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people seen in a dream by some Muslim figures, if they permitted themselves to use zakyat in a free and easy manner.
"Islamskaya ekonomicheskaya model i sovremennost", Moscow, 2010, pp. 289-305.
Khasan Dzutsev,
D.Sc. (Sociol.) (the North Ossetian CSS of ISPS of RAS)
WAHHABISM IN THE REPUBLICS OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS: REALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES
The dissemination of religious trend called wahhabism in the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) to a large extent is related to the crisis of Islam. As a rule, for this period civilization undermines the conservative foundations of any religion, including Islam, and of such ideological-political trend as wahhabism; their responsive self-protection acquires acute forms. It is possible to make prognoses that wahhabism will disseminate rapidly in the Muslim world just as a sign of the crisis in the way of life and custom but not in ideology. The crisis is clearly seen in the autochthon ethnoses of the republics in the NCFD, which are consolidated on the basis of the way of life. The problem consists in interconnection of religion with traditions, in the process, when religion becomes the sense of the given people, while the change of the way of life results in braking of the principles of religion itself and of its ideology.
In the countries characterized by dissemination of wahhabism the aim of wahhabism is the same - to connect the peoples in certain entity. The initial substance is not the territorial border but the ethnos and sub-ethnos with due account of the fact that ethnic membership does not
hinder the spread of wahhabism. Islam provides wide chances for it. One of its main pillars came from the Middle Ages: religion is above ethnic origin. Wahhabism sticks to this dogma more strictly than any other trend of Islam.
The economic crisis is one of the main factors, which promotes the inter-national and inter-confessional tension in the North Caucasus and creates favorable conditions for destabilization of political life and for dissemination of radical Islam. It is very urgent to study the extension and the main factors of dissemination of wahhabism, which is a mighty factor in daily life of a great part of the population in the North Caucasus. In January-February 2009, the sociological opinion poll of the population in the republics of the NCFD of the RF was arranged, and as a result of it there were discovered the social strata supporting wahhabism.
The following purposes were pursued in the course of the study: 1) definition of the main reasons of dissemination of wahhabism in the North Caucasus against the background of stirring up of the factor of "spiral of silence" (this theory of political science asserts that the person will be less inclined to express his meaning, if he feels that he is in minority or is afraid of punishment or disregard); 2) finding out of the attitude of the population to prohibition of wahhabism in the Russian Federation; 3) description of influence of religious trends on social behavior of people, on the social-cultural dynamics of society, with due account of the connection of religious beliefs of respondents with their nationality. The following national republics of the North Caucasus were subject to the study: Adygeya (RA), Dagestan (RD), Ingushetia (RI), Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR), Karachaevo-Cherkessia (KCR), North Ossetia-Alania (RSO-A) and the Chechen Republic (CR).
Wahhabism spreads mostly in the multinational republics of the North Caucasus of the NCFD with the ethnic autocratic system of governance. Most respondents think that this trend was disseminated mainly in the Chechen Republic, according to the opinion of the Russians and the Russian speaking people in KCR and RSO-A (72.6% and 71.3%, correspondingly), while Chechens do not think so. Dagestan occupies the second place in terms of dissemination of wahhabism. Unlike respondents in Chechnya, the respondents in Dagestan, irrespective of their nationality, think that the republic occupies the second place after CR in terms of dissemination of wahhabism. Ingushetia occupies the third place, and this opinion was expressed by the people in RSO-A (58.6% of Russians and 50.9% of Ossetians). Only the population in KBR comparing with the responses of other residents in the North Caucasus regard that wahhabism was widely spread in its republic (32.2% of Kabardins and Balkars, 29.4% of Russians and Russian speaking people). The biggest percent of those, who had difficulty or who refused to answer to the question, - in the population of Ingushetia (Ingushis - 49.1%, Russians and Russian speaking people - 61.1%), of Chechnya (Chechens - 44.3%, Russians and Russian speaking people - 37%), Karachais and Cherkessians (30.1%). According to the interviewers, the responses of the Russian and the Russian speaking population of the North Caucasian republics are characterized by greater information and openness.
