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according to the well-known principle "divide and rule". The other officials are convinced that it would be better to follow the example of Catherine II, who after some mutinies of Muslims united them and established in Orenburg the Muslim Department and in this way put the Muslim confession under state control and stopped dissemination of Islamism.
What position will prevail today? In the author's opinion, the key for overcoming the recurrences of Islamic fundamentalism, aggravated against a background of demographic augmentation of the number of Muslims and connected with the world financial crisis and social-economic problems, should be looked for not in the direct struggle against it as a certain materialized evil, but in the development of Russian economy and in amelioration of the level of living of the citizens. Only these actions, taken by the federal and the regional power, are able first "to preserve" and further, probably, to level completely the negative displays of Islamism on the territory of Muslims regions in Russia.
"Vestnik analitiki", M., 2010, N 3, p. 41-58.
Vladimir Semenov, candidate of political sciences TRENDS OF ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLES OF RUSSIA
The post-Soviet period was marked by the stage of ethnic feelings' growth of peoples in Russia and of their ethnic consciousness' development. The direction of these processes was shown by such evident indicator (to a large extent characteristic for other ethnic groups) as the change in mass consciousness of Turkic peoples, living
in Russia. The reconstruction itself was accepted by many representatives of Turkic ethnic groups as "national liberation", a chance to obtain state sovereignty. Under this slogan the national elites unleashed mass movement for raising the status of their national republics and entities, for solving problems with obligatory account of "national question".
The representatives of Turkic peoples, living in Russia, note that worried trends grow within their ethnic groups:
the reduction of the share of the people, who consider the language of their nation as their native language, great reduction of the sphere of the native language's use;
the poor chance for getting high special and higher education in the native language, great reduction of chances for national education in the native language;
the great reduction of the number of people, who acquire the values of national culture;
the reduction of the level of development of national cultures and the number of national fiction books;
the essential diminishing of the share of people, who know and observe national rites, habits and traditions;
the appearance within ethnoses of considerable number of people with national nihilistic consciousness and others.
Comparing these conclusions of ideologists of Turkic national elites with the processes going on in contemporary ethnic consciousness of Russians, it is possible to see that both Turkic and Slavonic peoples are involved in the process of ethnic disintegration. At the same time, the main reason of self-disintegration of nations is proclaimed to be not an internal but the external factor - "alien" nations are to blame: for Russians - "from the south" ("Caucasians", "Turks" and others) and "from the west" (Americans, Jews and others) ethic
groups; for Turkic peoples (particularly for ethnic elites) - often Russian themselves. It is characteristic that most non-Russian peoples do not possess the complex of "defeat delivered by the West" and do not regard "the West" as an enemy. They consider destruction of the Soviet Union as a defeat of Russia and Russians (being "over them") and as a chance to create a new life of their nation. If something fails in the construction of national state, the stereotype of mass consciousness works - "Russians are to blame".
Unlike Russians, many "small peoples" were keen on ethnic history, got interested in their cultural-historic heritage. There were created might ideological trends, called in the works of some western researchers as "mirasism" ("miras" - heritage). The new, "genuine" history of their own peoples often is presented as "the centuries of struggle for freedom" against the Russian state (by official ideologists) or against "the Russians as a whole" (by nationalists). Rafael Khakim, a contemporary Tatarian philosopher described it in the following characteristic way: "For more than four centuries of oppression, directed not simply to exploitation of the nation, but also to its assimilation and even physical annihilation, the Tatars stood up, survived and in full forces are ready to become an integral part of the world civilization". He puts the question: "What the Tatars wait to get from Russia, from Russia, which kept them in fear, was the source of humiliation and oppression of the nation? The Tatars do not need privileges. Freedom and equality of rights - that will do..." Do Russians understand such statement of a question? It is not likely. Many Russians are convinced that the Russian people "have led" from "the pre-historic abyss" many peoples, living in Russia, to "the civilized world", "gave" them their technical achievements, the well-being, language, culture and a lot of other things. The attempts "to review the history of peoples of Russia", to make "multinational" - the
education system, culture, mass media, the whole state apparatus, to change the status of the Russian language a the sole state language and to change many other things (initiated repeatedly, for instance, by Tatarian public organizations), which give rise to sustainable feelings of dislike and enmity of the Russians. For the post-Soviet time, the ethnic consolidation of Turkic (on the one side) and Slavonic peoples (on the other side) goes on according to these signs.
