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Igor Ivanov,
President of the Russian Council for International Affairs, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 1998-2004 WHAT KIND OF DIPLOMACY RUSSIA NEEDS IN THE 21st CENTURY
The past two decades in the development of the system of international relations was a period of great expectations and great disappointments, revolutionary shifts and desperate attempts to preserve the status quo, historic transformations and tragic mistakes. It is rather difficult to speak of this period also because of the fact that the process of fundamental restructuring of the world system, which began in the mid-1980s, still continues: apparently, we are in the middle of the prolonged historical cycle of changes. Many transformation tendencies are still ripening, and the result of their impact will only be seen in several decades.
However, it can safely be said today that the process of changes proved to be not only long, but also quite painful. This concerns not only those who lost in the Cold war, but also those who regard themselves to be the winner. This was largely due to the fact that the collapse of the old system took place very rapidly, almost instantaneously. Nobody had any "prepared variants," or any well-
thought-out strategy. Everybody had to "improvise," relying not so much on the experience of older colleagues or teachers, but on their own intuition and imagination. Sometimes this was successful, sometimes not. This is why it would not be just to assess the activities of political figures of the past two decades from the positions of today. Sometimes, they were simply unable to predict the consequences of their decisions.
Nevertheless, an objective and unbiased analysis of events, successes and errors is necessary, at least for being able to move ahead more confidently and avoid repetition of previous mistakes.
Trap for Winners
Today it seems quite evident that twenty years ago western countries, primarily the Unit6ed States, yielded to triumphant sentiments and became prisoners of illusions about "the end of history," "the unipolar world," and the universal character of liberal values. This prevented them from assessing the scope of the still unresolved tasks soberly, and gave rise to illusions that the stabilization of the international system would take place almost automatically, without strained efforts, great political and material investments, and without compromises with old enemies and new opponents. This cost them dearly: they not only had to face international crises and long-term foreign-policy problems, but also lost historic opportunities.
Speaking about the United States, that country had real chances to become the universally recognized leader of the world community at least twice, but missed them. The first time it was in 1989 - 1991 when the world communist system and the Soviet Union disintegrated. The prestige of the United States was very high at the time; the world public expected new ideas, strategic vision and long-term leadership in the rebuilding of the entire system of international relations. Instead of it
Washington demonstrated a desire to use the favorable situation to the maximum in order to gain immediate tactical advantages. The illusion of the unipolar world proved to be too tempting. The United States took the road of forcing its own interests on other countries, thus the opportune moment for global restructuring was missed.
Another historical chance appeared in 2001, when, after the terrorist acts in New York and Washington, a real opportunity emerged to create a broad coalition to fight international terrorism. Moreover, there was an opportunity to begin a serious discussion of the reform of world security as a whole, the fundamental problems of international, law, the restructuring of the UN bodies, etc. The level of sympathy for the United States and solidarity with the American people was very high at the time. However, Washington took the road of unilateral actions and quickly lost the credit of trust which could be used for making systemic changes in world politics. The result was blind alleys in regional conflicts, the inflated U.S. military budget with the subsequent budget deficits and accompanying economic problems, and also the explosion of anti-American sentiments all over the world. Tactical diplomatic victories were quickly replaced with strategic defeats.
From the Course of the 1990s to "Putin's Turn'
What about Russia? Looking back we have to admit that we too had illusions and made foreign-policy blunders. Perhaps, our main illusion in the 1990s was a romantic picture of the world after the Cold war. We thought at the time that a place for new Russia in the changed world system had already been reserved and that our partners would easily understand our present difficulties and help us resolve them and find answers to difficult questions. We hoped that somebody would do our job for us only because Russia had put an end to the Cold war
unilaterally and renounced a considerable portion of the Soviet heritage. But we considerably underestimated the harshness, even cruelty, of modern politics and exaggerated our partners' readiness for strategic vision and comprehensive solutions. Insight has come about much later and proved rather painful.