The analysis of the responses did not reveal special changes depending on the gender, age, education and place of residence. In total, on the basis of the views expressed by the population it is possible to make the conclusion that wahhabism was widely disseminating in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia.
There are several reasons of dissemination of wahhabism in the North Caucasus against the background of stirring up of "spiral of
silence" factor, according to experts. The main of them is as follows: Islam is regarded as the most significant criterion of the post-Soviet space's reconstruction. The radicalization of Islam in the republics of the NCFD is a challenge to the authorities, which should not only correspond to Islamic norms but should be formed out of the elite sanctioned by the religious figures; it is the demand of reconstruction not only of social but also of the public-political order on "Islamic principles". In this context, fundamentalism is understood as an ideology justifying radical reconstruction on the basis of Islam.
Islam itself is not a destabilizing factor. Politicization and radicalization of Islam in political respect is an inevitable consequence of liberalization of the post-Soviet authoritarian regimes, the result of reproduction of traditional social connections in the situation of weakening of the imposed statehood and of political mechanics. The crisis of the Soviet and further of Russian statehood revealed the social-cultural foundations of the public order where their power status turned out to be more guaranteed.
Wahhabism on the territory, where Islam is the dominant confession, and in all republics of the NCFD possesses rather stable positions. There is also the following meaning: in the restless republics, such as Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria they justify by existence of wahhabism all miscalculations in the work of power structures, as well as by terrorist and separatist feelings. Some experts express hope that in the North Caucasus there are no more people (wahhabies), who profess this reactionary trend. At the same time, according to them, in mass media there is a trend to speak about one person as a wahhaby and Muslim. Maybe, they are perceived by society as the mutually connected notions. The other part of experts is sure that wahhabism as a trend does not exist in any republic of the North Caucasus, that the law
enforcement bodies justify their presence in some republics of the North Caucasus by getting additional financial means for the struggle against the so called wahhabism.
There are no direct adepts of Wahhab teaching in the North Caucasus, but there are people, who may be called Salafits (looking for cleanness). For the 1980s-1990s, Orthodoxy and Islam were marked by renaissance. The neophytes, the young generation of religious teaching wished to get rid of muftis regarding them connected with KGB of the USSR. The lack of educated muftis resulted in some cases in appearance of real Salafit sects, where observance of shariat norms achieved the absurd and contradicted the Criminal Code of the RF. The Muslims in the North Caucasus called wahhabies (salafits) actually are Islamic fundamentalists. But one should not regard wahhabism and terrorism to be equal. But in Russia these notions became synonyms: probably, it is more correct to use the term "fundamentalist Islam". Due to the closed structure of these communities there are no definite data about them. It is not excluded that the people professing fundamentalist Islam exist in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan.
The living conditions of about 70% of the population in the republics of the North Caucasus are characterized by absolute poverty, which is one of the main reasons of the phenomenon, such as wahhabism. It is possible to mention also the mass unemployment, the bitterness of the people, the property differentiation, the national and religious extremism promoted by the leaders, who are former graduates from spiritual educational institutions in Saudi Arabia (of wahhaby persuasion) and in other countries of the Middle East and in Egypt.