Most representatives of non-Russian peoples in Russia feel their ethnic consolidation to a much greater extent than the Russians themselves. The sociological surveys testify to it. The respondents-representatives of the title ethnic groups in the list of "factors of confidence" gave the answer - "the support of the family, relatives, friends" to the question: "What gives you the sense of confidence in the future?" The first place in the responses, given by Russians to the same question, was the answer - "the ability to earn" (Tatarstan) and "gives nothing" (Yakutia, Tuva), which shows their pessimism.
D. Gorovits, a known conflictologist, having studied in the beginning of the 1990s the Russian realities and basing on the international experience, made the prognosis on development of inter-groups conflicts in the republics, opposing the federal center, particularly, in Tatarstan for the period of 1993-1994. Actually, in the end of the 1980s - the beginning of the 1990s, the elite of Tatarstan in the sphere of ideology and politics was waging the struggle for a new status of the republic: initially, for the status of the union republic and further for a status, which resembles the status of Puerto-Rico, maintaining associated relations with the USA. The elite of Yakutia, having established its national organizations, arranged the ethnic mobilization in support of the idea of the right for a special access to the resources, for the priority in the cultural-information space. Tuva lacked this level of ideological pressing, like in the first two republics,
but its ideologists questioned legitimacy of entry of the republic in the USSR and the Russian Federation. In Bashkortostan the ideological mobilization was going on for the right of the status of the union republic and further - the republic with special rights.
The most numerous meetings (from 5 to 50 thousand participants) took place in Tatarstan, where extreme nationalists raised not only slogans against Russia but also against Russian people. Although the authorities reduced the extremists' activities and took into account the small number of them (not more than 2-3%), nevertheless 35% of Russians and 25% of Tatars in 1991 considered the relations as "very tense", while over half the of both groups "felt the tension". In 1994, the tension decreased and was felt by 8% of Tatars and 15% of Russians. However, Russians felt tense situation more often 1.52 times in Tatarstan, 2.5-3.5 times more often in Sakha (Yakutia) and Tuva than the indigenous peoples.
About 40% of Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan (in 1997) encountered negative examples in the inter-national relations. The share of Russians in this group of people exceeded 60%, and they saw negative examples in "designations for higher posts for the national reason"; 35% of Russians encountered contradictions "in daily life, trade, services"; 20% of Russians sensed "the absence or insufficient participation of Russians in official activities". The Tatars were mostly dissatisfied with "negative attitude to Tatars" and "oral enmity, expressed to them" (about 35%); and 30% of Tatars were dissatisfied with "disregard to habits, traditions and refusal to learn the language of Tatars; and 20% of Tatrs were dissatisfied with nomination to official posts for national reason and with contradictions in daily life, in the sphere of trade and services.
The perceptions on significance of preservation and rebirth of culture greatly divide the ethnic communities. The renaissance and
development of culture in the opinion of Tatars acquires the ethnic and political importance relating to restoration of dignity and equality. This value, occupying the third place, is followed by "consolidation of the republican self-dependence", which acquires political value. For Russians this political value is "representation of their interests" in the organ of power.
The openness in friendly and family relations for Tatars and Russians in Tatarstan is not less and even a bit more important than between Russians and Ossetians in the North Ossetia-Alania and is much more important than in Tuva between indigenous residents of Tuva and Russians. (Readiness for friendship expressed about 60% of Tatars and over 70% of Russians, and correspondingly they (60%) are ready to be neighbors. Thus, in Tatarstan as a leader of Turkic peoples, as a republic with greater rights, according to the treaty with the Center, given evident ethnic-political conflict with the Center, the psychological distance between the title nationality and the Russians was less than in other republics. Correspondingly, since the middle of the 1990s the inter-national relations were appraised as more favorable in Tatarstan.