It has now become fashionable to criticize the Russian policy of the 1990s, interpreting it as a chain of unilateral concessions to the West, surrender of positions, unmotivated break-off of relations with traditional allies, and a sharp drop in the professional level of Russian diplomacy. Such criticism is unjust. Of course, there were drawbacks, even blunders, especially in the first half of the 1990s. But one should not forget the conditions in which our policy was evolved and implemented at the time.
Russian statehood was just taking shape, the material base of foreign policy practically did not exist, one political crisis followed another, and the country's economy was in a state close to collapse. In these conditions, the working out and implementation of a long-term foreign-policy strategy was well-nigh impossible. Sometimes our diplomats displayed wonders of inventiveness in tackling tactical problems. In the conditions of the catastrophic shortage of resources they minimized inevitable international losses which accompanied the fundamental internal transformation of Russia.
There is much talk in the West about "Putin's turn" in Russian foreign policy, opposing Putin's pragmatism to the romantic trends of the preceding period. However, it should be remembered that the first years of Putin's staying in power (the years between 2000 and 2003) were marked by the clear-cut "integrationist" course. It was at that time that resolute attempts were made to raise our relations with the European Union to a higher level. Russia agreed with the American military presence in Central Asia, the Russia - NATO Council was set
up for supporting the anti-Taliban operation in Afghanistan, and certain progress was achieved in the relations with the World Trade Organization.
Of course, Russian foreign policy ten years ago was also multiple-vector one. We were striving to develop relations with our eastern neighbors actively. Noticeable progress was achieved in the Chinese direction, our dialogue with India became more fruitful, and we began to look closer at resolving the sensitive territorial question with Japan. There could be no other way for such country as Russia: any "exclusive" geographical direction in policy was impossible for us because our interests were too varied and our involvement in the affairs of various regions of the world was too deep.
Yet, it would not be an exaggeration to say that in the first years of the 21st century the western direction was a priority. Moscow demonstrated time and again its readiness for serious political investments. I'd like to emphasize that Russia has not made a single step or undertaken any international initiative, which could be interpreted by our western partners as unfriendly or harming their legitimate interests.
And what did we get in reply to our striving for strategic partnership with the West? NATO continued to expand, despite Moscow's insistent objections and despite the obvious ambiguity of the strategy of its expansion from the military point if view. The United States has unilaterally withdrawn from the Soviet-American antimissile defense treaty, thus undermining the system of strategic balance which existed between Moscow and Washington over several decades. The beginning of the military operation of the United States and its allies in Iraq has put to doubt the principle of the supremacy of law in world politics. The West has made active attempts to penetrate politically the CIS territory and weaken the positions of Russia there.
Naturally, our western colleagues asserted, and continue to assert, that NATO expansion, the operation in Iraq, the U.S. withdrawal from the IBM treaty, and penetration in the post-Soviet area were not aimed against Russia and did not harm its "genuine" interests. One can argue about this contention, but the important thing is that Russian concern, irrespective of whether it was founded or not, has invariably been ignored. The West did not wish to hear us at all.
All this could not but cause deep disappointment. This was why "Putin's turn" clearly expressed in his well-known "Munich speech" was inevitable. Our western partners are largely responsible for it. The very logic of development at the beginning of the century has brought Russian political figures to the inauspicious conclusion that in this world of ours it is only force which is respected. Nobody guarantees Russia anything and therefore it should be tough and resolute in protecting its interests. The turn was based on understanding that Russia had passed the peak of its maximal weakness, that its resource base for active foreign policy was growing, and, consequently, Moscow could and should talk with the West in the language of an equal partner.
Judging by many things, such stand of Russia was unexpected by its western partners, who regarded this as a violation of the unwritten "rules of the game," which had never been agreed on formally. We were accused of all mortal sins possible - from intending to hammer together a worldwide coalition of anti-western regimes down to striving to recreate the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the West began to defer to Moscow's point of view, and Russian support was no longer taken for granted.