For the 1990s, in the North Caucasus there were destructed all public institutions, while nothing was created to replace them. As a result, the population was left to itself. The people are separated by national, property and religious reasons. Up to present, the marked
trend is the creation of mono-ethnic republics. The residents start to think that the Russian government fails to comprehend the situation in the North Caucasus and seems to be surprised by rapid dissemination of radical Islam, of wahhabism. According to an expert of Kabardino-Balkaria, the situation in the republic will be aggravated, since the intensive dissemination of wahhabism is going on. Nobody is disturbed that in all Muslim republics of the NCFD in crowded places of the capitals, of the district centers there has bred a lot of shops selling publications of wahhaby persuasion, Muslim cloths and attributes etc. It is significant that the sellers in these shops are men resembling wahhabies. One can not ignore the fact that the Russian financial means are used for construction of new cities resembling the cities of the Near East, which means that the ideology connected with genuine popular Islam, is being eradicated. But the local elite shut its eyes to it, since it is interested only in keeping its power and has to maneuver between the center and wahhabies. The wide dissemination of wahhabism in the North Caucasus to a large extent correlates closely with formation of political regimes in these republics. This type of power might be called the subsidy authoritarianism. Its main characteristics consist in the definite way of getting financial and political power. This connection may be traced in the following way: 1) the means of income - transfers and subsidies from the federal center; 2) the basis of power -distribution of these means; 3) the limits of power - ability to show loyalty repeatedly in exchange of protection.
The social foundation of radicalization of Islam is as follows: the social strata or the ethnic-national communities being deprived of the budgetary flows of means and possessing alternative sources of incomes. Regarding the ruling strata in the context of this problem, one may stress three main groups. First of all, it is possible to speak about the nomenclature-elite, which has formed its ideological and economic-
legal profile in the course of distribution of the budgetary means. The business-elite should be mentioned; it has been formed to a large extent from the nomenclature but keeps distance from it and has its own economic profile. The national business-elites in the North Caucasus are marked by the following ideology: the eclectic combination of contradictory paternalistic features (genesis of capital), nationalism (the republic as a tax springboard for the all-Russian beneficial operation) and liberalism (openness, transparency of borders and other features). This group presents an essential obstacle to radicalization of Islam.
A significant niche for radical Islam is the educated environment composed of the people, who are not economically adapted to the economic configuration built for themselves in Russia by the successful businessmen of the Diaspora from the North Caucasus. The elite represented by this strata, may get its internal power status only by use of radical Islamic rhetoric. The economic infrastructure for consolidation of this strata may be represented only by economic ties with Islamic, Arabic countries and by the educated cadres coming home from Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; the representatives of this strata turn out to be the natural rivals of the members of business elite, who are oriented to Russia, or of the members of nomenclature elite subsidized by Moscow. The alternative elite may find its place in political and spiritual life only in the definite social-economic context (reduction of the social dividends received by the North Caucasian societies from business and political "turn over" of the first two mentioned national elites). The great stratification and corruption represent the crisis of "national idea" and the ground of Islamization. The potential of such elites is directly connected with the number of the people educated in Turkey, Iran and in Arabic countries in terms of per capita calculation; this point of view is shared by the experts of Russian
and non-Russian nationality and by the indigenous population in the republics of the NCFD.
The citizens of the republics of the NCFD associate wahhabism with the Chechen war, and most of them say that wahhabism threatens the social-economic life in the area of their living. The greatest percent of neutral attention to wahhabism characterized the answers of respondents in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, while most citizens of Adygeya and Kabardino-Balkaria experienced difficulties in giving their responses.
The following view is expressed by some people: the preventive measures should be taken by the state. Should the preventive measures have taken place, we could have avoided many negative consequences and could have mastered to alleviate tension. It is necessary to provide greater cultural and language autonomy, a chance to speak the native language and to have its own publication particularly to rural settlements and to provincial cities, i.e. the communication is in need and not needed is the self-isolation, when contradictions are driven home deep down and the people lead the secluded life. It is necessary not only to reconcile the peoples but to create the conditions for their comfort living.
Wahhabism is not always conceived correctly. Some experts regard that its interpretation should be made very carefully. Society should be characterized mainly not by prohibitive measures but by a great explanatory work. The prohibitive measures should be taken only in the cases connected with extreme extremism and if the phenomenon irreversibly creates aggression and animosity to other religions. Other experts share the view that wahhabism is not the synonym of terrorism, that wahhabism is the state religion of Saudi Arabia, that Russian wahhabies have sullied themselves by participation in terrorist acts, having shaped a negative image of wahhabism.