The situation in poly-ethnic republics, given rising contradictions with the center, two opposite trends started to display: on the one side, the public dissatisfaction with the Center is being transferred to the local Russian population; on the other side, the official power of the republic and the elite, close to the official circles, aspire for uniting related ethnic communities to oppose the Center. The emerging republican authoritarian political regimes have great chances for development of ethnic-national relations in one or other direction. The viable ("treacherous" and "corrupted", according to the meaning of many Russians) position, marked by concessions, made by the federal government to the national elites for the 1990s (particularly in the
beginning - "take as much sovereignty, as you can!"), gave the chance to stop development of inter-ethnic conflicts according to the Karabakh or the Yugoslavian variant (except Chechnya, which became an example of probable destiny of our state in case of incorrect appraisal of ethnic factors) and to stabilize the relations among the peoples belonging to the Russian Federation. However, for how long the peoples and the national elites are ready to maintain the existing system of relations?
Certain significant attempts to change the balance were taken. In the end of the 1990s, the leaders of Tatarstan declared that the heed, taken by them, to introduce the Latin alphabet did exist and that they were ready to do it, clearly letting Moscow and the people in the republic understand what is the new target of Turkic peoples in Russia - it was Turkey and related with it entry in their "own" Islamic world. The Russians perceived this movement as a beginning of "the departure of the Tatars "from under" Moscow and out of Russia". It is significant that ideologists of the passage to the Latin alphabet ignore evident arguments about "the inevitable language split between Tatars of the other regions and Tatars of Tatarstan", about "the Tatarian literature of the XX century, based on the Cyrillic alphabet, falling into oblivion" etc. Their determination is based on certitude in the need of a new ethnicity of the Tatars in the XXI century - creation of the Pan-Turkic super-ethnos. As a result of the intended change in the contemporary consciousness of some part of Tatars for the period of reforms in the post-Soviet space, they started to consider themselves as a "northern outpost" of the Muslim world and Turkic civilization. The extreme ideologists of the national movement proclaim the need "no only to transform Tatarstan into a state, serving the interests of the whole Tatarian people, but also to create in Eurasia an ex-territorial national governance of the Tatarian nation in the name of the National
Assembly (Milli Majilis)". Some ideologists and organizations ("Tugan tel", "Azatlyk" and others) regard the restoration of the union of the Tatars and Bashkirs as a pivot of the supposed process of Turkic unification in the post-Russian space.
For the period of the 2000s, the Kremlin started to carry out a more rigid policy in relation to regions and in response to "the Tatarian maneuver" proclaimed "consolidation of power vertical" and further "obligation to use the Cyrillic alphabet in all regions". Time will show, in which way is it possible to consolidate "vertical" in a sovereign national republic and what will be the attitude to it on the part of the authorities and the population of this republic. Probably, the Kremlin will have again to recede and for a change of compromise to keep stability, being afraid of division of Russia in two by "Islamic arch" Turkey-Tatarstan. The decisive meaning, turning the scale, may be pronounced by the Russian people, who made a big concession in the end of the XX century. Will they make new concessions further (including the role of the state creating nation), will they agree to the role of "new poor people" in their own country or will the Russians formulate their new demands?
"The Eurasian Tatars" in order to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts propose to establish the Volga Basin Republic - Idel-Ural, where, like in Switzerland, the state creating nations will have completely the same rights. The processes, going on among the Tatars, from the point of view of western ethnology and political science, were studied by French political scientist Jean Rober Ravio, who formulated the main problem in the form of two questions: 1) do we see in Tatarstan "the nation, urged towards becoming a state", or "the state intended to be a nation"? 2) is it possible that Tatarstan will transform into a state without preliminary formation of a "nation" republic?
According to the meaning of the French political scientist, the ruling elite of Tatarstan has chosen the way of constructing "nation", based on the common character of economic and social interests. In response to this meaning, D.Iskhakov, a researcher of the Institute of History of Tatarstan advanced the thesis on existence in Tatarstan of two national communities - "Tatarian" ("ethnic" as the ethnic-cultural unity) and "Tatarstanian" ("political" as a territorial economic-social community), as well as concerning the further development of Tatarstan - the thesis on the need of "genuine" renaissance and development of ethnic culture, since ethnic Tatarian culture can not revive within "the narrow framework of Russian Orthodox Eurasia".
