruler of the largest in terms of territory, population and oil and gas reserves Abu Dhabi emirate Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. After his death in 2004 his son Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (he's 66 now) was elected as a president. Post of prime-minister occupies ruler of Dubai emirate -the second most important in the federation.
In 2006 after death of prime-minister Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum
his brother Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum occupied this post. In such a manner in 2004-2006 generation change of the UAE rulers took place, that gave momentum for renovation of political institutes in the country its activation in international
matters. However continuity of internal and external courses was preserved.
Since 14 February 2002 the Kingdom of Bahrain is a constitutional hereditary monarchy. In March 1999 after death of emir sheik Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa his son Hamad bin Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa came into office distinguishing by his more liberal views. At the initiative of the new monarch it was elaborated National Charter - project of political development and country's democratization. After its approval in a national referendum in February 2001 emir submitted amendments, establishing constitutional monarchy where power is divided among partially elected bicameral National Assembly and emir who is called the King. Executive power belongs to the king and the Council of Ministers. Hereditary power goes in the line of Al-Khalifa from father to the eldest son.
Although officially rights of the king are restricted, he uses broadest authorities and inner state structure provides supreme monarchy stability. It's forbidden to make amendments in the article 2 of the constitution which is dedicated to state religion (Islam) and also articles concerning constitutional monarchy and principles of hereditary transfer of power.
A. Fedorchenko concludes that accelerated transformation of the Arab world affected this peninsula of apparent tranquility. However changes happen in inertial way, not as rapidly as in other Arab countries.
Author of the abstract - Valentina Schensnovich
