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2017.01.011. D. POPOV. TAJIKISTAN FACING THE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM // "Problemy natsionalnoy strategii", Moscow, 2016, № 5 (38), P. 126-147.
Keywords: Tajikistan, Central Asia, terrorism, civil war, Batken events, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, ISIS, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, the 201st Russian military base.
D. Popov,
Ph. D (Law),
Head of the Ural regional information-analytical center, RISS, Ekaterinburg
The author notes that the top political leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) perceives terrorism and extremism as the "primary threat" to the national security. The reasons for terrorism are the open financing of terrorist and extremist organizations by some circles, states and foundations, policy of double standards, use of force in international relations, conflict of interest of global and regional powers, destruction of statehood and international law. The current assessment of security threats is dictated by the history of the establishment of independent Tajikistan. In 1992-1997 the Republic experienced a civil war, in which there were a confrontation between secular forces and military units of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO).
Events at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries have demonstrated the seriousness of the terrorist threat hanging over the former Soviet republics of the region. Another result of the war was the most extensive outflow of the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the civil war is over, almost all modern security problems of Tajikistan proceed from this "tragic period of opposition to extremism and terrorism," as President E. Rahmon called it.
By the early 2000s, about five thousand militants were formally integrated into the power structures of the country. After receiving the official status, many field commanders have
formed their parallel control systems in the regions. A wide and almost unprotected corridor has been arranged into the inner regions of Central Asia from Afghanistan, used for the smuggling of Afghan opiates and transferring of manpower of terrorist organizations. In the late 20th century, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (the IMU), whose raids went down in history as "the Batken events", used this route. The question of the actual involvement of the Tajikistan leadership to the displacement of the IMU troops on its territory is still open after more than fifteen years of the Batken events.
United under the pseudo-religious slogans, radical bandit formations have challenged territorial integrity and secular nature of the Central Asian states. The transnational nature of new risks became obvious: representatives of many nationalities fought in the ranks of the bandits, their ideologists and sponsors were scattered over a wide area of the Middle East - Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in countries - monarchies of the Persian Gulf, etc.
There was a series of attacks on Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, coincided and probably coordinated with the next opening of the Islamic front against Russia in the North Caucasus, where the mercenary troops of Basayev and Hattab attacked Dagestan in August 1999, unleashing the "second Chechen war".
This situation has demonstrated the vulnerability of the southern flank of the CIS, as well as the vulnerability of the state borders, and weakness in the training of the army and intelligence agencies of Central Asian countries to fight the radical bandit formations in mountains. The contradictions between the former Soviet republics and the lack of unity in relieving common threats were profitable extremists.
The response of Russia and Central Asian countries was the intensification of intergovernmental cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism in addition to military operations. As for Tajikistan, its further efforts were aimed at blocking free transit
through the Pamir-Karategin zone for effective resistance to breakthroughs of the bandit groups.
Balance of power has been changed considerably due to the military campaign "Enduring Freedom" of the Western coalition, initiated by the U.S. officially against the Taliban in response to the terrorist attacks "on September 11th". Having started the massive bombing attacks from the air, the U.S. command made a bet on the field commanders of "Northern Alliance", where representatives of national minorities of northern Afghanistan were prevailed, and first of all - the Tajiks and Uzbeks. The Government of Tajikistan (as well as Russia, Uzbekistan, Iran, and India) provided military and technical, and material assistance to the alliance against the Taliban before the U.S. entry into the conflict.
Terrorist organizations were driven into remote mountain regions on the Afghan-Pakistan border, having lost the previous possibilities for attacks on targets in Central Asia. The authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan have supported the efforts of the U.S., especially in the first stage. In 2001 Tajikistan opened corridors in its airspace to NATO aircraft, in 2009 - allow land transit "non-lethal" goods under the so-called Northern Distribution Network.
Tajikistan has made its contribution to the Western military campaign. At the same time, he took advantage of the changed geopolitical reality for a gradual solution of internal problems. Republic took another ten years almost to concentrate enough power for a full investigation with the centers of instability in the east.
The author notes that since 2012 the situation in the Pamirs is controlled by the government as a whole. The number of "blind" spots on the map of modern Tajikistan, where the central government has existed only nominally, has been reduced considerably. There were many active participants in the civil war in Tajikistan, who did not recognize the conditions of the inter-Tajik peace and who preferred to escape to neighboring
countries. They are a threat to the security of the country as before, and those who fought on the side of Joint Tajik opposition and those who were on the side of government forces.