Just intensified propagation of ethnicity by representatives of some peoples in Russia, particularly of the Tatars and the Bashkirs, contributed to the known protests against the lack of item "nationality" (the notorious "fifth point") in new Russian passports. The value of ethnic origin in the consciousness of a number of peoples of Russia greatly surpasses the significance of civil identity.
At the same time, the processes of new ethnoses' emergence intensified within developing nationalities. For example, among Tatars there were marked the so-called "Bulgarists", including many enthusiasts, who got after judicial proceedings new passports with mentioned nationality - Bulgar. In Siberia there are people, who formed a movement, aspiring for proclaiming Tatars of Siberia as a self-dependent people and for creating their own republic. In Kazan the baptized Tatars declared their wish to be an independent people -Kryashens. Some Tatars in Astrakhan signed themselves to be Nogai. The representatives of the elite in Tatarstan consider these processes as "artificial", provoked by "certain forces" in Russia itself (implied "great power state").
The national movement in Chuvashia emerged in the beginning of the 1990s. Many activists-intellectuals, sharing nationalist feelings, concentrated their activities and substantiation of their political views and positions on the pivotal search of national idea as an ideological doctrine of the movement, regarding religion as an outcome of this search. Great discord became evident in the course of discussions on the role of people's faith for the period before Christian religion as a factor of ethnic consolidation and a basis of the rise of national self-consciousness. At the initial stage of ideological searches and specific actions of intellectuals, the sameness of popular religiousness before Christianity and of the perspectives of nation's development, construction of a sovereign state and its ideology was not questioned. The confessional and ethnic aspects of self-consciousness of the Chuvahis were interpreted as identical notions by analogy and simultaneously were opposed to similar and integral notions "Russian"-"Orthodox" in the national Russian patriotic doctrines. Christianity was associated with Russian, "colonial" religion; the danger of the complete assimilation by Tatars was seen in Islam. The only way out for the ethnic-national consolidation of Chuvashis became conversion to their traditional faith. As the main organizers proposed, Kiremet symbolically and actually should become the temple of the Chuvashi religion and the center of the spiritual development of the nation.
In search of the sense and substance of Chuvashi spirituality, of its present realities the Chuvashi scientists, publicists and students of local lore examined again their historic heritage, religion and myths, making them subject to thorough thinking in contrast to the old conceptions. The national old gods and heroes, former public outstanding figures, devoted not only to the people but also to the genuine Chuvashi faith, were restored in memory of the people.
Seeing in Chuvashis' religiousness to ethnic and moral principles of life, to the basis, forming the national character, psychology and stereotypes of thinking, the researchers once more turned to Kiremet, which in contemporary consciousness became the symbol of recalcitrance, love of freedom, rebelliousness and independence. For instance, quite characteristic in this respect is the review, written by Yu. Yakovlev, on activities of I.N. Yurkin, a known writer, ethnographer and activist of original Chuvashi nationalism, who publicly proclaimed the idea of creating the sovereign state, "magic and cult of Kiremet" is compared with "freedom-loving spirit of Chuvashi faith", "perception of life as an effort of will, close to thinking of Nietzsche", and is connected with formation of national character, "contrary to modesty and sense of proportion". As a symbol of Chuvashi world outlook Kiremet is identified to national philosophy -"Chuvashi idea" and principles of the people's life subjected to destruction for a long time and interpreted as a "death of God" in Chuvashi culture.
The expression - Chuvashi culture is often perceived as liberation of "living spirit of the nation" from artificial hindrances and its development in the forms of Chuvashi ancient religion and myths corresponding to the contemporary context. One more example of such approach is represented by deliberations of I. Dmitriyev, a modern theater critic and producer. For the period from 1992 to 1995, being the peak of activities of the Chuvashi National Congress (CNC), he was in the epicenter of discussions on the problems of restoration of people's religion, in the course of public polemics with the Orthodox Church. He insisted on the need to create the canons of religion on the basis of detailed study of popular rites. He determined the national religion and spirit as "Chuvashi work", which opposes "state work". "Preservation of nation" consists in spiritual development and extension of spiritual
impact on all spheres of life. His pessimistic prognosis for the future of the Chuvashi nation during recession in national movement in 1999 he connected with the people's lack of mastering the value of their religion, with the loss of spiritual unity - "loss of spirit for the Christian and Soviet period", with "faithlessness" to Chuvashi God Tore and with sinful life of the nation as the deserved punishment. I. Dmitriyev regards as incongruous the arrangement of reconstructed rites, introducing disharmony in people's life, and sees the chance to comprehend the sense of not dissipated spirituality in its correlation with contemporary realities.