The political prognosis should include the attitude of the population of the republics of the NCFD to shariat, which supposes existence of a complete identity between the way of life and the moral norms of Koran. From the historic-sociological point of view, shariat may be understood as a teaching on the Islamic way of life representing a complex of obligatory religious-legal directions and norms based on Koran and Sunna.
At present, the number of people, who wish to live in the shariat state, is not great, and only in two republics this problem is significant. Nationalism in the North Caucasus is concentrated on Islam, while the connection between nationalism and Islam has a more contradictory characteristic. The ideology of ethnic nationalism and Islam nourished each other in the situation of self-determination in relation to Russia as the definition of a non-Islamic state. Under conditions of self-dependence, there appears the tension between Islam and national ideology. One of the demonstrations of this contradiction is fragmentation of the network of Islamic institutions and the evident trend to their separation by ethnic reason. But just the crisis of national proto-states will endure the splash of Islamism as a consequence. The crisis of ethnic (shariat) statehood and of ethnic solidarities results in the increased need of Islam as a genuine resource of solidarity and political force. From these points of view, it is possible to explain the views of the population in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Ingushetia and partially in Chechnya.
Of a particularly destructive consequence for society became the attempt to use religion as an alternative to positive law, the application of conception of "command of shariat" on the territory of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia. The leaders of armed groups appealed to Islam in order to get political legitimacy and command, while the unarmed people had the naive faith in the omnipotence of shariat,
which was understood in a simplified way and which was able in a moment and radically to get rid of criminality and to solve acute social problems.
According to the results of the research, the great majority of citizens of the republics of the NCFD observe the main religious rites. Religion has an impact on various spheres of the social life of society. A part of adults of the population in the North Caucasus consider themselves as members of one or other religious organization, although only a small part of them regularly read Koran.
There is a certain model in the attitude to religion determined by age, gender, education and the place of living. Usually older people possess greater piety than young people. Women as a rule, more often than men are involved in activities of religious organizations and the rural residents more piously than city residents observe religious rites. As a whole, wealthy people more often than poor people visit religious temples and more openly express their religious feelings, use often a chance to demonstrate their attitude to religion in public: make payments for repair and construction of religious buildings and make precious presents to the religious organizations.
According to materials of the author's research, the significance of Islam and attendance of prayers in mosques rise rather greatly. The emergence of wahhabism relying on personal religiousness attracted many residents, who are afraid of negative processes going on in the region. As traditional social foundations were annihilated for the 1990s, the people started to look for explanation of the phenomena and to seek consolation in religion. The religious fundamentalism in the North Caucasus is the result of the social-economic instability in the region. The leaders of wahhabism call upon their followers to observe strictly the principles and faiths, to interpret literally the main terms "reformation" or "renovation", and they consider that the doctrines
emerging as a result of such reading should be applied to all spheres of social life and should come forward as an opposition against the attempts to carry out modernization in the North Caucasus.
"SotsIs: Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya ", Moscow, 2011, N 8, pp. 107-114.
K. Landa,
Scholar of Oriental Studies
DAGESTAN AND GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS
IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA
The republic of Dagestan after disintegration of the USSR became a border subject of the Russian Federation and is contiguous with five states: with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran - by sea, on the one side, and with Azerbaijan and Georgia - on land, on the other side. In connection with the geographic location Dagestan develops more extensive mutual action with Azerbaijan. At the present stage, Russia and Azerbaijan thanks to the adequate Caspian policy (first, by V. Putin and G. Aliyev and further by D. Medvedev and I. Aliyev) solved many contradictory problems and overcame disagreements both in political and economic spheres. It is possible to mention three stages in the post-Soviet relations between the states.
The first stage represents the relations with the leaders of the People Front and president A. Elchibey. At that time the contacts were marked by mutual suspicion, claims and reproaches (often very emotional but unjustified).
Moscow and Baku with difficulties learned to live in a new way. But a lot was worsened by subjective factors. The second stage was characterized by relations with G. Aliyev and the gradual rapprochement (the first agreements on the Caspian Sea, the first