The author notes that the Tajik leadership still sees the Islamic Revival Party as the main internal enemy. This confrontation is the essence of the political process in the Republic of Tajikistan for the past quarter of a century. Contrary to the arrangement for peace, official Dushanbe systematically limited the possibilities of the IRP, accusing the structure of subversive activities and repressing its activists and leaders. At present, the legal political opposition (formed as a result of the civil war in Tajikistan), has ceased to exist de facto. The negative effect is the imbalance of ethno-territorial groups. IRP represented not only the organization of "political Islam", but also expressed the interests of "the Karategin zone".
Another dangerous consequence of the events can be a transition to the armed methods of struggle, and the outflow of an opposition-minded part of the Tajik society into the ranks of the international radical Islamic organizations. There is every reason to believe that the number of Tajik citizens who joined the terrorist organization of ISIS in 2013-2015, is significantly higher than official estimates. Most Tajik citizens were initially involved for Salafi. The graduates of religious schools in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Pakistan, receiving financial support from various public organizations of the Arab countries, acted as its emissaries. Dushanbe is concerned about not only cooperation between ISIS and followers of extremist organizations based in Tajikistan, but also the growing number of militants in neighboring Afghanistan, sworn allegiance to the "Islamic state".
Despite the complexity of the current operational situation, the special service of Tajikistan manages to avoid the resonance of terrorist attacks on its territory in recent years. Operational measures to combat extremist organizations are accompanied by attempts of the state to organize the religious life of the country,
where the rate of the spread of Islam is one of the highest in the whole of Central Asia.
In January 2016, President E. Rahmon gave instructions to Office of Public Prosecutor in cooperation with other government agencies to develop a National Strategy for the Republic of Tajikistan to combat extremism and terrorism for the period of 2016-2020. He called for increased legal responsibility for commitment of crimes against the constitutional order and security of the state, for the crimes of terrorism and extremist nature, treason.
Tajikistan participates in all the regional formats of international cooperation in countering terrorism - in the Regional Antiterrorist Structure of the SCO, the relevant committees of the CSTO and the CIS. The Russian Federation provides the basic external support for the republic on the military-technical line. The tenure of the 201st Russian military base (the successor to the 201-th division) in Tajikistan was extended until 2042 under the agreement of October 2012. The base is the largest compound of Russian armed forces abroad.
Weakly protected line of the state border in the direction of the Tajik remains a vulnerable point in the system of collective security. The Border Guard Service of the Republic is badly equipped and prepared. At the CSTO session in Sochi in September 2013 was made an important decision for the development of a long-term recovery program of border infrastructure of Tajikistan, which provides financial and technical assistance from the members of the organization and does not imply the return of the personnel of the Russian border guards.
In conclusion, the author emphasizes that the actions of Russia are aimed not only at strengthening the military capabilities of its ally, but to ensure its own safety. We are talking about the formation of the defense echelon rendered beyond Russian borders and designed to meet the enemy on the distant approaches. Moscow and the Tajik partners create a barrier from
the breakout of armed groups, the spread of hostile ideology, traffic in drugs and arms.
The author writes that today Tajikistan has ceased to be the weakest link on the southern borders of the former Soviet Union. Now the open spaces of the desert of Turkmenistan, which remains outside the CSTO, seem more vulnerable to possible intrusions of big bands from the territory of Afghanistan.
Selected strategic line of Russia to modernize the 201st RMB, and re-training of Tajik Armed Forces, the restoration of border infrastructure along the Tajik-Afghan border is optimal under the circumstances, and should be continued. It is important to avoid the growth of the number of Russian troops in Tajikistan in the future, at the same time increasing their mobility and ability to conduct remote hostilities in which the main burden of ground operations should be taken by the updated army and Border Service of Tajikistan.
The author of the abstract - N .Ginesina
2017.01.012. I. VOLKOV. A SYSTEM OF INTER-CONFESSIONAL RELATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN TURKMENISTAN AS A BASIS FOR THE INTER-CIVILIZED COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA // "Islamovedenie", Makhachkala, 2016, № 2, p. 5-15.
Keywords: Turkestan, the Islam, ethno-confessional relations, the Christianity, Judaism.
I. Volkov,
Ph. D. (Political), Academic Secretary, Society for Study of the National Intelligence Services History
In the article the problems of the inter-confessional relations in the pre-Islamic Turkestan are considered during the period of the religion supremacy of the Prophet and also when this