Given aspiration of the Cuvashi thinking for substantiation of its unique and original feature due to its historic factors, this thinking, nevertheless, is being shaped on the analogy of Slavonic search for the nation's spirituality in Orthodox religion. The explanation may be found, particularly, in the fact that the first generation of the Chuvashi intellectuals was educated in the traditions of Christian enlightenment. Kiremet will hardly become the temple of Chuvashi national religion under conditions, when the Orthodox Church gains in strength and influence. At the same time, Kiremet rests as a significant symbol of national self-consciousness in contemporary people's world outlook in Chuvashia. Analogous to transfer of people's mentality in the new and widely dispersed Chuvashi word "chavashlakh" ("belonged to Chuvash"), the word "kiremet" concentrates and expresses the people's spirit in national literature and arts, raises interest to ancient times by the youth inclined to myths, promotes dissemination of information on religion and myths through the system of education and mass media. The symbol of the sacred wood has passed from pages of scientific and popular books to contemporary consciousness and from popular creative works - to the symbols of national Flag and State Emblem.
At present, the sacral space of symbols' action is much stronger than their physical meaning. In the perception of national ideologists the constancy of symbols consists in their contradiction: on the one side, as the signs, personifying tradition, permanency, the past and the unchained entities; on the other side, as the negation of the past -regime, social order and establishment of a new order, norms, ideology and national doctrine. The viability of symbols, adjustability and adaptability of different religious and ideological directions, such as Islam, Orthodoxy, atheism and new religious trends, prove not only universality but also ability react to the going on processes and changes of the social sphere - reciprocal action with other cultures and ethnic neighbors, crisis periods in life of the people.
It is necessary to mention that the peoples gradually lose ethnic identity, the chance within the framework of their ethnos adequately to feel and to understand the challenges of the present time. It refers first of all to the small peoples of the North. For the XX century, the ethnic consciousness of Tungus, Yakut, Evenk, Dolgan, Nenets and Nganasan was losing its integrity. Traditions and ethnic culture were disappearing. The loss of identity by peoples of the North was one of the main reasons of hard drinking diffusion. The average life-time of the peoples of the North was reduced to 34 years.
The representatives of Mordovian people speak about the loss of ethnic identity, about a chance in the near future of "dissolution" of Mordva among other peoples. The situation is significant: out of all peoples in the Volga Basin only Mordva is subjected to such intensive assimilation processes. The Mordovian people are scattered in 45 regions of Russia from the Kaliningrad region to the Sakhalin Island, and this factor greatly weakens the consolidation processes and intensifies destructive feelings concerning ethnic perspectives. It is more evident in feelings of Mordovian people, living outside Mordovia.
In many regions of the Volga Basin the Mordovian people, being the indigenous population in this region, make rather small ethnic groups: in Ulyanov region - 61.1 thousand people, in Nizhni Novgorod region - 36.7 thousand people, in Bashkortostan - 31.9 thousand people, in Tatarstan - 28.9 thousand people, in Saratov region -23.4 thousand people, in Chuvashia - 18.7 thousand people. The representatives of social-cultural organizations note that the Mordovian language is on the stage of disappearance. The number of people speaking the Mordovian language reduces annually. According to the population census of 1989, 30% of the Mordovian people considered Russian as their native language. A rather great part of the Mordovian people think that by means of Erzya and Mokshan languages it is impossible to reap the fruits of the world civilization and that sooner or later these languages will disappear.
The similar processes go on among Ukranians, living in Russia, Byelorussians, Germans and Jews. They strive for integrating within the nation, which, in their opinions, is mightier and is able efficiently to react to the changes of life and to ethnic challenges; therefore the representatives of these peoples either leave for the historic motherland or are assimilated with Russians.