Perhaps, historians will continue to argue whether "Putin's turn" raised or decreased the effectiveness of our foreign policy. One could also argue whether it was fit for the obtaining situation or was too
strong and excessive. However, both supporters and critics of that "turn" would definitely agree on one thing, namely, that it is important now not to repeat the American mistakes of the recent past. This means that we should not feel euphoria caused by the growing possibilities of Russian foreign policy, should avoid temptations of one-sidedness, should not use harsh rhetoric, or place all hopes on our comparative advantages - be they in military force or energy resources.
American experience should also teach us that opportunism and leadership are incompatible. It is not possible to claim leadership in world politics and at the same time use opportunist approaches to concrete problems and situations. Opportunism is a weapon of the weak who would use every opportunity to gain marginal advantages to bolster up their positions. Only strong states are able to be the leaders, which can sacrifice transitory interests for the sake of solving strategic tasks, including those of a systemic character which go beyond the framework of the nearest and direct national interests. During the greater part of the past two decades Russia was sometimes forced to resort to opportunism due to the lack of proper resources. However, exceptions should not become rules.
Of course, the surrounding world is more cynical, selfish and harsh than we thought it to be twenty years ago, but such notions as "international law," "world public opinion," "political reputation," "balance of interests," etc. are not simply propaganda ruses disguising selfish interests of the leading powers. They are real and important parameters of modern life. A policy based exclusively on cold-blooded cynicism and national selfishness is far from the most effective instrument, as demonstrated by American experience.
New Measure of Force
During the past two decades the world has become more interdependent, so to say. The integration processes in the world economy, science, culture and in its social and political development have become more rapid. Not a single country, even the strongest and self-sufficient, is able to tackle all problems alone. Isolationism leads to an impasse, it dooms to stagnation, lagging behind and inevitable downfall. Effective inclusion in the global economic, political, technological, social and other processes requires the ability to use numerous instruments of foreign policy, and we should master them.
The fundamental problem of the next two decades is whether Russia will learn how to use instruments which are called soft power in political science. Realistically assessing the dynamics of world development, we have to admit that the possibilities of Russia to use the traditional instruments of foreign policy, such as military or economic might, will diminish. This is due not to the growing weakness of the country, but simply because many other players in world politics will increase their military-technical, economic and demographic potentials by accelerated rates. For the first time in several centuries the continental neighbors of Russia in Eurasia (primarily China and India) are more dynamic and successful than Russia. This means that the relative weakness of the material base of foreign policy will have to be compensated by the growth of its other, "non-material" aspects.
The possibilities of the economic development of Russia based on the use of its natural resources will gradually decrease. Hence, the task of radical diversification of its economic base comes to the fore -the development of scientific knowledge and introduction of innovative technologies, incentives to small businesses, etc. Without creating a new, "clever" economy we shall lose positions with every decade, every year, even if the world prices of energy and raw material
resources remain high. The economy of the future will not be based on raw materials. Similarly, the foreign policy of the future will not be based on a limited number of military or energy instruments.
Naturally, fuel and energy resources and military force will play their definite role in the future world. But we should realize that their significance in international relations will diminish as time goes by. It is exceptionally important for Russia to use the present, relatively favorable geopolitical situation for diversifying our instruments beyond the framework of military force and fuel and energy resources.
The states possessing greater resource base can afford to use "linear" and traditional foreign-policy strategies. Russia has no such possibilities, and will not have in the foreseeable future.
Within the next few years Russian foreign policy, just as our economy, should become "more clever," that is, it should not mainly be based on the military-technical and fuel-and-energy potential inherited from the past. It is not enough to preserve the international positions of Russia, all the more so, to strengthen them in the modern world.
I shall emphasize once again that transfer to a "clever" foreign policy does not confine to the improvement of the mechanism of adopting and implementing decisions. Apart from thorough preparation of our initiatives, better interdepartmental coordination of foreign policy, and inclusion of institutions of civil society in realization of foreign-policy projects, we should also use various models of stateprivate partnerships in foreign policy, etc.