The ethnic diversity on the territory of the North Caucasus is a long-standing feature of this region, and over hundred indigenous peoples, speaking 90 languages, live here and maintain reciprocal relations. The main groups are as follows: the Dagestani group (Avars, Aguls, Dargins, Laks, Lezgins, Rutuls, Tabasarans, Tskhurs - totally 30 ethnic groups), the Vainakh group (Chechens and Ingushis), the Turkic group (Azerbaijanis, Balkars, Karachais, Nogais, Tatars, Turks and Turkmen), the Abkhaz-Adygeya group (Abazins, Adygs, Kabardins, Cherkess), the Iranian group (Ossetians, Tats, mountainous Jews, Greeks, Koreans and Gipsy). For the post-Soviet time, the new
intentions of ethnic consciousness were displayed here most evidently, resulting in rapid intensification of inter-ethnic contradictions and direct conflicts. For a number of objective and subjective reasons, Chechnya remained and rests the territory of the greatest tension.
At present, the Chechens are at the stage of their historic development, characterized by a high vital energy leading to ethnic expansion. Quite often, in the course of confrontation with traditional values of other ethnic groups just Chechens initiate changes in the shaped ethnic structures and the means of mutual action. The dominant feature of a part of Chechens is the raised level of conflicting behavior and aggressive attitude to the external environment. Under these conditions, the inclination to conflicts, the forceful overcoming of hindrances in solving daily problems of ethnic self-assertion become insurmountable. Thus, Chechnya has become the focus of all anti-Russian feelings and movements in the North Caucasus, the peculiar center of ideological, organizational and economic support of separatist attempts, political aspirations for replacing the economic burden of the crisis on the Central leadership, on Russia and the Russian people as a whole.
At the present time, only Cossacks responded to "the challenge of the Caucasus" by active actions to raise their readiness for mobilization. Cossacks represent actually the sole movement based on the national reason in the Russian speaking subjects of the North Caucasus (Krasnodar krai, Stavropol krai and Rostov region), which aims at achievement of political targets. The idea of "renaissance of the Cossacks community" ceased to be an abstract of mass consciousness and transformed in a significant attempt to start the activities for a change of the ethnic-political situation in the North Caucasus and in Russia as a whole. Ideology of Cossacks community, combining ideas of national patriotism, Slavonic renaissance, community self-
governance, peculiar ethnic center feelings of Cossacks, is able to consolidate the Cossacks community, which proclaimed itself as a self-dependent ethnos (which differs from Russian ethnos). At the same time, the processes of internal division appeared among Cossacks: the division between "the Whites" and "the Reds", among the local and regional leaders of Cossacks, between Moscow and local leaders of Cossacks.
One should mention the reciprocal enmity among Cossacks and national movements in the North Caucasus. The Cossacks community shares negative attitude actually to all official political leaders and leaders of national movements, to the political aspirations of non-Russian peoples. The heterogeneity of political intentions of the Cossacks community may be explained by syncretism of their ethnic self-identification: on the one side, the Cossacks identify themselves with the Russian speaking population, and, on the other side, they are firmly convinced in their own ethnic specificity. However, in present circumstances, given ethnic passivity of the main part of the Russian population, the Cossacks community becomes more and more the All-Russian and All-Slavonic ethnic, cultural and political phenomenon.
The other direction of appearing dividing marks in mass consciousness of the peoples in the North Caucasus is connected with existence in the republics of bipolar ethnic structure. In the community with sustainable numerous ethnic interests, the rise of polarization of ethnic feelings and consciousness confronts hindrances, and it is difficult to reduce numerous interests to two opposing positions. The existence in the republic of two title nations creates chances for development of ethnic opposition, which resulted in military clashes in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. In Kabardino-Balkaria, where 49 nationalities live, the main problems, threatening unity of the republic, appear between Kabardins and Balkars. The conflicting tension is
determined by the struggle of the main ethnoses for political leadership. In the main, the analogous situation exists in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, although the opposition along the line Karachai-Cherkess is supplemented by intensified activities of Abazins and Cossacks. As a whole, the claims for formation of five separate states were made in the republic. The idea of "national sovereignty" became the central idea, reigned over the minds of the non-Russian peoples of the Caucasus (like among Turkic peoples in the Central Russia). The Chechen, Avars, Ingushis, Dargins, Kabardins and Karachai exert the greatest efforts to realize their ethnos as a "sovereign nation".
The steady acquisition the status of basic value by ethnicity results in urgent ethnic inequality for many peoples in Russia (gradually including Russians). As mentioned R. Dahrendorf, the ethnic inequality exists in any ethnic space, since the ethnic groups, exactly like all other social groups, form a particular hierarchy. The potential conflict is based in this circumstance.
The direction of a search for the limits of peoples' ethnic area is being consolidated in their mass consciousness. Thus, Russians remark that the ethnic space of Russians surpasses the borders of the political space of Russia, including the northern-eastern part of Estonia, the greater part of the Donetsk region of Ukraine, the northern territories of Kazakhstan and some districts of compact settlement of Russian people. For example, the ethnic space of Lezgins is divided in two between political spaces of the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijani Republic; the ethnic space of Ossetians is divided between territorial limits of Russia and Georgia. Exactly due to this fact it is impossible to make an assertion about absolute "superposition" of the political space on the ethnic space, which, in its turn, leads to the sense and the perception of the emerging situation as a challenge to the ethnos, to appearance of conflicts in the beginning at the level of ethnic
consciousness and further to their transfer to the sphere of ethnic-political relations.
The ethnic-central orientation results in appearance and incorporation into consciousness of some people (at the stage of emergence and development of the nation) of the idea proclaiming exclusiveness and the choice of the people. As a result, the following hierarchy of stereotypes is being constructed: the dominant dichotomy of mass consciousness of non-Russian peoples - "we - the people" differ from "them - Russians" - suddenly is supplemented by the feeling - "we - the peculiar people" differ from "them - ordinary peoples". The further taken actions to consolidate its exclusive sovereign status among other peoples lead to creation of the ethnic-political hierarchy.
In the post-Soviet space the similar direction of ethnic-political development leads to the rise of the status of the title nation's representative in the national-territorial entities against a background of diminishing of the status of the Russian people (and other peoples). Quite often, this outcome does not depend either on the number correlation between the title people and the Russian population in one or other subject of the Russian Federation, or even on the fact that Russians represent the title people of the state as a whole. Thus, the new ethnic stratification is being constructed, perceived particularly painful in the cases, when the greater in number "national majority" turns out to be at the lower steps of hierarchy for ethnic reason.
The peculiar feature of the beginning of the new millennium was the fact that the challenge addressed to Russians by Chechnya and Tatarstan was felt by representatives of dozens of peoples, preserving themselves as ethnoses. Many ethnic groups, unable to be ready to formulate their national ides, numerous ethnic groups turned out to accept a challenge: "Whom to support in the raised national
opposition?" Up till present, this issue is more often settled in favor of Russians: neither Chechnya, nor Tatarstan have become the consolidating pivot for emergence of the united Caucasian or Turkic super-ethnos. Given even the lack of a definite urge and actual actions towards preservation of All-Russian consolidation, the Russians probably due to traditions and the past inherent in ethnoses continue to keep in the poly-ethnic consciousness the status of the state creating nation and to a large extent to accumulate the rising ethnicity of other groups around themselves.
The confessional distinction of the population is another indication of aggravation of ethnic differences. Republics with traditional Islam are located in the compact way in the North Caucasus. The big Muslim Diaspora and the geographical nearness of Islamic states promote intensification of the political activities carried out by Turkey, Iran and Arabic countries. This factor leads to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the growth of feelings and ideas on the need of creating a united Islamic corridor. The growing influence of Islamic trends became the main threat to stability not only in Russia but also in the whole world. In contemporary society all fundamentalist and radical trends of the Sunni dogmas are called "wahhabism". However, the Caucasian adepts of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab express protests against this term relating to them. They prefer to name themselves "community of Muslims" (jama'at al-Muslimin), "Salafits" (salafuin) or "brothers" (it is the widely used form of communication in wahhaby communities in the Caucasus). At the same time, the Karachai name them "karasakal" ("black-bearded") because they do not shave the beards.