Foreign-policy course and its essence should not only be confined to greater flexibility and greater operational efficiency of adopting decisions. In my view, we should radically renovate and enlarge the set of foreign-policy instruments, which Moscow is capable to use in international relations. Our political leadership should use the maximally broad set of instruments and possibilities possessed by our
country and our society, including, of course, non-material ones, which have often been ignored or underestimated by traditional diplomacy of the past.
So far we do not well understand and are not able to control the leading trends of the world politics of the 21st century, such as the broader use of new communication technologies, sharp increase of migration flows, globalization of education and science, unprecedented growth of the activity of public diplomacy, inevitable climatic changes, etc. So far these trends are viewed in Russia as a challenge to our security and our interests, and also as threats to be protected from by all means.
Psychologically, the desire of many political figures, officials and diplomats to isolate themselves from the new trends of world politics is quite understandable. These trends do not correspond to the traditional logic of political games, it is difficult to predict them and still more difficult to use; their consequences cannot be predicted either. But isolating ourselves from the new, we not only ignore problems, but also miss opportunities, which can be quite promising for the next few decades. And problems will not disappear, notwithstanding our attempts to ignore them.
Russia, just as any other country of the modern world, will not be able to isolate itself from the changes taking place around it. It is only active participation in globalization processes that will be able to ensure the implementation of our national interests. And a "clever" foreign policy can be the decisive trump card compensating for the relative shortage of material resources. The significance of "non-material" components will apparently be growing in the world processes and in human life in general.
To illustrate this I shall cite just one example from everyday life. The iPad and iPhone communication devices so popular in the world
now are assembled in China by Chinese companies. However, no people but specialists know the names of these assembly plants or those of their managers, but everybody knows the Californian Apple Company and its late head S. Jobbs. It's because it was S. Jobbs and the Apple that have invented and developed the concept of electronic communicators of the new generation and put forward the revolutionary idea which has changed the attitude to the Internet of tens of millions of people in the most diverse countries. And it is just that the Apple Company, but not the Chinese contractors that have come to first place in the world in the level of capitalization. The idea, but not a standard material resource proved to be the decisive economic advantage in competitive struggle. Similarly, it will be the idea, but not a material resource that will become the determining political advantage of a state in the globalized world.
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Russia's transfer to the level of a new, "clever" policy will open broad vistas for its international influence and integration prospects in the new world system taking shape now.
Take, for example, two global markets - the arms market and the market of educational services. The export of arms has always been an instrument of traditional diplomacy, and the export of educational services is a relatively new phenomenon. These two markets are comparable in size, although the latter is developing faster than the former. Russia is well represented at the arms market, but its position at the market of education is quite modest. It's only natural, because the export of arms is a business of state importance for Russia, and numerous ministries and departments work for it, multi-billion subsidies are granted and entire federal programs are evolved for the purpose. Meanwhile, the export of educational services is not a priority.
Political and financial resources of the state are not earmarked for it, real interdepartmental coordination is practically absent, and individual universities implement their institutionalized programs of export of education services frequently competing with one another.
This situation should not be acceptable from the point of view of a "clever" policy. The export of educational services will be a very effective instrument and it has greater prospects than the world market of arms. This means that more attention and more material means should be given to the promotion of Russian educational services in the world, which should be turned into one of the priority tasks.
Similar strategic approach is necessary to other key spheres of world politics - from the use of the Internet to regulation of international migration. Russia should launch a foreign-policy offensive at a maximally broad front.
A "clever" foreign policy is only beginning to take shape. It is now not an integral project, but a scattered set of innovative ideas, but they will transform the international system sooner or later.
At present Russia has at least one tactical advantage as compared with other leading players. We are now at the beginning of a new political cycle and this is why we can have the benefits of medium-term planning - for at least six years ahead. Most countries do not have such advantage - their current political cycles are shorter and closer to completion. Why shouldn't Russia try to become a leader in the forthcoming intellectual breakthrough?
"Rossiya v globalnoi politike", Moscow, 2011, No 6, November-December, pp. 17-27.