"Purification of local Islam" is the first step in consolidation of influence of the so-called "wahhabism" not only in the Caucasus but also in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, Mordovia and other
regions. In the opinion of wahhabies, "traditional Russian Islam" is far from being real Islam. The adepts of "pure Islam" regard "traditional Muslims" nearly pagans. And what is more, in the contemporary wahhaby literature there is a special term, which means "new ignorance" (on the analogy of "old ignorance", which existed before coming of Prophet). As applied to Tatarian Muslims, "new ignorance" is considered as follows: the formerly existed for 1114 years complex of ritual daily public worship; funeral ceremony; rites, connected with funeral pray (reading Koran, devoted to the deceased, arrangement of the ritual redemption of the deceased's sins - "deur", giving alms in the cemetery); celebration of Mavlid (birth day of Prophet Muhammad); sanctifying historic-religious memorials, graves of saints and sacred springs; all traditional prays. Wahhabies assert that all these rites were unknown in times of the Prophet and therefore are innovations, which are groundless and unacceptable for Muslims.
However, wahhabies express the greatest irreconcilability to local Sufism and related cult of saints. Wahhabies consider as an indication of the deepest and conceived delusion, polytheism ("shirk") and disbelief ("kufr") as follows: worship of sheikhs, zikra, visiting the graves of saint sheikhs ("ziarat") and many other aspects of the practice, adopted by local tarikats. Wahhabies proclaim as unfaithful all Muslims who do not share their point of view. Wahhabies achieved rather great successes not only in the Caucasus but also in Tatarstan and other regions exactly in the struggle against traditional rites and pushing them out of daily life of the population. At the same time, one should mention the fact that exactly ethnicity actively opposes dissemination of wahhabism in the Caucasus and in other regions of Russia. It is possible to consider it as a definite display and justification and of the theoretical conclusion, made by the author, on diversity of
ethnic and religious processes in mass consciousness, on the opposition between ethnicity and religion.
The military operation in Chechnya, presented by ideologists of separatism as a war of "Christian-Judaic Russia" against Muslims of the Caucasus, contributed to successful penetration of extremist elements into radical fundamentalist ideas. It should be said that the impact of wahhabism on the Caucasus is often overestimated: as wahhabies were regarded those, who actually were not adepts of wahhabism but only used in their aims the extremist interpretation of the wahhaby teaching.
The most dangerous aspect of wahhabism is its postulate on the armed struggle. According to wahhabies, jihad consists in the struggle against internal enemies, i.e. the co-religionists using Islam not "in a wahhaby way", and against the adherents of another faith - primarily against Christians and Israelites, as well as against the unfaithful and pagans not only in Russia but also in the whole world.
The contemporary wahhabies in the Russian Federation do not represent a certain uniform movement. At present, two main trends have shaped - radical and moderate. The radicals demand the immediate installment of Islamic rule in the North Caucasus and introduction of shariat norms in all Muslim districts. The moderate wing correctly points out that the people are not ready to adopt shariat norms, since most people, considering themselves as Muslims, are not aware of the foundations of their own denomination. They think that first it is necessary to enlighten a generation of Muslims, sincerely striving for living according to shariat norms, while the problem of establishment of Islamic governance should be solved in the future, since the attempts to introduce shariat lack any real basis.
Thus, two main intentions, leading to different directions, were installed in consciousness of Islamic population: ethnic - in the form of
"traditional Islam" and religious - in the form of "pure Islam". The diversity of these intentions' development results first in different self-identification and emergence of a conflict in consciousness of Muslims and further in tension caused by clashes of opposite actions, taken by dominant Islamic groups. The stress made on ethnicity leads to further stratification of Turkic and Caucasian peoples, to their aspiration for installment of numerous inter-ethic borders, to attempted separation of one from the other. The growth of religious influence promotes overcoming the inter-ethnic borders, uniting Turkic-Caucasian ethnic groups in a national-state super-ethnos. The way of "pure Islamic religiousness", liquidating inter-ethnic contradictions and urging towards maximum elimination of external borders, actually became the start of an offensive against territorial and historic positions of Slavonic-Orthodox and Western-Christian worlds, which raises a conflict at the global scale.
"Aktualnye voprosypoliticheskoi nauki", Saratov, 2010, p. 66-82.
L. Birchanskaya,
Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS
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